Sectarianism and the accounting profession: the case of Lebanon. by Al Mardini, Maisa
AL MARDINI, M. 2018. Sectarianism and the accounting profession: the case of Lebanon. Robert Gordon University 
[online], PhD thesis. Available from: https://openair.rgu.ac.uk 
Sectarianism and the accounting profession: the 
case of Lebanon. 
AL MARDINI, M. 
2018 
This document was downloaded from 
https://openair.rgu.ac.uk 
The author of this thesis retains the right to be identified as such on any occasion in which content from this 
thesis is referenced or re-used. The licence under which this thesis is distributed applies to the text and any 
original images only – re-use of any third-party content must still be cleared with the original copyright holder. 
  
 
Sectarianism and the Accounting Profession 
The case of Lebanon 
 
 
Maisa Al Mardini 
 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the  
requirements of the  
Robert Gordon University  
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
Aberdeen Business School 
The Robert Gordon University, Aberdeen 
United Kingdom 
 
March, 2018 
  
 ii 
 
 iii 
 
Abstract 
The research on the development of accounting profession has been mostly 
confined to Anglo-Saxon settings and specific historical. In recent years, 
some researchers examined the impact of colonization, imperialism, race, 
and gender on the accounting professionalization project. Most of these 
researches are conducted on Ex-British colonies, while few addressed Ex-
USA or Ex-French colonies. None has examined the impact of religion and 
religious sectarianism on the development of accounting profession, and 
none has investigated it in an Ex-French colony.  
As an Ex-Ottoman and Ex-French colony, Lebanon is a country that has 
been devastated by religious sectarianism since 1850s. Many civil wars 
between the various religious sects have occurred throughout Lebanon’s 
history. Yet, instead of abolishing sectarianism, the Lebanese society has 
adopted it, constitutionalized it, and integrated it in everyday life. Since 
accounting is a product of its environment, and based on the sectarian 
nature of the history of Lebanon, the research proposes three fundamental 
questions:  
• How did the accounting professionalization project emerge and 
evolve in Lebanon? 
• Did religion/sectarianism play a role in shaping the accounting 
professionalization project in Lebanon? If so, to what extent? 
• What is the current state of the accounting profession in 
Lebanon? 
To answer these questions, the research undertakes the Neo-Weberian 
view of the theory of closure to examine how the accounting occupation 
became a profession in Lebanon. This is accompanied by examining the 
Lebanese professionalization project and its current state under the lens of 
social dominance theory and groups in ethnic conflict theory. 
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The findings of the research reveals the struggle that extended over three 
decades to achieve closure of the accounting profession. Through 
interviews, archival research, and quantitative analysis, the research 
evidences the mirroring of the accounting profession to the Lebanese 
society through the integration and adoption of religious sectarianism 
practices in the profession, among other social notions such as gender and 
nepotism.  
Keywords: Accounting Profession, Religion, Sectarianism, Middle East, 
Lebanon.  
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
1. 1. Introduction 
The main trigger for this research was a news report (Rahmi, 2013) 
describing the degree of corruption within the Lebanese Association of 
Certified Public Accountants (LACPA) arising from the political influence of 
two major sectarian political parties in Lebanon. The news report, 
broadcast by the Lebanese MTV channel news, accused the two main 
Muslim Shia political parties of manipulating the 2012 LACPA election in 
favour of one of their sect’s followers. The report explained that the 
Lebanese accountancy profession law requires the LACPA president to be 
a practicing member. It alleged that the elected president, a Muslim Shia 
who held a government position as a director in the Ministry of Finance, 
secured his position because of the political power of his sect, even though 
he was a non-practicing member. Listing several illegal acts committed by 
the elected LACPA president, the report claimed that these acts had been 
supported by the president’s religious sect’s political leaders. Particularly 
scandalous was that the named president completed his term of two years 
in full, with no investigation either by LACPA or the government.  
How can an accounting association responsible for protecting the public’s 
interest be filled and ruled by corruption? How can the association perform 
its duties of ensuring the financial transparency of the Lebanese economy 
if it lacks integrity? If the association is corrupt, how will the public and the 
international community trust the opinions of its members? While these 
questions are important to answer, this research do not intend to answer 
them, but rather focuses on a more essential question that is raised by 
these questions: What was the reason for the accounting profession to be 
in such a position? 
The aim of this thesis is to provide an answer to that essential question. 
However, to understand the present, one must look at the past. 
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Accordingly, a careful examination will be made of the accounting 
profession’s history in Lebanon, since understanding this past will allow “a 
more orderly and systematic development of accounting techniques and 
ideas” (Carnegie and Napier, 1996, p. 11). Such investigation entails 
examining the trajectory taken by accounting as it moved from being an 
occupation into becoming a profession from the 1930s and then analysing 
the factors that affected the profession henceforward.  
1. 2. The context of the research  
To examine the development of the accounting profession in Lebanon, a 
thorough exploration of the notion of a ‘profession’ is required. While there 
is no unified definition of the term, researchers have considered the 
concept of a profession via the professionalization process: i.e., how social 
groups move from being an occupation to become a profession. The 
sociology of professions provides three differing approaches to performing 
such an enquiry: the functionalist approach, the interactionalist approach, 
and the critical approach (Willmott, 1986). The functionalist approach 
focuses on examining the traits attained by an occupation that enables it 
to become a profession, such as standard of education or licensing. The 
interactionalist approach emphasises the way occupational groups attempt 
to persuade the public of the legitimacy of their occupation as a profession. 
The critical approach seeks to understand how the occupational groups 
achieve a monopoly over the market for the services. A Marxist version of 
the critical approach focuses on the capitalist relations of production in the 
process of achieving a monopoly over services; a Neo-Weberian version of 
the critical approach concentrates on the concept of closure; i.e. how 
occupational groups achieve a monopoly over the profession through 
socially defined characteristics.  
The approaches to examining professionalization are in line with the 
approaches to the sociology of professions (Ritzer, 1975). The structural 
model considers the professionalization process as complete once the 
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occupation attains all the traits of a profession. The processual model 
focuses on the sequence by which the occupation attains these traits. The 
power model calls for an examination of the professionalization process in 
light of social actors and suggests that the occupation becomes a 
profession once it attains power and monopoly over work by convincing 
the state and the public of the legitimacy of this monopoly.  
Birkett and Evans (2005) provide a general framework for understanding 
professionalization that considers the conditions, dependencies, and 
strategies the occupational group must manage during the 
professionalization process. In order to attain a monopoly, the Birkett and 
Evans model suggests that the organizational groups must meet three 
conditions: professional power, association control, and a sustaining 
ideology. Once these conditions are met, the dependencies of work, 
market, and the state must be managed to maintain the group’s 
monopolistic position. The model provides several strategies that the 
occupational groups would implement to attain a monopoly, as well as 
further strategies for maintaining the monopoly. To attain professional 
power, the profession must have the ability to self-regulate its standards, 
unify all the members under the association’s name to gain a monopoly, 
and build a successful relationship with the state to preserve the 
profession’s autonomy. Association control is achieved by delineation of 
the area of expertise of the members, control of standards of education 
and experience, and definition of the members’ competence levels. A 
sustaining ideology requires the formulation of a code of ethics as a symbol 
of rigor and image-building to convince the public of the legitimacy of the 
profession.  
The examination of the professionalization process through the Birkett and 
Evans’ model must be accompanied by the examination of the social and 
economic contexts in which the process occurs. This is achieved by 
considering the closure strategies used by the occupational groups for 
creating entry barriers into the profession. While some entry barriers, such 
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as minimum levels of education, may seem logical, closure strategies can 
also be used to exclude groups based on social attributes such as race, 
colour, and gender. For example, women were excluded from the 
accounting profession in the United Kingdom in the early 1900s based on 
the belief of that society at the time of the inferiority of women compared 
to men (Lehman, 1992). African-Americans faced similar exclusionary 
practices in the United States of America throughout much of the twentieth 
century: accounting firms would not train black people, thus eliminating 
the possibility of an African-American to successfully complete the required 
training periods set by the professional body (Hammond and Streeter, 
1994). These exclusionary practices were set in place to reflect the views 
of the society regarding race, colour, and gender, and to signal to society 
that the profession is ‘superior’ since only ‘superior’ members of society 
could join.  
While exclusionary practices based on gender, race, and ethnicity have 
been prominently evidenced in the literature, the impact of religion and 
religious sectarianism on the accounting professionalization project has 
been less well explored. Two research projects have considered this topic, 
but without providing an in-depth analysis. Edwards and Walker (2008) 
find strong evidence of informal exclusionary closure based on religion 
within the early Canadian accounting community in the late nineteenth 
century when Anglicans, although the minority within the wider Canadian 
population, were the dominant group in the accounting profession. 
Similarly, Protestants in Ireland, the socially dominant group in nineteenth-
century Ireland despite constituting only 20% of the Irish population, 
dominated the Irish accounting profession (Annisette and O’Regan, 2007). 
Neither piece of research, however, provides the reasons for the 
disproportionate dominance of these two sects in the accounting profession 
when compared to the sects’ percentages in the Irish and Canadian 
populations. 
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A comprehensive analysis of the accounting professionalization process can 
only be achieved by examining the impact of the social contexts 
surrounding the process. A review of Lebanon’s history reveals that 
religious sectarianism has been the main driver in Lebanese society since 
the early 1800s (Weiss, 2009). While sectarianism has permeated all 
aspects of Lebanese society, the sectarian struggle over power has led to 
several civil wars and armed conflicts. The Lebanese national identity has 
been eradicated and replaced by an identity based on sectarian belonging, 
in which high trust levels are reserved for members of the same sect, and 
low trust levels are shown towards members of other sects. The religious 
sects within Lebanon act as cults, around which political parties are formed 
to protect their sects’ rights within Lebanese society (Horowitz, 1985). 
Such attitudes in Lebanese society raise a question: Did religion and/or 
religious sectarianism play a role in shaping the accounting 
professionalization project in Lebanon? This question constitutes the heart 
of this research, as explained further in the following section.   
In summary, the research aims to answer the following three fundamental 
questions:  
• How did the accounting professionalization project emerge and 
evolve in Lebanon? 
• Did religion/sectarianism play a role in shaping the accounting 
professionalization project in Lebanon? If so, to what extent? 
• What is the current state of the accounting profession in 
Lebanon? 
1. 3. The purpose and importance of the 
research 
The purpose of this research is to examine the development of the 
accounting profession in Lebanon, while considering the role played by 
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religious sectarianism in shaping and defining this profession. Most 
research on the development of the accounting profession has been 
confined to Anglo-Saxon settings in the period between 1850 and 1945 
(Matamoros and Gutierrez-Hidalgo, 2010). However, in recent years there 
has been an increasing trend to examine other geographical settlings in 
light of social constructs such as gender, race, and colour. As mentioned 
above, the research by Annisette and O’Regan (2007) and Edwards and 
Walker (2008) evidence the use of exclusion in the accounting profession 
based on religious sectarianism, yet they do not provide the reasons for 
such exclusion. This research adds to their work to explaining the use of 
religion and religious sectarianism as a barrier of entry to the profession, 
and then the use of sectarianism as a power tool to control the profession 
and the professional body.  
This research strives to create new knowledge by filling two major gaps in 
the literature: social construct and geographic location of the accounting 
professionalization project. It seeks to investigate the possible effect of 
religious sectarianism as a social construct on the development of the 
accounting professionalization project. The research also intends to 
address a geographic location in which the examination of the development 
of the accounting profession has been neglected: Lebanon, as a site of 
historical enquiry. Lastly, by using archival material and the narratives of 
interviewees, the research contributes to the creation of an archive of the 
accounting profession in Lebanon, an archive which was mostly lost due to 
the 15-year Lebanese civil war that began in 1975.  
In addition, the research proposes a new theoretical framework that 
triangulates the Neo-Weberian approach to professionalization; i.e. the 
closure theory; with the social dominance theory (STD) and the theory of 
ethnic conflict (TEC). The closure theory explains the path that is taken to 
transform an occupation to a profession and how some groups are excluded 
from this process, but is limited in explaining the aftermath. This is where 
STD and TEC come to place, where they attempt to explain how the 
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excluded groups from the profession would ‘flight’ to be included in the 
profession. The framework is established to examine the inception of 
accounting as an occupation during the 1930s until the legal recognition of 
accounting as a profession in 1994 using Birkett and Evans’ (2005) model, 
and then considers the potential role played by religious sectarianism on 
the profession by using SDT to assess whether there is a sectarian 
influence that would create a division within the profession and TEC to 
examine the reasons behind this division throughout the profession’s 
young life until 2015. SDT and TEC are introduced in Chapter Four after 
examining the history of Lebanon in order to reveal the mindset of the 
Lebanese society. 
1. 4. The scope of the research 
The purpose of this research is achieved by using a Neo-Weberian critical 
perspective on the sociology of the profession, namely the Birkett and 
Evans (2005) professionalization model. In addition, Social Dominance 
Theory and the Theory of Ethnic Conflict are adopted to understand 
Lebanese sectarian intergroup relations. Social Dominance Theory 
classifies society into dominant and subordinate groups based on social 
contexts, where the dominant group utilizes legitimizing myths to preserve 
its dominance. The Theory of Ethnic Conflict attributes divisions between 
groups to ethnic factors and suggests that such divisions result from 
economic competition between groups arising from the monopolistic 
position of one of the ethnic groups.  
The scope of this research is to fill two major gaps in accounting research: 
the geographic location of Lebanon and the social construct of religious 
sectarianism. To achieve this scope, the research uses a mixed 
methodology: qualitative data are gathered from semi-structured oral 
history interviews with selected LACPA members, and archival material is 
analysed. The interviewees were selected on the basis of their involvement 
with the accounting occupational group in Lebanon: eight of the 
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interviewees are former board members within LACPA, while one was the 
founding father of the association that preceded LACPA. The members 
belong to various religious sects, thereby ensuring data collection of 
differing opinions with a view to producing unbiased findings. The archival 
material used in this research was generously provided by one of the 
interviewees on a loan basis.  
The qualitative data are gathered from LACPA regarding all its members’ 
age, gender, status, date of joining LACPA, and data of leaving LACPA (if 
applicable) between 1995 and 2015. In addition, the 2015 Lebanese 
electoral lists, purchased from the Lebanese Ministry of Interior, were 
compared with the data provided from LACPA that records LACPA 
members’ religion, religious sect, and family ties. The lack of an official 
census in Lebanon makes the electoral lists the next best alternative for 
providing data on the wider Lebanese population who are over the age of 
18 and have not been convicted of a crime, both of which are also 
conditions set by law for membership of LACPA.   
1. 5. Organization of the research 
This thesis is organized in the following manner. Chapter Two presents a 
review of the literature. Section 2.2 reviews the literature relating to 
ideology and the sociological perspective of professions. It also introduces 
the three approaches to the examination of professions: the functionalist 
approach, the interactionalist approach, and the critical approach. Within 
the critical approach, the Marxist approach and the Neo-Weberian 
approaches are discussed and compared. Section 2.3 examines the 
application of these approaches within studies of the accounting 
profession. While Section 2.4 provides an overview of the 
professionalization process, Section 2.5 reviews the three models of 
examining the professionalization process, namely the structural model, 
the processual model, and the power model, in addition to the Birkett and 
Evans model. Section 2.6 provides an overview of professionalization 
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strategies and the application of these strategies by various occupational 
groups. Section 2.7 reviews the closure strategies used in the accounting 
professionalization projects in Scotland, England and Wales, and France. It 
also describes the exclusionary strategies utilized in several accounting 
professionalization projects to bar people based on gender, race, ethnicity, 
and colonization. Finally, it provides an overview of the research that has 
been conducted on the role of religion in the accounting professionalization 
project.   
Chapter Three discusses Lebanon and religious sectarianism. Section 3.2 
provides an overview of the landscape of Lebanon. Section 3.3 examines 
the shifts in sectarian power in Lebanon, and the reasons for them. Section 
3.4 describes the history of Lebanon before its independence in 1943. 
Section 3.5 investigates the history of Lebanon over three main periods 
after its independence: the period of state-building, 1943-1975; the civil 
war period of 1975-1990; and the post-civil war period of 1990-2015. 
Chapter Four presents the purpose, methodology, and importance of this 
research. Section 4.2 discusses the purpose of this research and highlights 
the gap in the literature. Section 4.3 introduces the theoretical framework 
of the research and presents Social Dominance Theory and the Theory of 
Ethnic Conflict, detailing their application to this research topic in general 
and to Lebanon in particular. Section 4.4 discusses methodology, 
presenting the qualitative and quantitative methods utilized in the 
research. Section 4.5 outlines the importance of the research.  
Chapter Five investigates the road to the accounting profession in Lebanon. 
Section 5.2 discusses accounting as an occupation from the 5th century up 
to 1920, focusing mainly on the era in which Lebanon was part of the 
Ottoman Empire. Section 5.3 describes the emergence of the accounting 
profession in Lebanon between 1920 and 1950. Section 5.4 explores the 
first attempts towards professionalization between 1950 and 1990, while 
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explaining the strategies used by the occupational group to achieve 
professionalization.   
Chapter Six provides a comprehensive examination of the accounting 
professionalization project between 1990 and 2015, using both archival 
material and qualitative data. Section 6.2 considers the final steps taken 
by the accounting occupational group in Lebanon to establish the 
professionalization law between 1990 and 1994. Section 6.3 provides 
insights on the reasons for the establishment of LACPA between 1990 and 
1994. Section 6.4 describes the LACPA membership, while explaining the 
entry barriers that were set in order to monopolize the profession by 
LACPA. Section 6.5 discusses the sectarianism within the accounting 
profession in Lebanon between 1995 and 2015, providing evidence of the 
sectarian effect on the LACPA presidency, board membership, 
membership, and accounting firms. Section 6.6 highlights some other 
factors that influenced the accounting profession, namely the structure of 
the Lebanese economy and corruption, the admission, age and exams for 
LACPA membership, the effect of competition, the relationship with 
government and universities, the incompetent LACPA governance, and 
gender inequality.  
Finally, Chapter Seven concludes the research, while also considering 
possible limitations of the research and providing suggestions for future 
research. 
1. 6. Conclusion 
This chapter has introduced the following research and the motivation for 
undertaking it. Although the issue of corruption within LACPA due to 
sectarian interference was made public, no investigation or corrective 
actions followed. The 2012 MTV news report provided the trigger for 
various important questions, leading to the aims of this research: to 
examine the development of the accounting profession in Lebanon, while 
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considering the role played by religious sectarianism in shaping and 
defining the accounting profession. To achieve this aim, an extensive 
literature review of the sociology of professions and professionalization 
process has been undertaken. Integrating the Birkett and Evans (2005) 
professionalization model with Social Dominance Theory and the Theory of 
Ethnic Conflict creates the optimum theoretical framework for investigating 
the research question via the use of a range of quantitative and qualitative 
data. By answering the research question, the research fills two gaps within 
the literature. Research on the accounting profession has not previously 
examined the geographic location of Lebanon, nor has it considered in 
depth the social context of religious sectarianism. In addition to filling these 
gaps, this research serves as an archival reference for lost material relating 
to the accounting profession in Lebanon.  
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Chapter 2. Literature Review 
2. 1. Introduction 
“What is a profession?”, “How does an occupation become a profession?”, 
and more importantly, “How do the occupational associations convince the 
state and the public that their occupation is a profession?” are questions 
that this chapter endeavours to answer. This chapter starts by exploring 
the definition of the term ‘profession’, then moves towards explaining the 
various approaches towards the sociology of professions. It presents the 
functionalist, interactionist and critical approaches, and describes the 
Marxist and Neo-Weberian critical approaches. This is followed by an 
examination of the utilisation of the sociology of profession approaches 
when investigating the accounting profession. 
Next, the professionalisation process is discussed, providing an overview 
of various theories on this process – the structural model, the processual 
model and the power model – and concludes by presenting the Birkett and 
Evans (2005) model.  
The chapter then reviews the professionalisation strategies implemented 
in the professionalisation project of accounting, and then describes the 
closure strategies used in various contexts to prevent the ineligibles from 
the profession. The chapter then exhibits the use of closure strategies as 
a measure to exclude individuals based on social constructs such as 
gender, race, and ethnicity.  
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2. 2. Professions 
2. 2. 1. The ideology of a profession 
Defining the word ‘profession’ is of a problematic nature. Poullaos (2009-
a) notes the lack of consensus amongst sociologists as to the exact 
meaning of a profession. Havnes and Smeby (2014, p. 919) provide a 
generalised look at the term, stating that it was “traditionally used to 
describe common characteristics of an exclusive number of occupational 
groups” such as medicine and law. Evetts (2003) argues that in today’s 
modern world, the term is used loosely to describe knowledge-based 
occupational groups. Abbott (1988, p. 8) describes professions as an 
“exclusive occupational group applying somewhat abstract knowledge to 
particular cases”, while Hughes (1958, p. 157) states that “a profession is 
an occupation which has attained a special standing among occupations”. 
Later, Hughes (1971, p. 340) states that “the term profession is a symbol 
for a desired conception of one’s work and hence, of one’s self”.  
Havnes and Smeby (2014) suggest that the lack of a distinct definition of 
professions is a result of the changing autonomy of professionals over time 
and across countries. Freidson (1988) attributes this lack of agreement on 
a definition to a number of reasons, including the descriptive and 
evaluative nature of the word ‘profession’. Becker (1962) provides a 
pessimistic view of the word by describing it as the word used by a self-
conscious occupational group to describe themselves for the purpose of 
persuading others of their importance. He continues by stating that the 
word profession is just a social symbol used by these groups for prestige 
and to distinguish themselves from those occupational groups that are not 
a profession.  
Freidson (1988) considers that this desire to be distinguished is another 
reason for the lack of definition. He states that “people frequently draw up 
definitions first by deciding that certain occupations are professions and 
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then by attempting to determine the characteristics these occupations 
have in common” (p. 4). He then explains that since there is a lack of 
consensus of what occupations to include or exclude, the definition of the 
word ‘profession’ varies depending on the focus of the definers. Armstrong 
(1985), on the other hand, states that professions could be defined by the 
traits they possess, namely ethics and performance standards.  
Richardson (1997) agrees with Freidson’s view, and, similar to Armstrong 
(1985), suggests that occupations are recognised as professions based on 
key dimensions due to the lack of a coherent definition. He identifies these 
key dimensions as intellectual underpinnings and the existence of specific 
features such as ethical codes (p. 635-636). He warns that over-theorising 
the notion of profession leads to idealistic characteristics held by particular 
occupational groups, thus limiting the ability of other occupational groups 
to become a profession. Similarly, Goldstein (1984, p. 125) adopts a 
Foucauldian view by stating that the sociological concept of a profession 
stresses the application of a body of knowledge to particular social needs. 
Montanga (1974, p. 59-60) describes ten attributes of a profession, and 
contends that professionalisation occurs when occupational groups engage 
in activities that increase these attributes, while engaging in activities that 
reduce these attributes will result in de-professionalisation. These 
attributes, aside from the most critical attribute of body of knowledge 
according to Montagna (1974), include a code of ethics, education, formal 
recognition, formal examination, personal traits, professional association, 
and a set of values, symbols, and unwritten rules. Similarly, Jones (2003) 
distinguishes the professions from other occupations by having six traits of 
body of knowledge, absence of market-based competition, autonomy or 
self-regulation, code of ethics, altruistic motives, and substantial regulated 
training.  
Knowledge is considered a “principle component of their [the professions’] 
distinctive occupational identity” (Halliday, 1987, p. 29), and is an agreed-
upon concept in the sociology of the profession (Macdonald, 1999). 
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However, such views of classifying the body of knowledge as the most 
crucial attribute were examined by Hines (1989), where she finds that it is 
not the existence of the body of knowledge that advances the 
professionalisation process but rather the claim of such knowledge, i.e. the 
appearance and image of an exclusive knowledge. She suggests that the 
body of knowledge is used as a strategic resource to gain a monopoly over 
the services rather than a technical resource in the professionalisation 
project.  
With no definition for a profession but the identification of the socially 
accomplished attributes of a profession, Freidson (1986) suggests 
examining the professionalisation process, i.e. “how they [the occupational 
groups] 'make' or 'accomplish' professions by their activities” (p. 36).  
Before venturing into the professionalisation process, the following section 
presents the perspectives of the sociology of the profession, thus providing 
a better understanding of how such a process is viewed from a sociological 
perception.  
2. 2. 2. The Sociological Perspectives of a Profession 
“What distinguishes profession?”, “What makes a profession different from 
an occupation?”, and “Are professions the same as occupations?” are 
questions that this section aims to answer by examining the sociological 
perspective of a profession. Monteiro (2015) suggests that the aspiration 
to distinguish between profession and occupation is the foundation that 
started the Anglo-Saxon sociology of the professions. Abbott (2001) 
defines the sociology of professions as “a branch of the sociology of work 
concerned with the analysis of expert occupation. It analyses their patterns 
of organisation, types of work, and social status” (p. 12166).  
There is no unified sociological approach in examining the history and 
transformation of occupations into professions (Abbott, 1988; Willmott, 
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1986). In fact, the sociology of the professions includes differing 
approaches that were developed through three distinct stages. These 
approaches are the functionalist, interactionist, and critical approaches.  
2.2.2.1. The functionalist approach 
Willmott (1986) states that in the functionalist approach, a profession is 
viewed as a cohesive community in which the profession’s members 
assume highly skilled tasks which are vital for society’s continuation. He 
notes that this approach emphasises the distinctive characteristics of the 
profession while considering them undisputed. This approach views these 
characteristics of the profession, such as prestige, reward, and protection 
from competing services, as fair exchange for the practitioner’s 
independence from others and possession of knowledge while providing 
their services (Barber, 1963). Such independence provides professionals 
with the ability to exert their opinions or perform their services without 
being influenced, pressured, or having conflicts of interests. This can, for 
example, be viewed in the case of medicine, where doctors gain prestige, 
wealth and power due to their body of knowledge. They are protected from 
competing services, such as nursing and alternative medicine, by the 
government, in exchange for performing and through the monopoly of their 
highly skilled services.  
According to Sciulli (2005) and Abbott (2001), Alexander Carr-Saunders 
and Paul Wilson (1933) were the first to approach the sociology of the 
profession with their work to identify the unique traits of a profession. Carr-
Saunders and Wilson (1933, p. 497), while examining professions in Britain 
during the interwar period, perceive professions to be the most important 
pillar in society as professions “engender modes of life, habits of thought 
and standards of judgement which render them centres of resistance to 
crude forces which threaten steady and peaceful evolution”. They consider 
professions to transcend the other social pillars of family and the church, 
among others, in the protection of society itself, while possessing traits 
   17 
 
that elevate them over occupations. Abbott (2001) argues that Carr-
Saunders and Wilson’s analysis of the profession could not be applied to 
the military and the clergy, which were considered professions by the 
British. He also points out that their analysis could not be extended to other 
parts of the world, including Europe, and suggests that the German and 
French identification of a profession differs greatly from the Anglo-Saxon 
denotation given by Carr-Saunders and Wilson. For example, Carr-
Saunders and Wilson view professionals as all of the experts of a profession 
while assuming that all of these professional enjoy independence. The 
French, according to Abbott, viewed professionals as “only experts in free 
individual practice” (p. 107), thus assuming that independence is only 
achieved through being in an individual practice as compared to being 
employed by the government, for example.  
Goode (1960) discusses the following ten sociological traits that an 
occupation obtains as it becomes more professionalised. He suggests that 
as the occupation moves towards becoming a profession, the occupational 
group will set its own standards for education and training, in which “the 
student professional goes through a more far-reaching adult socialisation 
experience than the learner in other occupations” (p. 903). He argues that 
while the profession gains legal recognition in the form of some type of a 
license, most of the legislation concerning the profession is shaped by its 
members, and that the “licensing and admission boards are manned by 
members of the profession” (p. 903). He also suggests that “members are 
more strongly identified and affiliated with the profession than are 
members of other occupations with theirs” and that “members do not care 
to leave it, and a higher proportion assert that if they had it to do over 
again, they would again choose that type of work” (p. 903). 
The concept of occupational group, which itself transforms into a 
professional body as the occupation becomes a profession, is integral for 
the profession. It is this group that advocates the right of the occupation 
to be the sole provider of the services. The occupation group is the one 
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that exhibits the possession of the body of knowledge, self-regulate the 
profession, and seeks legal recognition.  
Sciulli (2005, p. 916) explains that this approach assumes that professions 
are distinct both empirically and analytically from other middle-class 
occupations, such as teachers, and that their presence “supports ‘social 
order’ in substance and intrinsically advances an ‘integrative’ direction of 
social change”. He argues that the problem in these assumptions is that 
researchers utilising this approach assume a connection between 
professions and ‘social order’, thus failing to “to identify analytically the 
uniquely integrative consequences of professions’ presence in civil society” 
(p. 916) since such an approach focuses on middle-class occupations only. 
Macdonald (1999) argues that the functionalist approach, aside from being 
biased, is not a viable approach as it is “not really a proper sociological 
enterprise” (p. 3). 
This approach of functionalism towards the sociology of the professions 
was adopted until the late 1960s by prominent researchers and focused on 
the traits that would constitute a profession in both the Anglo-Saxon and 
Anglo-American settings. Etizioni (1969) classifies occupations into 
professions, semi-professions, and non-professions based on functional 
traits. He views non-professions as occupations lacking any of the traits 
associated with professions. He classified semi-professions, such as social 
workers, nurses, and teachers, as semi-professions, i.e. occupations that 
possess some, but not all, the traits of professions. Durkheim (2003) 
emphasises the importance of ethics and professional ethical conduct, 
while Parsons (1954) argues that professions are rationalist, functionally 
authoritarian, and universalist. Hickson and Thomas (1969) suggests a 
Guttman scale of professionalism that uses predefined traits in considering 
if an occupation is a profession or not. The more traits the occupation has, 
the more it would be considered a profession. Such traits include relevant 
work experience between exams and full professional status, disciplinary 
procedures or committees, length of training, a royal charter of 
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incorporation, membership fees, three examination stages, eight or more 
specialist committees and minimum entry requirements (Hickson and 
Thomas, 1969, p. 44).  
In general, the following table summarises the functionalist approach view 
of the profession’s traits, characteristics, and institutions/policies: 
Table 2-1: Traits, characteristics and institutions of a profession 
Traits of a 
profession 
Characteristics of a 
profession 
Institution and 
policies of a 
profession 
Professional 
knowledge 
Prestige Professional body 
Professional 
autonomy 
Reward Legal recognition 
Professional skills Protection Professional training 
Professional ethics, 
behaviour and 
attitude 
Independence 
Admission and 
membership 
Barriers to entry Universal Identity and loyalty 
Monopoly over 
services 
Authoritative 
Minimum required 
education 
2.2.2.2. The interactionist approach 
In parallel to the functionalist approach, there was a rise to the symbolic 
interactionist approach which, as Willmott (1986) explains, examines the 
professions as interest groups whose purpose is to persuade others of the 
“legitimacy of their claim to professional recognition” (p. 557), in contract 
of assuming the characteristics of the profession prescribed by the 
functionalist approach. While the professional body that organises the 
profession is considered a method to regulate the competence and conduct 
of its members in the functionalist approach, it is seen as an instrument 
for “defining and securing a respectable and valued social identity” in the 
interactionist approach (Willmott, 1986, p. 557). Hughes (1963), for 
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example, moves from a functionalist approach of attempting to classify 
occupations as professions to wanting to understand the circumstances in 
which occupation practitioners attempt to turn their occupation into a 
profession. Macdonald (1999, p. 4) suggests that the interactionalist 
approach was based on “a tradition which took as its subject matter the 
actions and interactions of individuals and groups, how they constituted 
their social worlds as participants and how they constructed their careers”. 
The traits are no longer undisputable, and are examined as real constructs 
rather than abstract standards. For example, the profession’s monopoly 
over the services is no longer viewed as for the greater good for society, 
but is scrutinised under a more realistic view, such as the professionals 
grasping for power and prestige.  
Using the interactionalist approach, Johnson (1972) suggests that 
professionalism is a means to control and organise an occupation, thus 
empowering its members over the profession’s consumers. Freidson 
(1988) argues that professions use their resources to preserve control over 
their market and more specifically “control over the determination and 
evaluation of the technical knowledge used in the work” (p. 185-186). 
Boreham (1983) debates that while such views may not lack validity, they 
lack an adequate level of theorising when it comes to the control of 
professional occupations in the capitalist mode of production, and that 
occupational authority is “largely determined by the nature of the work of 
the profession and its centrality to the global functions” (p. 696). He argues 
that control over a profession is not limited to the professionals and their 
professional body but is influenced by managerial attempts and 
government interference. He calls for a better understanding of power and 
control, which are discussed in depth in the critical approach. 
2.2.2.3. The critical approach 
Willmott (1986) explains that prior to the early 1970s, the functionalist and 
interactionist sociological approaches prevailed when examining 
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professions; however, with the emergence of the works of Weber (1947 
and 1978) and Marx (1958 and 1976), a more critical approach was 
undertaken in the sociology of the profession research to “illuminate the 
institutional politics of professionalisation” (p. 557). This critical approach 
declines the functionalists’ assumption that professions are distinguished 
from other occupations based on certain traits. Sciulli (2005, p. 917) states 
that in this critical approach “[the] professions are simply expert 
occupations that happen, by one strategic means or another, to establish 
and maintain particularly well-patrolled, yet structurally unnecessary, 
monopolies in the labour market for expert services”. He then explains that 
this approach assumes that professions do not contribute to social 
integration but rather to social control, and that the monopolistic control 
of the profession over the labour market creates socioeconomic inequities.  
Willmott (1986) explains that the critical approach to examining the 
sociology of professions views the profession as an approach to control 
using solidarity and closure, thus enabling the profession to regulate the 
supply of its profession members. Such an approach can be viewed as an 
in-depth extension of the interactionist approach, as it examines the 
interest groups that constitute the profession in light of social attributes 
(Mihret, et al., 2012). Monteiro (2015, p. 50) suggests that this approach 
views professions as “actors… that win the exclusivity of practicing and 
activity and jurisdiction over its segment of the market of services, 
monopolizing and closing it”.  
Willmott (1986) explains that researchers influenced by Weber’s critical 
approach focus on the closure mechanisms developed by the profession, 
henceforth referred to as Neo-Weberian. The sociological perspective to 
examining professions using Marx’s approach focuses on examining the 
social division of labour in relation to the position and contribution of 
different professional groups within the developing social structure of the 
capitalist mode of production” (Willmott, 1986, p. 558).  
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Larson (1977), for example, builds on Weber and Marx’s views when she 
considers that professionalisation1, i.e. the process by which an occupation 
becomes a profession, is an attempt to translate special knowledge and 
skills into social and economic rewards. She suggests that the scares 
resources of special knowledge and skills may lead to the monopoly of the 
market and status. While her work reveals more emphasis on the work of 
Weber, mainly his ideas on social stratification, she suggests that the social 
status and monopoly gained by professions and professionals are not a 
direct result of the professions’ knowledge and skills but are the outcome 
of the professionalisation. On the other hand, Johnson (1980) contrasts 
the works of Weber and Marx and then adopts a Marxist approach of the 
capitalist relations of production. He argues against the Weberian 
approach, stating that it uses unexplained concepts of market and social 
competition, and advocates the Marxist approach that, according to 
Johnson, better explains the interrelation between the professions and 
state. The following sections discuss these two approaches in brief and 
their implementation in examining the sociology of the professions.  
2.2.2.3.1 The Marxist Approach 
The Marxist approach to the sociology of the profession focuses on the 
capitalist relations of production (Saks, 1983) – more specifically 
professions in relation to the state and the proletarianisation (moving from 
being an employer/self-employed to becoming employed) of the 
professions (Macdonald, 1999). This capitalist mode of production results 
in processes of work (Macdonald, 1999) and social division of labour 
(Willmott, 1986), thus leading to a ‘ranking’ of professions (Poulantzas, 
1975). Saks (2010. P. 890) argues that professions, under this approach, 
                                       
 
1 The concept of professionalisation is discussed in depth in sections 2.4 and 2.5. 
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“were situated on either side of the divide between capital and labour”, 
where top-ranking professions and professional managers are viewed as 
“agents of surveillance and control for the bourgeoisie rather than 
members of the proletariat”. For example, medical professionals were 
viewed as part of the capitalist class. This is explained by Willmott (1986), 
who claims that the Marxist approach assesses the success of the 
profession in relation to the position of the professional groups in the social 
structure of the capitalist mode of production. Saks (1983) argues that 
despite the focus on the state and proletarianisation, Marxist authors 
consider the connection of professions with a wider social structure. 
The view of the states as the most important actor in relation to professions 
can be seen in the works of Fielding and Portwood (1980) when they 
examine two bureaucratic professions - college lecturers and ophthalmic 
opticians - in Britain, but acknowledge that such a view cannot be applied 
to all professions as the state's heteronomy is progressively reduced in 
non-bureaucratic professions. The role of the state in the profession is also 
adopted by Cocks and Jarauch (1990), who examine the German 
professions and determined that the state is the most dominating actor in 
the professionalisation process. Similarly, Crawford et al. (2014) review 
several countries and find evidence of state control over professions.  
2.2.2.3.2 The Neo-Weberian Approach 
The concept of closure, developed by Max Weber in his Economy and 
Society (1978), attributes the “process by which given social collectivities 
seek to regulate market conditions in their favour… by restricting access to 
specific opportunities to a limited group of eligible” (Saks, 1983, p. 5-6).  
According to Brante (1988), Weber views power as the driving force in 
society, where such power is used by social groups and individuals to 
advance their own interests, even if such advancements are at the expense 
of others. He explains that in order to attain and maintain this power, social 
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groups use the closure mechanism to exclude other groups while 
monopolising opportunities, maximising their own rewards and furthering 
their own interests. He states that attributes such as “nobility… social 
origin, sex, race, caste, religion, income, and knowledge are other 
attributes that have been employed to justify social inequality” (p. 127) 
and that social groups, which share certain attributes, use these attributes 
to exclude other social groups, simply because the ‘others’ do not possess 
these attributes.  
Macdonald (1999) suggests that these social collectivities can be groups of 
common interest, common religious belief, or common race, among other 
common attributes. Likewise, Murphy (1984) states that “any convenient 
and visible characteristics, such as race, language, social origin, religion, 
or lack of particular school diplomas, can be used to declare competitors 
as outsiders” (p. 548). Macdonald (1999) argues that these groups unite 
to either pursue their common interest or defend their position against 
others, thus creating a monopoly over the profession. Weber (1978, p. 
342) explains how these groups practice the concept of closure: 
“In spite of their continued competition against another, the 
jointly acting competitors now form an interest group towards 
outsiders; there is a growing tendency to set up some kind of 
association with rational regulations; if the monopolistic 
interests persist, the time comes when the competitors… 
establish a legal order that limits competition through formal 
monopolies; from then, certain persons are available as 
organs to protect the monopolistic practices, if need be, with 
force. In such a case, the interest group has developed into a 
legally privileged group… and the participants have become 
privileged members.” 
Murphy (1984) and Parkin (1979) provide two generic forms of the concept 
of closure: usurpation, in which a subordinate group’s position is improved 
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at the expense of a dominant group, and exclusion, in which a dominant 
group exercises power downwards towards a subordinate group. In both 
cases, the dominant and subordinate groups are usually socially defined. 
Macdonald (1999) argue that exclusion is the reason for usurpation. This 
can be seen in the case of Kenya, where Sian (2006, 2007, and 2011) 
evidences the exclusion of African Kenyans from the accounting profession, 
while the dominant group, the British expatriate accountants, enjoyed the 
privileges of the profession. Once Kenya’s independence was achieved in 
1963, the subordinate group, i.e. the Kenyan African accountants, were 
able to improve their position with the help of the government’s initiation 
of affirmative action and social reforms.  
Parkin (1979) argues that professionalisation follows exclusionary closure 
as it limits and controls the supply of the occupation’s practitioners in order 
to safeguard the profession’s market share and value. He explains that 
‘professions’ exclude others by attaining a legal monopoly over the market 
by seeking state licensing, and that by restricting access to the profession 
to a limited group of eligibles, the profession can then elevate the social 
status, power and income of its members. 
Similarly, Parry and Parry (1976) view professionalisation as a strategy by 
which occupations control the market and attain monopoly by creating self-
governing associations, creating entry barriers, and securing legal 
recognition. In their examination of the medical profession in Britain, they 
argue the importance of analysing class structure when examining 
professions, as a closure strategy aims to achieve upwards social mobility. 
They suggest that the strategies implemented by the occupational 
associations to attain closure are highly related to class formation in 
society, and even play a significant role in the formation and development 
of these classes within capitalist societies.  
Saks (1983) advocates that researchers use the neo-Weberian approach 
to examine empirically the socio-political conditions under which 
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occupations become professions. Freidson (1988) views the 
professionalisation process as “essentially political and social… in 
character” (p. 79), and calls for the inspection of these factors when 
examining professions. His call was evident in Crankshaw’s (2002) 
examination of exclusion on the basis of race and class within professions 
in South Africa. A further discussion of exclusion based on social constructs 
is found in section 2.7. 
The neo-Weberian concept of social closure has been used widely when 
examining professions and professionalism, such as Evetts (2013, 2010, 
2003), Muzio and Tomlinson (2012), Saks (2012), Crankshaw (2002), 
Collins (1979), and Larson (1977). The attainment of closure with the 
support of the state is evident within the medicine (Berlant, 1975) and law 
(Burrage, 2006) professions in the United Kingdom and the United States.  
Murphy (1984) critiques the views of Neo-Weberians on social closure, 
stating that they did not provide coherent structural relationships of the 
rules and codes of closure, and therefore “have not provided the key for 
understanding the deep structure of dominations in society” (p. 555). To 
overcome this limitation, he provides a framework that distinguishes 
between the principal, derivative and contingent forms of exclusion in 
society. According to Murphy, in the principal form of exclusion, the 
exclusion rules are supported by a legal frame, mainly recognition from the 
state. The derivate form of exclusion includes the rules for creating the 
monopoly, such as credential requirements and “mechanisms that tend to 
exclude racial, ethnic, religious, or sexual groups” (Murphy, 1984, p. 556). 
He suggests that these sets of rules can be formally written or agreed 
upon. Murphy (p. 558) then calls attention to the analysis of the nature of 
the overall structure of exclusion, thus distinguishing between three types 
of exclusionary structures. The first is the tandem structure of exclusion, 
in which derivative and contingent rules are a result of the one main 
principal form of exclusion. In the dual structure of exclusion, two principal 
forms of exclusion, usually relatively complementary, exist from which 
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derivative and contingent rules stem. The third form, which is the polar 
structure of exclusion, is similar to the dual structure in having two 
principal structure of exclusion, but differs as it has opposed sets of 
exclusion rules (see Figure 2-1).  
Figure 2-1: Rule of closure by structures and forms of closure (Murphy, 1984, 
p.561) 
 
In contrast to exclusionary closure, the concept of closure by usurpation 
has been discussed by Murphy (1984), who presents two forms of 
usurpation. He identifies the first as inclusionary usurpation, which is the 
struggle by an excluded group for equality of opportunity, hence shifting 
exclusion from collectivist criteria to individualist ones. According to 
Murphy, this form of usurpation is evident in civil rights movements, 
leading to the inclusion of blacks as equal citizens to the whites in the USA. 
The second form, which is revolutionary usurpation, exists when the 
excluded group “makes a direct attempt to change the structure of [their] 
position in society and in some cases to change the structure of nation 
states” (Murphy, 1984, p. 560). Murphy suggests that independence 
movements and anti-colonial movements are examples of revolutionary 
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usurpation. He proposes that excluded groups will resort to one of these 
forms of usurpation depending on the usurpationary group’s tendencies, 
which may create a struggle between these groups themselves on the type 
of usurpation used in reacting to the exclusion enforced. Murphy’s 
explanation of closure is unique in the sense that it can be applied to both 
capitalist and socialist countries.  
2. 2. 3. Conclusion 
Willmott (1986) suggests that each of these different sociological 
perspectives provides a contribution to the understanding of the concept 
of profession. Willmott (1986) and later Yapa (1999) use a mix of these 
three perspectives when examining the accounting profession in the United 
Kingdom and Brunei Darussalam respectively. Edwards and Walker (2008, 
p. 374) note that these different perspectives intersect in major areas, 
namely “occupational trajectory, closure and conflict”. However, Walker 
(2004) explains that the research on the accounting profession has moved 
in recent years towards the critical perspective approach, and is no longer 
confined in the functionalist approach. He states that “it is now accepted 
that there are manifold paths to professional status and considerable 
historical variation in occupational projects” (Walker, 2004, p. 128).  
Saks (2016, 2010) advocates the implementation of the neo-Weberian 
critical approach to examining the sociology of the profession, stating that 
it establishes a coherent paradigm compared to the other main 
approaches, and claims that “the neo-Weberian approach is the most 
incisive and empirically fruitful approach to professions in analysing such 
occupations in the advanced societies” (Saks, 2010, p. 888). He argues 
that compared to the neo-Weberian, the trait-focused functionalist 
approach doesn’t consider the socio-political historical dynamics in the 
professionalisation and post-professionalisation process but mainly 
describes the significance of self-interest and occupational power. He 
considers that the micro-oriented approach of the interactionalists ignores 
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the centre of powers and historical processes that surrounds the immediate 
workplace, where power centres might be national or international. He 
argues against the Marxist approach to the professions, which views the 
state as “invariably operating in the long-term interests of capital” (2010, 
p. 890), and calls for the use of the neo-Weberian approach as it “enables 
the nature and role of professions to be examined empirically in a fairly 
open manner” (p. 891), without subscribing to assumptions of the other 
approaches.  
Hence, the research in this thesis adopts the neo-Weberian approach when 
it examines the accounting profession in Lebanon. Such an approach will 
provide a more realistic view of the profession, how it emerged, and how 
it evolved. This is achieved by not focusing on the Lebanese accounting 
profession’s traits that are comparable to the accounting profession in 
other countries, but by looking at the unique social and political 
surroundings that shaped its inception and development. Utilizing the Neo-
Weberian approach will aid in identifying the powers that influenced the 
profession, not just from a capitalist point of view, but rather from a 
societal point of view.  
2. 3. The sociology of the professions and 
accounting history 
As the research aims to examine how the accounting profession has 
evolved in Lebanon, i.e. the profession’s history, it provides an examination 
of the research conducted in the field of accounting history. This section 
provides the sociological perspectives of profession used in examining the 
development of the accounting profession, mainly under the umbrella of 
the general concept of accounting history.  
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Similar to the rise of the critical approach of the sociology of the 
professions, the research on accounting history has shifted from a 
functionalist approach to a critical approach.  
Johnson (1986, p. 68) follows the functionalist perspective by identifying 
accounting history research as being an examination of accounting in a 
“mechanical, procedural and technical” manner. Hoskin and Macve (1986) 
advocate a Foucauldian approach and suggest that accounting is not static 
as it affects and is affected by other disciplines. They assert that in order 
to understand the development of accounting through history, one must 
also examine its surroundings. Miller and O’Leary (1987) use the critical 
approach when arguing that the development of accounting cannot be 
merely interpreted by itself alone but that it must be examined in the 
contexts that influenced its advancement. Similarly, Hopwood (1987) 
states that the examination of accounting history must be accompanied 
with probing economic and social contexts. Following the critical 
perspective, Miller et al. (1991, p. 396) argue that accounting history is 
not just the “natural evolution of administrative technologies”, but rather 
“a complex that has itself been formed out of diverse materials and in 
relation to a heterogeneous range of issues and events”.  
Napier (2001, 2009) presents two categories of accounting histories: the 
traditional accounting history and the new accounting history, with the 
later reaching towards the utilisation of social theory. The ‘new’ accounting 
history challenges the notion of progress – a notion that is considered 
undisputed in the ‘old’ histories. Napier (2009-a) then proposes alternative 
categories or approaches for accounting history. He names the first as the 
history of accounting, which focuses on accounting as procedures and 
practices. He identifies the second approach as the socio-historical 
accounting research where research examines the impact of accounting on 
individuals, organisations, and society. This critical perspective approach 
in the new accounting history have been utilised by many researchers such 
as Walker (2004), Sian (2006), Uche (2002) and Abbott (1988) when they 
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examine the social contexts that have affected the development of the 
accounting profession in several countries. Their work will be discussed in 
more depth later in this chapter.   
The main trend in the studies on the accounting profession after the 1970s 
is the utilisation of the critical perspective approach of the sociology of the 
professions – mainly Weber’s concept of closure in which the occupational 
groups ‘closes’ the profession via legislation to ensure their monopolistic 
power over the profession’s services in their niche markets (Mihret et al., 
2012). The Weberian approach views the accounting profession “as a 
status group within the division of labour” while the Marxist approach 
examines the profession “in terms of class structure and the relations of 
production” (Caramanis, 2005, p. 196). Both approaches have provided 
significant insights into the accounting profession and its position within 
the society and economy. For example, Walker (1991) utilises the 
Weberian approach when he examines the methods by which the Scottish 
Chartered Accountants achieved a monopoly over practice between 1854 
and 1880 by examining the broader economic and political conditions at 
that time. He argues that the closure mechanism suggested by Weber 
aided in understanding “the adoption, exclusive usage and subsequent 
legal protection of the professional title” (p. 261). Chua and Pouliaos 
(1998) defend the use of the Weberian approach of being “technically 
deterministic… [and that it] eliminates the concept of capitalism 
altogether” (p. 157) while calling for the examination of impact of social 
constructs on the professions: 
“What they [closure theorists] do reject, however, is the 
assumption of a trans-historical primacy of productive 
relationships over other sources of social cleavage (ethnicity, 
gender, sexuality, age, religion, etc.) in the analysis of 
societies or professions” (p. 157). 
   32 
 
Cooper et al. (1998), on the other hand, build on the Marxist approach to 
provide theories of identity and nationalism when they examine the 
mechanisms of imperialism. Similarly, Hall (1977) adopts the Marxist 
approach by suggesting that the inability to integrate with the concept of 
class is not due to the nature of the society but rather to the “inadequate 
conceptualisation of class concepts, and their misapplication to specific 
historical formation” (p. 177).  
Both the Weberian and the Marxist critical approach bring attention to 
societal factors that influence professions. These approaches examine 
these factors from a different point of view, but none is superior to the 
other.   
This thesis attempts to examine the development of the accounting 
profession in Lebanon using the critical approach of the sociology of the 
profession described above. Moreover, this research adopts the Weberian 
critical approach, combined with other sociological concepts described in 
chapter four, to investigate the relationship between the dominant social 
factors in Lebanon and the country’s accounting profession. Given the lack 
of a unified definition of a profession, and utilising Freidson’s (1986) call to 
examine the professionalisation process, the following section provides an 
understanding of the professionalisation process before venturing into 
explaining the social contexts used in accounting research to examine such 
a process.  
2. 4. The professionalisation process 
Lee (2013) claims that while professions have existed for thousands of 
years, they emerged as institutionalised occupations in Victorian Britain in 
the mid-1800s due to social and economic changes. He argues that the 
rise of organised professions can be attributed to the desire of the Victorian 
middle class to exercise cultural control and remove the social status quo 
set by the church. He suggests that, at that time, practitioners claimed 
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social status by exercising independence and knowledge of their 
profession, as well as exemplifying an uninhibited moral obligation to act 
in the best interests of the public.  
Nonetheless, the reason for professionalisation and the professionalisation 
process is considered to be the transition from being an occupation to 
becoming a profession (Abbott, 1988; Cant and Sharma, 1996; Saks, 
1995). Freidson (1970), and later Pescosolido, Tuch and Martin (2001), 
examine the professionalisation process in the medical profession focusing 
on how the professionalisation process occurred by attaining professional 
dominance through state-granted monopoly, and establishing consulting 
status through the approval and support of the public.  
The case of organising the profession provides more questions than 
answers. How is the professionalisation project articulated in a specific 
context? Are the dimensions and processes of professionalisation related 
to a country’s specific context and history? And more importantly, how 
does professionalisation occur? Therefore, the next section critically 
assesses the theories of professionalisation in order to understand the 
dimensions of professionalisation. 
2. 5. The Theories of Professionalisation 
The theories of professionalisation follow, to a certain degree, the sociology 
of the profession’s perspectives discussed earlier in this chapter. Ritzer 
(1975) suggests that there are three approaches to the theories of 
professionalisation: the structural, the processual, and the power models. 
In addition to Ritzer’s classification, this research discusses Birkett and 
Evans’ (2005) model.  
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2. 5. 1. The structural model 
Greenwood (1957) and Goode (1957) adopt the purely functionalist 
approach of the structural model in stating that the professionalisation 
process is achieved once an occupation attains all of the traits that separate 
it from a non-profession. Millerson (1964) summarises these traits to 
include utilisation skills based on theoretical knowledge, formal education 
and training tested through examination, an ethical code of conduct, the 
preservation of the public good, legal recognition, and the formation of a 
professional association.  
2. 5. 2. The processual model 
The structural model was criticised for being based on “ahistorical and 
idealised notions of what is implied in the concept of a profession” and 
being “static and universalistic” (Tobias, 2003, p. 447). Therefore, 
researchers moved from this structural model to a processual model. 
Parsons (1954), for example, focuses on the sequence of attaining traits 
that separates professions from occupations using a functionalist 
approach. He states that through attaining these traits, an occupation is 
transformed from an occupation to a profession. Such traits, according to 
Parsons (1954), are formal training, the monopoly of the occupation via 
the establishment of an association, and then attaining more knowledge. 
Similarly, Wilensky (1964) suggests that professionalisation is a multi-step 
process that starts with a job being full-time and requiring formal training, 
then the establishment of an association as well as a monopoly through 
legal recognition from the state, and later the development of a code of 
ethics. Although he explains who initiates these steps, he does not provide 
the reasons that propelled these steps, or even the notion of 
professionalisation itself. Caplow (1954), on the other hand, provides a 
different timeline for the professionalisation process, which starts with the 
creation of professional associations that monopolise the market by 
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excluding the unqualified. However, Caplow does not divert from the 
functionalist/trait perspective.  
Such a focus on traits is criticised by many scholars such as Friedson 
(1970) and Saks (1983) from a critical approach, and Johnson (1972) from 
an interactionist approach. Although they adopt differing approaches, they 
agree that the focus on traits ignores the “social and historical conditions 
under which occupational groups become professions including the power 
struggles involved in the process of professionalisation” (Saks, 1983, p. 2). 
Abbott (1988) contests the linearity of the events sequence of the 
processual model. He argues that cultural legitimisation is integral in the 
professionalisation process.  
2. 5. 3. The power model 
Acknowledging the shortcomings of the structural and processual models, 
other frameworks, derived from interactionist and critical approaches, were 
developed to examine the professionalisation process in light of social 
actors (Shaffir and Pawluch, 2003). The focus of these frameworks is 
power, i.e. how professions attain, preserve, and exercise power. Freidson 
(1970) suggests that professions attain power, and consequently 
monopoly, by persuading both the state and the public that the profession’s 
work is needed.  
Forsyth and Danisiewicz (1985) regard professionalisation as a system 
which aspires to attain and maintain power. They develop a 
professionalisation model that is based on professional power acquired 
from autonomy from the client and autonomy from the employing 
organisation. They argue that the core of the professionalisation process is 
to convince the public that the occupation is a profession. This is done by 
convincing the public that the profession’s work is essential, exclusive and 
complex, thus attaining public recognition. A profession would have work 
that has these traits, and is able to convince the public of such claim. A 
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semi-profession, like social workers (Etizioni, 1969), is one that has these 
traits but is unable to convince the public, while a mimic profession is able 
to convince the public that it possesses these traits without actually having 
them.  
Similarly, Trice (1993, p.193) states that “unionism and professionalism 
are ideologies used by occupations to attempt to maintain control over 
their distinctive lines of work”, and that professionalisation is “an elaborate 
rite of conflict reduction” as the members perform activities to persuade 
their clients, and consequently the state, that their profession should attain 
and maintain the monopoly over their work”.  
The examination of the professionalisation process by these frameworks is 
most concerned with structure. Abbott (1988) suggests that professions 
exercise power by controlling the knowledge and skills of the occupation, 
creating entry barriers while protecting the profession from outsiders. He 
examines the structural necessities of the professions, and argues that the 
professionalisation process includes a social closure process to exclude 
others, and is done so by attaining professional status and monopolising 
the supply of knowledge-based skills and services. Such professional status 
is accompanied by the economic gain and elevated power of the 
professionals and the professional group over competing services and even 
customers.  
Larson (1977) calls for analysing the underlying processes of the 
professionalisation process, where she defines professionalisation as “an 
attempt to translate one order of scarce resources – special knowledge and 
skills – into another – social and economic rewards” (p. xvii). She then 
argues that the profession’s monopoly, and thus its power, is fully achieved 
once the professional association gains regulatory certification from the 
state, may it be a registration or a license.  
This structural perspective, according to Kimball (1995), challenges the 
functionalist approach of explaining the profession using professional 
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expertise. West (2003) suggests that the traits used by functionalists to 
examine professions are considered by the structuralists as tools used by 
professionals to enhance their professional status. Structuralists argue that 
the scarcity of the special knowledge and skills is artificial (Horowitz, 
1980), and that the profession’s claim of objective scientific expertise may 
be invalid as structuralists “tend to regard professions as self-conscious 
monopolies seeking to maximize their income and prestige” rather than 
the greater good (Kimball, 1995, p. 314). Kimball (1995) states that 
professionals, by barricading their expertise and artificially making it 
scarce, are able to exclude others while attaining their self-driven goals. 
This view agrees with Larson (1977) and Freidson’s (1970) claim that 
professions maintain the scarcity of their special knowledge and skills to 
maintain their monopoly of the market and monopoly of status. Parkin 
(1979, p.44) argues that professions maintain such a monopoly by 
“limiting access to privileges and opportunities to a restricted number of 
eligibles”.  
However, this focus on considering the profession as a self-interested 
monopoly has attracted criticism. Halliday (1987), for example, agrees that 
while “professional monopoly has thus rightly deserved some degree of the 
attention given to it” (p. 140), “the monopolistic interpretations of the rise 
of professions too readily become wrong-headed and unbalanced” (p. 349) 
as “all motivations and most consequences other than those that are 
explicitly or intentionally monopolistic become debased by the label [of 
monopoly]” (p.350), thus leading to the neglect of examining forces other 
than monopolistic desire. 
The foundation of this model, i.e. power, has also been criticised. Haug 
(1972) argues that the profession’s monopolistic control over specialised 
knowledge and skills will eventually be challenged by an increasingly 
educated public and the readily-available nature of information due to 
technological advancements. Halliday (1987) points out that while there is 
monopolistic protection provided by the profession to its members, the 
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profession does not provide equality within in terms of earnings and status 
to its members. Not all members receive equal income, and not all 
members are sought after by customers. Halliday views social closure not 
as the primary motivation for professionalisation, but rather as an outcome 
of the process itself. Others have argued that capital and bureaucracies 
are gaining control over professionals, leading to a loss of economic 
advantages and professional status (Covaleski et al., 2003; Larkin, 1983). 
McKinlay and Arches (1985), for example, state that bureaucratisation, as 
a consequence of the capitalist expansion, was forced on the medical 
profession, leading to the profession becoming subordinate to capitalist 
control. However, such criticism does not diminish the existence of closure 
mechanisms strategies used by professions to gain power.  
2. 5. 4. Birkett and Evans’ model 
In their ‘Theorizing Professionalisation’, Birkett and Evans (2005, p. 101) 
provide a “holistic model of professionalisation” that gathers and builds 
upon the “fragmented and disordered” literature of the sociology of the 
professions. They criticise the lack of a definition of professionalisation and 
suggest that the outcome of the professionalisation process (monopoly, 
power, closure, status, etc.) has received more attention than the process 
itself. Although they develop their model in order to provide a general 
framework, their model was built from the literature relating to the 
sociology of profession in general with the focus on accounting history 
literature. This focus elevates the value of the Birkett and Evans’ model to 
this research, as it provides a conceptual model of professionalisation as a 
process and an outcome with an emphasis on the accounting profession.  
Birkett and Evans summarise their model as the conditions that must be 
met to achieve the ultimate goal – the profession; the dependencies that 
must be maintained to safeguard such a position; and the strategies used 
by occupational associations to meet such conditions via managing these 
dependencies.  
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The focus of the Birkett and Evans’ model is to provide a framework that 
is built on the various variables found in the professionalisation literature. 
The following is a discussion of their model. 
Figure 2-2: Birkett and Evans’ (2005) model of professionalisation (p.104) 
 
2.5.4.1. Conditions of professionalisation 
There are three conditions that the literature has identified in order to 
attain professionalism. These include professional power (external 
dynamics), association control (internal dynamics), and sustaining 
ideology. Birkett and Evans (p.106) define professional power – which has 
been discussed in the previous section - as “a particular form of hegemony 
in society, by occupational associations over both the production and 
supply of services to consumers in a particular domain or jurisdiction”.  
They subdivide professional power into (p. 106): 
“The power to determine who shall be producers … the power 
to determine the conditions under which services are supplied 
by producers to consumers… legitimation by the state for the 
exercise of such powers; support for the exercise of such 
powers in society at large; (social) identification of the 
occupation with the occupational association; and the 
existence of ideologies which bind the practical exercise of 
such powers, through occupational associations, to 
legitimation by the state and societal acceptability”. 
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Association control is the control over the association’s membership by 
setting institutional frameworks. Such frameworks control (p.108): 
“… how producers engage with consumers in the market for 
services …; entry to practice ...; the knowledge base of the 
occupation, and the production of producers…; relations 
between producers collectively and the state …; the nature 
and structure of the occupation’s work …; and the 
credentialling of producers”.  
This control provides the association with the power to control who can 
practice the profession, and effectively who cannot. Without such control 
over its membership, the association would not be able to justify its 
monopolistic power. Larson (1977), for example, argues that association 
control provides bargaining power to the professional association when 
dealing with the state and the public.  
It is not enough for the occupation to meet these two conditions. The 
professional power and association control must be justified and 
maintained using ideology, which brings forward the third condition – 
sustaining ideology. Birkett and Evans (p. 110) quote the work of 
Plamenatz (1970), who defines ideology as “a set of closely related beliefs 
or ideas, or even attitudes, characteristics of a group or community”. These 
ideologies, in professionalism, are the ways in which professionals and 
their customers behave with each other. While the professional is expected 
to carry out services to the client with “competency and integrity” (Birkett, 
1984, p. 272), the client is expected to accept the legitimacy of the power 
of the professional in terms of their authority and autonomy. According to 
Birkett and Evans (p. 110), such authority is “promoted as the mechanism 
by which the structure of uncertainty experienced by consumers, as a 
result of occupational monopoly, is managed and elevated”.  
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2.5.4.2. Dependencies of professionalisation 
The Birkett and Evans’ model explains that once these conditions are met, 
the profession is formed. However, three dependencies must be managed 
while attaining these conditions and afterwards to maintain such an end-
state. These dependencies include the work, the market, and the state. 
The professional power depends on the perceived high task complexity of 
the work involved and high degree of indeterminacy of the task-related 
technologies to preserve the dependency of work. Managing the 
dependency of the market is preserving professional power in the face of 
shifts in consumer power. Such shifts are a result in changes in the market 
itself, such as the availability of substitute services, competition, and 
knowledge of the consumer, among others.  
In addition, professional power is affected by the state, which can support 
or weaken and even diminish such power through exerting pressure via 
legislation. Such pressure and intervention is justified by the state as a 
means to preserve the public’s interests. Because state support is crucial 
for occupational association’s professional power, “occupational 
associations can seek strong or weak forms of alliance with the state. They 
may seek or gain exclusivity in this alliance, or they may have to share in 
the alliance with competing associations. They can achieve licensure or 
registration … which provides monopoly power” (Birkett and Evans, 2005, 
p. 115). This relationship between the state and the profession becomes 
stable as the profession convinces the state of its legitimacy, and the state 
provides the profession with legal recognition.  
2.5.4.3. Strategies of professionalisation 
Attaining the conditions of professionalisation depends on continuous 
management of dependencies. Therefore, a variety of strategies are used 
by professions to achieve such conditions while managing the work, the 
market, and the state. While the strategies used by accounting professional 
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bodies will be discussed in-depth in the following section, Birkett and Evans 
identify three strategies that focus on managing a dependency in a manner 
to attain all of the conditions of professionalisation. The first strategy deals 
with favourably managing the work by “focus[ing] on: task arrays and 
complexity, work-technology indeterminacy, competition in the supply of 
services, and exogenous change affecting the work domain” (p. 120). The 
second strategy is how to manage the market favourably by “focus[ing] 
on: structures of uncertainty, dependency, and the social tension of 
consumers; consumer power and trust; competition in the market for 
services; and exogenous changes affecting the consumption of 
occupational” (p. 121). The third strategy is the favourable alignment with 
the state by “focus[ing] on various arms of the state, in relation to: 
alternative modes of state recognition, support and forbearance; 
competing claims for state recognition or support; alternative expressions 
of the public interest; and exogenous changes affecting modes of 
interaction between the state and professionalism” (p. 121). 
Birkett and Evans (2005) explain that occupational organisations can use 
various activities for each strategy, as explained in section 6, and 
sometimes a specific set of activities can serve all of these strategies, thus 
attaining the conditions for the optimum management of dependencies. 
They also note that these strategies vary over time, and that the 
occupational organisation may not utilise these strategies at the same 
time, thus managing one or two dependencies simultaneously.  
2. 5. 5. Conclusion 
Siegrist (2002, p. 12155) defines professionalisation as “a social project, 
which articulates itself in discourses on science, performance, honor, public 
welfare, and society, and in the ideology of professionalism”. He states 
(1990, p. 177) that professionalisation is “divergent processes which occur 
within institutions of learning, the division of labour, the economic market, 
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and areas of political and social power to generate an end result known as 
profession”.  
This section has provided the models that are used when examining the 
professionalisation process. These models align with the schools of thought 
that have developed the theories of the sociology of the professions, and 
as the sociology of profession has moved from the functionalist approach 
to the critical approach, the professionalisation models have moved 
towards a model that views professionalisation as a process that is affected 
by the conditions surrounding it.  
This research utilised the guidance of the work of Birkett and Evans, which 
combines the fragmented professionalisation literature and provides a 
generic theoretical model of professionalisation. The model connects the 
professionalisation process strategies with conditions that must be attained 
and the relationships that must managed to complete the 
professionalisation process. By utilizing this model, the research is able to 
identify the use and implementation (whether successful or not) of these 
strategies by the accounting occupational body as it attempts to transform 
accounting from an occupation to a profession. The research will also be 
able to identify if the occupational body was able to manage successfully 
the relationships with the state and the public to convince them of the 
legitimacy of the profession.   
The professionalisation project, which is the development and 
implementation of strategies by key players to move from an occupation 
to a profession, is a dynamic one. The strategies aim towards gaining, 
maintaining and retaining the profession through changing times. 
Therefore, it is important to analyse the strategies used by accounting 
occupational organisations in various countries to complete their 
professionalisation process, as identified by accounting history 
researchers. Such analysis is provided in the next section. 
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2. 6. Professionalisation Strategies in the 
Accounting Profession 
With the lack of a clear definition of profession, as discussed in section 2.2, 
the accounting profession is examined through its transformation from an 
occupation to a profession, i.e. its professionalisation process. In this 
research, the accounting profession is viewed as a profession that has legal 
recognition from the state, monopoly over services, the ability to self-
regulate, has developed code of ethics, and has control of entry 
requirements through control over the requisite level of education and 
training of its members. The accounting profession is thus able to build its 
image based on its ability to perform highly-skilled service, while 
convincing the state and the public of the necessity of its services.  
Allen (1991, p. 51) describes the image that professionals are able to exert 
to the public: “professional skills are highly valued, rarely questioned and 
much sought after”. Such a ‘powerful image’ can only be explained by the 
successful implementation of a variety of strategies used throughout the 
professionalisation process. Successful implementation of these strategies 
would result in successfully transforming the occupation into a profession, 
which in return will provide a prestigious image of the professional. The 
following are some strategies described by accounting history researchers, 
which have been used by occupation organisations in their 
professionalisation project.  
2. 6. 1. Suggested professionalisation strategies 
In his examination of the Australian accounting professionalisation project 
between 1953 and 1985, Allen (1991) provides a theoretical framework 
which builds on internal and external dynamics developed by Klegon 
(1978) to utilise professionalisation strategies. Klegon’s dynamics 
resemble the association control (internal dynamics) and professional 
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power (external dynamics) developed by Brikett and Evans (2005), as the 
internal dynamics are formulated to organise the profession internally, 
while the external dynamics addresses the arrangement of power with 
external groups. Allen (1991, pp. 53-54) provides eight professionalisation 
strategies that can be grouped using Birkett and Evans’ (2005) three 
conditions as follows: 
 Condition One: Professional power: 
 determinations of standards (S5)2 where the profession self-regulates 
its standards; 
 professional unification (S7) of all members and associations to gain 
monopoly over the work in the market; 
 achieving a relationship with the state (S8) to gain support for the 
autonomy of the profession and decreasing any threat from the state 
to such autonomy. 
 
 Condition Two: Association control:  
 delineation of the area of expertise (S2) and its protection from 
invasion and manipulation from outsiders; 
 control of education and entry by the organising body (S3) by setting 
and closely monitoring the level of university education required; 
 definition of competence levels of the members (S4) with more 
prestige awarded by the association to members who attain higher 
levels of membership. 
 
  
                                       
 
2 Allen (1991) used the term S to indicate strategy. 
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 Condition Three: Sustaining ideology: 
 formulation of a code of ethics (S1) as evidence of professionalisation 
and a symbol of rigor in serving the public’s interests;  
 image building (S6), in which the occupational organisation promotes 
itself to convince the public of the legitimacy of the profession. 
Table 2-2: Integration of Birkett and Evans’ (2005) model with Allen’s (1991) 
 Social Economic Political Intellectual 
Professional 
Power 
S7  S5, S8  
Association 
Control 
 S2  S3, S4 
Sustaining 
Ideology 
S1, S6 S1   
Allen (1991), however, groups these strategies into four spheres: social, 
economic, political, and intellectual. In examining the Australian 
professionalisation project between 1953 and 1985, Allen suggests that 
the occupational organisation was able to successfully implement these 
strategies to secure the economic sphere (S1 and S2). According to Allen, 
the strategies used to secure the social sphere (S1, S6, and S7) and the 
intellectual sphere (S3 and S4) were partially successful. However, the 
strategies used for the political sphere (S5 and S8) had minimal success, 
as the accounting profession at that time did not have experience 
developing adequate accounting and auditing standards while experiencing 
continuous state intervention.  
Lee (1995) identifies several strategies used in the professionalisation of 
accountancy in the UK and the US. The occupational organisations first 
sought legitimacy through royal charters – “the primary significance of this 
was the creation of institutions with royal permission to self-regulate 
professional accountancy, and to describe their members as chartered 
accountants” (p. 51). Thus they were able to sustain ideology (S6) through 
attaining the royal charters (S8), and the exclusive right to the title (S2). 
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For example, the Scottish accountancy bodies used the court system to 
defend their exclusive right to the CA (Charted Accountant) title when 
challenged by the non-chartered bodies (Walker, 1991). They viewed the 
title as a mirror to their “professional monopoly [which] provided a higher 
value of service because of the competence of their members, and that 
competition devalued the chartered accountant designation” (Lee, 1995, 
p. 53).  
According to Lee (1995), the UK and the USA accounting professional 
bodies were able to self-regulate the profession, i.e. set entry, education, 
and training standards, thus implementing occupational control. These 
professional bodies’ strategy in attaining professional power is evident in 
their ability to develop their respective countries’ accounting and auditing 
standards and conceptual frameworks. The UK and US bodies have 
continued to attain ideology through publishing journals that signal their 
professional power and occupational control. For example, the Institute of 
Chartered Accountants of Scotland (ICAS) publishes the CA Magazine3 and 
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (IACPA) publishes 
the Journal of Accountancy.4  
Carnegie and Edwards (2001) view these strategies as “signals of 
movement” (pp. 303 - 304), which start with subtle signals such as  
"The creation of [a] specialist knowledge base [association 
control], the emergence of an identifiable occupational group 
[associational control], the holding of oneself out to the public 
as an expert provider of specialist services [professional 
power], the arrangement of listings in commercial and trade 
                                       
 
3 https://www.icas.com/ 
4 http://www.journalofaccountancy.com/ 
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directories [professional power], the establishment in certain 
jurisdictions of formal links between groups of accountants 
and clerks [professional power], and the congregation of 
accounting practices in certain precincts of a city [sustaining 
ideology]” (conditions added to the quotation). 
Such signals of movements lead to the one visible signal, the formation of 
the organisational body, after which other signals are exerted such as:  
“the development of the role performed by a professional 
body [professional power], implementation of examination 
regimes for admission and membership upgrade purposes 
[association control], acquisition of a royal charter 
[professional power], recognition in legislation as the 
appropriate provider of expert services [professional power], 
reclassification of the occupational group in government 
census data [professional power], and the sponsorship pf 
professorial post and research activities at universities 
[sustaining ideology].” (Carnegie and Edwards, 2001, p. 304), 
(conditions added to the quotation). 
Carnegie and Edwards (2001) suggest that the organisation of the 
professional body is just one of the signals of movement – not the only 
one. They call for the examination of signals of movements prior to and 
after such organisation to better understand professionalisation. They also 
suggest that signals of movements are not only used for 
professionalisation, but that these strategies are used as well as other 
strategies for social closure. This notion is discussed in a later section. 
Richardson (1997) suggests that an occupation must successfully 
implement four strategies to become a profession. His model, built on 
Weber’s social closure theory, argues that occupations start their 
professionalisation process by establishing market enhancement, in which 
the occupation creates and demonstrates the value of its services (Birkett 
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and Evans, 2005). The occupation then attains market closure, where the 
practice of the service that the occupation provides is limited to 
practitioners that meet the competencies set by the occupation itself 
(Birkett and Evans, 2005). While these two strategies create a protected 
market, they are not enough by themselves to attain the professional 
status. Hence, the occupation moves towards attaining professional 
closure, which is similar to Birkett and Evans’ (2005) association control 
strategy. The last step in the professionalisation process, according to 
Richardson (1997), is to seek professional power.  
The strategies described by Allen (1991), Lee (1995), Richardson (1997), 
and Carnegie and Edwards (2001) have been identified in the 
professionalisation of the accounting literature. Walker (1995), Parker 
(1986), and Macdonald (1999), for example, pinpoint the most prominent 
factor in the organisation of the accounting profession in Scotland to be 
economic self-interest preservation. A change in bankruptcy law in 1853 
was proposed which allowed lawyers to take over some work usually done 
by accountants (Walker, 1995). According to Lee (2013), accountants, in 
fear of losing their economic privilege, successfully formed The Society of 
Accountants in Edinburgh in 1853 after many failed attempts (association 
control), and managed to secure a royal charter in 1854 (professional 
power). Walker (1995) explains that The Society of Accountants in 
Edinburgh joined forces with the Institute of Accountants and Actuaries in 
Glasgow (chartered in 1855) to challenge the proposed bankruptcy law 
changes (professional power), ensuring that accountants could continue to 
undertake such employment.  
Whether the strategy is forming an organisational body (Carnegie and 
Edwards, 2001; Walker, 1995), securing a royal charter (Willmott et al, 
1993; Walker, 1991), or negotiating and securing state support (Chua and 
Poullaos, 2002), only using one strategy would hinder the 
professionalisation project, if not cause it to fail. Fleischman and Tyson 
(1999) warn of professionalisation projects failing due to inadequate or 
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non-existent strategies, such as a lack of leadership or an inability to gain 
support from the state and the public. They illustrate the case of cost 
accountants in the US in the 1930s, who had the opportunity to organise 
themselves as a profession after the passing of the National Industrial 
Recovery Act in 1933. However, the act failed to gather public approval 
due to “the accounting profession’s lack of strong, visible, and sustained 
commitment to public service” (p. 68), and the act was demised in 1935. 
Utilising a variety of strategies that aid in the continuity of the 
professionalisation process and consequently in achieving the end-state is 
a must.  
2. 6. 2. Conclusion 
Lee (2013, p. 170) explains that while the traditional literature of the 
profession attributes the rise of professions to “privileged work with 
altruistic objectives”, he suggests that professionals organises professions 
to “gain market control of an occupational service by means of monopolistic 
exclusion of individuals deemed unworthy or unqualified to provide it”. 
While such reasons for professionalisation may be valid, this section 
focuses on “how” professionalisation is achieved rather than “why” it 
occurs. Therefore, it is empirical to utilize other theories that will aid in 
finding the reason why professionalisation process is initiated. This 
outreach for other theories is done in Chapter Four where the theoretical 
framework is introduced after taking an extensive look at the history of 
Lebanon and the Lebanese society.  
Birkett and Evans (2005, p. 120) state that “it is evident that the 
management of the process of professionalisation by professional 
accounting associations over time is likely to be context dependent, 
dynamic and piecemeal, [and] in turn opportunistic and intentional”. The 
successful implementation of the professionalisation strategies directed at 
the right audience at the right time should secure the end-state, i.e. the 
profession. Following Hopwood’s (1987) call for examination of the 
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professionalisation project while probing economic and social contexts, the 
next section presents the professionalisation closure strategies used in 
various social contexts.  
2. 7. The Themes of the Accounting 
Professionalisation 
Much research has been conducted on the organisation of the accounting 
profession in terms of social and economic contexts since Bruchell et al.’s 
(1980) call in 1980. In their study, Bruchell et al. (1980, p. 19) argue that:  
“Accounting cannot be conceived as purely an organisational 
phenomenon however. Whilst arising out of organisational 
and institutional pressures, it is also a prevalent feature of the 
societies in which we live… Unfortunately, however, very little 
is known about either the social nature of accounting thought 
and practice or the interplay between the social and the 
organisational”.  
They claim that whilst accounting is a product of the social factors 
influencing it, yet few researchers before 1980 had examined the effect of 
the social context on the organisation of the accounting profession. They 
called for the diverse array of interests that are intertwined in the 
development of the accounting profession to be examined, exemplifying 
the case of the organisation of the accounting profession in the UK due to 
“interface between a critical media, concerned agencies of the state and a 
profession concerned with preserving its powers of self-regulation and 
control” (p. 21). They argue that technical and conceptual developments 
are not the only influencers of the development of accounting and the 
accounting profession – social context plays a significant role as well.  
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However, Bruchell et al.’s call was not the first. Everett Hughes (1971, p. 
340) states:  
“Let me indicate that in my own studies I passed from the 
false question ‘Is this occupation a profession’ to the more 
fundamental one, ‘What are the circumstances in which 
people in an occupation attempt to turn it into a profession 
and themselves into professional people?’ and ‘What are the 
steps by which they attempt to bring about identification with 
their valued model?” 
Bruchell et al.’s (1980) call is echoed in Hopwood’s (1983, p. 289) 
research, in which he argues that “accounting is neither a static nor a 
homogeneous phenomenon” as it is shaped by the contexts that surround 
it. He claims that previous research relating to the development of the 
accounting profession (before 1953) have adapted a functionalist approach 
in which accounting development was seen as progressive, but notices that 
some studies were, at that time, starting to adopt a broader understanding 
by examining influencing social factors. He calls for an alternative view of 
“understanding accounting and its problems that is consonant with the 
historical conditions which have resulted in its emergence and development 
and those current organisational forces which contribute to its significance” 
(p. 290).  
This section is concerned primarily by identifying closure strategies used 
by the occupational organisations in their pursuit of professionalisation of 
accounting in various countries. More importantly, it discusses three main 
themes in which closure strategies were used to exclude others based on 
social traits such as race, gender, or nationality, rather than on education 
and competency.  
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2. 7. 3. Closure strategies and the accounting 
professionalisation project 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, the social closure theory views 
professions as status groups who seek to monopolise the market through 
implementing closure. According to Macdonald (1985, p. 541), “the 
essence of closure is the definition of membership at a particular point in 
time, and the setting of criteria for those who may join subsequently’’. 
Such closure is strategised and implemented by the occupational 
organisation via exclusionary strategies, which sets the restrictions and 
conditions of the eligibility to become a member of the occupational 
organisation, i.e. a practitioner in the profession (Murphy, 1984). Walker 
(1991) agrees with Parry and Parry (1976) that the implementation of 
closure strategies is a means by which the occupational organisation 
achieve, sustain and protect their monopolistic control of the services 
provided by their practitioners. The closure strategies presented in this 
section correspond with the strategies highlighted by Birkett and Evans 
(2005) and Allen (1991) to complete the professionalisation process.  
Sian (2011, p. 365) sets out closure strategies to include:  
“ensuring that only those achieving established standards of 
education and competence are included; the restrictive use of 
authorized designations or badges of professional 
competence; state registration or legal sanction or some other 
means of granting a professional monopoly, whereby the 
ability to practice is restricted to only those appearing on 
official lists; and finally there may be specific exclusions 
encoded within the institutional regulations”. 
The selected countries presented in the following section – Scotland, 
England, Wales and France – are related to the specific condition of 
Lebanon and this research. As a former French colony, Lebanon and its 
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laws and society may have been influenced by the French colonisation. In 
addition, the majority of research on the development of the accounting 
research in ex-colonies was conducted on ex-British colonies. To 
understand how the accounting profession developed in ex-colonies, it is 
important to examine how it developed in the coloniser, as the coloniser 
may have implemented the same closure strategies while governing the 
ex-colonies. The following sections detail the early professionalisation 
projects in Scotland, England and Wales, and France. It discusses the 
closure strategies implemented by the occupational bodies to complete the 
professional project and does not discuss the current state of the 
accounting profession of these countries.  
2.7.3.1. The professionalisation project in 
Scotland 
Lee (1995) suggests that in pursuit of professionalisation, the Scottish 
accountants organised to form accounting societies, mimicking the 
experience of other professional bodies in the fields of law and medicine. 
Poullaos (2009-a, p. 250) describes the founders of the three Scottish 
accounting organisational bodies between 1854 and 1867 as “elite 
accountants with close links to the legal profession and the higher strata 
of Scottish society”. Such links are described at length by Matthews et al. 
(1998), where they evidence that many Scottish accountants received their 
initial trainings in legal offices or had family connections with the legal 
profession. These elite accountants were able to use their image and 
connections to form the occupational societies in face of the threat of losing 
economic privileges (Kedslie, 1990) and defend their monopoly over the 
profession (Poullaos, 2009-b; Walker, 1991).  
Walker (1991) identifies defensive strategies as the entry barriers in the 
form of recruitment systems and the exclusivity of service performance in 
the form of state recognition. He explains that the CA (Chartered 
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Accountant) title provided its holders with an almost complete monopoly 
of the Scottish market between 1854 and 1914, and that, at that time, the 
three Scottish chartered societies that were using this title argued for its 
exclusivity to them when non-chartered societies requested use of it. The 
chartered societies were able to block various attempts by the non-
chartered societies to secure a royal charter (professional power) as the 
non-chartered societies were unable to build their image as professionals 
(sustaining ideology) (Shackleton, 1995).  
Kedslie (1990, p. 15) explains that the three Scottish associations first 
limited the entry of new members to a selected few that held an 
appropriate background and experience – more specifically those who were 
“generally in the same social class as the small groups of organizers". Later 
the societies set apprenticeships and informal examinations as conditions 
of entry and then agreed on a unified national examination system (Lee, 
1995). The chartered societies utilised their monopoly over the title to 
impose high admission fees and attract new members (association 
control), and then used these resources to defend their interests against 
the competing societies (professional power) (Walker, 1991).  
The Scottish societies were also able to use their image as professionals to 
secure a ruling in their favour for the sole and exclusive right to use of the 
CA title between 1854 and 1914 (sustaining ideology) (Lee, 1995). More 
importantly, the three chartered societies united to defend their monopoly 
against the external threats of the non-chartered associations (professional 
power) (Shackleton, 1995; Walker, 1995). The inability of the non-
chartered associations to become chartered or use the CA designation led 
them to either discontinue their existence, with almost all of their members 
joining the existing chartered associations, or move into other territories 
such as England.  
The Scottish societies also implemented other closure strategies described 
by Birkett and Evans’ (2005) model. For example, Lee (1995) and Kedslie 
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(1990) explain that accounting societies issued a national directory of CAs 
in 1896 (sustaining ideology), and published the Accountant’s Magazine 
journal in 1897 (sustaining ideology), and finally merged into one body in 
1951 (professional power). According to Walker (1996), the societies also 
imposed a high mandatory indenture fee and lengthy internship training 
with deep scrutiny of members, who were admitted at annual meetings 
and could only practice in restricted prenominated geographic areas 
(association control). By doing so, the societies were able to close the 
profession to include only “gentleman of professional standing” (Walker, 
1996, p. 14) having “socially-privileged background” (Kedslie, 1990, p. 
185). This closure against others is discussed in the following section. By 
utilising various closure strategies and benefiting from the economic, 
social, and political conditions that were in their favour, the Scottish 
chartered societies were able to maintain their monopoly over the 
professions’ services. 
2.7.3.2. The professionalisation project in 
England and Wales 
Walker (2004) suggests that the Companies Act of 1862 and the 
Bankruptcy Act of 1869 were the catalysts in English accountants’ 
organisation. Two societies were formed in 1870 in London and Liverpool, 
followed by one in Manchester in 1871 and another in Sheffield in 1877 
(Poullaous, 2009-a). Like the Scottish societies, the societies in England 
set entry barriers such as experience, examinations, and nomination from 
an existing member and/or election by ballot (Anderson et al., 2005). The 
attitude of each society differed as they strengthened or relaxed their entry 
barriers. According to Anderson et al. (2005), while the Liverpool society 
did not require examination, the London society set its sole route of entry 
to be rigorous examination and serving for “at least five years (four years 
of those having been in partnership with a member of an accounting 
society) as either a clerk to a member of a society of accountants, or as a 
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professional accountant” (p. 14), and that the applicant must provide 
written recommendations.  
The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW) was 
formed in 1880 after members of the English societies successfully 
petitioned a royal charter (MacDonald, 1999). Anderson et al. (2005) state 
that the ICAEW was not able to claim exclusivity for the ‘accountant’ 
designation and continued to lobby so in parliament. ICAEW used the royal 
charter to consequently build an image of the chartered accountants as “a 
class of persons well qualified to be employed in the responsible and 
difficult duties often devolving on public accountants" (p. 6), with entry 
conditions set to be either extensive experience or passing rigorous 
examinations. Similar to the law and architecture professions, the training 
member, as stipulated in the petition for the royal charter, must endure 
five years of training before becoming a full member, with high entrance 
fees and annual subscription fees (Anderson et al., 2005). Poullaous 
(2009-b) explains that while these conditions helped in establishing the 
image ICAEW wanted, they drew much criticism from both entry applicants 
and members. MacDonald (1999) views that these high entry barriers led 
to the creation of a rival body, the Incorporated Society of Accountants 
and Auditors (ISAA), formed mainly from the ICAEW ‘ineligibles’ who 
performed the same work as ICAEW members but on a smaller scale.  
With threats coming from other societies, accompanied by its inability to 
monopolise the accountant designation, ICAEW shifted its closure strategy 
and used the entry barriers it had set to signal to the public that “the 
chartered accountants who graduated through its [ICAEW] system of 
education and vocational training were specialist practitioners with tested 
competence and lengthy experience in the core areas of accounting as well 
as being well grounded in legal principles” (Anderson et al., 2005, p. 22). 
In 1893, ICAEW introduced a new non-examination entry route that would 
attract those non-members with substantial audit clients (Poullaos, 2009-
b). MacDonald (1999) states that ICAEW viewed these strategies as being 
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successful and that it attained a monopoly over the market such that by 
1930, it had dropped its pursuit of legislation by parliament regarding its 
exclusive rights. In 1957, ICAEW and ISAA merged, thus achieving another 
professional power strategy – professional unification. 
Noguchi and Edwards (2004) point out another strategy that ICAEW 
implemented to maintain its ideology and gain professional power by 
issuing a series of Recommendations of Accounting Principles (RoAP) that 
“were influential in constructing the accounting regulations introduced by 
the Companies Act 1948” (p. 281). What is more interesting in the case of 
ICAEW is the exhibition of the associational control strategy (S4) which is 
the “definition of competence levels of the members with more prestige 
awarded by the association to members who attain higher levels of 
membership” (discussed in section 2.6.1). ICAEW issued RoAP 12 in 1949 
and RoAP 15 in 1952, which discussed historical cost accounting. An 
internal conflict developed between ICAEW practising members and ICAEW 
industrial members, i.e. members who are full-time employees in industry 
or commerce, who had contradicting views on the RoAPs topic. The 
practising members, being the dominant group, were able to “[silence] the 
dissident views expressed by industrial members” (Noguchi and Edwards, 
2004, p. 303), thus attaining a higher perceived level of membership.  
2.7.3.3. The professionalisation project in 
France 
On the other side of the English Channel, the French professionalisation 
project was underway but under different circumstances. While 
accountants in the UK had to implement various strategies to gain the 
support of the state, French law had already paved the way for accountants 
to monopolise the audit service. According to Bocqueraz (2001, p. 13), the 
Code de Commerce of 1863 stipulated that a société à responsibilité limitée 
(SARL - limited liability company) must appoint one or more commissaires 
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(auditors) “by the annual general meeting to make a report to the general 
meeting in the following year on the situation of the company, on its 
balance sheet and on the accounts presented by the administration”. Baker 
(2014) explains that the 1863 Act did not specify the independence and 
competency standards of the commissaires, which led to the appointment 
of shareholders, family members, and employees who did not necessarily 
have the technical ability or independence. On the contrary, the 
commissaires were appointed due to “their lack of expertise” (Ramirez, 
2001, p. 394).  
Praquin (2012) argues that with the rise in the investment in SARL 
companies by the public, and with the promises of wealth (realistic or not) 
offered by their board members to investors, much criticism was addressed 
to the role of auditors in SARL companies. He evidences the use of judicial 
opinions in the late 1880s up to 1929 to ‘amend’ the role of auditors to 
better serve the public interest. However, Dattin (2014, p. 5) argues that 
many parliamentary committees between 1875 and 1902 were established 
to reform auditing, yet such attempts failed due to a “liberal and inflexible 
conception of business” and opposition of the business environment to 
external audit.  
It was in this setting that a group of practitioners with various levels of 
accounting experience decided to organise themselves into the Société 
Académique de Comptabilité (SAC) in 1881 (Degos, 2002; Bocqueraz, 
2001). Ramirez (2001, p. 395) suggests that the lack of prestige of the 
accounting science “hindered the launching of a professionalisation 
project” – a problem that was tackled by SAC’s concentration on spreading 
such science through education (Bocqueraz, 2001). According to Dattin 
(2014), SAC introduced three accounting certificates between 1881 and 
1905; however, the numbers of ‘certified’ accountants remained low. He 
explains that accounting was not taught in the prestigious universities or 
in higher education institutions, and that SAC attempts to create skilled 
knowledgeable practitioners were not endorsed by law. It can be viewed 
   60 
 
that there was little interest in becoming an accounting practitioner (or 
auditor) due to the “lowly position of professional accounting organisations, 
their lack of prestige, the predominance of secrecy in business, and an 
ethos of individualism” at that time (Dattin, 2012, p. 1) where auditors 
were “mocked in political and business spheres, and even by foreign 
professionals visiting France” (Ramirez, 2012, p. 94), unlike the more 
prestigious medicine, law, and engineering professions (Ramirez, 2001).  
The SAC then understood that the image of the ‘accounting profession’ 
must be built to attain professional power through associational control, 
through “building up an internal hierarchy in the professional field and 
constructing a distinction between experts-comptables and regular 
accountants” (Ramirez, 2001, p. 398). In 1912, members of the SAC 
organised the Campagnie des experts-comtables de Paris (CECP), an 
accounting society with strict membership requirements (Praquin, 2012), 
thus imitating the characteristics of the well-established professions of law 
and medicine (Ramirez, 2001).  
With World War One, major changes to taxation law were made in France, 
which resulted in a high demand for tax experts (Dattin, 2014), leading to 
an “invasion… by all sorts of individuals selling accounting and tax 
expertise” (Ramirez, 2001, p. 399), who in return started organising 
themselves in professional groups. While CECP set its mission to exclude 
bookkeepers and non-practicing members, these associations were open 
to all (Bocqueraz, 2001). With the rise in competition and the number of 
unqualified ‘experts’, the state signed the brevet d’expert-comptable 
decree in 1927, which set five years of training in addition to preliminary 
and final examination for individuals who wished to be expert comptable 
(Ramirez, 2001). It was not the professional power of the competing 
organisations that led to such a decree but rather the state’s concern for 
the preservation of the public interests. The decree did not provide a 
monopoly over the services, nor did it attract a high number of interested 
potential practitioners (Ramirez, 2001). It was the same concern of the 
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state that led to the creation of Decree Law of 8 August 1935, which 
specified the competencies of auditors of companies that were to undergo 
or issue public offerings (Praquin, 2012). It was a step in the right 
direction, however, as it was the first instance where the competence of 
an auditor was defined in French law (Ramirez, 2012).  
It has been argued that the profession in France had missed many 
opportunities to develop prior to 1942 (Nioche and Pesqueux, 1997) when 
the Ordre des Experts Comptables et Comptables Agréés was created 
under the German occupation (Dattin, 2014). The Ordre was able to 
develop its own rules over its members in terms of examinations and a 
three-year training course (occupational control) while providing them with 
a monopoly over the market of public accounting (professional power) 
(Dattin, 2014).  
2.7.3.4. Conclusion 
The case of France exemplifies the need to achieve a relationship with the 
state (S8) to gain support for the autonomy of the profession. While the 
French societies applied various strategies to achieve a monopoly over the 
market, the state was not responsive to such strategies. It can also be 
viewed that the few decrees issued by the state were to protect the public’s 
interests first, and silence the demands of the accounting societies. It took 
a change in the state itself for the professionalisation project to further 
itself. The state influence is apparent in the professionalisation project of 
accounting, to the degree that the state can be the leading force in 
initiating the establishment of accounting organisations, such as in the case 
of Ethiopia (Mihret et al., 2012) and Greece (Caramanis, 2005), creating 
favourable conditions and positively changing the public’s view of the 
profession, such as the case of China (Yee, 2012), and being the sole 
licensing body for the profession, as in the case of Brunei Darussalam 
(Yapa, 1999).  
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It is also evident that the attempt to close the profession by the 
professional association through signalling an ‘elite’ image of the 
practitioner and exclusivity of membership, among other strategies, did 
not prevent other groups from attempting to organise themselves, thus 
creating compaction (Shackleton, 1995).  
However, in the three cases of Scotland, England and Wales, and France, 
there was always a notion of exclusion of ‘others’ – the ‘ineligibles’. To 
build the ‘elite’ image, bookkeepers and non-practicing members were 
excluded based on not having the adequate qualifications or the acceptable 
level of experience. However, these two groups were not the only ones to 
be excluded. The following section describes how other groups were 
excluded in various accounting professionalisation projects based on race, 
gender, and ethnicity using social closure strategies.  
By examining these professionalisation projects, factors such as the state, 
elites, and ineligibles are brought into the examinations of the development 
of the accounting profession in Lebanon. Did the state had a positive or 
adverse attitude towards the occupation, and did the state aid in the 
professionalisation process or hindered it? Who are the key players that 
grouped into the occupational organization to attempt the 
professionalisation process? Did they consider themselves as the ‘elite’ and 
based on what factors? Who were the ‘ineligibles’ and based on what 
qualities? These questions will be further analysed in Chapters Five and 
Six.  
2. 7. 4. Exclusion and the accounting profession 
Richardson (2017, p. 6) suggests that, in their goal to attain monopoly and 
close the profession, occupational associations “used criteria unrelated to 
merit to exclude people”. He explains that while some associations were 
explicit in their exclusionary practices, others were more inbound in the 
nature of the closure strategies themselves. For example, he describes the 
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use of some legal systems’ definition of ‘person’ to exclude a ‘non-person’ 
from being considered as a professional, as in the case of gender discussed 
in the following section. He also points out the use of nativism as an explicit 
exclusionary form, especially in the case of imperialism and colonisation. 
He then illustrates that the use of closure strategies such as educational 
level and internship requirements might “exclude groups based on race, 
religion or other criteria” (p. 6). This section presents the exclusion 
methods that were implemented in various settings when attempting the 
accounting professionalisation project. While each of these projects is 
fascinating by itself, this section does not attempt to evaluate these 
projects, but rather provide an overview of the closure mechanisms 
implemented by the occupational associations in their pursuance to close 
the accounting profession. 
2.7.4.1. Gender and the accounting 
professionalisation project 
One of the most important closure strategies is to differentiate the 
professional status from others, thus creating the image of the professional 
as a knowledgeable elite member of society with considerable social status 
(Jacobs, 2003; Ramirez, 2001; Chua and Poullaos, 1998). Building this 
image requires the exclusion of others such as the lower educated, the 
working class, and women (Haynes, 2016) among others.  
When calls were made to admit women to the accounting profession in 
early 1900 in the United Kingdom, Lehman (1992, p. 266) explains that 
such calls were faced with statements such as “women and men are not 
equal… [and] nature had already marked out a profession for which 
[women] were pre-eminently fitted” and “only women from the lower 
classes would enter the profession” as British women from upper classes 
need not work. Lehman (1992) continues that it was specifically stated 
that admitting women to the accounting profession would “lead to 
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[lowering] the status of the profession and [increasing] competition” (p. 
266). With pressure from various groups such as Society for Promoting the 
Employment of Women and Women’s Freedom League, the ICAEW and 
ISAA acknowledged the right of women to practice accountancy in 1909 
(Kirkham and Loft, 1993), yet the same entry barriers of education, 
training, and fees that were set for the non-chartered accountants would 
be imposed on women, thus making it almost impossible for women to 
become chartered accountants (Lehman, 1992). Two bills were introduced 
in 1909 and 1911 that would allow the admittance of women to ICAEW and 
ISAA, yet both were unsuccessful due to pressure from organisational 
groups that claimed such bill would put them at disadvantage (Kirkham 
and Loft, 1993).  
In the wake of World War One, women were ‘permitted’ to take classes 
and perform accounting work (Kirkham and Loft, 1993), but soon they 
were ‘reinstated’ to their former positions after the war ended, “giving up 
their jobs to men”, willingly or not (Lehman, 1992, p. 269). Women were 
then able to join the accounting associations in 1921 but had restricted 
access to employment as many clients were not accepting of the idea of a 
woman doing a practitioner’s work (Lehman, 1992), thus limiting their 
ability to gain the necessary experience. In addition, society itself set entry 
barriers on age and marital status (Lehman, 1992). Most companies set a 
‘marriage bar’ where they would make the woman employee redundant 
once she was married (Kirkham and Loft, 1993). 
Kirkham (1992) views these exclusion strategies against admitting women 
in the accounting profession in the UK as a means for the occupation to 
attain social status, power, and the rewards associated with being a 
profession, by gendering the accounting profession as a masculine 
practice. Kirkham and Loft (1993) argue that in their attempt to build the 
‘elite’ image, the accounting occupational organisations in the United 
Kingdom, mainly ICAEW and ISAA, portrayed the titles of ‘clerk’ and 
‘bookkeeper’ as a lesser version of the ‘chartered accountant’ title, where 
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the formers could only do a lower level of work, where women who wished 
to practice accounting could only do so as clerks or bookkeepers. Kirkham 
and Loft (1993) explain that the same occupational groups of ‘ineligibles’ 
who were excluded from ICAEW and ISAA were more open to admitting 
women but only a few women were actually admitted; a notion that did 
not change until the latter half of the twentieth century (Wescott and 
Seiler, 1986). It can be argued that the occupational groups viewed female 
clerks and bookkeepers as a source of cheap labour, as Walker (2003) 
found the majority of bookkeepers in the late nineteenth century in the 
south of England to be women.  
A similar experience of excluding women can be seen in the former British 
colony of Australia. According to Cooper (2010), the Australian accounting 
occupational organisations set the rules of their membership in masculine 
terms, signalling that they would only accept male candidates. He explains 
that even though the Australasian Corporation of Public Accountants 
(ACPA, 1907) were informed that their request for a royal charter may be 
declined if its articles excluded women, the ACPA did not deviate from the 
norms and followed the implicitly masculine terms. Moreover, according to 
Cooper (2010), the accounting occupational organisations implemented 
various evasion strategies to maintain the exclusion of women. Such 
strategies included deferring decisions on or declining applications by 
several females to join. The pressure exerted by several organisations 
whose aim was to gain rights for women resulted in the Council of ACPA’s 
passing of Resolution No. 16 in 1916, which allowed women to be admitted. 
The resolution was then referred to State Councils in 1917 for their 
members’ opinions, and although the opinions were in favour of the 
resolution, it was deemed impractical due to the narrowness of the margin 
of approval. Another tactic was to allow women to sit the entry 
examinations, but they would still be ineligible for membership. It was not 
before 1925 that women could join as full members of ACPA. Emery et al. 
(2002), in their presentation of the women experience during the 
accounting professionalisation process in New Zealand, suggest that 
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exclusion tactics were the use of the ‘wording’ tactics of referring to the 
masculinity of the profession. Although women were able to join, they were 
treated as inferior as, for example, “after a meeting … it was reported that 
supper was served by the lady members [of the organisation]” (Emery et 
al., 2002, p. 16). 
McKeen and Richardson (1998) present a different experience of Canadian 
women’s exclusion from the accounting profession. They state that the 
gaining of rights for women to vote in municipal elections was mimicked 
by the Ontario Institute of Chartered Accountants (OICA) to accept their 
first female member in 1885. However, influenced by the United Kingdom’s 
accounting occupational associations’ refusal to admit women, the 
Canadian accounting associations, including the OICA, shifted their position 
in favour of excluding women. Such exclusion was based on the ebb of the 
women’s right to vote as society viewed their role to be housewives as they 
“lacked the well-rounded qualities of an auditor; their presence in the 
profession was feared to decrease the social standing of the profession as 
a whole and therefore the value of male labour” (McKeen and Richardson, 
1998, p. 516). The same exclusion strategies were deployed by the 
Canadian accounting associations until 1914, where there was a shift 
towards admitting women. However, the government of Quebec used the 
legal definition of the word ‘person’ to reject the Quebec organisation’s 
request to amend it charter to be able to admit women. The legal definition 
was then changed in 1929 to include both genders, thus allowing women 
to become members in the Quebec organisation.  
Walker (2011) explains that gendered exclusion strategies aim to exclude 
women by restricting and even denying them access to resources that 
would qualify them otherwise to be included. Such resources include “skills, 
knowledge, entry credentials, or technical competence” (Walker, 2011, p. 
187). He also states (p. 188) that the dominant male group would use 
“demarcationary strategies [which] concern inter-occupational control 
through the creation and maintenance of gender-defined boundaries 
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between the core profession and associated occupations of lower status”. 
It is evident that the occupational associations discussed in this section 
implemented these exclusion strategies to portray women as unequal, 
unskilled, and unknowledgeable, thus elevating and then preserving the 
image of ‘profession’ as an elite masculine profession, able to provide 
professional services competently and therefore deserving the monopoly 
over the market. The next section provides an analysis of the strategies 
used to exclude those of a different race and ethnicity. 
2.7.4.2. Race, ethnicity, colonisation, and the 
accounting professionalisation project 
The image that the accounting occupational associations held and desired 
for the profession led to the exclusion of ineligibles. The previous section 
explained that the view of the accounting profession as masculine led to 
the implementation of various exclusionary strategies against women. This 
section discusses the view of the accounting professional as white to 
exclude people based on race and ethnicity.  
Hammond and Streeter (1994) explain that during the early 1900s, the 
accounting profession in the United States was to be ‘white’, as society 
viewed that only ‘whites’ could perform mental labour, while ‘blacks’ could 
only perform physical work. They contended that even when the African 
Americans had the educational requirement, they would not be able to 
satisfy the three-year practical experience condition set as a membership 
condition to become a Certified Public Accountant (CPA), as the white 
accounting firms would not employ coloured people. Hammond and 
Streeter (1994) state that although the first African American CPA had the 
prestige and wealth that were regarded as ‘elite’ qualities, he had to take 
the examination in New Hampshire, instead of his home state of 
Washington DC, as the former had “ambiguous requirements regarding 
experience” at that time (p. 276). They then describe that the third African 
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American to become a CPA benefited from his appearance as he had ‘fair 
skin’, being of mixed race origin. However, Hammond and Streeter (1994) 
point out that due to the United States’ segregation law, the accounting 
occupational groups had the right to deny examinations to anyone merely 
based on their race. Miranti (1988) presents the exclusionary form of 
nativism towards immigrants who wished to join the United States 
accounting occupational groups in the late 1800s. He explains that while 
the British practitioners in the United States were integrated smoothly, the 
acculturation of immigrants from other nationalities through education was 
a condition for membership. Even when these immigrant practitioners were 
allowed membership, they were not able to “rise to the most prestigious 
levels within the profession” (Miranti, 1988, p. 375). 
Such effortless integration of the British accounting practitioners in other 
countries’ accounting associations can be attributed to imperialism and 
colonisation. The British accountants were able to ‘extend’ their ‘elite’ 
image as professionals into the British colonies, empowered by the control 
the British governance over these colonies and their own ‘superior’ 
knowledge of accounting. For example, Johnson and Caygill (1971) argue 
that British accounting professionals were highly influential in the 
establishment of the accounting associations in the countries to which they 
immigrated within the British Empire. However, the formation of these 
associations carried within exclusion of the locals. Poullaos (2009-b, p. 
454) argues that the British accountancy professionals perceived the 
colonised want-to-be professionals as inferior and that “not even 
completion of the allegedly rigorous training as a CA could remove it [other 
races’ inferiority]”. 
Sian (2011, p. 371) notes that first accounting organisation in East Africa, 
the Association of Accountants in East Africa (AAEA – formed in 1949) 
specified “acceptable social standing and racial identity” as conditions to 
join while admitting freely members with British qualifications, with the 
association council “made up of white male … chartered accountants” 
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(ibid). Sian (2006) argues that before the accounting occupational groups 
organised in Kenya, the British expatriate accountants controlled entry to 
the profession by limiting the requirements and training to ‘whites’. Sian 
(2007) explains that during the colonial governance of Kenya, ICAEW had 
the professional power to convince the British governor in Kenya to rule 
that the appointment of auditors was restricted to only those who have a 
certificate from the governor or are a member of an accounting society 
recognised by the governor, thus limiting the ‘auditor’ appointment to the 
British expatriate accountants. Similar to the case of Kenya, Hammond et 
al. (2009, p. 713) examined the case of South Africa and established the 
exclusion of all who were not “white, male, Christian South Africans of 
British descent and correct family background” from the accounting 
profession, even when the majority of the population was not of such 
criteria. They evidence the use of education and training conditions as a 
method to exclude those who are not from the ‘correct’ race or cultural or 
social background. In Trinidad and Tobago, Annisette (1999, 2000, and 
2003) demonstrate the use of education and social constructs to exclude 
the locals from the accounting profession to maintain British dominance of 
the profession.  
The establishment of the first Moroccan accounting association, La 
Compagnie des experts-comptables du Maroc (CECM), in 1950 was itself 
the first exclusionary strategy against the locals. According to El Omari and 
Saboly (2005), the association was organised by French chartered 
accountants who were working in Morocco and wished to transpose the 
French model at the time when France colonised Morocco. They state that 
Article 5 of the organisation charter set the conditions of membership to 
include “[being a] French graduate accountant or a certified accountant 
recognised by the French State or another foreign degree deemed 
equivalent in France; or be allowed to carry the title of chartered 
accountant in France; or [fulfil] the conditions of the transitional provisions 
laid down in article 6 [extensive experience and education]” (translated, p. 
135). Such conditions were not accessible to the colonised locals who were 
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mainly from agricultural backgrounds, and indeed only seven candidates 
passed the exams between 1955 and 1963, all non-Moroccans (El Omari 
and Saboly, 2005). Another exclusion strategy was implemented in 
Madagascar, the French former colony, where the French accounting 
practitioners monopolised the knowledge during the French ruling over the 
country: “Business-related subjects such as accounting and finance were 
neither taught at school nor at university level” (Boolaky and Jallow, 2008, 
p. 130), thus obstructing the locals’ access to the required skills to even 
build an occupation.  
2.7.4.3. Religion and the accounting 
professionalisation project 
Carmona and Ezzamel (2009) discuss the works of Durkheim (1976) and 
Suárez (2004) in identifying the high influence of religion on human 
behaviour and social life. They identify the role that religion has played in 
shaping professional activities, such as architecture and banking. They 
argue that the association between religion and accounting in a historical 
framework has been explored on a micro and macro level in accounting 
research. The micro level examines the position of accounting in religious 
organisations while the macro level analyses the impact of religious beliefs 
on business activities and accounting practice. Only a few researchers have 
attempted to relate the concept of religion and religious affliction to the 
accounting professionalisation project.  
In their study, Edwards and Walker (2008) find strong evidence of informal 
exclusionary closure based on religion within the early Canadian 
accounting community. By comparing the religious denomination of the 
1881 census to the information retrieved on the occupational groups, they 
found that Anglicans were the dominant accountant group by 42%, while 
they constituted only 13% of the total population. In contrast, the most 
dominant religious group, the Roman Catholic (42% of total population), 
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constituted only 15% of the accountants. Although they do not provide a 
detailed explanation of the exclusionary strategies, they state that “these 
differences imply exclusionary closure being practiced informally by certain 
sub-groups within the community of accounting functionaries” (p. 389). 
They justify this conclusion by the strong inconformity of the accounting 
community profile with the census. 
A similar approach was taken by Annisette and O’Regan (2007) in their 
examination of the professionalisation project in Ireland. They state that 
the Irish, at the dawn of the twentieth century, were facing social and 
political tensions as society was vertically divided between the ‘elite’ 
Protestant minority and the Catholic majority. They explain that while 
these tensions were dividing the society, Protestants constituted 49% of 
the accounting community compared to their 20% composition of the 1880 
census. Catholics, who constituted 80% of the Irish population at that date, 
only constituted 51% of the accounting community.  
However, as Annisette and O’Regan explain, faced with the threat of losing 
several clients to the United Kingdom organised accountants, 31 Irish 
accountants joined forces to establish an accounting occupational 
association in 1888, out of which 27 were Protestant. It can be argued that 
it was the self-interest and fear of loss of economic advantages that were 
the reasons why these men joined forces to establish the Institute of 
Chartered Accountants in Ireland (ICAI) and set aside their inherent 
religious tensions. They point out that while the ICAI members were able 
to withstand such a divide, other professional associations separated into 
bodies that represented the religious and political values of its members, 
such as the case of the Law Society and Irish soccer sporting associations.  
Although Annisette and O’Regan (2007) and Edwards and Walker (2008) 
review the idea of the impact of religion on the accounting 
professionalisation project, they do not provide a deep analysis of the 
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influence that religion and religious affiliation exerts on the 
professionalisation project.  
2.7.4.4. Conclusion 
As shocking as the exclusionary strategies discussed in this section are in 
today’s world, it can be argued that the occupational groups were just 
mirroring society’s view at the dates of their organising. Since the 
occupational groups were building their image, they had to conform to the 
norms of society to gain their professional power and attain monopoly over 
the services. It would not be beneficial for these organisations, who were 
soliciting the approval of the public regarding their legitimacy, to challenge 
the general norms that the public held.  
Race (Annisette 2003), ethnicity, and gender could be viewed as social 
constructs, and challenging society’s view on those social constructs could 
have resulted in an undesirable outcome for the occupational associations. 
As society norms changed, so too did the accounting societies. 
Exclusionary strategies were abolished, and the entry barriers were applied 
to all who wished to become a member, regardless of gender, race, or 
ethnicity. In most of the cases discussed in this section, inclusion strategies 
were applied at later dates to integrate those who were prevented from 
membership, due to civil rights movements such as those in the United 
States and the United Kingdom, or due to independence from colonisers, 
such in the case of Kenya and Trinidad and Tobago.  
Given that most professionalisation projects included the exclusion of ‘the 
others’ from the profession, did the project exclude others in Lebanon? And 
what were the basis for excluding the ‘ineligibles’ or the ‘others’. In the 
professionalisation projects discussed in this section, these ‘ineligibles’ 
were the excluded because they belonged to groups that are based on 
race, gender, ethnicity. The excluder would be the ‘white male’ group and 
the excluded would be females and non-white groups. The 
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excluder/excluded groups, however, followed the patterns by which the 
societies view these groups. For example, the females were excluded in 
the UK in later 1800s and early 1900s from the accounting profession 
because the society viewed them as ‘inferior’.  If we assume that Lebanon’s 
professionalization project will follow the excluder-excluded pattern, who 
would be the excluder and who would be the excluded? This requires an 
in-depth analysis of the Lebanese society to understand how this society 
views its members. Such analysis will be provided in Chapter Three. 
2. 8. Conclusion 
This chapter has highlighted the various approaches of the sociology of the 
profession, noting that the lack of a clear definition of the term ‘profession’ 
does not constitute an obstacle towards examining the concept. The 
professionalisation project and its various theories were then presented, 
underlining the importance of examining the strategies used by the 
occupational associations to close the profession and gain a monopoly over 
the market. However, these closure strategies that signal practitioners as 
elite are used to exclude what these same practitioners view as ineligible 
based on the social constructs that their respective society holds.  
“The role and conduct of the accounting profession [reflect] 
the wider norms of the societies in which it operates; and … 
the profession’s role in shaping and influencing those societal 
norms, as well as the positions and practices of the 
professionals who work for and in the profession” (Haynes, 
2016, p. 7). Thus it would be absurd and even illogical to 
analyse the professionalisation process without exploring its 
surroundings, i.e. the social constructs.  
As the aim of this thesis is to examine the accounting professionalisation 
project in Lebanon, the following chapter presents an overview and brief 
history of the country.  
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Chapter 3. Lebanon and Sectarianism 
3. 1. Introduction 
The accounting profession, as explained in chapter two, is not isolated from 
its surroundings. Hughes (1971) and Bruchell et al. (1980) called for the 
accounting profession and the professionalization process to be examined, 
while considering the effect of the social contexts in which accounting 
operates. This laid the foundations on which research on the interplay 
between gender, imperialism, race, colonization, and the accounting 
professionalization has been built. The examination of the accounting 
profession in Lebanon requires a parallel examination of Lebanon’s history 
to disseminate the most crucial social context(s) that governs Lebanese 
society. Once this social context(s) is determined, an investigation of its 
possible impacts of on the accounting professionalization process and the 
accounting profession is necessary to fully understand how the profession 
has developed in Lebanon.  
Lebanon enjoys a free market economy, unrestrictive commercial 
traditions (Theodora, 2016), and a high literacy rate with a strong 
emphasis on commercial culture (BBC, 2016). However, Lebanon has 
suffered from ‘sluggish’ economic conditions in recent years (World Bank, 
2016). These sluggish economic conditions did not exist prior to 1975, 
where Lebanon was enjoying an “impressive growth record” and 
“remarkable financial performance” (Gaspard, 2004, p. 67) to the degree 
that it surpassed all other countries in the Middle East. Why does a country 
which had a promising future with nil government debt in 1975 (Gaspard, 
2004) have a public debt of more than 134% of its GDP as of 2013 (Focus 
Economics, 2016)? Could it be due to its “geopolitical and security 
conditions, which remain decidedly volatile” (World Bank, 2016) or its 
being “at the centre of Middle Eastern conflicts, despite its small size, 
because of its borders with Syria and Israel and its uniquely complex 
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communal make-up” [demographic composition as explained in this 
chapter] (BBC, 2016)? This chapter attempts to answer this question by 
examining Lebanon’s history and identifying the most dominant social 
constructs that influence the ‘Lebanese identity’. This chapter starts by 
providing an overview of Lebanon’s landscape. It then moves on to 
describe its history, dividing it into three main periods: The Pre-
Independence Era (before 1943), Post-Independence Era (1943 – 1975), 
and Post-Civil-War Era (1975 – 2015). By doing so, the most prevailing 
social constructs can be inferred to provide a better understanding of 
Lebanon’s current socio-economic situation.  
3. 2. The landscape of Lebanon 
The history of Lebanon is one that is complicated, filled with civil wars and 
conflicts. Lebanon as an independent country did not exist on its own until 
it gained its independence from France in 1943. Previously, Lebanon had 
always been a part of a greater empire, whether a province, a jurisdiction, 
or a state. It was ruled by the Roman/Byzantine Empire (332 BCE – 7th 
century), the Islamic Empire (7th century – 14th century), the Ottoman 
Empire (14th century – 1920), and lastly by the French Mandate (1920 – 
1943). In these instances, except under the French mandate, Lebanon was 
considered part of Greater Syria, which after World War One was sub-
divided into the countries known today as Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, 
Palestine, and Israel. 
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Map 3-1: Greater Syria borders under the Ottoman rule (14th century – 1920) 
based on Pipes (1990) 
 
Smock and Smock (1975, p. 30) state that among the social and economic 
differentiations that have impacted Lebanon’s history, confessional 
identification was the “most clearly, most consistently, and most self-
consciously defined… [where] confessional identity usually constituted the 
principal axis of collective activity… from about 1800 onwards”. 
Confessionalism is a political system in which political and institutional 
powers are distributed proportionally among religious sub-communities 
(Canadians for Justice and Peace in the Middle East, 2007).  
Weiss (2009) asserts the presence of a confessional representation political 
system that is structured according to sectarian metrics in Lebanon since 
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1861. He notes that the perception of sectarianism is innate in the “hearts, 
minds, and souls of the various communities” that have lived and continue 
to live in Lebanon (Weiss, 2009, p. 143), to the degree that sectarianism 
has been embedded in the Lebanese constitution since its independence 
from France as a method of providing power-sharing balance between the 
various Lebanese communities (Haddad, 2002).  
According to the U.S. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor 
(2013), Lebanon’s population in 2013 constituted 59.7% Muslims, 39% 
Christians, and very small percentage of Jews, Bahais, Buddhists, Hindus, 
atheists, and Mormons. There are 18 officially recognized religious groups 
that include five Muslim groups, 12 Christian groups, and other minorities. 
The largest Muslim communities are Shia, Sunni and Druze, while the 
Alawites and the Ismailis are the smallest. The largest Christian 
communities by descending order are the Maronites, Greek Orthodox, 
Greek Catholics, Armenian Orthodox, Armenian Catholics, Syriac 
Orthodox, Syriac Catholics, Assyrians, Chaldeans, Copts, Evangelicals, and 
Latins. In all instances and until 2009 (BBC, 2009), the religious sect of 
any Lebanese national was encoded on both his/her national card and 
official registry documents, except passports.5 
The U.S. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (2013) continues 
to emphasize that the Lebanese constitution provides 50:50 representation 
between Muslims and Christians in the government, parliament, and 
civil/military service positions, with posts being distributed proportionally 
among the recognized sects of the religions (U.S. Bureau of Democracy, 
                                       
 
5 The Lebanese national ID and official registry documents depict, among other 
information, the religion, sect, gender, and marital status of its holder. This 
information is accessible to the public. 
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Human Rights and Labor, 2013). The constitution also affirms the religious 
sect of the President (Christian Maronite), the speaker of the parliament 
(Muslim Shia), and the prime minister (Muslim Sunni) as stipulated in the 
National Pact of 1943 (discussed later in this chapter), which was agreed 
upon as Lebanon began its era of formal independence from France 
(Makdisi, 1996). 
Why did Lebanon adopt the confessional governance model? And why is 
religious sectarian identity relevant to Lebanon’s history to the degree that 
heads of state must be from a specific religious sect? Does religious 
sectarianism have any effect on Lebanon’s accounting professionalization 
process and the accounting profession? The following sections aim to 
answer the first two questions by providing an overview of Lebanon’s 
history, while chapters five onwards examine the role of religious 
sectarianism in the development of the Lebanese accounting profession.  
3. 3. Lebanon and Sectarianism 
Corstange (2012, p. 119) states that “in societies with multiple faith 
traditions… people are born into community cults that sacralise the 
community itself rather the divine”. The examination of Lebanon’s history 
in the following sections reveals that religion and religious sectarianism has 
been the dominant social factor since the 1800s (Weiss, 2010; Makdisi, 
2000; Salibi, 1998; Akarli, 1993; Hudson, 1976 and 1968). Cleveland and 
Bunton (2016, p. 334) explain that “the perseverance of sectarian 
communal loyalties stultified Lebanon’s political development and allowed 
family and religious ties to prevail over national ones”. Sectarianism has 
permeated into all aspects of the Lebanese everyday life (Deeb, 2006) 
“through routinized social practices that cultivate exaggerations of 
communal identity in the absence of a unified Lebanese identity” 
(Corstange, 2012, p. 123). The Lebanese mono-sectarian political parties 
exist because of sectarianism, and thrive through it. The sects’ leaders 
have previously engaged in wars to gain additional power by exploiting 
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sectarian solidarity in the name of defending their sect’s rights. Moaddel et 
al. (2012, p. 7) explain that as demographics have changed over Lebanon’s 
history, so too has the balance of power. While the Muslim Druze enjoyed 
political power and its privileges during the Ottoman Era, the Christian 
Maronites managed to cease such power by the mid-1800s. By 1914, the 
population of Mount Lebanon compromised 20% Muslims and 80% 
Christians, out of which almost 60% were Maronites.  
Table 3-1: Lebanon’s major religious sects’ population percentage over the 
years6 
Religious 
Sects 
1895 
% 
1914 
% 
1932 
% 
1956 
% 
1985 
% 
2012 
% 
Muslim 
Sunni 
3.5 3.6 22.4 20 27 27 
Muslim 
Shia 
4.3 5.5 19.6 18 41 27 
Druze 12.5 11.3 6.8 6 7 5.6 
Christian 
Maronite 
57.5 58.3 28.8 30 16 21 
Others 22.3 21.2 22.4 26 9 19.4 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
                                       
 
6 Sources: 
1895 and 1913: (Chamie, 1981, p. 29) 
1914: (Yapp, 1991, pp. 104-115) 
1932: (Najem, 1998, p. 7) 
1951: (Crow, 1962) 
1985: (CIA, 1988) 
2012: (The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 2015) 
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The balance of power shifted towards Sunni Muslims after the end of the 
civil war in 1990. According to Haddad (2002), the Taif Agreement in 1990 
preserved the sectarian spirit of the National Pact of 19437, but carried two 
major changes. Power-sharing was now divided equally between Christians 
and Muslims rather than on a 6:5 ratio respectively (Berkley Center for 
Religion, Peace, and World Affairs, 2013), and most of the Maronite 
president’s privileges were given to the Sunni Muslim prime minister 
(Moaddel, et al., 2012). This agreement strengthened political 
confessionalism in Lebanon rather than producing a strong state (Haddad, 
2002).  
The balance of power then shifted in favour of the Shia Muslims as Israel 
withdrew from southern Lebanon in 2000, and increased dramatically after 
Prime Minister Rafic Hariri was assassinated in 2005 (Moaddel, et al., 
2012).  
The desire for power has led sectarian political leaders to engage in cross-
sectarian alliances as they were not able to achieve full authority on their 
own, with each claiming the dependence of the other party on international 
powers (Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs, 2013), 
leading to a “self-perpetuating capture of the state by the confessional 
elite, whose lack of accountability undermines their supposed commitment 
to the public good” (Nelson, 2013, p. 355), and whose main objective is to 
gain more power and diminish, in certain ways, other political leaders. 
According to Salamey (2009, p. 89), sectarianism has devastated Lebanon 
to the degree of disputing history among the conflicting parties, which has 
led to the absence of nationally unified history textbooks in public schools. 
                                       
 
7 The 1943 Pact is explained in section 3.5.1 and the 1990 Agreement is explained 
section 3.5.2. 
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Most history books are written to defend a sect’s actions towards or against 
other sects.  
Nedelcu (2013) explains the extent to which sectarianism has affected the 
Lebanese identity. She argues that religious identity has been the main 
trigger of the Lebanese identity, and that this religious identity “determines 
one’s social status and main level of belonging” (p. 40). This sectarian 
identity has also affected the level of trust between members of the various 
religious sects. According to Moaddel et al. (2012, p. 21), trust among 
members of the same religious sect is high and decreases dramatically 
towards members of other sects:  
“Fully 72.0% of the Shi’is trusted other Shi’is a great deal, 
while only 16.9% trusted the Sunnis and 21.7% trusted the 
Maronites a great deal. Likewise, 83.2% of the Sunnis trusted 
Sunnis a great deal, but only 32.5% and 31.7% of the Sunnis 
trusted the Shi’is and Maronites, respectively, a great deal. 
The Maronites also follow the same pattern: 58% of the 
Maronites trusted a great deal other Maronites, but the 
Maronites who trusted the Shi’is and Sunnis a great deal were 
18.2% and 13.8%, respectively”. 
3. 4. Pre-Independence Era (before 1943) 
To understand Lebanon’s history is to understand the history of two 
geographic provinces, Beirut and Mount Lebanon, which were established 
by the Romans (332 BCE – 7th century) and then united when Lebanon 
achieved its independence in 1943. This section will discuss the history of 
the Mount Lebanon province and the Beirut province, which later combined 
with another territory to form the Republic of Lebanon.  
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Map 3-2: Lebanese current borders compared to Mount Lebanon and Beirut 
Provinces based on Pipes (1990) 
 
It was during the Roman Era that Christianity was introduced to Lebanon, 
mainly in the first century due to Lebanon’s geographic proximity to the 
birthplace of Christ (Atiya, 1968). According to Tomass (2016), a new 
Christian sect emerged during the 5th century, known as Christian 
Maronites, who followed the Monastery of Maron founded in northern Syria. 
He explains that due to religious prosecution by the Romans who wanted 
the Maronites to practice Roman Catholic Christianity, the Maronites 
retreated to Mount Lebanon in late 900. In addition to fending off Romans 
attempts to dominate their faith, the Maronite were faced with an 
additional threat. During the 7th century, the Muslim Arabs conquered 
Great Syria, and Islam and Muslims started spreading into the region. 
According to Kazan (1972), Muslims settled mostly along the Lebanese 
coast, known as the Beirut province, where Christians were not allowed to 
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live unless there was a need for them (Sayegh, 1955). The first sectarian 
invisible borders were drawn – the Christian Maronites in Mount Lebanon 
living with Muslim minorities, and Muslims in Beirut province living with 
Christian minorities (Daher, 1975). The Muslims were not united 
themselves, as a dispute over ‘khilafa’ (succession) in the 600s led to the 
birth of two Muslim sects: the Sunni and the Shia, each arguing their right 
to be the rulers of the faith. Out of these two sects, additional sects 
emerged, such as the Muslim Druze in the early 1000s. The Druze gained 
popularity in Mount Lebanon, where they coexisted – for better or worse – 
with the Christian Maronites (Hatti, 1972). With the start of the Ottoman 
Empire rule over the Beirut and Mount Lebanon provinces, sectarian 
borders were established. Daher (1975) explains that by the 1500s, the 
Muslim Shia were living to the west of Mount Lebanon after leaving the 
coastal cities which were predominated by the Sunni Muslims, while the 
Muslim Druze inhabited Mount Lebanon.  
According to Traboulsi (2012), Lebanon started its existence as a political 
system in 1528, and was considered an autonomous region inside the 
Ottoman Empire. Given the name the Emirate of Mount Lebanon, the 
country enjoyed a degree of independence from the Ottomans. Residents 
of the Mount Lebanon and Beirut provinces were categorized according to 
their ‘millet’ or religious sects. This two-tier hierarchy separated between 
a higher community of Muslims, compromised of Sunni, Shia, and Druze, 
while the lower sheltered community were mainly Christians and Jews 
(Kawtharany, 1976). Both Christians and Jews enjoyed freedom of 
religious belief and unconditional rights to perform their religious rituals as 
well as complete autonomy on their personal affairs, such as marriage and 
inheritance regulations (Khairallah, 1941). However, they were prohibited 
from joining the military or assuming administrative jobs (Traboulsi, 
2012). Traboulsi (2012) states that the Emirate’s life (1528-1860) was 
filled with revolutions against the Ottoman Empire and its rulers. It was 
also marked with military and bloody conflict between the Druze and 
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Christians, each trying to become the sole ruler of Mount Lebanon, such as 
the 1931 conflict and the 1860 war (Takoush, 2013).  
Traboulsi (2012) explains that the 1860 sectarian war led to the 
establishment of the Mutasarrifiya (province) of Mount Lebanon. Instead 
of having Lebanese rules, the Mutasarrifiya was governed by a non-
Lebanese Ottoman Christian appointed by the Ottomans and was assisted 
by an administrative council consisting of 12 elected members. The 
members were divided equally between the Muslim sects (Sunni, Shi’i, and 
Druze) and the Christian sects (Maronite, Greek Orthodox, and Greek 
Catholic). This was the beginning of the confessional political model in 
Lebanon, where power-sharing was done on a sectarian basis. An 
amendment in 1864 modified this distribution to become seven Christians 
and five Muslims.  
The invisible sectarian borders continued to strengthen through the life of 
the Mutasarrifiya (1860-1920) and extended into the region’s work 
practices. According to Daher (2009), Muslims dominated occupations such 
as herbal medicine and house painting, and monopolized up to nine-tenths 
of food trading. Christians moved from being farmers and workers to 
become merchants.  
Traboulsi (2012) states that the number of silk-reeling factories increased 
from 67 in 1867 to 105 in 1885. About 14,500 workers filled these 
factories, 8,500 of which were Maronite, 2,500 Greek Catholics, 2,500 
Greek Orthodox, and 1,000 Druze. The dominance of the silk industry led 
to the decline of other industries and agriculture. The result was the 
emigration of almost one-third of the Mount Lebanon population between 
1860 and 1914 to the Beirut province or overseas. 
In contrast to Mount Lebanon, the Beirut province and its capital Beirut 
flourished. According to Traboulsi (2012), the city was the central 
economic hub in the area. Between 1830 and 1920, Beirut’s population 
tripled to reach 120,000. Most newcomers were Christians, constituting 
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60% of the total population by the beginning of the 20th century. The city 
was thriving with advanced infrastructure, progressive education, 
publications and publishing houses, and was very forward-thinking.  
Salibi (1976) explains that the calls for an independent Lebanon by 
Christian Maronites increased in the beginning of the 1900s but were faced 
with bloody retaliation from the Ottomans, especially during World War I. 
Compulsory military service was put in place and Ottomans expropriated 
wheat and livestock. Gold coins were replaced with paper notes and people 
were forced to invest in war bonds. Famine hit Beirut and Mount Lebanon 
hard, especially with the locust invasion in 1915, with the end result of 
over 100,000 killed by the end of World War One. 
According to Traboulsi (2012), the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement divided 
the Arab provinces of the defeated Ottoman Empire between Great Britain 
and France, as seen in Map 3-3 below. The French were interested in the 
Greater Syria area and advocated France’s claim over Greater Syria to 
defend the Christian minority rights. Such a claim was supported by the 
Christian Maronite Church. After little struggle, Lebanon was given its 
independence from the Ottoman Empire but came under complete French 
control in 1920.  
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Map 3-3: Division of former Ottoman Empire’s Arab provenances in accordance 
to Sykes-Picot Agreement (Stars and Stripes, 2014) 
 
On 26 April 1920, France was granted a mandate over Syria and Lebanon 
at the San Remo conference. On 1 September 1920, Greater Lebanon was 
established under the French mandate (Traboulsi, 2012), and the first 
Lebanese constitution was formulated on 23 May 1926 (Salibi, 1998).  
While the Christian Maronites were a strong majority of 70% of the 
population in the Ottoman’s Mount Lebanon, they were almost equal in 
number to the Muslims in Greater Lebanon (Salibi, 1998). The State of 
Greater Lebanon extended the borders of the Mount Lebanon (Christian 
Maronite majority) region to include the Beqaa Valley (mainly dominated 
by Shia Muslims), and the sea-coast cities of Tripoli, Beirut, Sidon 
(predominantly Muslim Sunni majority) and Tyre (primarily Shia Muslim 
occupants) (Crow, 1962). Although no sect was dominant in terms of 
population number, the Christian Maronites assumed political power as an 
inheritance from Mount Lebanon state (Crow, 1962).  
   87 
 
Map 3-4: Greater Lebanon based on Qaph (2013) 
 
The new parliamentary republic had a Greek Orthodox Christian president 
and a Sunni Muslim speaker of parliament, but all other key positions were 
given to Christian Maronites, which later extended to the presidency 
(Salibi, 1998). Salibi (1998, p. 36) explains the reason why Christian 
Maronites were not willing to view Muslims as political equals as “[in the 
eyes of the Maronites] Muslims were naturally susceptible to the strong 
influence of their co-religionists in other Arab countries, and could 
therefore not be trusted with the more sensitive political and administrative 
positions in Lebanon”. He then argues that “the Maronites actually behaved 
more as a tribe or tribal confederation with a special church than a purely 
religious community” (p. 41). He continues that the Maronites’ ability to 
develop relations with European states gave them an advantage over 
Muslim communities as well as other Christian sects.  
Economic, social and political injustices led to many Muslims rising up 
against the French and the Christian Maronites. According to Traboulsi 
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(2012), 111 public schools were closed by the Christian Maronite Prime 
Minister Edde in 1930, most of which were in Muslim-dominated areas. 
Edde, who was later elected to be president, also invited Muslims who did 
not want to live in Christian Lebanon to immigrate to Mecca.  
According to Ftouni (2013), with continuing calls for Lebanon’s 
independence, 1936 brought a promise of internal Lebanese independence 
whereby France would only control the country’s defence and foreign 
relationships. Solh (1988) explains that instead of uniting the Lebanese, 
the independence promise increased sectarian division as each sect 
demanded more political power under the umbrella of ‘preserving minority 
rights’ and ‘eliminating injustice’. The Muslims demanded the right to have 
a Muslim president, given that they constituted the majority of the 
population (Daher, 1979). To reduce the sectarian tension, Edde, the 
Christian Maronite president, appointed a Sunni Muslim as prime minister 
for the first time in 1937 (Ftouni, 2013).  
While World War One created the first stepping stone into shaping Lebanon 
as a state, the outbreak of World War Two and then the German occupation 
of France matured the conditions of Lebanon’s independence. The years 
between 1939 and 1943 witnessed a political tug-of-war between French 
and Lebanese politicians to enforce Lebanon’s independence treaty. France 
retaliated to the request for independence by suspending the constitution 
and dissolving the parliament in 1939 (Salibi, 1976). Lebanese politicians 
united and took unilateral steps towards independence by reactivating the 
constitution and setting new elections (Rabil, 2011). For the first time in 
the country’s history, the election allocated seats in parliament to each 
sect according to their representation in society. According to Hatti (1972), 
30 parliament seats were reserved for Christians, and 25 seats for Muslims. 
This 6/5 distribution remained the same until 1990, and was unaffected by 
demographic changes in the country (Traboulsi, 2012). According to 
Jonblat (2002), France did not digest these actions easily as it arrested the 
Lebanese political leaders, imposed a curfew, and sent troops to repress 
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the demonstrations that erupted from arresting the politicians. Takiy 
Aldeen (1953) explains that Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Iraq solicited the help 
of the British, who in return gave France an ultimatum to free the arrested 
politicians. Just a few hours before the ultimatum was to expire, France 
released the Lebanese leaders and declared Lebanon’s independence on 
the morning of 22 November 1943.  
3. 5. Lebanon: After independence (1943-1990) 
3. 5. 1. Building the state: 1943-1975 
According to Traboulsi (2012), Lebanon’s independence was established 
based on two founding documents; the first is a formal ‘independent’ 
constitution, and the second an informal verbal agreement known as the 
National Pact of 1943, which was announced in the Prime Minister’s speech 
in front of parliament on 7 October 1943. The speech carried an explicit 
promise to “eradicate sectarianism which is a tool used to diminish the 
Lebanese identity” (Ftouni, 2013, p. 110). The National Pact of 1943 was 
not aligned with the ideas expressed in the speech as it asserts that the 
president must be a Christian Maronite, the prime minister a Sunni Muslim, 
and the speaker of parliament a Shia Muslim. 
The 1951 Lebanese constitution did not differ from that of 1926 as although 
it established the civil, judicial and political equality of all Lebanese, it 
institutionalized judicial and political inequality as it considered Lebanese 
to be subjects belonging to “hierarchized religious communities with 
unequal access to political and public office” (Traboulsi, 2012, p. 110). 
Daher (1977) argues that the constitution ‘legalized’ religious sectarianism 
by providing each sect with its independence in civic matters such as 
marriage and heritage, among others. The constitution was a replica of 
that set by the coloniser enforcing the power given to Christian Maronites, 
ensuring that the sect’s superiority would continue even after the coloniser 
has gave Lebanon its independence, creating long-lasting division. 
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In addition, Traboulsi (2012) explains that the 1951 constitution gave the 
Christian Maronite president unlimited power, with the ability to appoint 
and dismiss ministers and the prime minister, veto legislation passed in 
the parliament, dissolve parliament and call for new elections as they 
desired. Article 60 of the constitution states that the president is 
unaccountable for his actions during office except in two cases: violation 
of the constitution and high treason. Article 95 enforces the already 
established 6:5 ratio in political and administrative representation between 
Christians and Muslims respectively. According to Ftouni (2013), the climax 
of embedding religious sectarianism in the Lebanese identity was the 1959 
Law No. 112, which explicitly specified the appointment of government and 
public administration employees based on Article 95. This law ascertained 
that one’s religious sect was the foremost important factor in getting hired, 
while qualifications and education were second.  
Traboulsi (2012) explains that the unlimited power enjoyed by the 
Christian Maronite president provided his extended family with power and 
consequently wealth. Some 30 families, called the consortium, held 
monopolistic powers over all axes of the Lebanese economy and increased 
their wealth through entry barriers and marriage ties. Out of these 30 
families, 24 were Christian with nine being Christian Maronite and seven 
being Christian Catholic. Six of these families were Muslims, with four 
Sunni Muslim, one being Shia, and one being Druze. Aside from controlling 
all sectors of the Lebanese economy and having an estimated wealth of 
more than 40% of Lebanon’s GDP in 1948, the consortium members were 
either parliament members, ministers, or both. The high injustice suffered 
by the Lebanese public led them to another revolt in 1952 where a 
prolonged general strike forced the president to resign, creating a new era 
in Lebanon’s history. In parallel, the Lebanese demographic was changing 
again. According to Traboulsi (2012), the 1948 Arab-Israeli War resulted 
in the migration of a large number of Palestinians, mostly Sunni Muslims, 
into Lebanon. The war also affected south Lebanon’s industry, which 
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collapsed due to the conflict on Lebanon’s southern borders. Many 
southerners, primarily Muslim Shia, migrated to Beirut and overseas.  
On 23 September 1952, the pro-western Christian Maronite Kamil 
Shamoun was elected as president. Although he promised to fight 
corruption and eliminate social injustice in his nomination speech, his 
exercise of power reached the level of autocracy (Jonblat, 2002), and he 
tasked himself to abolish any powers given to Muslims (Ftouni, 2013). 
According to Traboulsi (2012), while the Christian Maronite population was 
around 29% of the total Lebanese population at that time, they held more 
than half of all administrative posts. Shamoun took full control of both 
executive and legislative branches and “strengthened by foreign backing, 
the complicity of the bourgeoisie and Maronite mobilization, Shamoun 
exacerbated sectarian tensions as no other political leader had done 
before” (Traboulsi, 2012, p. 131).  
Ftouni (2013) explains that during his term (1958-1964), Foad Shihab, 
Shamoun’s successor, attempted to create a sectarian equilibrium rather 
than eradicating sectarianism. He limited the powers of sectarian-political 
leaders by establishing new services and agencies that were beyond the 
sectarian leaders’ control, and modified the sectarian composition in the 
administrative posts to include more Muslims.  
According to Rabil (2011), Helou’s era (1964-1970) was one filled with 
instability and deep political polarization. Christian leaders called for 
Muslim ‘foreigners’ – Syrians, Kurds, and Palestinians – to be expelled from 
Lebanon, yet similar calls were not made against Christian Armenians who 
fled Armenia due to the Ottoman massacres. Traboulsi (2012) explains 
that the Christians had an added tension towards the Palestinians as the 
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) stationed itself in southern 
Lebanon to launch their attacks against Israel, which the Christians feared 
would bring about Israeli retaliation. With the election of Sulayman 
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Franjiyeh as the new president in September 1970, sectarian conflict began 
to boil again until it exploded in 1975. 
The Christians, and more specifically the Christian Maronites, continued to 
dominate the economy over this period. Traboulsi (2012, p. 163) explains 
that: 
“At the end [of the] 1950s, Yusuf Sayigh [‘s research]… found 
that the ratio of Christians to Muslims was 10:2 in industry, 
11:2 in finance and 16:2 in services. In a later study in 1973, 
Boutros Labaki proved that these ratios had been sizably 
modified but remained quite uneven: 75.5 per cent 
Christians/24.5 per cent Muslims in commercial firms…, 67.5 
per cent/32.4 per cent in industrial firms, and 71 per cent/29 
per cent in the banking sector. Conversely, among the 
industrial working class, 75 per cent of the workers were 
Muslims, Shia in particular, against 25 per cent Christians, 
though the percentage of Christian wage earners would 
increase markedly when it came to service sector”. 
3. 5. 2. The civil war: 1975-1990 
As sectarian tensions heightened, the conflict concerning the PLO’s 
existence grew to a degree that demonstrations with and against the group 
spread across Lebanon in 1975. According to Traboulsi (2012), on 13 April 
1975 an anonymous car opened fire on the congregation of one of the 
Christian political parties, Al Kataeb, who were gathered in front of a 
church. Al Kataeb reacted by machine-gunning a bus carrying Palestinians, 
killing 21 of the bus riders.  
The incident turned into a 15-year war between Christians and Muslims 
(Fakhoury Mühlbacher, 2009). Traboulsi (2012) explains that “killing based 
on national ID” became very popular, where the fighting militias used the 
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religion written on targets’ national ID card as a method to determine if 
the holder was Christian or Muslim, and then killed him/her on that basis. 
The war divided the country into sectarian geographical areas, and 
Lebanon’s army into two sectarian armies (Ftouni, 2013).  
According to Buheiry (1987), the Lebanese civil war acted as an invitation 
for Lebanon’s neighbours, Syria and Israel, to justify their interference in 
the country. Syrian troops deployed in most of the Lebanese territories in 
June 1976, while Israel occupied most of Southern Lebanon in March 1978.  
Map 3-5: Lebanon’s Civil War Militias distribution in 1976 and 1983, adapted 
from Fochler-Hauke (1976) 
 
Salibi (1998) explains that in the South and Bekaa, Shia Muslims realized 
that Israel planned to stay, and the ‘Hope Movement’, led by Nabih Birri, 
started a massive resistance in these areas. With Birri’s approval to 
participate in the National Salvation Committee alongside the Lebanese 
President, a separation group from the Hope Movement came to life, and 
Hezbollah was established as a second Muslim Shia militia – an Iranian-
funded, trained and supported ‘defender’ against Israel (Nagel, 2002).  
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What is notable in the Lebanese civil war is that when the militias finished 
cleansing their territories of outsiders based on sectarian, political and 
ethnic boundaries, they turned on their own sects to memoricide them, 
that is “the eradication of all memories of coexistence and common 
interests among Lebanese” (Traboulsi, 2012, p. 240). With the territories 
cleansed, the militias started their struggle with other militias from the 
same sect.  
Krayem (2006) explains that in 1989 the USA successfully brokered a deal 
with delegates from the Arab League to end the Lebanese civil war in the 
Saudi city of Taif, which was signed on 22 October 1989. Elias Harawi then 
became the president of Lebanon, and all militias, except Hezbollah, were 
disarmed. On 21 September 1990, a new constitution was drafted to 
incorporate the Taif Agreement reforms. The unlimited powers of the 
president were reduced and shared among the prime minister, the cabinet, 
the speaker of the house and parliament.  
While the constitution abolished the sectarian quotas, they still exist to this 
day as an unwritten agreement between the political leaders. The Taif 
Agreement ended the 15-year civil war but was not able to abolish the 
sectarian spatial segregation in Lebanon itself, nor was it able to eradicate 
the sectarian social identity among the Lebanese people (Traboulsi, 2012).  
3. 5. 3. Post-Civil-War Era (1975 – 2015) 
The demographic distribution of sects was impacted heavily during the 15-
year civil war. The Shia, previously located in southern Lebanon and the 
Bekaa area, fled Israeli occupied southern Lebanon and expanded their 
presence into Beirut’s southern suburbs and the Hermel area (north-east 
Lebanon) (Salamey, 2009). Many Christians fled their villages in the Mount 
Lebanon area to East Beirut’s suburbs as they feared Druz retaliation after 
the assassination of their key leader in 1977 (Nagel, 2002). The capital 
Beirut, largely occupied by Christian Catholics and Sunni Muslims, was 
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transformed into a city inhabited by various religious sects, yet each 
confined to own-acclaimed geographic territory. The war created invisible 
sectarian geographic borders within Lebanon, where geographic areas 
were largely inhabited by same-sect or same-religion Lebanese. The new 
election law followed that pattern as well. For example, the South Lebanon 
district, which has a predominantly Shia Muslim presence, has 23 
parliament members, out of which 14 are required by law to be Shia 
Muslim.  
Map 3-6: Lebanon’s religious distribution map (Ministry of Tourism, 2013) 
 
According to Kingston (2013), the Taif Agreement managed to end the civil 
war, yet sectarian boundaries between the Lebanese increased. Moussa 
(2011) explains that most Christians boycotted the 1992 parliamentary 
elections as they felt unrest due to the fact that one Christian Maronite 
leader was in prison and another in exile. Most Christian Maronites felt 
deceived as they had lost their political power due to the Taif Agreement, 
which forced them to share it with the remaining sects. While the new era 
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focused on rebuilding the state, it was filled with contradicting socio-
political forces. The same militias that were fighting during the war 
participated in the building of the state. For example, the Hope Movement’s 
leader Nabih Birri has been the speaker of the house of parliament since 
20 November 1992 to the present day.  
According to Salti and Chaaban (2010), the 1992 elections carried with 
them the election of Sunni Muslim Rafic Hariri as prime minister. Hariri’s 
ambitious plan to rebuild the country emphasized the transformation of 
Lebanon from a war-torn country to a regional commercial and banking 
hub. In order to rebuild Lebanon, Hariri formed bonds with the former 
militias leaders, who were now members of parliament and political 
leaders, by establishing their ‘share in the cake’. No project could be 
passed in either the parliament or the cabinet without determining their 
shares in that project first. This also extended to administrative posts and 
high-ranked positions where people were given jobs based on their 
relationship with the sect’s leader, now called the political leader. The price 
for guaranteeing political cooperation was unprecedented large-scale 
corruption. Salti and Chaaban (2010) then evidence the allocation of public 
capital expenditure between 1996 and 2005 to the religious sects’ areas in 
accordance to the sects’ percentage of the total population. For example, 
the Muslim Druze constituted 6% of the total population at that period, and 
consequently, geographic areas predominantly inhabited by the Druze 
received 6% of public expenditure in the same period. Such sectarian 
division of funds extended to welfare. Cammett (2014) states that 
Lebanese welfare agencies that ‘belonged’ to a certain sect would only 
cater to the needs of the Lebanese who followed their sect, thus securing 
the votes needed for elections.  
According to Delatolla (2016), the Taif agreement allowed the Syrian Army 
to maintain a presence in Lebanon to preserve stability – a presence that 
was not viewed favourably by some sects as it controlled mostly every 
political and economic aspect of the country. The assassination of Harari 
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on 14 February 2005 ignited a new division in the country. Hariri’s followers 
and allies accused Syria of killing him. With increased pressure from the 
Lebanese public, Syria announced that it would withdraw its troops from 
Lebanon ‘in few months’ on 2 March 2005. According to Traboulsi (2012), 
Pro-Syrian groups, namely the Hope Movement and Hezbollah, organized 
a rally on 8 March to thank Syria (known hereafter as 8-Match Movement). 
A pro-Hariri group (known hereafter as 14-March Movement) responded 
on 14 March of the same year by organizing the Cider Revolution, which 
called for Lebanon’s real independence from all foreign forces, including 
Syria and Iran, and the establishment of an international commission that 
would investigate Hariri’s assassination. Syria completed its troops’ 
withdrawal from Lebanon on 26 April 2005 and the United Nation declared 
UNSC Resolution 1595 to investigate Hariri’s assassination. The country 
was deeply divided between these two forces: the Shia Hope Movement 
and Hezbollah joined by Christian Maronite Free Patriotic Movement on one 
side, and the Christian Maronite’s Lebanese Forces, the Muslim Sunni 
Future Movement, and the Muslim Druze Progressive Socialist Party on the 
other. Both sides used their relative sects as political leverage against the 
other. Political and even violent clashes occurred afterwards. For example, 
the Muslim Shia Hezbollah and Hope Movement ministers resigned from 
the cabinet in November 2006 when it approved a UN tribunal aimed to 
trial Hariri’s assassins, named as Hezbollah members. The 8-March 
Movement used its parliamentary powers and military presence to control 
Lebanon and to obstruct presidential elections. Lebanon had no president 
between October 2007 and May 2008 and between May 2014 and October 
2016 due to such powers. The struggle between the two movements 
continues to the present day. 
3. 6. Conclusion 
This chapter has provided an examination of Lebanon’s history – a history 
that is rife with sectarian conflict and power struggle. This examination 
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reveals that the most dominant social context in Lebanon is religious 
sectarianism to the degree that it has replaced the Lebanese identity in the 
society. While the colonial experience was present in Lebanon, it was not 
the root of religious sectarianism, as such division was evident since early 
1800s. Unlike other counties where the colonizer had to enforce the idea 
of dominant-inferior groups based on social contexts, this notion was 
already established in Lebanon, where the Maronite viewed themselves as 
superior. The presence of the colonizer only enforced this view but added 
to the intensity of the vertical division between the sects.  
According to Haddad (2002), Lebanese people are identified by, and 
identify others by, their affiliation to a religious sect first and then use other 
social attributes to complete their cultural identity. Was such an affiliation 
extended to the accounting profession? Did sectarianism influence the 
development of the accounting profession in Lebanon? Did sectarianism 
permeate into the accounting profession as it did all of Lebanese society, 
or did the profession managed to ‘escape’ this fate?  
Before answering these questions, it is important to note that the Neo-
Weberian theory of closure by itself might fall short when examining the 
accounting profession in Lebanon and its professionalisation process. They 
closure theory would provide how exclusion of the ‘ineligibles’ was 
implemented during the professionalisation process, but do not extend 
beyond the stage where the occupation becomes a profession. It simply 
does not explain ‘what happens after’ the process is completed. It is also 
important to note that exclusionary practices discussed in Chapter Two 
were done based on visible physical appearances (colour, tone of skin, 
shape, gender). If we assume that religious sect was/is the basis for 
exclusion in the accounting profession in Lebanon, then how to differentiate 
using physical appearances between people of different faiths? To better 
explain how to overcome these two points, the next chapter presents the 
methodology undertaken by this research, where the closure theory is 
triangulated with STD and TEC. 
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Chapter 4. Research Purpose, Methodology, 
and Importance 
4. 1. Introduction 
As discussed in the previous chapter, sectarianism has permeated all 
aspects of Lebanese society since the 1840s, leading to many civil wars 
resulting in high human casualties and devastation to the country’s 
infrastructure. Has religious sectarianism played, and continued to play, a 
role in constructing and reconstructing the accounting profession in 
Lebanon? And if so, to what extent? This chapter endeavours to answer 
these questions by first providing the research purpose and then 
presenting the theoretical framework through which the research can be 
conducted. The chapter then explains the methods that will be utilized to 
answer the research purpose. The chapter concludes by highlighting the 
importance of this research. 
4. 2. Research purpose 
The purpose of this research is to examine the development of the 
accounting profession in the ex-Ottoman, an ex-French colony of Lebanon, 
while considering the role played by religious sectarianism in shaping and 
defining the accounting profession. The aim is to fill two major gaps in 
accounting research: geographic location and social construct.  
Lebanon does not fall into the ‘traditional’ accounting profession locations 
examined by researchers. Research on the development of the accounting 
profession has been mostly confined to Anglo-Saxon settings and specific 
historical periods (Carmona, 2004; Fleischman and Radcliffe, 2005; 
Walker, 2005; Napier, 2009; Al-Akra and Marashdeh, 2009; Matamoros 
and Gutierrez-Hidalgo, 2010) with no consideration given to other 
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historiographies (Carmona and Zan, 2002). Walker (2005) examines 
publications in accounting history between 1945 and 2002, and provides 
evidence that out of 521 published materials, 44% were written in English, 
38% chose the twentieth century as a time period, and 68% selected 
Europe as a geographic location. Accounting history research performed in 
non-Anglo-Saxon settings by non-Anglo-Saxon scholars and covering an 
era that differs from the norm of 1850-1945, is, as Carmona (2004) points 
out, neglected by international journals, leading to problems in the 
dissemination of knowledge.  
A social construct is the perception of society towards an idea, object, 
individual, or group based on the collective adopted views of that society 
(Turner 2008). It is the way the society views, reacts and interacts with 
these ideas, objects, individuals and groups. Some of the social constructs 
in a society include gender (Risman, 2004; Glenn, 1999), race and 
ethnicity (Shih et al., 2007; Andreasen, 2000), cultural identity (Campbell, 
2000; Eisenstadt and Giesen, 1995), and religion (Beckford, 2003).  
In recent years, some researchers have examined the impact of 
colonization and race (for example, Hammond et al., 2009 and 2012; 
Poullaos, 2009-b; Walker, 2008; Chua and Poullaos, 2002; Carnegie and 
Parker, 1999; Richardson, 1997; Graig and Jenkins, 1996; Hammond and 
Streeter, 1994), and gender (for example, Khalifa and Kirkham, 2009; 
Hantrais, 1995; Kirkham, 1992; Lehman, 1992; Thane, 1992; Loft, 1992, 
and Roberts and Coutts, 1992) on the project to professionalize 
accounting. Many of these studies have examined former British colonies 
(for example, Bakre, 2005, 2006 and 2013; Sian, 2006 and 2007; Verma 
and Gray, 2006; Uche, 2002; Annisette, 1999, 2000 and 2003). Few have 
addressed former US (Dyball et al., 2007; Dyball et al., 2006) or French 
colonies (Zakari, 2013; El Omari, 2009; Boolaky and Jallow, 2008, El Omari 
and Saboly, 2005). None, to the researcher’s knowledge, has examined 
the impact of religion and sectarianism on the development of the 
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accounting profession or the accounting professionalization project in 
Lebanon.  
Carmona and Ezzamel (2009) quote the works of Durkheim (1976) and 
Suárez (2004) in identifying the high influence of religion on human 
behaviour and social life. They identify the role religion has played in 
shaping professional activities such as architecture and banking. However, 
religion, as a contextual level of analysis in accounting history, has only 
been examined either as affecting accounting practice in businesses and 
organizations (McGuire et al., 2012; Maali et al., 2006; Gao and Handley-
Schachler, 2003; Sukoharsono, 1998; Karim, 1990), or in terms of its role 
in religious institutions such as churches and temples (Leardini and Rossi, 
2013; Wissler, 2013; Liyanarachchi, 2009; Ezzamel, 2005; Jacobs, 2005; 
Booth, 1993). Cordery (2015) examines research conducted using religion 
as a focus in accounting history and has found that, while this research is 
scarce, there is growing interest in the field. She summarizes previous and 
current interests to include early accounting (antecedents), organizational 
resources (sacred-secular), and institutions (religious enterprises), noting 
that “European studies and those from Christendom predominate in both 
micro- and macro-perspectives” (p. 23).  
Two research examples have evidenced the exclusion of individuals from 
early Canadian (Edwards and Walker, 2008) and early Irish (Annisette and 
O’Regan, 2007) accounting professions based on religious belonging, 
among other spatial and demographic factors. The research presented in 
the current thesis differs from these examples as it explores the potential 
continuing role of religious sectarianism in constructing and reconstructing 
the accounting profession in Lebanon. To fill the gaps of geographic 
location and social construct, in the context of Lebanon, a theoretical 
framework is suggested in the following section.  
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4. 3. Theoretical framework  
This research undertakes the neo-Weberian critical perspective of the 
sociology of the profession, namely Birkett and Evans’ (2005) 
professionalization model which is discussed in Chapter Two. In addition, 
this research adopts two perspectives from sociology that complement 
each other and provide a better understanding of social attitudes and 
intergroup relations, one of which is social dominance theory (SDT), while 
the other is the theory of ethnic conflict (TEC). This section introduces 
these two sociological theories and explains the motives for examining the 
development of the accounting profession through their lenses.    
4. 3. 1. Background of the theoretical framework 
When exploring history, Parker (1999, p. 18) advises that the research 
must be primarily concerned with answering questions such as “what 
was?”, “why was that so?”, and “what follows from this past?”. Napier 
(2009-a, p. 40) calls for “broadening conceptions of accounting” and 
“widening arenas for accounting” by considering social constructs. Farcas 
and Tiron Tudor (2015) present two main approaches for examining the 
development of the accounting profession in the literature on accounting 
history: chronological evolution and theme/role. The theme/role approach, 
which calls for examining the professionalization project while considering 
social constructs, has been advocated and utilized heavily (by, for 
example, Hoskin and Macve, 1986; Miller and O’Leary, 1987; Hopwood, 
1987; Previts et al., 1990-a, 1990-b; Miller et al., 1991; and Napier, 2001 
and 2009) as exhibited in Chapter Two.  
Carnegie (2014) argues that accounting should be examined in the context 
it operates within, and advocates utilizing established theories from other 
disciplines to examine the accounting professionalization project due to the 
interdisciplinary nature of accounting history. Historiographies of 
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accounting history research include various categories (Farcas and Tiron 
Tudor, 2015), within each of which is a wide range of topics in which 
researchers ‘borrow’ theoretical understandings from other disciplines and 
then utilize these understandings to explore issues in accounting history 
(Gaffikin, 2015). Poullaos (2009-a) explains that accounting 
professionalization research relies heavily on sociology, mainly on the 
sociology of the profession, by utilizing the ideas of Marx, Durkheim, and 
predominantly Weber.  
The introduction of sociological thought into the examination of the 
profession was pioneered by Willmott in 1986 (Willmott 1986) and has 
been used by many accounting historians such as Albu (2013) and 
Gallhofer and Haslam (2004). Since Willmott’s important contribution, 
there has been a growing number of studies which have contributed to our 
understanding of accounting’s past, through an examination of the impact 
played by social constructs such as gender, race, and imperialism as 
discussed in Chapter Two. Exploitation, discrimination, and inequalities are 
the main themes in these concepts, where exclusion, repression, and 
oppression of the ‘others’ were exercised to dismiss these others from the 
accounting profession.   
The researchers who pioneered the inquiry into the accounting profession 
development under these social constructs introduced new theoretical 
perspectives to shed light on the phenomena under examination. For 
example, Kirkham and Loft (1993) utilize discourse analysis to highlight 
the dominance of the male gender in the historical settings of the 
accounting profession in the United Kingdom during the early 1900s, while 
Sian (2006, 2007) uses a framework of social inclusion and exclusion when 
examining the use of accounting practices in relation to racial exploitation 
during the mid-1900s. Such studies illustrate the importance of both the 
historical and social construct within which the development of the 
accounting profession is observed. While these theoretical approaches of 
discourse and social inclusion and exclusion provide valuable insights, they 
   104 
 
are context-specific. Adapting these two theoretical perspectives, which 
were developed to examine specific social constructs, may result in an 
incomplete analysis of the effect of religious sectarianism on the accounting 
professionalization project in Lebanon since they do not consider religion 
as a social construct.  
As discussed in Chapter Three, this research has identified, through careful 
and detailed consideration of Lebanon’s history, religious sectarianism as 
the dominant social construct in Lebanon. Lebanese society is highly 
influenced by sectarianism: it governs all aspects of everyday life and 
extends to the workplace, the political environment, and the self-
awareness of the Lebanese individual. The Lebanese religious sects have 
displayed excessive and extreme craving for power through civil and 
violent events throughout Lebanon’s history, and have used such power to 
exhibit their ‘superiority’ over the other sects.  
There is evidence in the literature that religious belonging, among other 
attributes, impacts the standard of life for individuals. For example, 
Khattab (2009) obtains evidence from the UK 2001 Census to establish 
that skin colour, religion and ethnicity (to a certain degree) play a major 
role in sustaining disadvantage in educational and occupational realization 
in Britain. From the data collected, he was able to conclude that Jewish 
white-British, non-religious white-British and Christian white-British were 
advantaged in terms of educational and professional attainment. He points 
out that Christian black-African and Christian black-Caribbean were 
advantaged in educational attainment but not in occupational realization. 
He also argues that Muslim-Pakistanis, Muslim-Bangladeshis, Muslim-
whites, and Sikh-Indians were disadvantaged in educational attainment 
and occupational realization. Similarly, Walls and Williams (2003) find 
evidence of sectarian discrimination in employment against Irish Catholics 
in Glasgow when they interviewed a sample from the two oldest cohorts of 
the West of Scotland Twenty-07 Study. Aunger (1975) was able to 
evidence occupational class difference in Northern Ireland between 
   105 
 
Protestants, who were skilled and dominated upper occupational classes, 
and Catholics, who were predominantly semi-skilled or unskilled and were 
in the lower occupational classes.  
These findings of the effect of religious sectarianism on the workplace and 
standard of living in the UK may be echoed in the research question, i.e. 
did/does religious sectarianism influence the development of the 
accounting profession in Lebanon? They also generate other questions. 
How is the social construct of religion viewed in Lebanon and by Lebanese 
society? How do members of the accounting profession interact with the 
profession and with members belonging to the other religions and other 
religious sects? Did such interaction affect the accounting profession? To 
answer these questions while utilizing the calls of Carnegie (2014), 
Poullaos (2009-a), and Willmott (1986) to ‘borrow’ from sociological 
theories to examine professions, the following sections introduce two 
sociological theories that are utilized in this research to examine the role 
played by religious sectarianism on the development of the accounting 
profession in Lebanon: social dominance theory (SDT) and the theory of 
ethnic conflict (TEC). While each of these theories stands by itself, they 
also complement each other.   
4. 3. 2. Social dominance theory 
Sidanius, Pratto, Van Laar and Levin (2004, p. 846) explain STD as: 
“Social dominance theory… focuses on both individual and 
structural factors that contribute to various forms of group-
based oppression. The theory views all of the familiar forms of 
group-based oppression (e.g., group-based discrimination, 
racism, ethnocentrism, classism, sexism) as special cases of a 
more general tendency for humans to form and maintain group-
based hierarchy. Rather than merely asking why people 
stereotype, why people are prejudiced, why they discriminate, 
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or why they believe the world is just and fair, social dominance 
theory asks why human societies tend to be organized as group-
based hierarchies.” 
SDT argues that human societies are “structured as systems of group-
based social hierarchies” (Sidanius and Pratto 1999, p. 31) with three 
distinct stratification systems of age, gender, and arbitrary-set (Sidanius 
& Pratto, 1999). Within this arbitrary-set system, people are classified into 
“socially constructed and highly salient groups based on characteristics 
such as… religious sect” (Sidanius and Pratto, 1999, p. 33). In such 
societies, people construct their social identity based on “race, nationality, 
class, ethnicity and religion” (Sidanius et al., 2004, p. 863). This system is 
usually accompanied by high degrees of viciousness, violence, and 
brutality (Sidanius and Pratto, 1999) similar to the several sectarian wars 
and the various armed conflicts throughout Lebanon’s history, such as in 
the 1860s, 1950s and the fifteen-year civil war beginning in 1975 (as 
discussed in Chapter Three).  
Society, according to SDT, is divided into dominant social groups who enjoy 
positive social value and subordinate groups who suffer from negative 
social value (Pratto et al., 2006). According to Sidanius et al. (2004, p. 
847): 
“Social dominance theory notes that chronic group-based 
oppression is driven by systematic institutional and individual 
discrimination. That is, many social institutions (e.g., schools, 
organized religions, marriage practices, financial houses) and 
many powerful individuals disproportionately allocate desired 
goods – such as prestige, wealth, power, food, and health care 
– to members of dominant and privileged groups, while directing 
undesirable things – such as dangerous work, disdain, 
imprisonment, and premature death – toward members of less 
powerful groups.” 
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It is argued that to preserve social dominance legitimizing myths, such as 
fate, superiority, and nationalism, are used by the dominant groups to 
maintain group-based inequality (Pratto and Stewart, 2011). Such 
inequality is driven by systematic institutional and individual 
discrimination, where social institutions allocate desired goods and power 
to the dominant groups’ members (Sidanius et al., 2004). These myths are 
advocated for by social institutions such as religious establishments, 
financial bodies, and educational organizations, where these institutions 
engage in promoting values and stereotypes to justify these practices 
(Pratto et al., 2006). This is evident in the case of Lebanon, where the 
Muslim Druze monopolized high-ranking government positions until the 
mid-1800s when Christian Maronites gained power and became the 
dominant sect, exercising unlimited power over all the other religious sects. 
Such dominance is lost, as explained in Chapter Three, when other groups 
use peaceful and non-peaceful methods to reclaim dominance.  
4. 3. 3. Theory of ethnic conflict 
While STD explains the division of society into dominant and subordinate 
groups based on social constructs and legitimizing myths, TEC provides an 
in-depth analysis for such division. In a similar manner to the division 
described in STD, Horowitz (1985), in his Theory of Ethnic Conflict, views 
Lebanon as a deeply divided society where “the ethnic identity of each sect 
was specified” (p. 633), and as “a system that depended upon and 
exacerbated pre-existing subethnic cleavages, based on family, clan, and 
region” (p. 634) where “ethnic hostility was strong” (p. 635). Horowitz 
(1998) explains that ethnicity is a primordial affiliation, a collective 
belonging to a group that has common descent, language, history, culture, 
race, religion, or a combination of these elements. Members of the ethnic 
group derive their own self-esteem from the ethnic group and view any 
success of the group or a member of the group as their own. This is evident 
in the case of Lebanon as the Lebanese national identity is substituted by 
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a sect-belonging, whereby sect members have high trust levels in other 
members of the same sect and, conversely, low trust levels in members of 
other sects.  
According to Horowitz (1998), ethnicity extends beyond individual 
belonging and is reflected in deeply divided societies in the form of a 
segmented organizational structure of economic and political 
organizations. The confessional political system adopted in Lebanon is a 
vivid example of this segmentation: specific high-ranking positions within 
the government and administrations are ‘reserved’ for certain sects, 
regardless of qualifications and suitability.  
Horowitz (1985) suggests that ethnic conflict is a result of economic 
competition between ethnically differentiated groups of the working class, 
either because of underbidding of labour or because of the monopolistic 
position of one of the ethnic groups. According to Horowitz (1985), in 
deeply divided societies capital and labour are organized on ethnic lines, 
where these societies are controlled by one or another ethnic group. He 
explains (p. 108): 
“The ethnic division of labour … [is the] ethnic specialisation of 
occupation in general; the phenomenon is not confined to labour 
in the narrow sense. The concentration of particular ethnic 
groups in particular sectors of the economy and in particular 
occupations within sectors is a feature of many societies, but it 
reaches its apogee in the ex-colonial countries. There, ethnic-
occupational differentiation may be elaborately organized.” 
Such dominance over occupations is manifest throughout Lebanon’s 
history, as explained in Chapter Three. Between 1860 and 1920, Christians 
dominated administrative jobs and the silk trade, while Muslims 
monopolized certain occupations such as herbal medicine and the food 
trade. Horowitz (1985) clarifies that such occupational specialization is 
supported by a diverse set of public policies and private practices such as 
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education and recruitment, which themselves are constructed in part by 
ethnicity. After Lebanon’s independence in 1943, and before the 1975 civil 
war, Christian Maronites dominated almost every aspect of Lebanon as the 
Maronite presidents possessed unlimited powers which were used to 
allocate most of government spending in their sect’s geographic areas. 
The ethnic division of labour is cemented by the ethnic relations of family, 
close friends, and members of the same ethnic group who work towards 
locating economic opportunities from kinsmen; this leads to the 
preservation of certain occupations among one ethnic group or another 
(Horowitz, 1985), which could explain the monopolistic powers held by the 
30-families consortium in Lebanon between 1943 and 1975 (as discussed 
in Chapter Three). Horowitz (1985) concludes that ethnic division of labour 
is a result of colonial and contemporary policies, stereotypes of group 
qualifications for occupations, and (a)scriptive factors in economic 
relations. Both the Ottomans and the French provided, respectively, the 
Muslim Druze and the Christian Maronites with power by setting policies 
aimed at the establishment and maintenance of such power. This power 
was then used by the ruling sect to dominate other sects.  
Horowitz’s (1985) ethnic division of labour is vivid throughout Lebanon’s 
history. During the Ottoman Era, the Muslim Druze enjoyed monopolistic 
powers over administrative offices and ownership of silk factories, yet lost 
these powers at the end of the Ottoman rule to Christian Maronites 
(Traboulsi, 2012). The Christian Maronite then enjoyed privileges that 
included better education, easier access to employment, and monopolistic 
powers over administrative offices, trade, and business 
management/ownership during the French Era and then from 
independence until the outbreak of civil war in 1975. According to Traboulsi 
(2012), the Muslim Shia, during the same period, were viewed as 
‘peasants’, but began to demand more rights in education and employment 
after the establishment of the ‘Hope Movement’ during the civil war. He 
suggests that they finally managed to be viewed as ‘equal’ and even 
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‘superior’ after the end of the civil war due to the armed presence of the 
Hope Movement and Hezbollah. 
Horowitz’s theory of ethnic conflict (1985) has been employed by various 
researchers when examining the effects of sectarianism. For example, 
Shirlow (2003) studies the influence of economic and cultural sectarianism 
in Belfast, Nasr (2000) examines the impact of sectarianism on identity 
mobilization in Pakistan, while Al-Qarawee (2012) analyses the effect of 
sectarianism on collective identities in Iraq. More pertinently, the theory of 
ethnic conflict has been applied when examining the effect of sectarianism 
in Lebanon on the allocation of welfare (Cammett and Issar, 2010; 
Cammett, 2014), the public sphere (Corstange, 2012), voting rights 
(Corstange, 2013), elections (Salloukh, 2006), socio-political attitudes 
(Haddad, 2001), and power sharing (Hudson, 1997). 
While discriminating social constructs such as race, gender, and colour 
have been used to establish and maintain a monopolistic position over 
professions in and from other countries (as discussed in Chapter Two), 
Horowitz (1985) suggests that ethnicity in particular can be used to gain 
and maintain monopolistic positions in professions by creating high barriers 
of entry and exit. Such a suggestion provides the basis for investigating 
the effects of sectarianism on the accounting professionalization project in 
Lebanon by examining exclusionary strategies in the closure process. This 
is achieved by examining the members of the sects participating in the 
profession, and then inspecting their possible use of sectarian power to 
strengthen their sect’s position within the profession, while observing if 
religious sectarianism was and/or is used in Lebanon as a method to 
exclude/include people on sectarian grounds.  
4. 3. 4. Conclusion 
The theoretical framework developed in this research is based on the neo-
Weberian critical perspective of the sociology of the profession, which 
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focuses on the closure of the profession using exclusionary strategies 
towards ‘outsiders’. More specifically, the research in this thesis utilizes 
Birkett and Evans’ (2005) professionalization model which outlines the 
professionalization strategies used by occupational associations to attain 
conditions of professional power, association control, and sustaining 
ideology while managing the dependencies of work, market and the state. 
This model would explain how exclusionary practices were put in place to 
exclude the ‘ineligibles’ during the professionalization process, but falls 
short in explaining why the ‘ineligibles’ were excluded.  In other words, the 
Birkett and Evan’s model explains the ‘how’ but not the ‘why’. To overcome 
this shortage, the theoretical framework presented here integrates the 
Birkett and Evan’s model with STC and TEC. STC suggests that societies 
can be divided into group-based social hierarchies that use social 
constructs. TEC attributes the creation of such hierarchies to the economic 
competition between socially-differentiated groups, where ethnicity is used 
as the joining factor between members of the same group.  
In addition to examining the accounting professionalization project in 
Lebanon using Birkett and Evans’ (2005) model, the theoretical framework 
in this chapter also considers the potential role played by religious 
sectarianism on the profession by using SDT to assess whether there is a 
sectarian influence that would create a division within the profession and 
TEC to examine the reasons behind this division. This entails examining 
the inception of accounting as an occupation during the 1930s until the 
legal recognition of accounting as a profession in 1994, and then 
throughout its young life until 2015.  
The next section details the methods used in this research to investigate 
the development of the accounting profession in Lebanon using the 
suggested framework. 
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4. 4. Research methodology  
Previts, Parker and Coffman (1990-b) provide a classification guide to help 
accounting history researchers consider the most appropriate research 
method relating to the topic under investigation. They first categorize study 
areas such as biography, institutional history, development of thought, 
general history, critical history, and historiography. The critical history 
study area “adopts a perspective inclined towards criticism in examining 
the role of an historical factor in the context of conflicting social, political, 
economic, and institutional interaction” (Previts et al., 1990-b, p. 142). 
They then present various methodological techniques that accounting 
historians can utilize in their research, including celiometrics, empirical 
approaches, content analysis, case-method field-based research, and oral 
history, while emphasizing that the problem being examined defines the 
method used. Carnegie and Napier (1996, p. 17) call for “using 
accounting’s past to put the present into context and as a data bank of 
solutions to the current problem, and interpreting the past through 
currently fashionable theoretical perspectives”. Like Previts et al. (1990-
a), they present an extensive list of topic areas with suggestions about the 
sources that the accounting historian can seek. While they note that 
accounting history is largely document-based, they suggest the use of oral 
history, i.e. a history which “is concerned with capturing the oral 
reminiscences of individuals interviewed by the historian” (Carnegie and 
Napier, 1996, p. 28). Collins and Bloom (1991) highlight the importance of 
oral history in providing a better analysis and a unique perspective of the 
issue under inquiry. Similarly, Hammond and Sikka (1996) advocate the 
use of oral history as a method to overcome the limitation of the one-way 
communication of a written record. 
Parker (1999) explains that oral history was frequently used up to the end 
of the eighteenth century, when it was discarded in favour of documented 
history. He then calls for the use of oral history as a means to better assess 
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the topic examined, and to give a voice to the ‘unheard’. Since then, many 
accounting history researchers have relied on oral history to capture 
valuable information, such as gender inequality (Emery et al., 2002; 
Johnston and Kyriacou, 2011), experiences of the disabled (Duff and 
Ferguson, 2011), and racial discrimination (Hammond et al., 2012). 
However, oral history has its limitations since it constrains the researchers 
with interviewees who are alive and retain good mental capabilities to 
remember the past (McKeen and Richardson, 1998). In addition, oral 
histories may be tampered by faulty memory or personal perception and 
motivation (Hammond and Sikka, 1996).  
Collins and Bloom (1991, pp. 25-26) suggest a process that researchers 
may follow when gathering oral history which includes: 
• Identification of sources available 
• Selection of knowledgeable persons as interviewees 
• Preliminary research of relevant literature 
• Conducting the interview with flexibility. 
This research undertakes a mixed methodology, in which data is gathered 
from quantitative and qualitative approaches simultaneously. The following 
sections discuss these approaches in details. 
4. 4. 5. The qualitative approach 
The qualitative data is gathered by conducting semi-structured oral history 
interviews with eight selected members of the Lebanese Association of 
Certified Public Accountants (LACPA). The semi-structured questions are 
presented in Appendix II. Translated archival material from Arabic are 
presented in Appendix IV. 
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4.4.5.1. Sample selection 
Each member was selected based on his/her ability to provide in-depth 
information relating to the establishment and operational continuity of 
LACPA. To ensure diversity, the interviewees were from various religious 
sects. Eight other members were contacted for interview, but either 
declined or postponed indefinitely using ‘workload’ or ‘travel’ as excuses 
even though repeated interview requests were made over a period of six 
months.  
The reasons for choosing oral history to collect data for this research are 
twofold. Lebanon’s civil war (1975-1990) has destroyed most of the 
archives. As discussed later, the headquarters of LACPA was burnt during 
the civil war, leaving no archival material. However, some of the 
association’s members provided valuable archival materials which they 
preserved in their personal homes or offices. The second factor is the 
nature of Lebanese society, where information is mostly oral rather than 
written, especially when it relates to sectarian issues. Many power-sharing 
schemes that are based on sectarianism in Lebanon are verbal rather than 
written agreements. Many Lebanese would discuss openly the effect of 
sectarianism, but few research studies have been conducted on this issue. 
Due to limited archival material and written documents, oral history 
provides the most suitable method to collect the memories of the people 
who recall the construction and reconstruction of the accounting profession 
in Lebanon (1930s-2015).  
The choice of the interviewee was also twofold. The first attempts towards 
the accounting professionalization project began in 1964, although the 
profession did not receive legal recognition by the Lebanese state until 
1994. Few people who experienced this period of the professionalization 
project are still alive, and of those who are alive, very few have the ability 
to remember historical details accurately. Given these reasons, 
Interviewee Wael Abou Shakra was selected because he still has the full 
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mental capability to remember the events of that period (1930-1994), 
during which he presided over the first accounting association between 
1977 and 1992 and was present when LACPA was established. Interviewee 
Afif Sharara was interviewed since he attempted to preserve the historical 
archival materials of that period and interviewed many of the pioneers who 
called for the professionalization project of accounting and were members 
of the first association. To preserve the archival material and the memories 
of the pioneers, Interviewee Afif Sharara published some of them in a book 
cited in this thesis as Sharara (2006).  
The remaining interviewees were selected to cover the remaining period, 
i.e. 1992 to 2015. For example, Interviewee Mouwafak El Yafi was 
president of LACPA during 1995-2000, 2002-2003, and 2010, and was the 
only Muslim Sunni to occupy that role. Interviewee Gina Chammas is the 
only female president in the history of LACPA; she was elected to the role 
in 2011. She had major conflicts with her successor as president, 
Interviewee Amin Saleh, who was also interviewed for this research. The 
remaining interviewees participated on the LACPA board during the period 
1992-2015 as members, treasurer, vice presidents, and/or secretary. 
Many of these members served for years on the board, as will be discussed 
in Chapter Seven. The signed consent by the interviewees to be quoted 
and named in this research are in Appendix II, with the exception of 
Interviewee El Yafi and Interviewee Abou Shakra who provided verbal 
consent. The interviewees will be cited throughout the remaining chapters 
as Interviewee X to distinguish them from other sources. For example, the 
interview conducted with Mr. Sharara is cited as Mr. Afif Sharara or Mr. 
Sharara. The material and information retrieved from Mr. Sharara’s book 
are cited as Sharara (2006).  
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Table 4-1: LACPA interviewees 
Name Position From-To 
Interviewee Abed ElKader 
Al Saghir 
Vice President 
Board Member 
Vice President 
2009-2010 
2010 
2014 
Interviewee Afif Sharara Secretary 2005-2006 
Interviewee Amin Saleh President 2012-2014 
Interviewee Gina 
Chammas 
President 2011 
Interviewee Mowafak El 
Yafi 
President 1995-2000 
2002-2003 
2010 
Interviewee Rajaa Saab Board Member 
Treasurer 
2008 
2009-2010 
Interviewee Walid Richani Board Member 2010-2011 
4.4.5.2. The interviews 
The semi-structured interview questions were developed in a manner that 
would not influence the interviewees’ opinions. The interview questions 
were based on the theoretical framework of this research. The interviewees 
are asked about the main reasons that ignited the professionalisation 
process in the first two questions. The third question is directed towards 
knowing the occupational group(s) that pioneered the professionalisation 
process and the attitude of the state and the public towards the project. 
The fourth question represents the heart of the research, where STD and 
TEC would emerge when identifying the factor(s) that hindered the 
development of the profession.  While the question was designed not to 
direct the interviewees towards issues such as sectarianism, 
discrimination, or exclusion, it was noted that almost immediately, the 
interviewees answers would be sectarianism and its political affiliation. 
Such finding is discussed in-depth in Chapter Six. The last question was 
set to retrieve how the LACPA members view themselves and their 
colleagues in terms of education, competency, prestige and experience, 
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thus evaluating if the professional body was able to successfully implement 
associational control and image building strategies.  
To provide the interviewee with a stress-free environment, the interviewee 
decided on the method (face-to-face, telephone, or via Skype), location 
and date of the interviews. All selected face-to-face interviews at their 
offices during April 2015 when the researcher/interviewer was present in 
Lebanon. The interviewees were asked the same questions, with additional 
questions arising as the conversation developed. The pre-approved 
questions by LACPA were emailed to the interviewees before the interviews 
and were as follows:   
1. What were, in your opinion, the main factors that led to the 
establishment of LACPA? 
2. Which factor do you believe to be the most significant one? 
3. Which interest group (or groups) do you believe were most 
influential in promoting the establishment of LACPA?  
4. In your opinion, what were the major influences that affected the 
development of LACPA? What pushed it in the direction it is in right 
now?   
5. What elements do you believe are helping in the advancement of 
LACPA? What elements are holding it back? 
6. Where do you see LACPA going in the next 20 years? 
7. How would you describe a typical member of LACPA? 
4.4.5.3. Archival Material 
Mr. Sharara has generously provided – on a loan basis – the original 
transcripts and archival materials for the purposes of this research. These 
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documents are analysed using the systematic procedure of document 
analysis described by Bowen (2009, p. 27) where “data be examined and 
interpreted in order to elicit meaning, gain understanding, and develop 
empirical knowledge”. The choice of utilizing this method to analyse the 
material provided by Mr. Sharara as the documents are unobtrusive, non-
reactive, readily available, stable, and are unaffected by the research 
purpose. The documents also provide exactness (exact names, locations, 
events details), as well as coverage (board coverage of a long span of 
time).  
The first step in analysing the documents was to determine their relevance 
to the research purpose and its theoretical framework, their purpose and 
intended audience, and their accuracy in recording the events. The 
documents were then reviewed and put in context: laws, minutes of 
meetings, correspondence, news articles, etc., and then grouped in 
chronological order. The review of the documents in such matter provided 
grounds towards understanding the socio-political surrounding context in 
which these documents were issued. Using inductive approach, patterns 
are revealed. These patterns are discussed in depth in Chapters Five and 
Six. However, this research acknowledges that there are limitations when 
analysing the documents, mainly the availability of additional documents 
that were not attained by the researcher, and the inability of the research 
to authenticate some of the documents provided due the lack of public 
record.  
The material obtained are formal laws and minutes of meetings, which 
leaves little room for discourse analysis. Niemi-Kiesiläinen et al (2007) 
identifies the scarcity of discourse as the main problem facing those 
attempting discourse analysis of legal texts. They call for the use of critical 
discourse analysis, in which discourse is often utilized to analyse the use 
of power to exercise dominance and inequality. Such analysis is employed 
in this research in relation to the power exercised by the state on the 
occupational group and then the profession, and in relation to the power 
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exercised by the occupational group on its members and those who aspire 
to join the occupation/profession.  
In addition, the documents provide valuable information such as the names 
of the founding fathers of the profession in Lebanon, the organizational 
body’s fight with the state, and documentation of some of the strategies 
used to attain professionalisation. All the documents and pictures 
presented in Chapter Five and the beginning of Chapter Six are copies from 
Mr. Sharara’s material. 
4.4.5.4. Bias and its mitigation 
The nature of the Lebanese society by itself is biased against the ‘others’. 
The Lebanese individual would immediately categorize another individual 
as “from our sect” or “from that sect” solely based on the name of the 
individual, as many first and last names are representatives of which sect 
the individual belong to. If the name is unrevealing, the other individual 
would be asked “where are you from” to retrieve the province or district 
they are from. By connecting the other individual to a geographical area 
dominated by a certain sect, the Lebanese individual would then 
immediately categorize the other individual as “our sect “or “that sect”.  
This was evident when the researcher/interviewer attempted to seek 
other interviews, as many refused solely on the basis that the researcher 
is a Muslim Sunni, evident by the way she wears her clothes. An 
interviewee who accepted to sit for the interview changed their mind 
after meeting the researcher (and how she looked). Another asked for 
her full name, and was able to ‘categorize’ her into a certain religion or 
sect, thus refusing the interview. Another person who was very 
welcoming and excited to sit for the interview was very rigid and formal 
during the interview, thinking very carefully before saying any words, 
fearing that any word they say would be used against them.  
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There were minimal measures that the interviewer could take to reduce 
stereotyping bias. It was noted, however, that interviewees that shared 
the same religion with the interviewer were more open with her from 
those belonging to another religion, even though she did not belong to 
their religious sect. As for cultural noise, the interviewees and the 
interviewer belong to the same culture, making it easy for the interviewer 
to pick up on socially acceptable answers rather than ‘true-opinion’ 
answers.  
The choice of a semi-structured open-ended questions was deliberate by 
the researcher to reduce her own bias. Having lived for most of her life as 
part of the Lebanese society, the researcher is conscious of her own 
inherent bias. The semi-structure interviews provided a space for the 
interviewees to express their own opinions without being influenced by 
that of the interviewer’s. The interviewer would only pick up on what they 
have revealed to form her next question, keeping her interference level 
at minimal. The interviewer deliberately did not mention “sectarianism” 
during the interviews or in the interview questions to reduce any 
confirmation bias.  
The choice of the interviewees themselves were done to mitigate bias in 
the research, as they were selected from different religions, religious 
sects, background, and even time-era at the LACPA. However, the 
researcher was limited by the availability and acceptance of the 
interviewees to sit for the interviews, as well as their level of knowledge 
regarding the professionalisation process and the professional body. For 
example, the researcher would have liked to include more females in the 
interviews, but was limited to the fact that only two females were in 
‘power’ position within the association, and only one of them was 
available for an interview.  
It is also important to acknowledge that sectarianism in Lebanon has now 
exceeded the basics of religious belonging, as one’s sect identifies the 
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person’s political, cultural, and geographical belongings, not just religious 
identity.  
4. 4. 6. The quantitative approach 
The quantitative approach of this research focuses on obtaining data 
relating to all the LACPA members, such as age, gender, religion, sect, 
status (practising member vs. non-practising member), and workplace. 
LACPA has generously provided data relating to date of birth, gender, 
status, date of joining LACPA, and date of leaving LACPA (if applicable). 
Letters addressed to LACPA from the researcher and her supervisor 
requesting such data are found in Appendix III. Workplace for each 
member, i.e. company, was retrieved from the LACPA website and from 
the LACPA members’ directory published in 2014 (LACPA 2014). These 
social attributes are based on the theoretical framework suggested by both 
STD and TEC. The framework proposes the use of these social attributes – 
of age, gender, religion, sect, family relationships, and location, among 
others – by the ethnic groups as a method to claim and reclaim 
monopolistic power over occupation. STD argues that these attributes are 
used in parallel with legitimizing myths to maintain inequality and 
discrimination. TEC suggests the use of these social attributes to establish 
and maintain a monopolistic position over professions. Therefore, 
examining these social attributes is fundamental for this research in order 
to inspect whether sectarianism has an effect on the development of the 
accounting profession in Lebanon. Such examination may also provide 
insights on whether and how these attributes are used to maintain sect 
power.  
To retrieve data relating to religion, and sect, the researcher obtained the 
2015 electoral lists (Lebanese Ministry of Interior 2015) of all the Lebanese 
population entitled to vote (i.e. who enjoyed full civil rights) amounting to 
around 3 million people. The electoral lists were purchased from the 
Lebanese Ministry of Interior and contained the required data detailing 
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religion, and sect, among other attributes as presented in table 4-2. The 
data in these lists are maintained by the Lebanese government and are 
updated on an annual basis. The data is also publicly available through the 
CDs published by the Ministry of Interior throughout the year, as well as 
on its website in March of every year.  
The electoral lists were utilized in this research due to the lack of an 
updated Lebanese official census. According to An Nahar Newspaper 
(Dhahir, 2008), “The Lebanese have avoided conducting an official census 
since 1932, fearing that the results could trigger a renewed bout of inter-
communal fighting, but various surveys estimate that Muslims account for 
around 64 percent of the 4.2 million population and Christians 36 percent.” 
While an official census would contain data relating to all the Lebanese 
population of the year in which the census is conducted, the electoral lists 
contain the data of those Lebanese who have the right to vote. This 
eliminates Lebanese who are under the voting age of 21 and those who 
hold a criminal record. Such elimination does not affect the research, since 
membership of LACPA requires an individual to be “Enjoying all his civil 
rights and having never been convicted of a disgraceful crime or offence, 
as defined in law-decree No.59/112, article 4, paragraph (E)”8 as well as 
being over the age of 21. The use of census and similar archival material 
is not new in accounting history research. For example, Edwards and 
Walker (2008) utilized the 1881 Canadian census to retrieve ethnic origin, 
geographic location, religion, gender, age, and marital status when 
examining the early Canadian accounting profession. Similarly, Annisette 
and O’Regan (2007) support their findings on the early Irish accounting 
                                       
 
8 LACPA (2015), Accountancy Profession Act. 
http://www.grafium.solutions/dev/accountancy-profession-act 
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profession by relying on census data from the years 1881 to 1911. Given 
the lack of an updated official census, this research utilizes the next-best 
alternative, which is that 2015 electoral lists.  
The lists were on Microsoft Access and were transferred to Excel sheets by 
the researcher. Each LACPA member’s name was searched using this 
database and was retrieved by comparing the full name (including father’s 
name) and date of birth to ensure matching. The lists also categorize 
individuals according to direct family relation (i.e. parents/children, 
siblings, etc.). This enabled the researcher to retrieve existing family ties 
between LACPA members. Examining such family ties is suggested by the 
theoretical framework, since these ties are used by the groups as a method 
to maintain dominance or to reclaim it. 
Table 4-2: Sample of the 2015 Electoral List (original and translated) 
M4_HASBAYA 
ID Field1 Field2 Field3 Field4 Field5 Field6 Field7 
1 ةظفاحم ءاضق يحلا وا ةدلبلا نيدلا سنجلا   
2 ةيطبنلا ايبصاح ةحمق وبا يحيسم ركذ   
3 ةرهشلا لاامس  بلاا مسا ملاا مسا ةدلاولا خيرات لجسلا مقر بهذملا 
4 * * * * 1976/9/27 9 سكذوثرا مور 
 
District: HASBAYA 
ID Field1 Field2 Field3 Field4 Field5 Field6 Field7 
1 Province District Town Religion Gender   
2 Nabatiyeh Hasbaya Abo Kamha Christian Male   
3 Family 
Name 
First 
Name 
Father’s 
Name 
Mother’s 
Name 
Date of Birth Record 
Number 
Religious 
Sect 
4 *9 * * * 1976/9/27 9 Rome 
Orthodox 
                                       
 
9 The names were deleted on purpose to maintain the anonymity of the individual.  
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The data was compiled into three categories for each year since LACPA’s 
inception: all members in that year, new members, and deleted members. 
A deleted member is a member who has left LACPA either voluntarily 
(death, personal choice, immigration, etc.) or involuntarily (membership 
terminated by LACPA either for ethical reasons or for failure to pay the 
yearly membership). A trend analysis was then established to examine the 
changes over the years. The analysis of the data relevant to this research 
is found in Chapter Six, while other findings are compiled in Appendix I. 
4. 5. Importance of this research  
Carnegie and Napier (1996) identify the role of accounting history to 
include investigating the past as a method to enhance the status of the 
profession. They quote Haskins (1904, p. 141) in stating that accounting 
history enriches the way we “understand our present and… forecast or 
control our future”. This research aims to critically examine the 
development of the Lebanese accounting professionalization project while 
exploring the possible role played by religious sectarianism in constructing 
and reconstructing the accounting profession in a location where such a 
social construct has permeated all aspects of institutions, society and 
individuals. This research aspires to provide insights into how past events 
have shaped the Lebanese accounting profession and have moulded its 
current status, thus also providing insights that may lead towards an 
alternative future for the profession.  
The research strives to create a new knowledge by filling two major gaps 
in the literature: social construct and geographic location of the accounting 
professionalization project. It seeks to investigate the possible effect of 
religious sectarianism as a social construct on the development of the 
accounting professionalization project. The research also intends to 
address a geographic location in which the examination of the development 
of the accounting profession has been neglected. Lebanon, as a site of 
historical enquiry, has been ignored except for a few researchers focusing 
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on the current position of the audit profession (for example, Sidani, 1992). 
Lastly, by using archival material and the interviewees’ narratives, the 
research contributes to the creation of an archive of the accounting 
profession, an important initiative since the existing archival record is 
extremely limited due to the civil war demolition of the LACPA headquarters 
as well as the undocumented memories of the association’s pioneers.  
4. 6. Conclusion 
Since the accounting profession is part of society, this research examines 
the accounting professionalization project in Lebanon through the lens of 
a struggle for social dominance and the existing ethnic conflict among the 
various religious sects in order to understand how the profession may 
have, in part, been constructed and reconstructed by ethnic and religious 
association. Applying the framework suggested in this section focuses this 
research on viewing the Lebanese religious sects as competing ethnic 
groups, thereby considering how these groups attempt to maintain 
monopolistic powers over the profession to preserve the group’s power. 
The research utilizes qualitative and quantitative data to achieve these 
aims by conducting oral history interviews and analysing compiled data 
relating to various attributes of LACPA members. The goal is to fill two gaps 
that have been neglected in the literature: the geographic location of 
Lebanon and the social construct of religious sectarianism. 
The following chapter marks the start of this examination by investigating 
the accounting profession during the Ottoman and French eras, and the 
first steps towards the accounting professionalization project after 
Lebanon’s independence in 1943. 
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Chapter 5. The Road to the Accounting 
Profession (5th century – 1990) 
5. 1. Introduction 
To understand the accounting profession’s current state in Lebanon, it is 
necessary to look at its past to grasp the factors and challenges that have 
shaped and moulded the profession. The accounting profession, as 
discussed in Chapter Two, should be examined through the social contexts 
in which it operates. This chapter describes the accounting profession’s 
development in pre-independent (pre-1943) and post-independent (post-
1943) Lebanon. The chapter is divided into three main periods presented 
chronologically and in a manner that corresponds to the major intervals in 
Lebanon’s history, as presented in the previous chapter. The post-war era 
(post-1990) is discussed in chapter six.  
The chapter starts by demonstrating the existence of accounting as a tool 
during the Islamic Empire era (7th century–14th century) and the Ottoman 
Empire era (14th century–1920) of governing Lebanon. It then describes 
the introduction of accounting as an occupation during the French era 
(1920–1943) and early independence years (1943–1950). The chapter 
then reveals the various attempts towards professionalizing the accounting 
occupation between 1950 and 1990. The chapter then concludes by 
discussing emerging sectarian tensions surrounding the accounting 
profession in Lebanon. 
5. 2. The accounting occupation in the Ottoman 
era (up to 1920) 
Accounting has played a major role in the Middle East since the middle 
ages (5th century–15th century), where accountants – known as Al-Kateb  
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بتاكلا– contributed greatly to government and businesses in particular and 
to society as a whole (Zaid, 2000). Zaid (2004) has provided evidence of 
the existence and use of accounting in the Islamic world – known today as 
the Middle East – as early as 976 AD. Napier (2009-b) draws back on the 
work of Said (2003) to warn about the confusion between "The Middle East" 
and "Arab" or "Islam". He identifies Islamic accounting to cover various 
parts of the world at different time periods. The Middle East is the region 
centred on Western Asia and Egypt that includes 21 countries, one of which 
is Lebanon, as shown in Map 5-1. 
Map 5-1: The countries of the Middle East (Dartmouth, 2001) 
 
Accounting is not a new notion in the Middle East. Baker (2013) discusses 
the use of established accounting practices such as taxation and customs 
duties in the Byzantine Empire (4th century to mid-15th century), in which 
the subdivision of Prefecture of the East constitutes what is known today 
as the Middle East, apart from Arabia (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, United 
Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman). With the rise of Islam, the 
Prefecture of the East and Arabia became part of the Islamic world, 
governed by many Caliphs and then dynasties. The earliest documentation 
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of accounting systems in the Middle East was recognized by the scholar Al-
Khawarizmy in 976 and then detailed by the scholar Al-Mazendarany to 
include stable accounting, construction accounting, agricultural 
accounting, warehouse accounting, among others (Zaid, 2004). During the 
Ottoman rule of the Middle East, Mert (2013) emphasizes the fact that, in 
contrast to western accounting, the accounting development in the 
Ottoman Empire was to cater for state needs rather than the needs of 
business people. 
The rise of the Ottoman era (1299-1922) in the 14th century was 
accompanied by the Ottoman Empire’s adoption of the Merdiban method 
of accounting – also known as Merdiven – which had been adapted from 
the Ilhanians (1251-1353), a Mongolian state in Iran assimilated by the 
Ottomans (Erkan, et al., 2006). Güvemli and Güvemli (2007-b) and Mert 
(2013) suggest that the Merdiban method was used by the Abbasid Empire 
(750-1258), and they claim that the political and economic relations 
between the Abbasids, Ilhanians and Ottomans led to the passage of the 
Merdiban method from one to the other. The Arabs of the Abbasid Empire 
exported their knowledge of fiscal structure and accounting systems to the 
Ilhanian State, which developed the Merdiban method further. The 
geographic expansion of the Ottoman Empire and its absorption of the 
Mongol Empire were then followed by the digestion of Merdiban method 
into the Ottoman accounting system (Güvemli and Güvemli 2007-b). 
Siyakat, the accounting language of writing and numbers, was used until 
the mid-19th century in the Middle East (Mert, 2013; Erkan, et al., 2006; 
Faroqhi, 1999). The teaching of Siyakat was passed on by a master-
apprentice relationship through interns practicing state accounting (Erkan 
and Elitaş, 2011). Yükçü et al. (2007) examine footprints associated with 
accounting methods used in the construction of Süleymaniye Mosque in 
Istanbul (1550-1557) and connect these methods to modern-day cost 
accounting. 
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Changes in accounting in the Ottoman era were associated with the 
Caliph's preferences, for example the reforms in the Waqf10  فقولاand its 
accounting in 1826 (Yayla, 2011). However, the most prominent change 
that occurred was the Tanzimat (a word meaning reorganization; see 
Güvemli and Güvemli, 2007-a, p. 2). The Tanzimat period presented the 
development of councils and committees for accounting purposes such as 
the establishment of the Council of Fiscal Accounting and the Imperial 
Chancery of Accounting in 1725 (Erol and Ören, 2007). During the 
Tanzimat period, those who practiced accounting as an occupation either 
dealt with central accounting activities or were responsible for accounting 
activities in the provinces (Erol and Ören, 2007). The next change took 
place during the second half of the 19th century when the Merdiban 
method was ushered out with the adoption of the double-entry system 
which the Ottomans imported in 1838 from French books (Güvemli and 
Güvemli, 2007-a). Since Mount Lebanon and Beirut provinces were a small 
part of the Ottoman Empire, their encounter with accounting was limited 
to state accounting, mainly for tax purposes.   
While state accounting was practiced in Lebanon as a continuation of the 
accounting practices of the Ottoman Empire, accounting as an occupation 
and a profession was not introduced to Lebanon until well after the end of 
World War One. It is noted that at that time (prior to 1920), few accounting 
associations were able to change accounting from an occupation into a 
profession, such as had happened in the United Kingdom.  
                                       
 
10 The waqf are endowments made by Muslims to charities or religious institutions. During 
the Ottoman Era, the Waqf were managed by the government.  
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5. 3. The emergence of the accounting 
occupation in Lebanon (1920-1950) 
With the fall of the Ottoman Empire, Lebanon fell under the French 
mandate in 1920. However, the accounting profession in France was not 
fully developed until 1942 (Nioche and Pesqueux, 1997), after France 
adopted the Nazi German model upon its fall to Germany in World War II 
(Boolaky and Jallow, 2008; Standish, 1990). The Lebanese laws were 
adapted from French laws during the French mandate and were sustained 
well after Lebanon’s independence in 1943. However, the French 
accounting professionalization project was too undeveloped to be 
transferred and implemented in Lebanon during the French mandate, as 
discussed in Chapter Two. Longuenesse (2006, p. 110) reveals that the 
French “maintained the Ottoman [accounting] legislations [during their 
mandate over Lebanon] and simply complemented or adapted laws 
according to the new development”, and that a new commercial law in 
Lebanon was not formulated until 24 December 1942 when the Code of 
Commerce Decree No. 304 was declared (Ministry of Economy and Trade, 
2011). The Code of Commerce was an adaptation of the French Code of 
Commerce (Longuenesse, 2006). It contained specific provisions defining 
auditing and the auditor’s title, but it did not set the specific qualifications 
an auditor should possess.  
According to Longuenesse (2009-a), accounting, as an occupation in the 
Middle East, was imported from Britain at the end of the 19th century, with 
the arrival of British companies to the region accompanying the British 
mandate over Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, and Palestine. Her study reveals that 
the first accounting firms were established in Alexandria and Cairo in Egypt 
as a response to the increased development of the cotton industry, and 
later spread throughout the region due to the oil industry. She claims that 
British auditing firms opened offices in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Palestine, and 
Lebanon during the 1920s and 1930s and that these firms hired local staff 
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and invested in their training by sending them to the UK to gain 
professional certificates and practical experience.  
Similar to Longuenesse, Interviewee Afif Sharara has stated: 
“The Audit profession was excelled by the British, who 
transferred the profession to Palestine. In the late 1930s, the 
audit profession was introduced to the Lebanese by people 
coming from Palestine who trained the Lebanese on the British 
Standards of Audit. The audit practice started spreading, to 
the degree that schools and universities started teaching audit 
and accounting in their curriculums.” 
Sharara (2006) interviewed many of the pioneers of the accounting 
profession in Lebanon. Most of these pioneers are now deceased or have 
difficulties remembering historical details, limiting the ability of the 
researcher to interview them. Therefore, interviews with one of the 
pioneers, Interviewee Wael Abou Shakra, and LACPA members are 
presented here and in the following chapter (as per Table 5-2), and 
interpreted with extracts from Sharara’s (2006) interviews with pioneers 
as follows:11  
  
                                       
 
11 Sharara’s interviews with these pioneers will be marked as Sharara (2006) 
throughout this chapter and chapter six, while the researcher’s interviews will be 
indicated by using the Mr XX or Mrs XX. 
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Table 5-1: Sharara interviewees as presented in Sharara (2006) 
Name of interviewee Position 
Ali Awada Member of AAFO constituent committee. 
Elected as AAFO vice president in 1964, 
President in 1968, and board member in 1972.  
Anis Kasbarian Member of AAFO constituent committee. 
Elected as AAFO board member in 1964 and 
1965.  
Antoine Salem Participated in several meetings in drafting the 
accounting profession organization law. 
Beshara Bahout Member of AAFO constituent committee. 
Elected as AAFO secretary in 1964, vice 
president in 1965 and president in 1970. 
Fadil Al-Hajj Influential AAFO member. Ran for several 
terms for AAFO board membership.  
George Gholam Influential AAFO member. 
Jamil Atiyeh First Lebanese to form an accounting and audit 
firm in 1945. Called for the establishment of a 
Lebanese accounting association since 1952. 
Joseph Tasso Member of AAFO constituent committee. 
Elected as the first president of AAFO on 4 
March 1964. Served as AAFO president in 1971 
and 1972, and as board member for the 
remaining years (1964-1973). 
Mohamad Saloum Member of AAFO constituent committee. 
Elected as AAFO board member in 1964.   
Sami Zakka Board member of AAFO in 1978 and 1983. Son 
of Simon Zakka, who was member of AAFO 
constituent committee, AAFO president in 
1969 and in 1974, and board member in 1964, 
1965, 1972, and 1973.  
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Table 5-2: Research interviewees conducted in April 2015 
Name of interviewee Position 
Interviewee Wael 
Abou Shakra 
AAFO accountant in 1965, board member in 
1972, 1973, and 1974, President between 
1977 and 1992 
Interviewee Abed 
ElKader Al Saghir 
LACPA Vice President (2009-2010), board 
member (2010), vice president (2014) 
Interviewee Afif 
Sharara 
LACPA Secretary (2005-2006) 
Interviewee Amin 
Saleh 
LACPA President (2012-2014) 
Interviewee Gina 
Chammas 
LACPA President (2011) 
Interviewee 
Mowafak El Yafi 
LACPA President (1995-2000, 2002-2003, 
2010) 
Interviewee Rajaa 
Saab 
LACPA Board member (2008), treasurer 
(2009-2010) 
Interviewee Walid 
Richani 
LACPA Board member (2010-2011) 
Interviewee Fawzi 
Hamdan  
LACPA Board member (2000), vice president 
(2001) 
An interview conducted by Sharara (2006) with George Gholam (presented 
in Picture 5-1), a pioneer in the development of the accounting profession 
in Lebanon, reveals that two secondary schools, aside from the American 
University of Beirut, were delivering accountancy modules. He also states 
that most pioneers of the profession studied and practiced the British 
model since they trained with British firms either in Lebanon or abroad.   
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Picture 5-1: George Gholam and Iskandar Simaan (Sharara, 2006) 
 
Sharara briefly discussed the effect of the colonization of Lebanon by the 
French at the start of the accounting profession: 
“Lebanon at that time [1930s-1940s] was a French colony, 
who had its own laws and regulations. During the colonization 
period, some French practitioners came to Lebanon and 
practiced the audit profession, spreading the French 
standards. In parallel, some Lebanese went to France to learn 
the profession and came back to practice under the French 
standards. At that time, the profession in Lebanon could be 
practiced under the British rules or the French rules”. 
However, Sharara, like Longuenesse (2009-a), stressed that the British 
accounting practices were the dominant ones in Lebanon. A comparison 
between the British and French accounting professions in the 1930s and 
1940s reveals the maturity of the British model over that of the French, as 
discussed in Chapter Two of this thesis. While the British professionals 
could easily influence accounting practice in Palestine and consequently 
transfer it to Lebanon, the French practitioners did not enjoy a similar 
experience. This can be attributed to the inability of the French 
practitioners to build the ‘image of a profession’ in both their home country 
and their colonies, as discussed above in Chapter Two. This finding reveals 
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that while accounting was practiced in Lebanon under laws adapted from 
the French legal system, it followed British standards and practices through 
the transfer of knowledge.  
Such a transfer of knowledge was effected by the immigration of 
Palestinian practitioners to Lebanon in the 1930s and 1940s. For example, 
Ben Mahmoud (2002) states that Fouad Saba, one of the most prominent 
pioneers in developing the accounting profession in Lebanon, established 
the first audit office in Palestine in 1924 upon obtaining his British 
certificate. Saba later moved to Beirut in 1948 where he advanced his audit 
business and created subsidiaries in the region.  
Similarly, Mr Mowafak El Yafi reveals that the accounting profession was 
introduced to Lebanon around 1932 through Russell and Co., a British 
company operating in Palestine. He states:  
“The accounting profession started in Lebanon in the 1930s 
or even before through a company called Russell. Other firms 
were later established like William Mitri’s office [office refers 
to accounting firm] and Jamil Atiyeh’s office in the beginning 
of 1940s. Jamil Atiyeh’s office was established in the early 
1940s and it was the first Lebanese office. Right afterward, 
William Mitri opened his office in 1945 which was a 
correspondent to an office in Palestine called Saba office”.  
According to Sharara (2006), Russell and Co. was one of the first foreign 
firms to establish branches in the Middle East, opening its offices in 
Lebanon in the 1930s. He reveals that the Lebanese Iskandar Simaan is 
considered the founding father of accounting as an occupation in the 
Lebanon. Sharara (2006) has explained that after joining Russell and Co. 
in March 1931, Simaan developed his skills by continuing his education and 
obtaining certification from the British ICAEW.  
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Picture 5-2: Russell and Co.’s office plate (Sharara, 2006) 
 
The immigration of the British-trained Palestinian accounting practitioners 
and the establishment of the audit firms in the 1930s and 1940s mark the 
birth of accounting as an occupation in Lebanon. Interviewee Mowafak El 
Yafi states that before these developments, accountants were known and 
identified as bookkeepers, and there was little public knowledge about 
accounting as a field of practice.  
Between 1938 and 1939, there were six accountants and auditors in 
Lebanon, as presented in Table 5-3 (Sharara, 2006). On 4 April 1945, Jamil 
Atiyeh became the first Lebanese to establish an accountancy firm not 
associated with a foreign firm, and therefore won the title of the first 
Lebanese charted accountant expert at court (Sharara, 2006).12  
  
                                       
 
12 The title ‘expert at court’ indicates that the practitioner can advise the court in 
matters related to his/her field. Atiyeh was the first Lebanese accounting expert 
at court who was not an employee or a partner in a foreign audit firm.  
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Table 5-3: List of accountant and auditors in Lebanon between the 1930s and 
1950s 
Name Year of establishment 
Charles Abela Unknown but was registered in 1938 
Alfred Azori Unknown but was registered in 1938 
Khalil Hbeesh Unknown but was registered in 1938 
Salim Maalouf Unknown but was registered in 1938 
Asper Miski Unknown but was registered in 1938 
Russell and Co. About 1932 
William Mitri Early 1940s 
Jamil Atiyeh 1945 
Fouad Saba 1948 
 
5.1.1. Conclusion 
The fall of the Ottoman Empire brought with it the introduction of 
accounting as an occupation to Lebanon. Although Lebanon fell under the 
French mandate between 1920 and 1943, French accountants had a 
minimal effect on the accounting occupation in Lebanon in contrast to the 
British-trained Palestinian accountants who were able to transfer their 
knowledge to Lebanon. With at least six accounting and audit firms founded 
by the early 1940s in Lebanon, there was a growing interest in accounting, 
as indicated by one major university and two secondary schools offering 
accounting study in their curriculums. Referring to the literature review as 
presented in Chapter Two, the next logical step after establishing 
accounting as an occupation is to forward it into a profession, through the 
creation, as a first phase, of an accounting association that unifies 
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members and attains a monopoly over the work and the market. This will 
be discussed in the following section.  
5. 4. First attempts at professionalization 
(1950-1990) 
This section attempts to identify the strategies employed by AAFO actors 
in pursuit of establishing the AAFO as an accounting professional body by 
1963. AAFO’s long fight to build a relationship with the state and to 
establish a law to legitimize and protect the profession between 1965 and 
1990 is discussed in sections 5.4.2 and 5.4.3. Section 5.4.3 presents the 
transformation of the AAFO to the LACPA. Lastly, the impact of emerging 
sectarian tensions on the association is discussed.  
In this section, the research interprets the developments in 
professionalization using the eight professionalization strategies suggested 
by the Birkett and Evans’ (2005) model discussed in section 2.6.1 above. 
As a reminder, these strategies are: 
 To attain professional power, the strategies include:  
 determinations of standards (S5)13 where the profession self-
regulates its standards; 
 professional unification (S7) of all members and associations to 
gain a monopoly over the work in the market; 
                                       
 
13 Allen (1991) used the term S to indicate strategy. 
   139 
 
 achieving a relationship with the state (S8) to gain support for 
the autonomy of the profession and decreasing any threat from 
the state to such autonomy. 
 To achieve association control, the strategies are:  
 delineation of the area of expertise (S2) and its protection from 
invasion and manipulation from outsiders; 
 control of education and entry by the organizing body (S3) by 
setting and closely monitoring the level of university education 
required; 
 definition of competence levels of the members (S4) with more 
prestige awarded by the association to members who attain 
higher levels of membership. 
 To sustain ideology, the strategies include:  
 formulation of a code of ethics (S1) as evidence of 
professionalization and a symbol of rigour in serving the public’s 
interests;  
 image building (S6), in which the occupational organization 
promotes itself to convince the public of the legitimacy of the 
profession. 
5. 4. 1. Establishing AAFO (1950-1963) 
With the establishment of Lebanon’s independence in 1943, Lebanese 
society grew accustomed to accounting as a field of practice. Lebanon 
witnessed an increase in accounting practitioners. According to 
Longuenesse (2006), the British-trained professionals dominated audit 
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firms and the French-trained accountants were employed in commercial 
and industrial companies, as the audit practices were followed British 
standards at the time. In 1954, the French-trained Elie Aoun founded the 
‘Fiduciaire du Proche-Orient’, the first ‘French’ audit firm in Lebanon. The 
French influence then expanded as more ‘French-oriented’ schools, centres 
and universities provided accountancy education, such as the École 
Pratique de Commerce et de Comptabilité, Centre d’Études Comptables, 
and Saint-Joseph University in the late 1950s. Longuenesse (2006) argues 
that there was a coexistence of both influences, providing Lebanese 
professionals with a unique exposure to various methods, since the 
Lebanese regulations were based on French laws yet auditing was practiced 
following British standards.   
According to Sharara (2006), Jamil Atiyeh remembers that he started 
calling for the establishment of a professional body in 1952. The Lebanese 
economy was booming at that time, yet the profession was not regulated 
and was dominated by foreign companies. A news article titled ‘Protecting 
national accounting from foreign espionage’ (presented as Document 5-1), 
published on 16 August 1965, discussed how the first Lebanese accounting 
professional body was established; the article provides evidence of the 
implementation of strategies S7, S2, S8 and S5. According to the news 
article, in 1957 Antoine Karam, the owner of Karam Accounting Firm, was 
the first person to suggest establishing an association for accounting firm 
owners in Lebanon, thus attempting the professional unification strategy 
(S7) to attain professional power whereby all the association members 
unite to gain a monopoly over the work in the market. Karam suggested 
the idea of the association as a means to oversee the members’ interests, 
follow-up on their needs, and ensure better conditions for the profession 
(S2 – delineation of the area of expertise). As the news article describes, 
Karam contacted Jamil Atiyeh, Fouad Abou Izeddine and Farid Jobran, 
among others, and held a series of meetings. After one year of 
deliberations, an initial draft of the association’s organization was 
prepared. However, the 1958 revolution forced the participants to 
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postpone establishing the association and to cease all meetings. On 7 
January 1960, after stability was restored in Lebanon, a grand meeting 
was held, and the members agreed to form two committees, the first to 
deal with official matters (S8 – achieving a relationship with the state), and 
the second to examine income taxes law (S5 – determinations of 
standards). The meeting also discussed the importance of protecting the 
profession from foreign firms and competition (S2 – delineation of the area 
of expertise).  
What is worth mentioning is the increase in the number of accountants and 
auditors. While there were six accountants and auditors by 1939 (as 
discussed in the previous section), the number of accountants and auditors 
who attended the meeting in 1960 was 50 (excluding Russell and Co. which 
did not attend), indicating a high interest in accounting as an occupation. 
Document 5-1: A newspaper article discussing the need to protect national 
accounting from ‘foreign espionage’ (Sharara, 2006) 
  
Interviewee Wael Abou Shakra has recalled this period:  
“When the profession started [1950s-1960s], there were two 
types of firms. Big firms that were big names such as Arthur 
   142 
 
Anderson,14 Deloitte [established in 1942], etc. These were 
well known, the big five or the big six, before they were the 
big eight. There was a great conflict between them and the 
French School [professionals who were trained to French 
standards]. Till 1964, there was no internal regulation for the 
profession – in Lebanon by the government – except for some 
‘weak’ [minimal] laws. These dealt with the responsibilities of 
the auditor of Joint Stock Companies. Later there was another 
script that was for banks. But these were not the essential 
things that were supposed to be [to organize the profession]. 
There were no scripts that would make the [accounting] 
professionals abide by the international standards, abide by 
its changes over time, because our profession is the most 
progressive profession because it is built around events, and 
its concepts are shaped by the events that occurred, and there 
is constant progress that forces the professional to keep up 
with current economic and monetary events, which will make 
you progress your profession. This was non-existent. We had 
none of these, in addition to the lack of law that would 
organize it [the profession]”. 
Interviewee Afifi Sharara has described the start of the professionalization 
project: 
“With the increasing number of people practicing [in] the audit 
profession [in the early 1960s], there were calls for regulating 
                                       
 
14 There is no information available about Arthur Anderson’s branch in Lebanon as 
it is closed.  
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the profession, and ten persons15 out of the 40/50 persons 
practicing audit gathered to create an association for audit 
and accounting practices, influenced by such trend to regulate 
in other countries”.  
According to Sharara (2006), before the establishment of the association 
Beshara Bahout remembers meeting frequently with other accounting 
practitioners such as Simon Zakka, Aziz Mokarzil, Joseph Jabbour, Edward 
Kasabian and Amin Masoud to create laws and regulations to organize the 
accounting profession in Lebanon. Anis Kasbarian recalls more names such 
as Joseph Tasso, Elie Aoun, Jamil Atiyeh, Ali Awada and Michael Firnayni 
between 1960 and 1963. Sharara (2006) interviewed Sami Zakka, son of 
Simon Zakka, who stated that, during these meetings, the members 
decided to apply for licensing for the association from the Ministry of 
Labour and Social Affairs (S8 – achieving a relationship with the state), 
and then continued to demand a law governing the profession. Mohamad 
Saloum recollects that the decision to apply for the license was a result of 
many failed attempts to obtain a law to organize the profession. At that 
time, according to Joseph Tasso, only about 50 Lebanese accounting 
practitioners were working in Lebanon (Sharara, 2006).  
On 17 December 1963, the Labour and Social Affairs Minister Fouad Botros 
signed Decree 518/1, granting Farid Jobran, Ahmad Abed Al Baki, Amin 
Masoud and Bshara Bahout the permission to establish an association with 
the name Association of Accounting Firms’ Owners (AAFO), thus 
implementing the relationship with the state strategy (S8 – achieving a 
relationship with the state). The decree, presented in Document 5-2, 
                                       
 
15 Such as Antoine Karam, Jamil Atiyeh, Fouad Abou Izeddine, and Farid Jobran 
who were earlier mentioned in Document 5-1, and in Sharara (2006). 
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specified the aim of the association to “elevate the level of profession 
materially, economically and socially”. The decree also gave the association 
three months for the general assembly’s congress to elect the first board 
of the association; otherwise, the license would be deemed void.  
Document 5-2: Decree number 518/1 of 17 December 1963 
 
There is no archival material that details the information relating to the 
size and number of the accounting firms and accounting practitioners who 
joined the AAFO. However, Abou Shakra (2015) recalls that not all 
practitioners joined the newly established Association:  
“Professionals who joined the associations were professional 
in medium and small sized firms. The big sized firms 
[referencing ‘foreign’ accounting companies such as Deloitte] 
didn’t join and created their own association called The 
Association for Certified Auditors in the Middle East 
[established on 12 March 1964 according to Longuenesse 
(2006)], or something like that. They fought the [accounting 
professionalization] law because they wanted the law to be 
tailored to their needs only”. 
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These ‘big sized’ firms were the Anglo-Saxon firms who were well 
established in Lebanon in the 1950s. According to Longuenesse (2006), 
these firms included Ernst and Ernst through Russell and Winney Firm; 
Andersen through Saba Firm; Peat Marwick through Hazem Hassan Firm 
and his Lebanese associate; and PWC “through its Lebanese associate 
manager who was for some time the president of the association” (p. 7). 
On 15 March 1964, the first general assembly of the association was held, 
at which the first AAFO board, consisting of 12 board members and 
presided over by Joseph Tasso, was elected. It was remarkable that while 
the profession was dominated by ‘British-trained’ professionals, the first 
president was French-educated and trained. This could be seen as an 
implementation of the professional unification strategy (S7) to gain 
professional power. 
On 6 July 1964, the AAFO’s first general assembly approved the 
association’s internal bylaws. These bylaws, presented in Document 5-3, 
set out the aims of the Association (S2 – delineation of the area of 
expertise) as follows: 
 Protecting, encouraging, and promoting the accounting and audit 
profession, and working on its progress and prosperity in all 
financial and economic matters. 
 Promoting cooperation and solidarity among members, protecting 
their interests, defending their legitimate rights, and working on 
promoting their status. 
 Undertaking and contributing to scientific research projects and 
improving accounting principles and techniques to be used locally. 
 Encouraging professional information exchange with other 
professional bodies in Arab countries and other countries. 
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 Providing the association members with all information relating to 
the progress and prosperity of the profession. 
The internal bylaws also set the conditions to join the Association (S3 – 
control of education and entry by the organizing body; and S4 – definition 
of competence levels of the members). These were: 
 To be a Lebanese citizen with full civil rights. 
 To not be an employee in public, private or any other institution, 
and to be practicing accounting and audit profession in his own firm, 
whether a sole proprietorship or partnership.  
 To be at least 18 years old. 
 To not be convicted of any crime. 
 Non-Lebanese are allowed to join the association if they meet the 
conditions and have the right to work in Lebanon. However, they 
can’t take part in the elections or be board members. 
What is notable is that the internal bylaws did not specify the education or 
training levels of the members as entry barriers, but rather focused on the 
member being an owner of an accounting firm. This is evidence of the 
closure strategy used by the AAFO to monopolize the market for the 
advantage of those who had the financial ability to establish an accounting 
firm rather than in relation to standards of education or training. 
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Document 5-3: The first, second and last pages of the Association of Accounting 
Firms’ Owners Internal Bylaws, as approved by the first general assembly of the 
Association 
        
 
Sharara (2006) interviewed Fadil Al-Hajj who recalled that organizing the 
profession was the first priority among the founding fathers. He believed 
that the AAFO had a leading role in introducing the profession to Lebanese 
society and explaining the role and importance of certified accountants (S6 
– image building), since “all institutions started to talk about the role of 
the association [AAFO] and the importance of the profession” (Sharara, 
2006, p. 231). Al-Hajj also recollected that while the AAFO did not have a 
‘legal’ status, it managed to join other associations and international 
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bodies16 thanks to the tremendous efforts of its administrators (S6 – image 
building).  
Table 5-4 summarizes the establishment of AAFO and the surrounding 
events, and presents the various strategies used by the AAFO, where 
applicable, to attain monopoly over work and the market.  
Table 5-4: Establishing the AAFO and bylaws 
Date Event Strategy 
1930s Introduction of accounting as an occupation by 
the British-trained Palestinian accountants who 
immigrated to Lebanon. 
 
1943 Lebanon gains independence.  
1952 First calls made by Jamil Atiyeh to create an 
accounting professional body. 
 
1957 The establishment of the French-trained audit 
firm. 
Antoine Karam suggests establishing an 
association for firm owners. 
 
1958 Civil War postponed any discussion relating to the 
establishment of a professional body. 
 
1960 Stability returns to Lebanon.  
Grand meeting attended by 50 accountants and 
auditors was held and called for the establishment 
of a professional body. 
 
1963 AAFO was established by Decree 518/1. S8 
1964 AAFO’s first general assembly, the election of its 
first board, and approval of its internal bylaws. 
S2, S3, 
S4, S7 
                                       
 
16 The loss of the archive of the AAFO in the civil war and the name change of the 
association limits the ability to find the names of the associations and bodies which 
the AAFO joined.  
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5. 4. 2. First attempts to seek legalization through a 
professionalization law (1965-1975) 
This section discusses the steps taken by the AAFO to attain a monopoly 
over work and the market through a professionalization law. It reveals that 
the state showed little interest in such a law, even with the several 
attempts by the AAFO to push for the Lebanese parliament to pass a law.  
According to Sharara (2006), Anis Kasbarian recalls that the first meetings 
of the AAFO were held in the offices of Joseph Tasso, and were later moved 
to the rented offices of the association in the Ras El Nabie area in Beirut. 
Mohamad Saloum (Sharara, 2006) explains that the AAFO constituent 
assembly had met 53 times between its establishment in 1963 and 1965 
in order to create a comprehensive draft law that would organize the 
accounting profession in Lebanon. This draft was presented to the AAFO’s 
general assembly on 14 March 1965 (S5 – determinations of standards). 
Picture 5-3: The members of the constituent  Picture 5-4: The members of   
assembly of the AAFO in 1964       the first Council of the AAFO in 1971 
    
The draft law was approved by the AAFO’s general assembly and was then 
sent to the Lebanese Cabinet to obtain the government’s approval. 
Mohamad Saloum (Sharara, 2006) recalled that the government and the 
   150 
 
AAFO entered a negotiation phase in which demands for alteration and re-
alterations of certain articles were set by both sides (S8 – achieving a 
relationship with the state). Similarly, Sharara (2006) interviewed Antoine 
Salem who said that when the law was sent to the Lebanese Cabinet for 
approval in 1971, the cabinet transferred the law to one ministry and then 
another, with each demanding alterations to some of the articles. He also 
remembered that the law finally reached the Lebanese parliament, but was 
rejected because it contained an article that limited foreign companies’ 
activities in Lebanon. Ali Awada (Sharara, 2006) said that the law was sent 
to the cabinet four times, and each time was rejected. He claimed that only 
after the fourth rejection did the AAFO know that the reason for rejection 
was the article limiting foreign companies’ activities.  
Document 5-4: The first and the second pages of the amended law relating to 
the organization of the accounting profession in Lebanon  
   
The draft law differed greatly from the AAFO’s internal bylaws. The internal 
bylaws dealt with association-specific issues such as the name and location 
of the association, its purpose and aims, type of members, conditions for 
joining the association, the length of board governance, and association 
elections. On the other hand, the draft law focused on the definition of the 
certified public accountant (CPA), the conditions for becoming a CPA, and 
the committee for approving the accounting profession practice. The draft, 
presented in Document 5-4, defined the CPA as the person who performs 
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auditing and appraisal of all types of accounts and renders an opinion as 
to the authenticity and accuracy of financial data in the public and private 
sectors. Unlike the conditions that limit membership of the AAFO to owners 
of accounting firms, the draft law specified education and training as 
conditions to become a CPA in a manner that mimicked other professional 
organization laws (discussed in Chapter Two above). The new entry 
barriers intended to monopolize and protect the profession included: 
1. Being a Lebanese citizen for more than ten years. 
2. Being over 21 years of age. 
3. Enjoying all his civil rights and having never been convicted of a 
disgraceful crime or offence. 
4. Holding a degree in Business Administration (accounting major) 
from one of the universities operating in Lebanon, or its equivalent. 
5. Obtaining a license to practice the profession. 
6. Completion of training in one of the licensed CPA firms registered 
with the AAFO for at least three years, or experience of practicing 
the profession in the public or private sector as a chief or senior 
accountant along with completion of one year of training at a 
licensed CPA firm.  
While these conditions were similar to the closure strategies used in other 
countries, the training conditions added another entry barrier by requiring 
the CPA to train for three years under the supervision of an AAFO member, 
thus enforcing the exclusivity of the profession to the accounting firm 
owners who were AAFO members. Such conditions enabled AAFO members 
to have a complete monopoly of labour and the market simultaneously. By 
setting these conditions, the association attempted to implement all three 
strategies for association control: delineation of the area of expertise (S2), 
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control of education and entry by the organizing body (S3), and definition 
of competence levels of the members (S4).  
AAFO members also attempted to implement other professionalization 
strategies. For example, Antoine Karam (Sharara, 2006) recalled that he 
owned a weekly magazine that was dedicated to defending the newly 
established association between 1965 and 1968 (S6 – image building). His 
main objective was to solidify the AAFO’s position and strengthen it against 
the international companies, such as Arthur Anderson and Deloitte, both 
of which were dominating the Lebanese market through their contracts 
with almost all Lebanese major companies and the Lebanese government. 
He claimed that these international companies used their home countries’ 
influences and their own financial abilities to fight the professional 
organization law, managing to delay it for a lengthy time. Joseph Tasso 
explained that non-Lebanese did not join the association; any foreigner 
who wished to join the AAFO needed to partner with Lebanese in order to 
compete in the market as a member of the Association.  
In parallel with Antoine Karam’s efforts, Mohamad Saloum has stated 
(Sharara, 2006, p. 236): 
“I sent a report to the association board on 14 March 1965, 
briefing about the efforts done by the Ministry of Labour and 
Social Affairs regarding the licensing for the foreign 
companies to work in Lebanon, where the Ministry of Economy 
was basing the licensing for these foreign companies on the 
decree number 69 issued by the French Mandate. These 
companies, as a result, were able to open offices in Lebanon 
by just notifying the Ministry of Economy. Based on the 
objection of the Association board, I notified both ministries 
and asked them to stop the foreign [international] companies 
from opening the offices without the Ministry of Labour’s 
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approval. This limited these companies’ ability to open new 
offices in Lebanon”.  
By seeking the state’s help against the international companies, AAFO 
aimed to achieve monopoly through S8 (achieving a relationship with the 
state), while also attempting to achieve another closure strategy through 
the creation of an entry barrier to new international firms attempting to 
establish a presence in Lebanon.  
While the AAFO managed to successfully implement this strategy, it was 
not able to convince the state of the necessity of approving the draft 
professionalization law. Mohamad Saloum recalled that, despite the 
continuous efforts of the association’s board members, the law was not 
passed by parliament until 1994 (as discussed below in Chapter Six). The 
efforts included sending frequent memos and requests to the prime 
ministers and presidents. The association continued its attempts to achieve 
a relationship with the state (S8) to gain a monopoly over the profession 
through legislation.  
Table 5-5 summarizes the efforts conducted by the AAFO boards over the 
years to pass the professional organization law, and the reactions of 
cabinets, presidents, and parliaments. The archival material discussing 
these events is presented in Documents 5-5 to 5-8. The archival material 
covering the period between 1965 and 1971 was not retrieved because 
none of the interviewees had copies of such material.  
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Table 5-5: Chronology of the professionalization law between 1965 and 1975 
14/3/1965 AAFO’s general assembly approved the draft professional 
organization law. 
4/5/1971 The draft law was examined by the Lebanese 
government cabinet but was not passed. 
3/6/1971 AAFO members met with ministers, the Prime Minister, 
and the president to ask for their approval of the law. 
9/8/1971 The law was examined again by the Lebanese Cabinet, 
but was not passed. 
24/2/1972 The AAFO board sent the law to the Lebanese president.  
15/9/1972 The AAFO sent a memo to the Lebanese Prime Minister 
to pass the law. 
10/1/1973 The AAFO board discussed the law with the Minister of 
Labour and Social Affairs. 
7/11/1973 The law was re-examined by the cabinet and refused. 
9/2/1974 A memo was sent again to the Lebanese president 
asking for his approval of the law. 
8/5/1974 A parliamentary committee discussed the law and 
transferred it for further study to the Administration and 
Justice Committee. 
9/10/1974 The law was discussed again with the Lebanese President 
and Minister of Finance. 
1/5/1975 The board met with the Lebanese President and Minister 
of Education to discuss the law. 
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Document 5-5: The letter from the 
Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs to 
the cabinet asking for its decision on 
the Organization of the Accounting 
Profession Law in 1971 
Document 5-6: A letter addressed 
to the Lebanese president asking 
him to approve the professional 
organization law in February 1972 
  
Document 5-7: Letter to the President of the Lebanese Cassation Court 
demanding the inclusion of the association in decisions relating to the 
appointment of sworn experts and other matters. 
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Document 5-8: A letter addressed to the Prime Minister soliciting his help to 
pass the professional organization law in August 1971 
                           
 
In addition to the government’s unwillingness to approve the 
professionalization law, the draft professional organization law faced 
obstruction from other accounting associations. Sharara (2015) recalls 
that:  
“There were three associations at that time [1960s-1970s]. The 
AAFO presided by Wael Abou Shakra, the Certified Public 
Accountants in the Middle East, and the Court Experts presided 
by Dr. John Abdallah. Only the AAFO was formed under the 
Ministry of Labour [Decree 518/1], while the others were just 
associations with no ‘legal’ existence except notification to the 
Ministry of Interior”.  
Abou Shakra has discussed the conflict between the AAFO and the Certified 
Public Accountant in the Middle East (CPAME). He claims that the CPAME 
association was constituted by all audit firms who represented international 
audit companies. He recalled that CPAME’s actions could only be viewed as 
methods to delay the Lebanese professionalization law, stating (2015): 
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“The conflict with the other association [CPAME] was that they 
wanted the persons who are in the profession to be chartered 
or certified, while most practitioner at that time were ones by 
experience and practice.  They soon felt isolated [from 
CPAME] and later joined our association [AAFO]”. 
As the president of the AAFO, Abou Shakra resorted to the Arab Federation 
of Accountants and Auditors (AFAA) to resolve the conflict between the 
AAFO and CPAME. The AFAA requested a meeting with CPAME and AAFO, 
which was held on 3 January 1974. At the meeting, the AAFO and CPAME 
agreed to create a committee from both associations. According to 
Document 5-9 presented below, the purpose of that committee was to 
“examine and pursue the professionalization law... and communicate with 
all the people who are in charge and have an interest in this subject”. Abou 
Shakra (2015) has indicated that the AAFO and CPAME reached a 
compromise as follows: 
“To overcome the differences suggested by the associations, 
those who have TS degrees [Technicien Supérieur gained 
after studying three years after the secondary cycle] had to 
have five years of training. Those who have university degrees 
had to have three years of training, while those who have the 
American CPA, British CA, or French CPA can become full 
members of the association once they pass the Lebanese Laws 
test”. 
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Document 5-9: The minutes of the meeting held between AAFO and CPAME 
  
5. 4. 3. Second attempt to seek legalization through a 
professionalization law (1975-1990) 
The start of the civil war in Lebanon in 1975 did not stop the demands 
made by the association to pass a law governing the profession (S2 – 
delineation of the area of expertise; and S8 – achieving a relationship with 
the state). While the Two-Years’ War halted the work of the AAFO board, 
Simon Zakka, the AAFO president, met with four of AAFO’s influential 
members on 11 June 1977 and took the decision to re-activate the 
association by calling for elections and asking the association’s members 
to actively participate in these activities.  
The newly-elected AAFO board met with the Ministry of Finance’s general 
manager in June 1977, asking him to progress the profession by passing 
the law that would organize it. The general manager then sent a letter to 
the minister suggesting the creation of a government committee that 
would examine such a law. On 27 September 1977, the Prime Minister 
issued Decree number 43 announcing the establishment of the committee, 
as presented in Document 5-10. The committee had five governmental 
representatives from the Ministries of Finance, Labour and Social Affairs, 
Economy, and Justice, while one representative from the AAFO was asked 
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to participate, but was not named among the committee members. The 
decree stated that the purpose of the committee was to examine the 
organization of the accounting profession in Lebanon and to suggest a draft 
law regarding the professional organization.  
Document 5-10: The Cabinet decision to establish a committee that would 
suggest a law to organise the accounting profession in Lebanon in 1977 
 
On 23 March 1978, the committee sent the suggested law to the Lebanese 
Cabinet. In the memo addressed to the Prime Minister, the committee 
distinguished between the profession of CPA and the occupation of account 
on the following basis (and as presented in Document 5-11). While the 
occupation of accountant included anyone who practiced bookkeeping, 
CPAs were viewed as auditors and experts in court. The committee did not 
provide any education, training, or experience as a basis for distinguishing 
between CPAs and accountants. Document 5-11 reads:  
“The certified accountants are to monitor and audit joint stock 
and limited liability companies in accordance to the Commerce 
Law. They are also to be chartered by the courts that will rely 
on their reports in conflicts and disputes resolutions. The 
accountants’ duty is limited to bookkeeping”. 
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Document 5-11: The first two pages of the suggested law governing the 
organization of the profession in 1978 
    
In April 1978, the AAFO board decided to create a committee that would 
suggest a unified accounting framework (S5 – determinations of 
standards) in another strategy to achieve professionalization. The AAFO 
also attempted to signal its legitimacy to the public by publishing a code of 
ethics in the Orient Press newspaper on 14 June 1978 (S1 – formulation of 
a code of ethics) (Sharara, 2006). However, this strategy had no effect as 
the public was more engaged with the civil war.  
With the second round of war ending in 1979, the government established 
a committee to set the unified accounting framework in response to the 
draft framework submitted by the AAFO (as presented in Document 5-12). 
The framework committee was constituted with 11 members from the 
government and two members from the AAFO, proving again the inability 
of the AAFO to successfully implement the professional power strategy of 
achieving a relationship with the state (S8).  
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Document 5-12: A letter from the Ministry of Finance addressed to the 
association asking for the establishment of a committee to create a unified 
accounting framework 
 
A semi-successful implementation of S8 (achieving a relationship with the 
state) by the AAFO is described by Sharara (2006) where he explains that 
the Lebanese Ministry of Finance sent the professional organization draft 
law in February 1979 to the cabinet after it had been discussed in detail 
between the Association chairman and the Ministry’s representatives. The 
draft law was sent back to the Ministry in February 1980 for further 
modification. On 15 April 1980, representatives from the Lebanese Central 
Bank, the Ministry of Finance, the Lebanese Cabinet, the AAFO, and CPAME 
met to discuss the draft law. In that meeting, according to Document 5-
13, the draft was amended in accordance with the observations made by 
the Ministries of Finance, Justice, and Economy, and the CPAME. However, 
CPAME claimed during that meeting that it had further notes that it would 
like the committee to consider. These notes were then integrated into the 
draft law, which was then submitted to the Lebanese parliament after 
approval from the Ministries of Finance and Economy.   
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Document 5-13: The minutes of the meeting held on 15 April 1980. 
   
5. 4. 4. The establishment of LACPA 
In 1980, the AAFO changed its name to the Lebanese Association of 
Certified Public Accountants (LACPA), as shown in Document 5-14. The 
general assembly modified the conditions for joining LACPA to include a 
degree in accounting, three years of training, and successful completion of 
LACPA exams (S3 – control of education and entry by the organizing body; 
and S4 – definition of competence levels of the members). It also changed 
the minimum age requirement from 18 to 21 (S3 – control of education 
and entry by the organizing body). Abou Shakra has explained that the 
name was changed so that the association could be easily integrated with 
international professional bodies’ names, and to facilitate the joining of the 
association to international organizations such as the International 
Federation of Accountants. This could be viewed as an attempt to 
implement an image-building strategy (S6) by providing the public with an 
image reflecting the legitimacy of the profession through its connection to 
reputable and established organizations.  
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Document 5-14: Decree 246/1 announcing the name change from the 
Association of Accounting Firms’ Owners to Lebanese Association of Certified 
Public Accountants in 1980 
 
Abou Shakra recalls that a meeting held on 17 February 1981 by the LACPA 
board discussed the intention of the government to pass the professional 
organization law without LACPA’s suggestions and that the law would pass 
without containing articles for the establishment of a professional 
accounting body. The reason behind this intention was that that the 
government feared that a new law with an article for a professional body 
would set a precedent that would lead other professional associations to 
demand laws governing their own professions. As evident from Document 
5-15 below, the LACPA board responded quickly and notified the Lebanese 
Cabinet that such a law would damage the profession. With the civil war 
flaring up again over the next nine years, the association continued to wish 
for a law that would govern the profession, but it postponed its dream in 
the face of war, political instability and lack of government. Due to the civil 
war, the LACPA paused all its activities until the end of the war in 1990.  
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Document 5-15: Letter from LACPA addressed to the Lebanese Ministry of 
Finance requesting the Ministry’s aid in approving the professionalization law 
 
In parallel with the attempts to pass the law, the AAFO focused on building 
its image as a professional body, thus catering for S6 (image-building 
strategy) between 1964 and 1983. Sharara (2006 and 2015) has stated 
that the AAFO accomplished tremendous things, such as the monitoring of 
banks’ procedures, and becoming one of the founding members of FIDEF 
(Fédération Internationale des Experts Comptables et Commissaires aux 
Comptes Francophones). He also remembered that the AAFO oversaw the 
design of Lebanese accounting processes in 1982. Longuenesse (2009-b) 
has viewed the intervention of the Lebanese government in accountancy 
regulation as minimal and late, and even negatively passive. She has 
stated (2009, p. 78) that “surprisingly, it was during the civil war, in 1983 
that an accounting system was published, and a high council for 
accountancy created in 1984”. 
5. 4. 5. Conclusion 
With the growing numbers of accountants and auditors, calls for 
establishing a professional body were answered when 50 accountants and 
auditors met in 1960 and agreed to seek the government’s aid in forming 
the AAFO. With Decree 518/1 permitting the establishment of the AAFO 
and the approval of AAFO’s internal bylaws, the first steps were taken 
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towards professionalization. The internal bylaws provided the AAFO with 
entry barriers, and closed the profession in the face of those who were not 
firm owners, thus creating the first entry barrier to joining the Lebanese 
accounting profession. The need to protect the profession and attain a 
monopoly led the AAFO to formulate a draft law that would create 
additional entry barriers of education and training. However, the 
government showed great reluctance to approve the law, claiming that it 
would provide a precedent and justification for other occupations to seek 
similar laws. In addition, the AAFO faced several obstructing attempts from 
the other two associations in its efforts to get the law passed. However, 
this did not stop the AAFO from attempting on multiple occasions to gain 
the state’s approval of the law, but such attempts were paused frequently 
due to the civil war after 1975 and then ceased completely in 1983 as the 
civil war escalated.  
5. 5. Resolution of emerging sectarian tension 
Sectarian tensions dominated Lebanese society (as discussed in Chapter 
Three above), and there is some evidence that such tensions also existed 
among AAFO’s members. Table 5-6 provides evidence that Christians 
dominated AAFO board membership and the presidency between 1964 and 
1983. Such dominance by the Christians over the AAFO board and 
presidency is unsurprising, since Christians, mainly Christian Maronites, 
were the dominant sect within Lebanese society before the civil war in 
1975. It should be noted that the continuity of the Muslim president of the 
AAFO between 1977 and 1983 can be attributed to the war conditions 
which made new elections almost impossible to hold. No further evidence 
of the religious affiliation of the presidents or board members could be 
obtained since no public record provides this information. 
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Table 5-6: The religious composition of the AAFO presidents and board members 
1964-1983 
Year President religion 
Board’s religious 
composition 
1964 Christian 4 Muslims – 7 Christians 
1965 Muslim 2 Muslims – 9 Christians 
1966 Christian No information 
1967 Muslim No information 
1968 Muslim No information 
1969 Christian No information 
1970 Christian No information 
1971 Christian 3 Muslims – 8 Christians 
1972 Christian 3 Muslims – 8 Christians 
1973 Christian 4 Muslims – 7 Christians 
1974 Christian 3 Muslims – 8 Christians 
1977 Muslim 2 Muslims – 9 Christians 
1978 Muslim 2 Muslims – 9 Christians 
1983 Muslim 3 Muslims – 8 Christians 
While no evidence can be found on sectarian conflicts in the AAFO prior to 
the civil war, the severity of the sectarian division due to the 1975 civil war 
had an influence on the association. Abou Shakra was elected president in 
the 1977 election, as presented in Document 5-10.   
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Document 5-16: The results of the association elections in 1977 
 
Looking back at this election, Abou Shakra has recalled the death threats 
– based on sectarian grounds – made against him:  
“The sectarianism in the Lebanese society is reflected in the 
members of the association. The day I was elected as 
president in 1977, amidst the civil war, the election place was 
in the SNA17 building, crossing the green line to the other side 
to eastern Beirut. There were a lot of threats to my person 
[being a Muslim Druze crossing to an area controlled by 
Christian Militias], but I told them I don’t care and I will take 
all the necessary precautions. I contacted the Lebanese 
Minister of Interior at that time, Dr. Salah Salman, and he 
begged me not to go. I told him I will go and I need you to 
send police force with me. He warned me a couple of times 
again, but I insisted on going, and then I got elected. I always 
refused to discuss sectarianism, and when the 1977 elections 
                                       
 
17 The SNA building is considered as a landmark in Lebanon due to its location 
between the divisions of Beirut created by the 1975 civil war. 
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occurred, there were accusations that my election as 
president is a means to take the presidency from the Christian 
Maronites [Abou Shakra is a Muslim Druze]. I told them I am 
a Lebanese first, and all I care about is the future of our 
profession”. 
He has also recalled the effect of war and sectarian divisions on the 
association, and the methods he used to overcome these effects: 
“During my tenure, when there were events for the profession 
where I couldn’t get all the members to join due to war, I 
would take them outside of Lebanon for the event, so no 
person belonging to any of the sects would feel isolated”. 
The sectarian war was had an immense impact on the economy and the 
accounting profession. With the sectarian war raging again in 1978, the 
AAFO warned of the war’s consequences on the economy. It also pointed 
out that Lebanon had lost a considerable number of accounting and audit 
practitioners due to emigration and the attraction of job offers in other 
markets, as presented in Document 5-17. The war also led to the closure 
of international accounting companies. For example, according to Sharara 
(2006), Russell and Co. closed its offices with the result that 22 
accountants were dismissed. He also stated that the AAFO was present 
during the mediation between the company and its former employees, 
helping to reach satisfying severance packages.  
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Document 5-17: Newspaper clips discussing AAFO’s warning of the war’s 
economic consequences and the emigration of practitioners.  
 
Abou Shakra (2016) has recalled that, in his capacity as AAFO president, 
he decided to create accounting and audit norms, which all members of 
the association could follow until the professional organization law was 
approved. His memoirs (2016) also recall that the media showed an 
interest in the profession (S6 – image building), and asked him to 
participate in many television shows and news articles. However, the 
sectarian war had already extended to the media as well. As he stated 
(2016): 
In the autumn of 1982, I was invited by the Tele Liban [official 
Lebanese TV] – known as Channel 11 – to a televised 
discussion of the developments relating to the profession. The 
discussion was to be set in a panel form that included, aside 
from myself, the general manager of the Ministry of Finance, 
the President of the Lebanese Banking Association, the head 
of the income taxes division, and an army general. At that 
time, many of my family members and friends feared for my 
life due to the location of the interview in Hazmieh [area under 
the control of Christians]. I told them [the people conducting 
the discussion] that I will only agree with the discussion is 
transmitted on the Channel 11 and Channel 7 [Tele Liban was 
   170 
 
then divided into two channels: Channel 11 was controlled by 
Christians and Channel 7 was controlled by Muslims]. Two 
other panel members [the general manager of the Ministry of 
Finance, the President of the Lebanese Banking Association] 
set my participation as the condition for theirs. After 
communications with the Chairman of the TV stations, he 
approved that broadcasting of the discussion on both 
channels. On that day, I was escorted by the interior defence 
cars to an area close to Badaro Street [on the green line], 
where I met the other panel members who escorted me to the 
televised discussion. I returned back in the same manner”. 
LACPA called its general assembly in 1983 for the elections of the board, 
but was faced with the objections of a few members. Abou Shakra recalls 
(2016) that these members spread rumours that the election was intended 
to create divisions among LACPA members based on sectarian lines and 
that some members contacted the Ministry of Labour alleging that the sole 
purpose of the election was to divide the LACPA in a sectarian manner, 
thus creating a Christian accounting association and a Muslim accounting 
association. When the Minister of Labour asked Abou Shakra about these 
claims, Abou Shakra rejected them. Document 5-18 reveals that out of 195 
members at that time, 150 members attended the elections, and Abou 
Shakra’s election list won by 121 votes. 
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Document 5-18: Newspapers articles discussing the AAFO elections in 1983 
 
Due to a lack of archival material, no other evidence of the sectarian impact 
could be obtained for the period 1975-1990. Other interviewees were not 
members of the AAFO and could not provide any information relating to 
the sectarian impact during this period.  
While SDT suggests that the dominant groups in a society will dominate 
the ‘higher-end’ occupations, TEC argues that the conflicting groups will 
‘fight’ over such occupations to attain economic benefits. Like their 
dominance in Lebanese society pre-1975, Christians also dominated the 
AAFO’s board and the presidency. Even when a Muslim was elected as 
president, there were accusations that he was confiscating the ‘rights’ of 
the Christian Maronites, making it evident that Maronites viewed the AAFO 
presidency as an entitlement for their sect, even to the extent of making 
threats against the Muslim president and issuing claims that his action 
would lead to the division of the association. These could be considered as 
retaliations, or as legitimizing myths, used by the dominant group to 
maintain its position and to preserve its economic interests.  
5. 6. Analysis and Conclusion 
While there was accounting during the Ottoman era, accounting as an 
occupation was not fully introduced in Lebanon until the late 1930s by 
   172 
 
some French accountants and practitioners coming from Palestine and 
whose training was based on British standards. From 1952 there were calls 
to establish an accounting professional body, but it was not until the 1960s 
that the first efforts towards professionalization were made with the 
establishment of the AAFO.  
Despite its strategic efforts to advance the accounting professionalization 
project in Lebanon, the professional accounting agents were unable to 
advance beyond establishing the AAFO and its internal bylaws and code of 
ethics. Achieving recognition by the state was held up for almost thirty 
years. This exhibits the power of the state over the profession, where the 
state was able to manipulate the occupational body using bureaucracy to 
delay the charting of the professionalization law.  
The AAFO attempted many professionalization strategies from the Birkett 
and Evans’ model between 1964 and 1990 to achieve the end goal: the 
establishment of an accounting profession in Lebanon. To gain professional 
power, the AAFO attempted to set accounting standards (S5) by 
suggesting a unified accounting framework, and to partially attain 
professional unification (S7). However, the AAFO was not able to achieve 
a positive relationship with the state (S8) that would grant autonomy to 
the profession or a monopoly over its services. The AAFO also partially 
implemented association control strategies by setting control over entry 
conditions (S2, S3, and S4), but it was unable to grant its members 
protection from invasion and manipulation by outsiders. The AAFO 
attempted to implement the formulation of a code of ethics strategy (S1) 
to sustain its ideology, but it was unsuccessful in attracting interest from 
a public that was preoccupied with the civil war. With the lack of legislative 
support, the acknowledgement of accounting as a profession was not 
successful. Although the AAFO was unable to convince the state of its 
legitimacy, it was able to build its image (S6) in the eyes of the public, 
albeit only semi-successfully. However, the professionalization process was 
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halted due to the war. No further attempts were made to achieve legislative 
approval until the war end in 1990 (as discussed in the following chapter).  
The actions of AAFO corresponds to that described in the Neo-Weberian 
closure theory, where in order to ‘elevate’ the occupation to a profession, 
the occupational body set entry barriers in face of the ‘ineligibles’. The first 
category of ‘ineligibles’ was identified even before the establishment of 
AAFO. The “foreigners” acted as the first ineligible category and ‘risk of 
foreign espionage’ was used as the billboard reason to establish AAFO, 
similar to the use of potential change of the bankruptcy law in England and 
Scotland to establish their respective professional bodies. The next 
‘ineligible’ categories were defined in the 1964 internal bylaws. The focus 
was not on the experience, education, or qualification of the member, but 
rather on their ability to own their own firm. This condition links AAFO 
membership to the ability of the member to have adequate funds to own 
and operating a firm, thus limiting membership to privileged members with 
money. In AAFO’s law draft and its amendments linked the profession to 
AAFO membership, thus indirectly enforcing ownership condition within the 
law. However, more conditions were added to include more ‘ineligibles’, 
such as age, training, and education.  
There is some evidence presented in this chapter that religious 
sectarianism had an influence on the accounting professionalization project 
in Lebanon between 1964 and 1990. The power, as described in both STD 
and TEC, was exercised to make sure that the dominant group in society 
has dominance over the profession by ensuring that the dominant sect has 
control over AAFO. This is exhibited by the composition of AAFO board 
which was dominated by Christians, mirroring Christian social dominance 
in Lebanon. Similarly, the majority of the AAFO presidents were Christians. 
In addition, Abou Shakra has provided his own experience of dealing with 
sectarian conflicts. His statements reflect the degree to which the 
Christians were willing to go in order to protect their interests. The war 
also led to the loss of many talents due to emigration or death, which had 
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a negative impact on the profession. However, the lack of data and archival 
material due to the civil war means that such effects cannot be determined. 
In addition, further evidence could not be obtained due to the inability of 
interviewees – with the exception of Abou Shakra – to provide insights 
relating to this period. I attempted to find other individuals who had been 
involved with the AAFO, but I was unsuccessful as many had either died or 
emigrated, or they have little recollection of that period.  
It should be noted that while there is some evidence, it is only logical to 
assume that the sectarian tensions which led to a 15-year civil war had an 
impact on Lebanese society. It can also be logically assumed that Lebanese 
accountants, who are members of this society, were affected by the 
sectarian tensions. The testimonies provided by Abou Shakra demonstrate 
some of the behaviour that Lebanese society witnessed during the war 
years.  
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Chapter 6. The accounting 
professionalization project 
(1990-2015) 
6. 1. Introduction 
The restructuring of Lebanon, its infrastructure, and its economy began 
once the civil war ended in 1990. Reform plans were set by the new 
President and the new Prime Minister to regain Lebanon’s position as a 
leading Middle Eastern country. Longuenesse’s (2009-b) study reveals that 
it is not surprising that the accounting profession was at the forefront of 
reforms. The reconstruction period that began in 1990 was marked by the 
growth in foreign investment, the establishment of tax reform and the 
introduction of the Value-Added Tax, the reopening of the Beirut stock 
exchange, and the obligation to align with international accounting 
standards to regain the trust of the public and the international community 
(Longuenesse, 2006 and 2009-b). 
This chapter explores the final steps taken towards gaining legitimacy of 
the profession by legislation (S8 – achieving a relationship with the state) 
between 1990 and 1994, which, as the previous chapter discussed, the 
AAFO had not been successful in obtaining. It identifies the factors that led 
to the establishment of the current association in 1994 through the eyes 
of the interviewees: some of LACPA’s previous presidents and board 
members. With the help of these interviews, the religious sectarian effects 
on the profession are revealed. The chapter concludes by investigating the 
factors that have affected and are currently affecting the profession. 
To support the findings of this chapter, qualitative data are collected about 
LACPA from 1995 to 2015. Such data include full name, gender, type of 
membership (practicing versus non-practicing), date of joining LACPA, and 
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date of and the reason for leaving LACPA (if applicable). Data relating to 
current employment status and place of work were retrieved from LACPA’s 
website and directory.  
The LACPA members’ data relating to religion and religious sect were 
retrieved from the 2015 electoral list obtained from the Lebanese Ministry 
of the Interior. In addition, any family relationship (for example, parent-
child, siblings, uncle-niece-nephew, and cousins) has been obtained from 
the electoral lists. The LACPA members’ data have been analysed either by 
performing historical analysis (year-to-year) or by comparing it with the 
Lebanese population. As discussed in Chapter Four, there is no official 
census of the Lebanese population. However, the 2015 electoral lists 
provide the next best alternative, since they include the population of 
citizens over the age of 18 and with no criminal record, both of which are 
LACPA membership criteria. The full data relating to LACPA members 
between 1995 and 2015 and the data relating to religion and religious sects 
are presented in Appendix I. 
While the previous chapter provided some evidence of the negative impact 
of religious sectarianism on the development of the accounting profession 
in Lebanon prior to 1990, this chapter endeavours to analyse the data 
collected from LACPA and from the interviewees through SDT and TEC, 
while highlighting some of Birkett and Evans’ (2009) professionalization 
strategies as used by LACPA.  
While AAFO’s legal name was changed to the Lebanese Association of 
Certified Public Accountants (LACPA) in 1980, the term AAFO is used in this 
chapter to distinguish the pre-1990 LACPA from the one established in 
1994. 
   177 
 
6. 2. The final steps to establish a 
professionalization law (1990-1994) 
With the end of the war and calls for reform, the AAFO held its first post-
war elections in 1992. According to Al Mal Wal Alam’s new article presented 
in Document 6-1, 163 members of AAFO met in the Bristol Hotel and 
elected 12 board members and the AAFO president. The election was run 
with two competing lists. The first was presided over by Wael Abou Shakra, 
AAFO’s president between 1973 and 1992. The second list was formed by 
firm owners who were representative of international audit firms. 
Remarkably, between 90 and 120 members voted for Abou Shakra’s list, 
while the other list received between 50 and 60 votes. The published article 
claims that “on the election day, the members of the first list [the losing 
list] were surprised by the presence of many new members in the AAFO 
that were not known to them, while some were very young. These were 
the swaying votes who voted completely to Abou Shakra’s list”. While the 
representatives of the international firms’ list did not win the 1992 
elections, they later won the first election of the LACPA once it was 
established in 1995.  
Document 6-1: Al Mal Wal Alam article pertaining to the AAFO elections in 1992 
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According to Eid’s (1992) new article published in Ad-Diyar newspaper and 
presented in Document 6-2, the winning list set the following agenda to 
complete the professionalization process in accordance with the Birkett and 
Evans’ (2005) professionalization model: 
 Continue to seek the professionalization law (S6 – image building, 
and S8 – achieving a relationship with the state) that would organize 
the profession and protect the profession and its practitioners (S2 – 
delineation of the area of expertise).  
 Increase scientific and other activities (S6 – image building). 
 Continue the coordination with the Ministry of Finance and the 
Higher Accounting Council (S8 – achieving a relationship with the 
state) to modernize the accounting systems and audit practices (S5 
– determinations of standards). 
 Continue the collaboration with the Lawyers’ Association to secure 
synergies between the two associations (S6 – image building). 
 Activate the ‘Collaboration Fund’ within the AAFO to benefit the 
members (S7 – professional unification). 
 Establish the joint committees that would perform scientific research 
and pursue professional development (S2 – delineation of the area 
of expertise, and S5 – determinations of standards).   
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Document 6-2: Newspaper articles covering the AAFO 1992 elections, including 
Eid’s (1992) at top right. 
 
The AAFO found in the new government presided by Rafic Hariri the perfect 
ally for regulating the profession, a point made by some of the 
interviewees. While the Lebanese government had little interest in the 
accounting professionalization law prior to 1990, the economic 
reconstruction of Lebanon created a fundamental need for such law to gain 
the trust of both the public and international community in the Lebanese 
economy. For the first time, LACPA strategy to achieve a relationship with 
the state (S8) was being successful. However, such success was due to the 
needs of the state rather than of LACPA or the profession. According to 
interviewee Abed Al Kader Al Saghir: 
“In the 1990s, both the Prime Minister Rafic Hariri and the 
Minister of Finance [Fouad Sanyora] were men with a strong 
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financial background and full understanding of the importance 
of having solid accounting practices. When they were 
appointed, they found that the accounting profession was 
scattered and weak, while the old association [AAFO] was 
trying its best to get the profession regulated by a law. Before 
Hariri there was war, and nothing could be done to help the 
profession”. 
The first step, after the new AAFO 1992 election, was to go through the 
formal channels again, in the hope of securing the passage of the draft law 
to organize the profession, thereby attempting to gain professional power 
through a positive relationship with the state (S8). Abou Shakra 
remembers: 
“We gained a lot in the beginning of 1990s from the Rafic 
Hariri [Lebanese Prime Minister at that time] and Elias Herawi 
[the Lebanese President at that time] era, where we managed 
to finally pass the professionalization law. I contacted a lawyer 
who was a common friend between me and Hariri, and Hariri 
reacted quickly. He asked me and the cabinet secretary to 
meet and work on the law”. 
The AAFO, therefore, submitted a request to the Minister of Finance. This 
request to consider the professional organization law draft included a letter 
(presented in Document 6-3) outlining the reasons why the profession 
need regulation, which reflects the image-building strategy (S6) by 
convincing the state of the legitimacy of the profession. Some of the 
reasons listed in the request letter encompassed the following: 
 Enrich the state income, attune the taxes, and safeguard the 
processes of the banking, monetary and economic entities (S6 – 
image building). 
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 Protect those Lebanese workers who have the qualifications to bear 
the responsibilities, from foreign competition (S2 – delineation of 
the area of expertise, and S7 – professional unification). 
Document 6-3: Letter addressed to the Minister of Finance from AAFO in 1992 
 
The government then established a committee that would suggest a draft 
law for the regulation of the accounting profession. According to El Yafi 
(2015), the three associations – AAFO, CPAME, and the Court Experts 
(discussed above in the Chapter Five, Section 5.4) – were competing 
among themselves to be the representative association for the auditors in 
Lebanon. He states that the AAFO had the highest number of members, 
had already created a draft of the law to regulate the profession, and had 
a plan that would progress the profession. Therefore, when the Ministry of 
Finance asked for a law that would regulate the profession, according to 
interviewee Mowafak El Yafi, the AAFO presented its draft, which was 
amended and then passed in the parliament. Thus, with AAFO, having 
successfully established a relationship with the state (S8 – achieving a 
relationship with the state), had convinced the state of the legitimacy of 
the profession (S6 – image building). 
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Abou Shakra has recalled:  
“Fouad Sanyora [the Minister of Finance at that time] asked 
me to join a committee to address the law, and in the 
committee, I told them to stop wasting time since the law 
draft has been ready for the past 30 years. Around 10% of 
the draft was amended. To avoid getting the law rejected by 
the cabinet, it was not listed on the agenda [of the Cabinet 
meeting], and it was passed from outside the agenda. The 
reason was that I was expecting that some people may 
interfere to not pass it by contacting ministers whom they 
have sectarian relationships with. The next step was to get it 
passed by the parliament. For that, I contacted August 
Bakhos, the president of the Monetary and Justice 
Commission in the parliament, who studied [the law draft] for 
few sessions and then approve it”. 
The interference Abou Shakra expected happened. Interviewee Afif 
Sharara remembers: 
“While the law was supposed to be passed in 1992, Dr. John 
Abdahllah [president of CPAME] managed to stop it in the 
parliament until his association’s points of view were included. 
There were huge conflicts regarding TS degree [Superior 
Technician degree] holders. One group [AAFO] was arguing 
for their inclusion in the association, while the other group 
[CPAME] didn’t want to give them the right to join the LACPA. 
Another conflict was that one group wanted to accept the new 
association members who are academically qualified 
[CPAME], while the other group [AAFO] defended the rights 
of the people who have practical experience to join”. 
The conflict regarding the education and experience levels of the members 
represented the debate between the two associations on the closure 
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mechanism and entry barriers to joining the profession. The debate 
relating to the inclusion of the TS degree holders reveals the closure 
strategy (S3) of controlling the educational level of the members by setting 
and closely monitoring the level of education required. In contrast to AAFO, 
CPAME required a higher level of education. The second debate reveals a 
fundamental difference between the AAFO and CPAME. While CPAME set 
the entry condition to having a certain level of education, AAFO favoured 
experience over education. This can be viewed as the AAFO protecting its 
members’ right to join LACPA, since the entry conditions to join AAFO did 
not include a set level of education but rather practical experience and 
ownership of an accounting/audit firm. The negotiation of education versus 
experience was a debate on the definition of competence levels of the 
members (S4). 
Abou Shakra has detailed what happened: 
“When the law draft reached the parliament, one of the people 
practicing the profession contacted a parliament member 
[from the same sect – Muslim Shia], who was under the 
Umbrella of Parliament Speaker Nabih Berry [Muslim Shia] 
and stopped the law from passing. I contacted ministers Bahij 
Tabbarah [Muslim Sunni], Marwan Hamadeh [Muslim Druze], 
and Anwar Khalil [Muslim Shia], and they met with Berry. He 
[Berri] asked them to take the draft to the Ministry of Justice, 
and then he would approve it. The ministry then amended 
three parts, one of which was limiting the association 
president to two years instead of three”. 
This established the first political/sectarian intervention in the profession: 
an accounting association member of a religious sect successfully sought 
the aid of the sect’s political leader. The aim was to stop the draft law from 
being passed without the amendments suggested by the accounting 
association to which the member belonged. The member used his sectarian 
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connections to preserve the ‘rights’ of his association to include its 
conditions in the draft professional organization law and, consequently, his 
association members’ ability to control what would be the unifying 
principles of the accounting association. Both SDT and TEC predict and 
explain the behaviour of the association member. SDT suggests that the 
sect members undertake all possible measures to protect the interests of 
their sect, which the accounting association member did by using his 
sectarian political connections to prevent parliament from passing the law. 
TEC argues that the sect will take such measures necessary for preserving 
the economic advantages of the sect. By preventing the draft law from 
passing, the ‘rights and preferences’ of the accounting association to which 
the member belonged are preserved.   
The interviewee Afifi Sharara noted that, while some of the members from 
the CPAME and the Court Experts tried to stop the draft law from passing, 
their intentions were, in their opinion, for the benefit of the profession: 
“they fought passing the law not because they didn’t want to organize the 
profession, they simply wanted their points of view to be included in the 
law as well”. After their amendments were included in the draft 
professional organization law, the Lebanese president referred the draft 
law to parliament for approval on 20 January 1994 (Document 6-4).  
Document 6-4: The Lebanese president authorizes the law governing the 
organization of the profession and transfers it to parliament for final approval. 
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The parliament approved the draft law on 1 August 1994, and it was 
published in the Official Gazette on 11 August 1994 as Law number 364 – 
The Organization of the Lebanese Chartered Accountants Profession in 
Lebanon (as presented in Document 6-5).  
Document 6-5: The first two pages of the Law number 364 – The Organization of 
the Lebanese Chartered Accountants Profession in Lebanon, as it appeared in the 
Official Gazette in 1994 
         
With the Law number 364 published, the most important step in the 
professionalization project was completed, according to interviewee Raja 
Saab. The AAFO was finally able to successfully gain legalization of the 
profession through convincing the state of its legitimacy (S8 – achieving a 
relationship with the state). The AAFO, as an association, did not gain a 
monopoly over the services offered by the profession (S7 – professional 
unification) since the law called for the establishment of a new unifying 
Association (LACPA) rather than the merger of the three existing 
accounting associations (AAFO, CPAME, the Court Experts). However, the 
law, as presented in Document 6-5, granted the new association a 
monopoly over professional practices as described in Article 3: “No person 
shall act as CPA unless registered in the Association established in 
accordance with the present Act”.  
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Sharara has commented in an interview: 
“The current association [LACPA] is a continuity of the old 
association [AAFO]. The members of the old association are 
the ones who pressured towards regulating the profession 
through a law. The association was always there, yet not 
‘legalized’ by law, only with a decision by the Ministry of 
Labour [AAFO was established under Decree 518/1]”. 
While this might be true as per the numbers of AAFO members joining 
LACPA, and the fact that the AAFO pushed for the professional organization 
law, the initial governance of LACPA was mainly controlled by CPAME. On 
18 August 1994, the Ministry of Finance issued the Decision Number 
1/9548 that forms the constituent committee for LACPA (Document 6-6). 
Longuenesse (2009-b) has examined the composition of this committee. 
Her study reveals that the representatives of the Big Four audit firms 
played an important role in the constituent committee of the new 
professional association. She states that out of the ten members serving 
on the committee, four were representatives of the Ministry of Finance and 
the Central Bank, and six were professional accountants. Three of the 
professional accountants were managing partners of local representatives 
of the Big Four: Joseph Fadl (Deloitte), Georges Abu Mansour (Price 
Waterhouse Coopers), and Ramzi Akkawi (Ernst and Young). The other 
three were Wael Abou Shakra (president of AAFO), Mouwafak El Yafi (the 
first president of LACPA and also a representative of an international firm), 
and Wael Hamdan. The dominance of the representatives of international 
firms and government representatives in the constituent committee, who 
were members of CPAME, suggests that the AAFO had little influence in the 
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committee. In addition to dissolving the AAFO, Law 364 Article 6418 
described the role of the constituent committee: 
“As of the enforcement of this Act, the Minister of Finance and 
the Minister of Economy and Trade shall form a constituent 
committee composed of ten members chosen from among 
accountants and auditors practicing the profession or from 
among the holders of auditing and accounting degrees and 
diplomas. The constituent committee shall have the powers of 
the Association Council, as defined in the present Act, for a 
period of one year, during which, the committee shall take all 
necessary measures to elect the first Association Council”. 
All the members of the constituent committee who were professional 
accountants, with the exception of Abou Shakra, served as board members 
and presidents of LACPA after its establishment: Fadl (Deloitte) was a 
board member for three terms (1995-1998); Abu Mansour (Price 
Waterhouse Coopers) acted as president (2000-2001), vice president 
(1998-1999), and board member (1995-1997) for six terms; Akkawi (Ernst 
and Young) was board member for two terms (2003-2004); El Yafi acted 
as president for seven terms (1995-1999, 2002-2003, and 2010); and 
Hamdan served as a board member for four terms (1995-1999). The effect 
of such prolonged governance over the board is discussed later in this 
chapter (section 6.5.5).  
  
                                       
 
18 http://grafium.solutions/dev/accountancy-profession-act 
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Document 6-6: Decree number 9548/1 announcing the establishment of the 
constituent committee for organizing the profession 
 
Recognizing the support given by Prime Minister Rafic Hariri, the 
constituent committee organized a ceremony to honour him. In the 
ceremony, Hariri stated: “The organization of the accounting profession is 
a cornerstone in the process of Lebanon’s construction” (Al-Muhasaba, 
1995), thus acknowledging the positive relationship between the state and 
the profession, and indicating a successful implementation of S6 (image 
building) and S8 (achieving a relationship with the state). 
The publication of the professionalization law and the formation of the 
constituent committee established, for the first time in Lebanon, the 
monopoly of the profession over the services it provided to the market (S7 
– professional unification). According to Abu Saker (1994), the constituent 
committee, in a meeting with Lebanese newspapers after the first meeting 
of the committee on 2 September 1994 (Document 6-7), declared that: 
“from now anyone who wished to practise the accounting profession and 
to perform an audit on the financials of companies, has to be a member of 
the association”. On 25 October 1994, the constituent committee invited 
those who were interested to join the Association (Document 6-8), now 
known as the Lebanese Association of Certified Public Accountants 
(LACPA), with a closing date set for 17 August 1995.  
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Document 6-7: Newspaper articles 
relating to the first constituent 
committee meeting 
Document 6-8: The invitation to join 
LACPA published by AD-Diyar 
newspaper 
                 
 
Law 364 Article 60 sets the requirements to join LACPA as:  
1- Having been appointed as Certified Public Accountant to the Lebanese 
courts for a minimum period of three years and having practiced the 
accountancy profession prior to the enforcement of the present Act. 
2- Having practiced the accountancy profession, at his own office or at 
a firm where he is one of the partners, for a minimum period of four 
consecutive years before the enforcement of the present Act. 
3- Having practiced the accountancy profession at the auditing firm of 
another CPA for a minimum period of five years, two of which at least 
as “senior auditor” and above, knowing that the decision as to the 
seriousness of the submitted membership request lies with the 
constituent committee. 
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These three conditions satisfied the needs of the three associations. While 
members of the Court Expert association would be able to join LACPA due 
to the first requirement, AAFO members would be able to join due to the 
second requirement. Similarly, CPAME members would be eligible to join 
LACPA because of the third requirement. 
On 16 September 1995, according to Abou Shakra (2016), the first LACPA 
general assembly was held to elect the first board. The two competing lists 
were the same as those for the 1992 AAFO election. Abou Shakra (2016) 
claims that due to political and sectarian interference, his list lost the 
election, with the result that Mouwafak El Yafi became the first LACPA 
president. He argues that the internal bylaws set by El Yafi and his board, 
mainly from CPAME, were a result of these interferences, creating conflict 
with the professionalization law. While Abou Shakra (2016) states that 
these conflicts were deemed to be illegal and were changed afterward, he 
does not provide further explanation of the nature or type of these 
conflicts. I was not able to obtain a copy of the internal bylaws set by El 
Yafi before amendments. A further discussion of the internal bylaws is 
presented in section 6.4 below. 
Abou Shakra has also stated that a new code of ethics was developed by 
the first LACPA board, thus achieving a sustaining ideology through S1 
(formulating a code of ethics as evidence of professionalization and a 
symbol of rigour). The code of ethics also served as a reminder to the 
public, by its use of words such as integrity, objectivity, professional 
competence, and respect of professional confidentiality, that the profession 
was designed to protect the public’s interests.19 
                                       
 
19 The LACPA code of ethics can be accessed at: 
http://grafium.solutions/dev/code-ethics 
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6. 2. 1. Conclusion 
Between 1992 and 1995, significant steps were taken towards establishing 
a legally recognized and unified accounting professional body. The need for 
the law was argued to be in the Lebanese public interest and to protect the 
profession from foreign competition. The first step responded to calls for 
reforms after the end of the civil war, supported by the Lebanese Prime 
Minister. A committee was set up by the government to establish an 
agenda for continuing, as a priority, to seek a professionalization law. 
Abou Shakra attempted to gain passage of the law through his professional 
network but without discussions with CPAME or the Court Experts. He was 
unsuccessful, because a member of CPAME used his sectarian connections 
to prevent the draft law from passing in the Lebanese parliament. With the 
inclusion of amendments, the law was accepted by the government and 
included a legal decision for the establishment of a unifying accounting 
body: LACPA. LACPA’s constitution was governed by a legally required 
constituent committee led by El Yafi, an international firm representative. 
The committee invited those who wished to become members to submit 
their applications. 
It is apparent in this section that out of all of the strategies suggested by 
the Birkett and Evans model, achieving a positive relationship with the 
state is most crucial strategy to implement successfully. The state has the 
upper power over the transformation from an occupation to a profession, 
which can only be achieved by acquiring monopoly over work through laws. 
AAFO has attempted to charter the professionalization law for almost 30 
years, yet the law was considered only when the state felt the need for the 
profession. The debate between AAFO and CPAME revealed the closure 
strategies desired by each body, thus identifying the ‘ineligibles’ in 
accordance to each association standards for entry. AAFO favoured 
experience over education as its members were practicing owners, 
whereas CPAME members were of a higher level of education. Although the 
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new association, LACPA, was a continuum of AAFO, yet it set entry barriers 
that matched those of the accounting profession in other countries such as 
training, education, exams, etc. It is notable that the ‘ownership’ condition 
was eliminated as LACPA set the entry barriers in its own internal bylaws 
that matched Law 364 Article 60.  
In line with TEC and STC, the change in sect’s power was reflected in the 
LACPA first election. With the rise of the Muslim Sunni sect after the end 
of the civil war, the first LACPA president was a Muslim Sunni which is a 
huge contrast to the Christian Maronite dominance of AAFO presidency. 
The board composition of 50/50 mirrored the legitimizing myth set by the 
Taif Agreement of distributing power among the two religions in an effort 
to restore peace in Lebanon. 
6. 3. Reasons for the establishment of LACPA 
(1990-1994) 
The LACPA was established in Lebanon to cater for its members’ needs, in 
accordance with Law 36420 – the Accountancy Profession Organization Law. 
While such aims were set in AAFO’s internal bylaws, as discussed in 
Chapter 5 Section 5.4.1, Article 4 of Law 364 describes the aims of LACPA 
to include: 
First- Protecting the profession, promoting it and preserving its 
image. 
                                       
 
20 The full version of Law 364 can be accessed at: 
http://grafium.solutions/dev/accountancy-profession-act 
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Second- Promoting cooperation and solidarity among members, 
protecting their interests and defending their legitimate 
rights. 
Third- Undertaking scientific research projects and improving 
accounting principles and techniques. 
Fourth- Formulating and proposing accounting and auditing 
principles as well as professional conduct rules in accordance 
with international standards, including those set by the Arab 
and international unions that the Association belongs to. 
Fifth- Imposing sanctions on members who do not comply with its 
statutes or the ethics of the profession. 
Sixth- Working on resolving conflicts and disputes that arise among 
members. 
The aims of LACPA set the economic monopoly of the association and its 
members over the profession, while describing the strategies used to 
preserve such a monopoly. The first aim clearly states that LACPA will 
protect the profession, which is the strategy of delineating the area of 
expertise (S2) by which the association protects the profession from 
invasion and manipulation from outsiders. It also aims to establish the 
image-building strategy (S6), by which the association promotes itself to 
convince the public of the profession’s legitimacy. The second, fifth and 
sixth aims also set and defend the monopolistic rights of the association 
members by utilizing the professional unification strategy (S7) to gain a 
monopoly over work and the market. The third aim utilizes the use of 
research to indicate the rigour of the profession, thus establishing image 
building (S6). The fourth aim provides the association with the right to 
formulate accounting and auditing principles, thus successfully 
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implementing the determinations of standards strategy (S5) whereby the 
profession self-regulates its standards. 
Interviewee Mouwafak El Yafi explained that the main factor for LACPA’s 
establishment was the government’s need for transparency in building the 
economy. By founding a self-dependent accounting profession, the 
government presented LACPA as a source that added credibility to financial 
information. This enabled the government to regain the trust of both the 
international community and the public after the end of the civil war in 
1990. At the same time, it provided the profession with both the support 
of the state (S8 – achieving a relationship with the state) and it convinced 
the public of the necessity, legitimacy, and importance of the profession 
(S6 – image building).  
Interviewee Amin Saleh refers the establishment of LACPA to self-
preservation. He stated that people who are united by one profession will 
gather together in a legal form to preserve their interests and to elevate 
the level of members by enriching their competencies and skills. He 
suggested that LACPA did not deviate from that target, as other 
associations had done. Such reasons for LACPA’s establishment mimic 
those in other countries. For example, as discussed in Chapter Two Section 
2.7.1, the UK professional bodies in the late nineteenth century were 
formed for economic self-interest and reasons of preservation in the face 
of suggested changes proposed by the Bankruptcy Act.  
Interviewee Gina Chammas took another view, attributing the 
establishment of LACPA to two factors. First, she stated that organizing the 
profession was a political move whereby members of the association 
received the titles and the benefits associated with the profession. Second, 
by becoming LACPA members, the practitioners were able to achieve the 
characteristics discussed in Chapter Two, such as prestige, power, 
authority, wealth, and monopoly over services. She also pointed out 
another reason, namely the elimination of injustice: 
   195 
 
“The main objective of forming the LACPA was to remove the 
injustice that the previous association had. The members of 
the previous association were all owners of audit firms. The 
LACPA was established to admit all members based on 
technical abilities, not just having the financial means to own 
an audit firm. The main objective of LACPA is that all members 
are equal based on their abilities as practitioners”. 
The statements of Chammas reflect the exclusion mechanism that was 
practiced by the AAFO, as discussed in Chapter Five. This mechanism set 
the criteria for admission to the association to include ownership of an 
accounting firm, rather than educational achievement and accumulation of 
experience. This entry barrier was high to overcome, since, in the words 
of Sharara, “few had the financial ability and the social connections [at that 
time] to own and operate an accounting office”. Such exclusion was done 
to protect the economic interests of the firms’ owners who aimed for the 
monopoly over professional practices by eliminating the ‘ineligibles’ from 
practicing the profession, thus decreasing competition over work and in 
the market. Such a practice of exclusion is at the heart of TEC, where the 
ethnic group secures control of resources by prohibiting the rights of the 
other groups to access such resources. The inclusion of the non-owners, 
however, was tied to new exclusionary entry barriers as discussed in the 
next section.  
6. 4. LACPA membership 
Law 36421 mandates entry requirements set by the government to achieve 
closure to the accounting profession. Article 8 of the Law prohibits anyone 
                                       
 
21 http://grafium.solutions/dev/accountancy-profession-act 
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from practicing the profession in Lebanon unless they are LACPA members. 
It also sets the requirements to include:  
1- Being a Lebanese citizen for more than ten years. 
2- Being over 21 years of age. 
3- Enjoying all his civil rights and having never been convicted of a 
disgraceful crime or offence, as defined in law-decree No. 
59/112, Article 4, paragraph (E). 
4- Holding a degree in Business Administration or its equivalent or 
a “TS” degree in accounting, recognized by the Ministry of 
professional and technical education. These degrees must be 
accompanied by a minimum of five years of experience. 
5- Passing the examination set by the examination committee and 
approved by the Council. As for holders of CPA (Certified Public 
Accountant) or CA (Chartered Accountant) diplomas or their 
French equivalent, i.e., “Diplome d’Expertise Comptable”, and 
above, from international institutes and associations, they shall 
only sit for exams related to Lebanese laws as set by the 
Association Council. 
By setting these requirements, the profession controls membership criteria 
by successfully implementing association control strategies, namely control 
of education and entry by the organizing body (S3) and by setting and 
closely monitoring the level of university education required and definition 
of competence levels of the members (S4). 
Interviewee Raja Saab explained the monopolistic power over the 
profession that the establishment of the LACPA brought about. He recalled 
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that before the LACPA era (pre-1994), anyone could go to the Ministry of 
Justice and ask to be considered as an auditor. He described the process 
as very simple and even ridiculous, as the judge would just swear him in 
without ascertaining whether he had the capabilities to perform the duties 
of a court expert. This changed after the passage of Law 364, which stated 
that only LACPA members could serve as Court Experts.  
While AAFO’s internal bylaws focused on the entry requirements to join the 
association, the internal bylaws22 of LACPA set both the responsibilities and 
the rewards of membership. The bylaws provide the members with the 
monopolistic right of using the title of Certified Public Accountant, the 
opportunity to vote and participate in LACPA general elections and general 
assemblies, access to LACPA social and financial services, and the privilege 
to “conclude consultation and arbitration contracts and perform academic, 
administrative and financial studies in the professional field before any 
public or private body”. 
The bylaws also provide two types of membership category: practicing and 
non-practising. Interviewee Fawzi Hamdan explained the difference 
between the two. Non-practising members are those who are not working 
in audit firms. They can be working in the public or private sectors, but not 
as auditors. The practicing members, as Hamdan explained, are those 
devoted only to the audit profession, giving it all their work time, and who 
can, therefore, act as certified experts in Lebanese courts by applying to 
the Ministry of Justice. Such an expert is known as an Additional Audit 
Expert. Practicing members are discussed further in section 6.5 below. 
The total number of LACPA members between 1995 and 2015 was 2,271. 
Between 1996 and 2015, 630 new members were admitted and 396 
                                       
 
22 http://grafium.solutions/dev/lacpa-internal-bylaws 
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members left. In 2015, LACPA had 1,753 members, of which 309 were 
non-practising members. Analysis of LACPA’s members’ data is presented 
in the following sections. 
6. 5. Sectarianism and the profession 
Discussing sectarianism in Lebanon is not a taboo, but it must be 
approached discreetly. In the interviews conducted, I avoided asking 
directly about sectarianism. However, the interviewees would point it out 
within the interview as discussed in this section. Among the many factors 
hindering the advancement of the accounting profession in Lebanon, most 
of the interviewees agreed that sectarianism has been the most 
devastating one.  
Interviewee Mouwafak El Yafi suggested that the political and sectarian 
interference in the profession has created, and is continuing to create, 
obstacles towards advancing the profession. He associates these sectarian 
interferences to the specific nature of Lebanon, where everything is divided 
politically and in a sectarian manner. Afif Sharara attributes the current 
position of LACPA to the sectarian nature of the Lebanese society: 
“This is simply why the profession is in its current state. We 
value and view a person by the sect he belongs to, not by his 
manners or qualifications. This is not limited to our profession, 
it is countrywide. The sectarian leaders have monopolistic 
powers over Lebanon, and if this doesn’t change, our country 
is doomed. They [political leaders] enrich sectarian conflict to 
preserve their powers and gain more power and money”.  
Interviewee Amin Saleh expressed the view that sectarianism is evident in 
LACPA: 
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“The first thing they [Lebanese society] looks at is your sect. 
We [Lebanese society] don’t believe in institutions in our 
country, we believe in religious sects. They determine what 
sect you are from, and if they belong to a different sect and 
political party, they will automatically delete everything done 
by you. This is not limited to LACPA, it happens in other 
associations and in the government as well. The association 
has the infrastructure and the financial means to progress 
both the accounting and audit profession once it moves past 
sectarianism. If I want to employ someone in the association, 
I have to employ another person from another religion as well 
to preserve sectarian equilibrium. If I employ a Christian, I 
have to employ a Muslim as well and vice versa, regardless of 
their qualifications. We are professionals and should be 
leaders the society and not limit ourselves to sectarian 
boundaries”.   
Amin Saleh’s words are the perfect expression of the TEC and reflect 
flawlessly the nature of Lebanese society. The behaviour and attitude 
towards another member of the Lebanese society are bounded by the sect 
to which someone belongs to. It also reflects the myths used to defend the 
dominance of one group over the other, as described in Social Dominance 
Theory. The sectarian group maintains its exclusivity by supporting its 
members and showing hostility to the other group.  
The sectarian division extends beyond LACPA. For example, Interviewee 
Amin Saleh stated that in 2012, when he was LACPA president, he tried to 
establish positive relations with Banque Du Liban – the Lebanese Central 
Bank – and the Banking Control Commission of Lebanon, but was faced 
with negativity: 
“I tried to establish cooperation ties with Banque Du Liban. I 
couldn’t. Why? In all transparency, because I am from a 
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certain sect. They looked at my name, my sect, and my 
religion, and refused to work with me due to sectarian 
differences, regardless of my qualifications. This doesn’t lead 
to the progress of any profession in this country. They only 
want to work with us [LACPA] when they want to complain 
about one of our members, but never to do conferences or 
workshops”. 
“I will give you one example. The Banking Control Commission 
of Lebanon (BCCL) submitted a complaint against one of our 
members relating to the format of the reports submitted. I 
took corrective actions against him and asked BCCL to come 
and do training sessions for our members relating to reporting 
formats. They didn’t come. They kept deferring me from one 
person to another, simply because the BCCL president was a 
follower of 14 March collision, while I was perceived as 8 
March collision follower because of my name and sect”. 
This type of behaviour is explained by TEC, where sect affiliation is the 
predominant sense of belonging and will affect the level of trust towards 
other members of society. According to TEC, sect members have high trust 
levels in other members of the same sect and, conversely, low trust levels 
in members of other sects, which can explain the reasons for the behaviour 
towards Saleh.  
The sections below discuss in detail the degree of influence religious 
sectarianism has exerted on the accounting profession between 1995 and 
2015. They provide the interviewee’s own views and memoirs regarding 
sectarianism in LACPA and the statistical findings that support their points 
of views. These sections consider the effect of sectarianism on LACPA’s 
presidency and board, membership, and firms’ composition.   
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6. 5. 2. LACPA presidency and board membership 
Article 26 of Law 364 stipulates the composition of the LACPA board to 
consist of a president and nine members elected by the general assembly. 
Article 29 states that the president and the association members are to be 
elected for two years. Interviewee Walid Richani explains that in the early 
years of LACPA (2000-2010) five members of the board would be elected 
each year to ensure that the board had full knowledge of LACPA’s strategic 
plans. An analysis of the board competency is presented in section 6.6.5. 
Ghina Chammas considers sectarianism as the main factor that controlled 
LACPA elections:  
“Sectarian politics pushed the LACPA leadership to ignore the 
best interest of LACPA, the profession, and the members… The 
political parties have a very small portion of the LACPA 
members belonging to them. On their own, they are not a lot. 
However, they can come together and form a stronger 
collision”. 
Abou Shakra explains that when his list lost the 1995 LACPA elections, 
some religious leaders were extremely happy with that outcome. He 
believes that sectarianism has affected the trajectory of the association. 
He points out that sectarianism has even dictated the religion of the 
president since there was an unwritten agreement when LACPA was 
established that the presidency would alternate between a Muslim and a 
Christian.  
The statistical data supports Abou Shakra’s claim. The religious affiliation 
of the board members is divided almost equally between Christians and 
Muslims (Figure 6-5), as is the trend of the presidents’ religion (Figure 6-
6). This is due to the fact that the 50-50 rule that governs the Lebanese 
governance system has been applied to LACPA. However, this was not the 
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case when LACPA was established, as more Christians than Muslims served 
as board members in 1995, 1996, 1997, and 2002, as shown in Table 6-
1.  
Figure 6-1: Board Members Religion   Figure 6-2: Board Presidents Religion Trend 
 
Table 6-1: Religious distribution of LACPA board members between 1995 and 
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The sectarian influence extends beyond the presidency and the board 
membership, which are statistically divided almost equally between 
Muslims and Christians. When LACPA was established, Mouwafak El Yafi (a 
Sunni Muslim) was president between 1995 and 1999, Jobran Bargoud (a 
Greek Orthodox Christian Greek) was his vice president between 1995 and 
1996, while George Abou Mansour (a Maronite Christian) was vice 
president between 1997 and 1999. This distribution mimicked that of the 
Lebanese practice of distributing official positions equally between 
Christians and Muslims, with the result that a Muslim will act as a deputy 
to a Christian and vice versa. As discussed in Chapter Three, the end of 
the civil war in 1990 was accompanied by the rise in power of Sunni 
Muslims and the decrease in power of the Christian Maronites. The most 
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influential political leaders at that time (1990-2005) were the Prime 
Minister Rafic Hariri and the Minister of Finance, Fouad Sanyora, both Sunni 
Muslim.  
Interviewee Abed Al Kader Al Saghir felt reluctant at first to discuss political 
and sectarian influences:  
“I am just going to discuss the economic influences that 
affected the development of the LACPA. I don’t want to 
discuss political ones. [Pauses for a moment]. There are a lot 
of political influences. I don’t want to discuss them”. 
However, as the interview progressed, it seemed that he was boiling 
inside; eventually, he stated with frustration that he had had enough of 
the continual political and sectarian conflicts among the members of the 
association. Reflecting back on Chapter Three, the politics in Lebanon is 
intertwined and interdependent with sectarianism, where politics is 
practiced for the benefit of the sect and sectarianism is used to elevate the 
power of the sect’s political leader.  
“I have had enough. There are political and sectarian conflicts 
between the members, the members don’t choose a president 
that has the aspirations to elevate the profession, but based 
on his political trend that matches theirs. Their choices of the 
leadership in the association have hindered the LACPA. All of 
our elections [in the LACPA] are affected by sectarian politics, 
and they don’t elect the most qualified people. If you look at 
all our boards, they were elected politically since 2006. After 
Hariri’s assassination, the sectarian influences started to 
affect LACPA. If you look at the first president elected after 
the assassination you will see what he did. Since its 
establishment till 2005, the LACPA was progressing, albeit 
slowly. However, there was no sectarian interference. After 
that [after Hariri’s assassination in 2005], politics started to 
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affect LACPA, and the elections of board members were done 
on that basis [political power the sects] rather on the basis of 
qualification and knowledge… Our choice of board members is 
not done based on professional needs, but on sectarian and 
political grounds. Unfortunately, this is Lebanon. Everyone 
follow their sect and religion”.  
This reflects the sense of belonging to the group that is described by both 
SDT and TEC. This belonging demands full cooperation of the group 
member for the benefit of the group, regardless of whether the person 
chosen for running is qualified or not. The LACPA members have to follow 
the decisions made by their sects in voting for the sect’s selected running 
president with no regard to whether such a person has the leadership 
qualifications. The elections of board members and the president were 
done on sectarian basis rather than on the basis of qualification and 
knowledge in a manner that mimicked the power struggle between the 
sects.  
The 2001 elections represented the first move to create more sectarian 
boundaries within the LACPA. The Muslim/Christian turn in the presidency 
was no longer sufficient. The Muslim Shia were not satisfied that they did 
not have an established right to govern LACPA. Afif Sharara remembers 
the 2002 election:  
“After Abou Mansour’s term end [2001], El Yafi ran again for 
the presidency, and was the president for two more years. 
This ignited a huge discussion between LACPA members, and 
I was one of them. We asked him why you are running again 
instead of nominating another person, like Adel Karim [Muslim 
Shia] who was his assistant and very close to him like his 
shadow. In a meeting, some members asked El Yafi as well to 
make the Muslim term once Muslim Sunni and once Muslim 
Shia. He told them that we agreed on the Muslim/Christian 
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terms, and we will not make sectarian within the same 
religion. That is the maximum we will let religion and 
sectarianism affect the association. He ran for the presidency 
and won”.  
Sharara also reveals his own experience when he ran for the presidency in 
2002: 
“When I ran for president, many [political] leaders said that 
they can’t support me because I don’t belong to their sects, 
and they have to support another person from their own 
sects. Even though only around 300 or 400 members of the 
LACPA belong to political parties, yet sectarianism exists in 
the association as a reflection of the sectarian society. When 
I ran for president, the other Muslim Shia candidate failed, 
and consequently, the Muslim Shia blamed me for not letting 
one of us win [Afif Sharara is Muslim Shia]. They even accused 
me of intentionally running to let the Muslim Sunni candidate 
win. I only ran for professional reasons, what a shame”.  
Afif Sharara’s experience is well established in TEC, where the members of 
the ethnic group are expected to work together for the benefit of the group, 
regardless of other considerations. Sharara was blamed by his own sect’s 
LACPA members for not staying in line with the decisions made by the sect, 
thus leading to the sect’s loss.  
Sharara also reveals how the increase in sectarian divisions in Lebanon 
was reflected in the 2006 elections. The Sunni/Shia division was at its 
height at that time due to the assassination of the Sunni Muslim Prime 
Minister Rafic Hariri in 2005, which the Muslim Shia party – Hezbollah – 
was accused of.  
“In 2006 I was the secretary for the LACPA, and I ran for the 
presidency. At that time, Hariri was assassinated, and 
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sectarianism division started to increase. Four Muslim 
members ran for the presidency at that time [because it was 
the Muslims’ turn to be president]. Three were Muslim Shia – 
Adel Karim, Hikmat Sleem and me – and one was Muslim 
Sunni – Monir Sidani. At that time, sectarianism was at its 
height. Around 20 of the most influential members of LACPA 
gathered in its headquarters, begging Monir Sidani to 
withdraw from the election, and leave the fight for the 
presidency for the three Muslim Shia, in order for the 
association to not split into sectarian boundaries of Muslim 
Sunni and Muslim Shia like the remainder of the country. They 
also reminded him that the last Muslim president was Sunni, 
and maybe it is time for a Shia to be president, dedicating the 
Muslim Sunni/Shia norm refused by El Yafi. He refused to 
withdraw. He said that he was one of the members of the 
constitutional committee who set the Muslim/Christian 
presidency trend, but he will never accept the Muslim 
Sunni/Shia trend. He didn’t win”. 
The assassination of Hariri in 2005 created a shift in political power. As 
discussed in Chapter Three, prior to 1990 Christian Maronites were the 
most influential religious sect. The end of the civil war in 1990 shifted this 
power to Sunni Muslims, while the assassination of Hariri shifted the power 
to Shia Muslims. Mouwafak El Yafi was the only Sunni Muslim LACPA 
president, holding office from 1995 till 1999, then again in 2002-2003, and 
lastly for 11 months in 2010. The Christian Maronites have had the highest 
number of LACPA presidents, followed by Sunni Muslims, and then Shia 
Muslims and Greek Orthodox Christians, as shown in Table 6-2.  
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Table 6-2: Religion and religious sect of LACPA Presidents 
Board Religion Sect 
1995 - 1999 Muslim Sunni 
2000 - 2001 Christian Maronite 
2002 - 2003 Muslim Sunni 
2004 - 2005 Christian Maronite 
2006 - 2007 Muslim Shia 
2008 - 2009 Christian Greek Orthodox 
2010 First Christian Greek Orthodox 
2010 Second Muslim Sunni 
2011 Christian Maronite 
2012 - 2014 Muslim Shia 
2014 - 2015 Christian Maronite 
While the board membership was divided equally between Muslims and 
Christians, such equal division did not exist regarding religious sects as 
shown in Figure 6-7. The Christian Maronite was the dominant sect among 
board members between 1995 and 2015, constituting 34% of all members. 
The two next most dominant sects were Shia Muslim (21%) and Sunni 
Muslim (20%). Detailed sect distribution of LACPA members by year can 
be found in Appendix I. 
Figure 6-3: Board Members’ Sects, 1995-2015    
  
The power struggle between the sects did not stop at the elections, but 
rather extended to include major decisions within the LACPA. Gina 
Chammas had many detailed encounters during her 11-month term in 
2011 with sectarianism within the LACPA that has affected her on both 
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personal and professional levels. Chammas states that she was not 
satisfied with the level set in the LACPA exams and negotiated a deal in 
which LACPA training members would sit for the AICPA. The LACPA 
representative of Hezbollah (Muslim Shia political party) attempted to stop 
the deals:  
“I secured for our training members the chance to sit for the 
AICPA. The representative of Hezbollah [in the LACPA] was 
really trying to stop it whatever it took, mostly because they 
[hinting here to the Muslim Shia who are raised under 
Hezbollah ideology] don’t speak a language other than Arabic, 
and they didn’t like the fact that we [Lebanese society in her 
opinion] believe that the strength of the Lebanese is the fact 
that we are multilingual. There is a generation of Lebanese 
that are not multilingual [again hinting here to the Muslim 
Shia who are raised under Hezbollah ideology]. They speak 
only Arabic and are not competent in other languages even 
though they have access to learning them. From their 
[Hezbollah followers] point of view, they have their own way 
of thinking that makes them think that they can lead without 
embracing the profession. [They think] they can lead because 
they decided to lead, not because of competence. They don’t 
have the political power; they have the abusive power. They 
are not afraid to abuse. They think if I abuse and push and 
take someone else’s rights or place, then I am doing 
something. This is a destructive behaviour when it comes to 
the profession. Unfortunately, they left a very bad trace on 
the [exams] committee. We managed to overcome their bad 
influence and created an internal control mechanism on the 
committee. We also introduced an oral exam to ensure that 
the training member is a well-rounded person, a reasonable 
person. I even suggested to have an exam in ethics, which 
was not received well”.  
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Such an attempt by the Hezbollah is a manifestation of the methods that 
would be used by a group to preserve and defend its rights and gain 
additional rights in accordance with both SDT and TEC. To preserve the 
ability of the sect’s members to become LACPA members, the Hezbollah 
member would take all the necessary steps to preserve such rights, and 
even “abuse and push and take someone else’s rights”, as described by 
Chammas. In her opinion, these members wanted to shape LACPA to 
match their needs rather than transforming themselves into what the 
association needed: multilingual, open-minded CPAs. Such a sense of 
close-mindedness exhibits the mentality of the sectarian groups, whereby 
they view their own beliefs as superior and righteous compared to others.  
Chammas also claims that sect-belonging was used to diminish her 
decisions:  
“During my term, we had 15 complaints about LACPA 
members. They were investigated and one of them was 
transferred to the LACPA Disciplinary Board. That member 
was disbarred, which brought a lot of talk on me. First, they 
accused me of disbarring him because he was Christian, but I 
am a Christian as well. Then they said I did it because he was 
‘Aouni’ [member of the Free Patriotic Movement political 
party], but I was as well”. 
In line with TEC, it was expected from Chammas to ignore the complaint 
against the member and not to open an investigation into him. On the 
contrary, it was expected from Chammas that she would have to support 
that member against the complaint simply because they belonged to the 
same sect. In retaliation against her decision, she was accused of out-
casting the member, first based on sectarian belonging and then on 
political belonging. The member defended his position against her, stating 
that she only disbarred him because he belonged to a specific sect. Such 
an attitude of accusation is well explained in SDT, where the group 
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members view any complaint or action taken against the member as an 
attack on their person due to their sectarian belonging.  
Chammas also had another sectarian encounter relating to the medical 
retirement fund of LACPA that she has discussed publicly in the media. The 
‘they’ in her statement below refers to Shia Muslim LACPA members who 
belong to the Hope Movement political party: 
“Regarding the medical retirement fund, I looked into it with 
another president in November 2011 and found out that a 
group [Muslim Shia] was dominating it. Within a month and a 
half, I found out that only 200 members were benefiting from 
it and that it was closed to other members. I opened the fund 
for membership, and we doubled it to 400 members. During 
later months, I discovered more hidden benefits that were 
preserved only for the few selected people from this sect 
[Muslim Shia]. When I wanted to expose them, all hell broke 
loose. They gathered against me in a sectarian manner from 
one specific sect and went after me big time by aligning 
themselves with the former Minister of Agriculture who was 
from the same sect [Muslim Shia] and political party [Hope 
Movement]. They targeted me professionally and personally 
and tried to destroy my name. I went to court and defended 
myself and I won. They then took a decision to seize all my 
powers as president. I defended myself again in court and 
took back my powers as president because there were no 
legal reasons to remove me. They tried again when some of 
my board members resigned. I called for an election to 
replace them, and my team won. They then decided that the 
best way was to remove me completely from the LACPA. In 
an illegal way, that has nothing to do with our law or the 
profession, they broke a cabinet that contains the papers of 
the fund that I was presiding, and they stole the documents 
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from it. I went to court again and had a direct lawsuit – in 
which I named the accused instead of stating him as 
unknown. All hell broke loose again. They called the church 
and some church heads to pressure me to withdraw my 
lawsuit. I refused and he was accused of stealing. He faced 
charges, but they used all their political and sectarian powers 
so he is found not guilty. Their next step was to refer me to 
the LACPA Disciplinary Board with the accusation of 
misbehaving, because I had a lawsuit against that person and 
contacted the media to inform the public about what is going 
on inside the LACPA. The disciplinary board said that they 
don’t have a case. They still fight me on professional grounds. 
For example, they issued the LACPA directory, but didn’t 
include my name and contacts in it so I wouldn’t get 
customers. That is why now I entered into a partnership with 
another CPA. They are targeting him now as well but he is a 
very strong man. This is what the LACPA is really all about, 
unfortunately. This is making a lot of members feel 
disengaged from LACPA”. 
Chammas’s experience reveals the degree to which the dominant group 
would go to preserve its rights and dominance. The decisions that she 
made to stand against the dominant sect led to that sect’s utilization of all 
legal and non-legal methods against her. When Chammas attempted to 
protect the medical retirement fund, she found that some members, who 
belonged to a specific sect, were illegally benefiting from the fund. They 
retaliated through legal actions, disciplinary attempts, theft, and breaking 
and entering. They even tried to reach for the head of her sect to preserve 
their right to access the fund. These attempts are a reflection of TEC’s 
argument that the ethnic group will utilize all means, legal or not, to 
preserve its economic interests. 
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The struggles that faced the interviewees were a result of the sectarian 
nature of Lebanese society, which extended itself to the LACPA. The 
presidents and board members were expected to optimize their relative 
sects’ privileges within the association, while defending these privileges 
against members from the other sects. The experiences of Sharara and 
Chammas with their own sects, reveals that the sect expects its members 
to align with the best interests of the sect, not of the profession. The 
encounters of Chammas and Saleh exhibit the low trust level towards 
members from other sects. While, in the case of Amin Saleh, it was limited 
to a refusal to work with a member of another sect, in the case of Gina 
Chammas it extended to personal and professional attacks. These 
experiences exhibit the degree of sectarian influence in both Lebanese 
society and the LACPA, and the sectarian pressures exerted on LACPA 
members from the religious sects.    
6. 5. 3. LACPA membership 
Ghina Chammas elaborated further on sectarian influence on LACPA 
membership since its inception in 1994. She stated that the majority of 
members that joined LACPA in 1994 were admitted based on sectarian 
merits rather than on the conditions of education and experience set in 
Law 364 itself. She stated that the majority of the members in 1994 were 
Christian Maronites, since they constituted the majority of the accounting 
practitioners at that date. This statement does not come as a surprise given 
that the Christian Maronites were the dominant sectarian group in Lebanon 
at that time and utilized myths that they (Christian Maronites) were better 
educated or more socially presentable to assert their dominance over 
prestigious occupations and professions. Chammas’s statement is backed 
up by the statistical data: out of the 1,641 LACPA members in 1995, 35% 
(577 members) were Christian Maronite. At that date, 359 Muslim Sunni 
and 301 Muslim Shia became LACPA members.  
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To better analyse the membership composition of LACPA between 1995 
and 2015, a historical (vertical and horizontal) analysis of this membership 
relating to the religion and religious sect was conducted. In addition, a 
comparison between the Lebanese population, as retrieved from the 
electoral lists, and the 2015 LACPA membership data was made. The 
descriptive data show patterns of behaviour that reflect both SDT and TEC. 
However, they are not backed up by interview data, since none of the 
interviewees discussed the sectarian distribution of LACPA members and 
consequently did not discuss the reasons behind such distribution. 
However, the religious and sectarian distribution of the members can be 
interpreted via both SDT and TEC. 
The two major religions in Lebanon are Christianity and Islam. Within each 
religion are various religious sects. The 2015 composition of the Christian 
sects was 21% Maronites, 7% Greek Orthodox, 5% Greek Catholics and 
1% other minority Christian sects. The composition of the Muslim sects 
was 28% Sunni, 28% Shia, 6% Druze, and 1% Alawites and Ismailis. The 
electoral lists also reveal the following distribution of each sect within its 
religion: 
Table 6-3: The 2015 distribution of religion and religious sects’ among the 
Lebanese population 
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23 The numbers are rounded to the first decimal point for simplicity.  
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6. 5. 4. LACPA membership and religion 
In contrast to the demographic distribution of the Lebanese population, in 
which Christians are 38% and Muslims are 62% (as presented in Table 6-
2), LACPA’s membership between 1995 and 2015 was on average 54.7% 
Christian and 45.3% Muslim. There were no members who belonged to the 
other existing religious minorities of Jews, Bahais, Buddhists, Hindus, 
Atheists, and Mormons.  
Between 1995 and 2015, the number of Christian members averaged 55% 
of total LACPA members, while the Muslim members averaged 45%, as 
shown in Table 6-4. While such composition was justified in 1994 when 
Christians were the dominant group in Lebanese society, the composition 
did not change significantly over the years as power shifted from one sect 
to another, as might have been expected.  
The insignificant change in the membership composition can be attributed 
to the conditions set in Law 364 to join LACPA, and more specifically the 
training condition. Out of all the entry requirements, the three-years 
training requirement can be controlled by the sects to determine who can 
and cannot join the association. Law 364 Article 10 specifies that a trainee, 
while satisfying all other entry requirements, can become an LACPA 
member after completing a three-year training period as an auditor at the 
office of a registered CPA. Given that trust in the Lebanese society is 
associated with sectarian belonging (as discussed above in Chapters Three 
and Four), it can be assumed that the trainee from a certain religion would 
be trained under a CPA from the same religion. SDT suggests that the 
dominant group uses legitimizing myths to preserve its dominance. In this 
case, the dominant sect in the LACPA used training as a legitimizing myth 
to maintain its dominance over LACPA to preserve the economic benefits 
of the sect’s members’ economic benefits, in accordance with TEC.  
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Table 6-4: Percentage change among religions of LACPA members over the years 
Year Christian 
% of 
LACPA 
Christian 
Members 
Muslim 
% of 
LACPA 
Muslim 
Members 
Total 
1995 905 55.1% 736 44.9% 1,641 
1996 914 54.9% 750 45.1% 1,664 
1997 913 54.7% 757 45.3% 1,670 
1998 915 54.5% 763 45.5% 1,678 
1999 914 54.3% 769 45.7% 1,683 
2000 918 54.1% 778 45.9% 1,696 
2001 885 54.4% 741 45.6% 1,626 
2002 881 54.5% 736 45.5% 1,617 
2003 871 54.5% 728 45.5% 1,599 
2004 881 54.5% 736 45.5% 1,617 
2005 856 54.2% 724 45.8% 1,580 
2006 876 54.2% 739 45.8% 1,615 
2007 894 54.3% 753 45.7% 1,647 
2008 890 54.1% 754 45.9% 1,644 
2009 908 54.1% 771 45.9% 1,679 
2010 918 53.8% 789 46.2% 1,707 
2011 927 54.0% 791 46.0% 1,718 
2012 927 54.0% 791 46.0% 1,718 
2013 950 54.4% 795 45.6% 1,745 
2014 971 54.9% 797 45.1% 1,768 
2015 967 54.9% 794 45.1% 1,761 
According to Figure 6-8, both religions experienced a simultaneous 
increase or decrease in membership numbers, except in 1997, 1999 and 
2008 when Christians experienced a positive increase while Muslims 
experienced a negative decrease. Christians enjoyed either a similar or a 
more positive increase compared to Muslims. The trend line of both 
religions reveals an expected positive growth in numbers of both religions 
within LACPA members, with the Christians having an expected higher 
growth rate in membership numbers compared to Muslims. 
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Figure 6-4: Percentage of Change in Religion 
 
6. 5. 5. LACPA membership and sects 
The statistical analysis, presented in Table 6-5, reveals that some religious 
sects are not represented in LACPA, namely Christian Assyrians, Christian 
Copts, Muslim Alawites and Muslim Ismailis. The most dominant sect 
among LACPA membership is Christian Maronite. Maronites average 807 
of all members between 1995 and 2015, almost double the numbers of the 
two other major sects combined, the Muslim Shia and Muslim Sunni. As 
shown in Table 6-4, while Christian Maronites constitute almost 21% of the 
Lebanese population, they constitute 35.5% of all LACPA members, a 14% 
difference. This implies that Christian Maronites are over-represented in 
LACPA compared to the Lebanese population. Similarly, Greek Catholic, 
Greek Orthodox, and Christian Minorities are over-represented in LACPA 
by 2.7%, 1.1% and 0.5% respectively.  
On the other hand, both Armenian Catholics and Armenian Orthodox are 
underrepresented in LACPA. All Muslim sects are underrepresented in 
LACPA membership compared to the Lebanese population as a whole. 
y = 0.0009x - 0.0074
y = 0.0001x + 0.0025
-6.0%
-5.0%
-4.0%
-3.0%
-2.0%
-1.0%
0.0%
1.0%
2.0%
3.0%
1
9
95
1
9
96
1
9
97
1
9
98
1
9
99
2
0
00
2
0
01
2
0
02
2
0
03
2
0
04
2
0
05
2
0
06
2
0
07
2
0
08
2
0
09
2
0
10
2
0
11
2
0
12
2
0
13
2
0
14
2
0
15
% of Change in Religion
1995 - 2015
% of change in Christian Members
% of change in Muslim Members
Linear (% of change in Christian Members)
Linear (% of change in Muslim Members)
   217 
 
While the Muslim Shia are underrepresented by 8.5%, the Muslim Sunni 
are underrepresented by 6.8%.  
Table 6-5: 1995-2015 Comparison between distribution of religion among LACPA 
membership and national population 
Religion 
% of 
Lebanese 
population 
% of 
total 
members 
Sect 
% of 
Lebanese 
population 
% of 
total 
members 
Christian 37.9% 54.65% 
Armenian Catholics 0.6% 0.4% 
Armenian Orthodox 2.6% 0.7% 
Evangelicals 0.5% 0.5% 
Greek Catholic 4.7% 7.4% 
Greek Orthodox 7.3% 8.4% 
Maronite 20.9% 35.5% 
Minorities 1.3% 1.8% 
Muslim 62.1% 45.35% 
Alawites and Ismailis 0.9% 0.0% 
Druze 5.7% 5.0% 
Shia 27.6% 19.1% 
Sunni 27.9% 21.1% 
A trend analysis of the sect identity of LACPA members between 1995 and 
2015, presented below, reveals that both Armenian Catholics and 
Armenian Orthodox experienced a slight decrease in membership 
numbers. Chaldeans, Evangelicals and Syriac Catholics had a large 
decrease in membership numbers. Latins had a slight increase in 
membership numbers. Greek Catholic, Greek Orthodox, Maronite, and 
Syriac Orthodox had a notable increase in membership numbers, with 
Maronites having the highest increase. While both Druze and Shia Muslim 
sects exhibited a trend of increasing membership, Sunni Muslims 
experienced a sharp decline in their membership rate. Christian Maronites, 
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Muslim Sunni and Muslim Shia trend analysis is presented below; the 
trends relating to the remaining sects are presented in Appendix I. The X-
axis represents the years between 1995 and 2015 while the Y-axis 
represents the number of members from each sect. 
Figure 6-5: Maronites Sect Trend  Figure 6-6: Shia Sect Trend 
 
Figure 6-7: Sunni Sect Trend 
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members who were Christians, as shown in Figure 6-12. However, after 
2003 this changed dramatically as the numbers of new Christian members 
exceeded the numbers of Muslims, except in 2004 (when there were equal 
numbers from both religions) and 2010.  
Looking back at the previous section at the terms served by the only 
Muslim Sunni president, this trend can be explained to a certain degree. 
During the Muslim Sunni LACPA presidential term (1995-2000), more 
Muslims joined LACPA than Christians. In his second term (2002-2003), he 
countered the claims of being sectarian by admitting more Christians than 
Muslims. However, noticing the inequality that happened in later years, he 
reclaimed his previous position in 2010 as the number of Muslim new 
members exceeded those of Christians (Anonymous source, 2016). In the 
period extending from 2002 to 2015 (excluding the years 2004 and 2010), 
the majority of new members were Christian, reaching almost double the 
number of Muslims in 2013. The new members trend is presented in Figure 
6-8, where the X-axis represents the number of Christian and Muslim 
members admitted to LACPA between years 2995 and 2015, while the Y-
axis represents the total number of members. 
Figure 6-8: New LACPA members’ religion trend 
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percentages do not deviate significantly from the percentages held by each 
sect of total LACPA members, being 35.5% Christian Maronites, 19% 
Muslim Shia and 21% Muslim Sunni, suggesting that each sect was 
attempting to preserve its numbers within the LACPA. 
Table 6-6: New LACPA members’ sects per year 
Year Christian Maronite Muslim Shia Muslim Sunni Total 
1996 8 10 10 40 
1997 1 4 2 9 
1998 2 0 3 9 
1999 1 4 2 8 
2000 5 3 8 18 
2001 9 8 6 31 
2002 1 0 1 4 
2003 11 7 4 28 
2004 11 8 5 26 
2005 10 6 4 27 
2006 17 10 4 44 
2007 16 9 5 38 
2008 16 5 9 40 
2009 14 7 10 40 
2010 8 8 12 40 
2011 9 7 2 22 
2012 4 2 3 11 
2013 43 18 15 104 
2014 33 12 15 70 
2015 11 4 2 21 
Total 230 132 122 630 
 37% 21% 19% 100% 
The Christian Maronites constituted the majority of new Christian members 
from 2003 onwards, except in 2010. This is, in practice, an application of 
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Horowitz’s theory which suggests that ethnic conflict is a result of economic 
competition between ethnically differentiated groups of the working class, 
either as a result of underbidding of labour or the monopolistic position of 
one of the ethnic groups. In this case, the Christian Maronites attempted 
to regain their monopolistic position within LACPA by admitting new 
members of their religious sect through control of the training required to 
satisfy entry criteria. It can also be viewed as the dominant group within 
the profession exhibiting, through their presentation of themselves as 
better educated and more qualified, their ‘better suitability for the job’ by 
comparison with the other groups.  
Between 1995 and 2015, 396 LACPA members were removed from LACPA’s 
register, of which 52% were Christians and 48% were Muslims. The 
members were removed for one of four reasons: death; a decision by 
LACPA to delete them for various reasons including misconduct; failure to 
pay annual subscriptions and fees; or the member’s own choice to leave 
LACPA. The data provided by LACPA only include two reasons (death and 
deletion), with no further explanation of the reason for deletion. Of the 396 
removed members, 366 were deleted by LACPA and 30 were removed due 
to death. 
It is expected that since the Christian Maronites were the dominant group 
in terms of membership that they would also constitute the highest number 
of deleted members. However, compared to their 35.5% presence in 
LACPA, Christian Maronites members amounted to 32% of all deletions. 
Similarly, the 15% of deleted members who were Muslim Shia are 
understated compared to their 19% representation in LACPA membership. 
By contrast, the deleted Muslim Sunni members amount to 27% of all 
deleted members, which is an over-representation of their 21% total 
membership in LACPA.  
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Table 6-7: Summary of all, new, and deleted LACPA members’ percentages 
between 1995 and 2015 
Sect 
% of all 
members 
% of new 
members 
% of deleted 
members 
Christian Maronite 35.5% 37% 32% 
Muslim Sunni 21.1% 19% 27% 
Muslim Shia 19.1% 21% 15% 
The summary provided in Table 6-7 could explain the trend analysis in 
Figures 6-9, 6-10 and 6-11. The increase in Christian Maronite and Muslim 
Shia LACPA members was due to a higher number of new members 
belonging to these two sects and their low number of deleted members. 
The sharp decrease in Muslim Sunni presence in LACPA was attributed to 
a lower percentage of new members and a higher percentage of deleted 
members when compared to Muslim Sunni LACPA membership. It is 
evident that both the Christian Maronites and Muslim Shia were attempting 
to increase their presence in LACPA at the expense of other sects. Such a 
position can be explained by both TEC and SDT. The dominant group prior 
to 1990, the Christian Maronite, attempted to regain its power over the 
association, and consequently over the profession, by increasing its 
presence in LACPA using training requirements as an entry barrier to other 
sects. The increase in numbers of the Muslim Shia members reflects the 
power shift from the Muslim Sunni to Muslim Shia after the assassination 
of Rafic Hariri in 2005. While the Muslim Sunni strived to control the 
association when it was first established due to the presence of a Sunni 
LACPA president, the sect’s loss of power in Lebanese society was reflected 
in their loss of power and number of members in LACPA.  
Another method that the dominant sect utilizes to attain and maintain its 
dominance over the profession is the use of family ties. Out of all LACPA 
members, 269 members have family ties, ranging between brothers and 
sisters, fathers and children, cousins, and uncles, as shown in Figure 6-13. 
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According to Horowitz’s theory of ethnic conflict, these family ties act as a 
means of cementing ethnic identity and the ethnic division of labour by the 
ethnic relations of the family who work towards locating economic 
opportunities from kinsmen, leading to the preservation of certain 
occupations to one ethnic group or another. It is also evident in the theory 
of social dominance, according to which family ties are a means for 
preserving dominance over other groups. 
Figure 6-9: Family-related members between 1995 and 2015 
 
6. 5. 6. Firms’ analysis 
LACPA practicing members are bound to be working in accounting and 
audit firms in order to perform their duties, either as owners or employees. 
While some members operate in proprietorship, others have formed 
partnerships and limited liabilities firms. The 2015 LACPA members were 
distributed into five categories as shown in Table 6-8.  
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Table 6-8: Categories of LACPA members in 2015 
Category 
Number of 
LACPA 
members 
Percentage of 
2015 total 
members 
Non-practising 309 17.5% 
Sole CPA 720 40.9% 
Same religion/Same sect CPAs 342 19.4% 
Same religion/Different sect 
CPAs 
244 13.9% 
Different religion CPAs 122 6.9% 
The following analysis classifies the firms organized by LACPA members 
into three categories: non-practising members; firms with one CPA; and 
firms with more than one CPA. Due to lack of data pertaining to previous 
years, the analysis is conducted for the year 2015.  
6.5.6.1. Non-practising members 
A non-practising member is defined as “any natural person registered on 
the general list of LACPA, not practicing the profession according to the 
present bylaws, and not entitled to state opinions on financial statements 
as an auditor engaged by company’s shareholders/partners or by court” 
(LACPA, 2016). Non-practising members enjoy the same voting rights as 
practicing members, as well as reduced membership fees. The non-
practising member can change to become a practicing member by applying 
to LACPA, which will then move the member onto the practicing member's’ 
list.  
Of the 309 LACPA non-practising members in 2015, 80% were male and 
20% were female; the religious distribution is 58% Muslim and 42% 
Christian; among the different sects, Shia Muslims accounted for the 
highest percentage (27%), followed by Sunni Muslims (26%) and then 
Christian Maronites (24%). Figures 6.1 to 6.3 present the data analysis of 
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the LCPA non-practising members. Analysis of the data retaining to 
LACPA’s practicing members is presented in the following sections. 
Figure 6-10: Non-Practising Members Gender 
  
Figure 6-11: Non-Practising Members Religion 
 
Figure 6-12: Non-Practising Members Religious Sects 
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The types of industry in which the non-practising members were engaged 
were extracted from the LACPA directory which lists the last known 
declared workplace of the member. Consequently, 23% of the non-
practising members were listed with audit firms as their workplace, which 
might not be the case. While 28% of the non-practising members’ industry 
is unknown, the others were distributed among NGOs, insurance, hospitals, 
government, general, entertainment, education, and banking. Those 
working in the government were mainly employed in the Ministry of 
Finance (18 members), Caisse Nationale de Securité Sociale (five 
members), Bank of Lebanon (three members), and other governmental 
agencies (12 members), as shown in Figure 6-4.  
Figure 6-13: Non-Practising Members’ Industry Type 
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CPA to include the term non-practising. These members cannot perform 
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characteristics of a profession, i.e. the financial wealth and prestige 
discussed in Chapter Two Section 2.2.2, which raises the question of why 
these 309 non-practising members would maintain their LACPA 
membership. Article 10 of the LACPA internal bylaws provides the answer, 
since it identifies the right of the non-practising member to: “vote in the 
23%
13%
3%
1%
16%
12%
3%
1%
1%
28%
% of members in each domain
Jo
b
 d
o
m
ai
n
s
Non Practicing Members - Industry Type - 2015
Unknown
NGO
Insurance
Hospital
Government
General
Entertainment
Education
Banking
Audit
   227 
 
general assemblies of LACPA, including the right to take part in the 
elections, without the right to run election to any position in the LACPA 
Council or disciplinary council or any of the positions stipulated by the 
article 40 of the law organizing the profession”. Constituting almost 17% 
of all members, the non-practising members have an influential sway on 
LACPA’s decision-making. Such voting rights can be utilized by the sects 
within LACPA to maintain or attain control over LACPA. Such justification 
is reflected in SDT in which the dominant sect utilizes all its members to 
preserve its position. The non-practising members can shape the strategic 
direction of LACPA in accordance with the needs of their sect. This can be 
achieved due to voting rights, as the non-practising members have voting 
rights in LACPA’s general assemblies and can elect the president and board.  
6.5.6.2. Firms with one CPA (sole CPA) 
There are 720 CPA proprietorships in Lebanon, of which 410 have a 
Christian CPA, and 301 have a Muslim CPA (Figure 6-14). Nearly 37% of 
these firms are owned by a Christian Maronite, and nearly 19% are run by 
either a Sunni or a Shia Muslim (Figure 6-15). This indicates a Christian 
Maronite dominance among firms with one CPA, with 16.5% a positive 
representation when compared to the overall Lebanese population. In 
general, the dominant Christian sects of Maronites, Greek Catholics, and 
Greek Orthodox are over-represented. The analysis also points out the 
highest under-representation of 9.3% of Sunni Muslims, followed by 8.8% 
of Shia Muslims.  
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Figure 6-14: Firms with One CPA: Religious Distribution 
 
Figure 6-15: Firms with One CPA Religious Sects Distribution 
 
Of the 410 firms with one CPA owned by Christians, 269 firms (65.6%) 
were owned by a Christian Maronite, showing a considerably high 
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(13.4%). Compared to the Christian sects’ distribution in the Lebanese 
population, the only two sects that were over-represented were Greek 
Catholics (1%) and Maronites (10.5%). 
The Muslim Sunni and Muslim Shia had almost equal distribution among 
their religion of 43%, while Muslim Druze owned 12.9% firms with one 
CPA. However, the analysis reveals that the Druze were the only sect with 
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an over-representation (3.7%) when compared to the sects’ distribution in 
the overall Lebanese population. 
6.5.6.3. Firms with more than one CPA 
Compared to the 720 CPAs who operated in firms with one CPA in 2015, 
708 LACPA members were working in 222 firms. These firms can be 
distributed into three categories: firms with same religion/same sect CPAs 
(129 firms); firms with same religion/different sects CPAs (67 firms); and 
firms with different religion CPAs (26 firms), as shown in Figure 6-16. 
Figure 6-16: Firms with more than one CPA – Configuration 
  
6.5.6.3.1 Firms with same religion/Same sect CPAs (SRSS CPA) 
There were 129 firms with same religion/same sect CPAs, with 342 CPAs 
operating in them. These firms had different sizes: 164 CPAs worked in 
two-member firms, 84 CPAs worked in three-member firms, 40 members 
worked in four-member firms, 10 members worked in five-member firms, 
30 members worked in six-member firms, and 14 members work in seven-
member firms (Figure 6-17). This is an alarming fact, especially for the ‘big 
sized’ firms who only hire CPAs of the same religious sect.  
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Figure 6-17: SRSS CPA – Number of members 
 
According to Figures 6-18 and 6-19, of the 129 firms that had same 
religion/same sect CPAs, 57% had Christian CPAs, with 46.5% being 
exclusively Christian Maronite. Of the 43% of the firms with the same 
religion/same sect CPAs that had Muslim CPAs, 24.8% had Shia CPAs and 
16.3% had Sunni CPAs. All the other sects combined come to less than 
10%. 
Figure 6-18: SRSS CPA– Percentage of Members’ Religion 
 
  
82
28
10
2 5 2
2
 M
em
b
er
s
3
 M
em
b
er
s
4
 M
em
b
er
s
5
 M
em
b
er
s
6
 M
em
b
er
s
7
 M
em
b
er
s
# 
o
f 
m
em
b
er
s
Firms with Same Religion/Same Sect CPAs -
Number of Members - 2015
57%
43%
Firms with Same Religion/Same Sect 
CPAs % of Members' Religion - 2015
Christian Muslim
   231 
 
Figure 6-19: SRSS CPA – Percentage of Dominant Sects 
  
Considering the distribution within the same religion, Christian Maronites 
constituted the majority of Christian firms with same religion/same sect 
CPAs, with 82.2% among all Christian sects. Among Muslim firms with 
same sect CPAs, 57.1% were Shia, and 37.5% were Sunni (Figures 6-20 
and 6-21). 
Figure 6-20: SRSS CPA – Distribution of Christian Sects 
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Figure 6-21: SRSS CPA – Distribution of Muslim Sects 
  
6.5.6.3.2 Firms with same religion/Different sect CPAs (SRDS 
CPA) 
Among LACPA members, 244 worked in 67 firms that had same 
religion/different sects CPAs (Figure 6-22). The analysis of the sizes of the 
firms reveals there were ‘big’ firms that had CPAs drawn exclusively from 
the same religion, such as the firm that was composed of 17 members who 
were all Christian, and the firm that had 11 Muslim members. This reflects 
the depth of sectarianism in Lebanon that has also managed to integrate 
itself into the accounting profession and professionals.  
Figure 6-22: SRDS CPA – Number of members 
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In contrast to the findings on the same religion/same sect CPAs’ firms, 
61% of the firms that had same religion/different sects CPAs were Muslim, 
compared to 39% Christian (Figure 6-23). Of the 67 firms with same 
religion/different sects’ firms, 52% had equal sect representation, while 
24% were dominated by Christian Maronites (Figure 6-24).  
Figure 6-23: SRDS CPA – Percentage of members’ religion  
 
Figure 6-24: SRDS CPA– Percentage of dominant sects 
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acted as evidence that the firm does not follow sectarian division. This is 
explained by the percentage of members’ religion, according to which 23% 
of these firms were dominated by Muslims and 39% were dominated by 
Christians, with only 38% having equal representation of both religions 
(Figure 6-26). While 11 of these firms had an equal sect representation, 
seven firms were dominated by Christian Maronites, four firms by Sunni 
Muslims, and two firms by Shia Muslims (Figure 6-27).  
Figure 6-25 DR CPA - Number of members 
 
Figure 6-26: DR CPA - % of Members' Religion 
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Figure 6-27: DR CPA - % of Dominant Sects 
  
6. 5. 7. Interpretation and conclusion 
The interviews and statistical data presented in the previous sections 
provide comprehensive evidence for the influence of religious sectarianism 
on the accounting profession in Lebanon. The interviewees shared personal 
experiences that exhibit the power of sect identity over other 
considerations, to the extent that it impacted on the interviewee’s personal 
life and professional judgement. The interviewees, who were from different 
religious sects, were intolerant towards sectarian behaviour when it 
targeted them. Yet some of them, unconsciously, did not hide their 
disagreement with other sects, thus revealing the ‘us versus them’ attitude 
that is embedded in Lebanese society due to religious sectarianism. Such 
behaviour goes to the heart of SDT, where the members of the group are 
raised from childhood to uphold the beliefs of the group. Most of the 
interviewees agreed that sectarianism had affected LACPA but attributed 
this to the nature of Lebanese society. Saleh, in his interview, attributed it 
to belief in religious sects rather than institutions. Interviewee El Yafi 
claimed that it is the nature of Lebanese society that is mirrored in LACPA, 
while Sharara attributed it to the sectarian belonging.  
SDT suggests that societies are organized in systems of group-based social 
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number of weaker groups at the bottom. SDT also argues that there are 
two types of hierarchy: one that is focused on the individual, and a second 
that is focused on group membership. In the case of LACPA members, the 
hierarchies within the association are based on group membership, more 
specifically on the sectarian identity of the members. This sense of 
belonging to the sect enables the members belonging to the dominant sect 
– the Christian Maronites in LACPA – to achieve more wealth or prestige 
simply because they belong to this sect. The top group, according to SDT, 
enjoys the luxury of being the dominant group, with all the benefits 
associated with this luxury. Such benefits include positive social values 
such as authority, power, and superiority within the system. Looking at the 
data presented in the previous sections, the Christian Maronites have 
dominated LACPA through the number of their members and through 
governance. The Christian Maronites constitute 35.5% of the LACPA 
members, a massive over-representation when compared to their 21% 
representation in the Lebanese population as a whole. Similarly, Christian 
Maronites dominated LACPA board membership between 1995 and 2015 
with 34% of members and the LACPA presidency with 36% of presidents.  
In addition, the Christian Maronites dominate accounting and auditing 
firms, whether in the form of firms with one CPA or with more than one 
CPA. This enables the members of this sect to control one of the main entry 
requirements for LACPA membership: the three-year training stipulation. 
Christian Maronites own 37% of the 720 accounting and auditing 
proprietorships, 46% of the 129 same-sect firms, and 23% of the 67 same-
religion firms. Combined with the low trust level towards other sects, the 
probability of these firms accepting a non-Christian Maronite as a trainee 
is low. This is also reflected in the number of new members who joined 
LACPA between 1996 and 2015: of 630 new members, 37% were Christian 
Maronites, which is in line with the sect’s representation in the association. 
SDT also suggests that subordinate groups either accept the role of the 
dominant group or attempt to overcome such dominance by becoming the 
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dominant group themselves. This is exemplified by the attitude of the two 
Muslim sects. While the Muslim Sunni enjoyed a high presence in LACPA 
when it was established, the loss of political power by the sect in 2005 was 
accompanied by a decrease in LACPA Muslim Sunni members. Constituting 
27% of the members who left LACPA and 19% of the new members who 
joined LACPA between 1995 and 2015, the Muslim Sunni have experienced 
a decrease in the sect’s power within LACPA due to the decreasing number 
of members (Figure 6-11). 
On the other hand, the Muslim Shia have increased in number, with two 
peaks in 2005 when the Muslim Shia gained power within Lebanese society 
and again in 2012 when the first Muslim Shia LACPA president was elected 
(Figure 6-10). The Muslim Shia strategies towards gaining power are 
exhibited in the 2002 elections when they attempted to establish a 
rotational Muslim Sunni/Muslim Shia presidency in LACPA. It is also evident 
in the sect’s behaviour towards its own members and towards members of 
the other sects. Sharara’s interviews presented his own experience of the 
‘shaming’ behaviour he experienced when he did not conform to the sect’s 
decision in the 2006 elections. Chammas discussed the legal and illegal 
actions taken against her when she attempted to protect the LACPA 
medical retirement fund and to change the LACPA examination. The 
behaviour towards Sharara is expected, since the sectarian group expects 
its members to have the ‘in-group’ attitude and to obey almost blindly all 
the decisions taken by the group. SDT also warns that when group interests 
are threatened, the group may retaliate with a high degree of violence, 
which could explain the attitude towards Chammas that she recalled in her 
interview. 
TEC claims that the members of the ethnic group – the sectarian groups in 
the case of Lebanon – define themselves based on their belonging to such 
groups to the extent that they recognize one another as kin: “Ethnicity and 
kinship thus overlap in a quite direct, operational way: the former builds 
on the latter, the one is often confused with the other, and behavior in one 
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sphere is extended into the other.” (Harowitz, 1985, p. 61). Extending this 
kinship, by increasing the number of LACPA members from the sect or by 
enabling actual kin to become members, enables the sect to gain more 
benefits. By increasing the number of their members, both the Christian 
Maronites and the Muslim Shia have exhibited behaviour that is described 
by TEC. In addition, the family ties that unify 269 members of LACPA is a 
perfect example of the use of kinship to allow the group to be more 
effective. 
TEC also argues that the ethnic division of labour is the root of ethnic 
conflict; such conflict arises when the groups compete for jobs, markets or 
resources. In addition, TEC argues that the elites in the subordinate groups 
will urge their members to imitate those in the dominant groups in order 
to ‘catch up’ to their status and eventually take their place. The theory also 
suggests that one ethnic group would favour a line of work, and would 
defend it fiercely against those attempting to attain position within this line 
of work, viewing such attempts as threats to the group’s dominance. While 
there is no evidence, yet, of the retaliation of the dominant Christian 
Maronite group within LACPA towards advances made by the Muslim Shia 
to gain more power within the association, it is evident that the threat to 
the Christian Maronite dominance within LACPA is starting to take place. 
This is evident by the increase in the number of Muslim Shia LACPA 
members in recent years and the attitude of this group towards other sects 
in the association.  
TEC argues that much of the tension between ethnic groups is a result of 
group comparison, and that group identity is essential to the individual. 
The sense of belonging to the group overcomes all other beliefs and 
demands full collaboration of the member with the decisions of the group, 
since individual group members derive their self-esteem from the group. 
This entails high levels of trust in members of the same group, while 
exhibiting low levels of trust levels towards members of other groups. The 
statistical data provides further evidence of the lack of trust between 
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LACPA members based on sectarian identity. Among the 2015 LACPA 
practicing members, 720 CPAs operated in sole proprietorships, providing 
little evidence of their behaviour towards LACPA members of different sects 
and religions. However, the 708 CPAs who operated in firms with more 
than one CPA constitute almost half of the 2015 practicing members, thus 
providing insights on at least half of the LACPA practicing members’ 
attitudes about the members from different sects and different religions.   
Among LACPA practicing members who operated in firms with more than 
one CPA, 48.3% had chosen to work with CPAs who belonged to their own 
sect and religion, with the majority being Christian Maronites. Of this 
sample, 34.5% had chosen to work with CPAs who belonged to the same 
religion, but different sects, while only 17.2% had chosen to work with 
CPAs from a different religion. However, most of these firms provide the 
illusion of religious diversity due to the presence of a token CPA 
representing the other religion.  
This finding indicates that at least 24% (342 out of 1,428) of the 2015 
LACPA practising members had high trust levels with members belonging 
to their own sect, since they chose to work with CPAs exclusively from their 
own sect, while 41% (342 and 244 out of 1,428) of these members chose 
to work with people from their own religion. Even with the 8.5% (122 out 
of 1,428) of members who worked with CPAs from a different religion, 
there is evidence that a such choice was primarily to create a false image 
of openness towards others rather than out of genuine trust with members 
who belonged to a different religion.   
This section has also evidenced the use of the entry barriers of training and 
family ties in attempting to either attain (Muslim Shia) or preserve 
(Christian Maronite) the sects’ privileges within the profession. The inability 
to sustain power within Lebanese society by the Muslim Sunni has led to a 
shift in power within LACPA, demonstrated by the sharp decline in Sunni 
member numbers. This section has also revealed the attempts to increase 
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sectarian boundaries in LACPA by raising the calls for sects’ right to the 
presidency, regardless of qualifications or experience. The next section 
provides insights on other factors affecting the accounting profession in 
Lebanon.  
6. 6. Other factors affecting the profession 
(1995-2015) 
The conditions that led to the establishment of LACPA in 1994, combined 
with the conditions of Lebanon as a country, affected the accounting 
profession in Lebanon. In fact, the profession has faced (and continues to 
face) many internal and external factors hindering its advancement. The 
following sections highlight these factors and their effects on the 
development of the Lebanese accounting profession.  
6. 6. 1. The structure of the Lebanese economy and 
corruption 
Interviewee Amin Saleh identified the composition of the Lebanese 
economy after the civil war as the factor that hindered the development of 
the profession. According to him, the Lebanese economy has always been 
constructed of service providers, rather than industrial and agricultural 
providers, and that these service firms are mostly family-owned businesses 
who are not willing to expose their financial ‘secrets’ to an accountant or 
auditor. He affirms that the owners of these economic entities do not 
believe in accounting and auditing as functions aiding their firms. His 
statements indicate that the profession is not able to get accepted by the 
companies’ owners, thus decreasing the level of the profession’s legitimacy 
in the eyes of the public. He states: 
“They [Lebanese firms] feel that “this is my money, I made 
it, you cannot come and ask me how I made it and how I 
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spent it”. Given that feeling, they do not want to pay the fees 
for an auditor that will pinpoint the firms’ exact financial 
position. This is also combined with the relaxed approach by 
tax authorities in monitoring these firms’ accounts. I consider 
that there is collusion between some members of the tax 
authorities and some of the firms that are subject to tax to 
avoid high taxes by bribing these members. This completely 
diminishes the profession. This practice made the auditor 
becomes an intermediary between the colluding parties, 
rather than performing his ethical and professional duties”. 
Amin Saleh expressed his concerns with the existence of ethical issues such 
as tax evasion and tax avoidance. He confirmed that there are some firms 
that want to evade taxes and therefore would hire a corrupt 
accountant/auditor who would fake the financial records.  
Similarly, Fawzi Hamdan supported Saleh’s claims by stating that although 
the firms are required by law to have external auditors, some external 
auditors just view and then use the internal auditors’ reports as their own 
reports without actually performing any audit themselves. He attributed 
this to the fact that the CPAs in Lebanon are in a severe case of 
competition, where they lower their prices to attract customers, instead of 
using a unified fee. This reveals that the profession has not successfully 
attained association control through the protection of its practitioners from 
manipulation by others (S2 – delineation of the area of expertise). Hamdan 
claimed that this competition led the CPAs to be controlled by the 
customer, whereby the customer can dictate how the CPA can perform his 
duties, and in certain cases even ask the CPA to manipulate the accounting 
records to avoid taxes. 
In addition to corruption, the profession has faced an additional threat to 
its exclusivity (S2 – delineation of the area of expertise). Abou Zeid (2016) 
has investigated the presence of CPA impersonators in Lebanon who 
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present themselves as licensed CPAs. He interviewed the LACPA president 
Elie Abboud who stated that these CPA impersonators have scammed some 
small- and medium-sized Lebanese companies and embezzled hundreds of 
thousand US dollars. Abou Zeid also found that these impersonators solicit 
licensed CPAs for their signature on the forged audit reports and reward 
them with some of the financial profits gained. In his interview with Abou 
Zeid, Abboud stated that 20 of these licensed CPAs have been referred to 
the LACPA Disciplinary Board, and the search for any misconduct continues 
in collaboration with the Lebanese Ministry of Economy, Ministry of Finance 
and the Higher Justice Commission.  
On the other hand, Longuenesse’s (2009-b) study argues that it is not 
competition that has this effect, attributing corruption instead to the 
quality and competencies of the members. As she stated:  
“The LACPA had in 2005, 1,230 practicing members (i.e. in 
private practice), 365 non-practicing (employed either in banks 
or financial institutions, or in the ministry of finance), plus 290 
trainees… The “real number” of “good” professional was 
sometimes evaluated as not more than 450, whereas the WB 
ROSC24 quotes a figure of 250 auditors”. (Longuenesse, 2009-b, 
p. 6)  
Afif Sharara, in his interview, concurred with Longuenesse’s argument. 
Discussing the establishment of LACPA, he recalled that one group of 
LACPA constituent members wanted to restrict membership to those who 
are academically qualified, while the other group defended the rights of 
those who have only practical experience to join LACPA. Unfortunately, in 
his opinion, many undeserving people were able to join the association 
                                       
 
24 WB ROSC is the World Bank Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes. 
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once it was established as the Association decided to accept both types to 
settle the conflict between the two groups. He said: 
“My membership number is 374, and I applied for the LACPA 
membership before the closing date by one month. The total 
period for accepting members was one year from 1 August 
1994 till 1 August 1995. On 1 August 1995, 1,731 members 
were accepted. They accepted everyone who applied, 
including car mechanics, drivers, government employees, and 
bank employees. All they had to submit to become members 
is an audit experience letter from any source, and many were 
forged. This is the root of all the LACPA problems. These 
unqualified members have no experience in audit or 
accounting, and all of their work is wrong and not up to 
standard. In that last month [of accepting applications for 
membership], 1,400 persons applied and were accepted, out 
of which – in my opinion – around 1,000 have no idea what 
audit means”. 
He continued:  
“Sanyora [Minister of Finance at that time] is the person to 
blame. While he did a lot to establish the association, his 
decision to include the employees (bank, government, etc.) is 
the main reason why the LACPA is at its current weak 
situation. These 1,000 joined the association because of the 
anticipated social status and financial benefits from being a 
CPA, yet they are the same reason why the Lebanese CPAs 
are not reaping any financial or social benefits. They don’t 
have the knowledge, the experience, the know-how, and the 
ethics. Some of them sign the financial reports without 
actually making sure that they are correct or performing 
audit, just for financial gains. This is fraud and deception”. 
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In her interview, Gina Chammas agreed with Sharara. She stated that 
there are several types of members of LACPA. In her opinion, there are 
members who have enough experience of taxation to the extent that they 
could write new tax laws and modernize them, but that they do not know 
anything about auditing. She claimed that there are other members who 
are completely ignorant of anything related to tax law and are just 
auditors. She also affirmed that there are other members who are  
“completely away from the profession, as they don’t know what 
an auditor is and yet they are members in the LACPA. They think 
that the smart part of being a member in the LACPA is to [have 
connections] know people in the Ministry of Finance, and to help 
the companies not pay their taxes. They act as intermediaries 
for bribe and corruption. These are catastrophes”. 
Chammas also referred to Lebanese culture as having a negative effect on 
the profession. She stated: 
“We have the ‘walaw’ word in Arabic, which can only be 
translated in the context of the talk you are having [walaw is 
similar to ‘come on’ in English]. Unfortunately, we have the 
‘walaw’ word in our profession and it became a technical word 
now. When the primary external auditor signs the audit 
report, the additional external auditor has the right to perform 
his duties at full by examining all the financial statements. He 
is not auditing the work of the primary external auditor; he is 
auditing the company’s records. The first reaction of the 
primary external auditor is ‘walaw’, meaning “do you want to 
audit my work? Don’t you trust my work?” making the 
additional external auditor feel embarrassed and wrong to 
even want to perform his duties”. 
At its current stage, the accounting profession in Lebanon has failed to 
attain the characteristics of a profession (as discussed in Chapter Two). 
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The Lebanese accounting profession has not provided the accounting 
professionals with prestige, protection or authority. The observations in 
this section reflect the inability of the Lebanese CPAs to successfully 
convince the Lebanese firms of the legitimacy of their claims to be a 
profession. The firm owners do not trust the Lebanese CPAs and view them 
either as a source of aid to evade taxes or as a threat to their wealth due 
to tax purposes. In certain instances, the CPAs are expected by some of 
these owners to help in falsifying financial information submitted to the 
government, or not to perform due diligence in their duty as auditors. This 
is evidence of an unsuccessful image-building strategy, since the CPAs 
have failed to convince clients that the CPAs will act in the best interest of 
the clients and the public. This can be attributed to both the corruption 
levels within Lebanese society and the incompetent CPAs who joined LACPA 
in 1994 for social status reasons.  
Had LACPA, at its inception, set proper conditions for joining the 
association rather than accepting members haphazardly, the profession 
would have gained the trust of the public and clients. However, the nature 
of Lebanese culture and the level of corruption within society would still 
have affected the profession negatively. To properly build the appropriate 
image of the CPA, LACPA must take corrective measures to ensure that the 
CPAs are performing due diligence. Any deviation by CPAs from ethical 
conduct and the ethical code of LACPA must be dealt with quickly and 
ruthlessly by LACPA. Only then will the profession be able to fully gain the 
trust of the clients, the public, and the government.  
6. 6. 2. Admission, age, and exams 
Article 8 of Law 364 – The Organization of the Lebanese Chartered 
Accountants Profession in Lebanon (LACPA, 2017) sets the closure 
conditions of age, education, experience, and training required to become 
a CPA. In order to become a CPA in Lebanon, the applicant must be over 
21 years old, hold a degree in Business Administration or its equivalent, 
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pass the four examinations set by LACPA, have three years’ experience, 
and be devoted entirely to the profession and to practising it in his or her 
own office or that of an associate or as an employee in a firm owned by 
another CPA. 
Amin Saleh, in his interview, expressed unhappiness with the current 
situation of the LACPA membership age. He stated that the current 
composition of LACPA is dominated by members who are “old”. He declared 
that this is due to the fact that a large proportion of the current 
membership joined LACPA when it was established in 1994. He also 
mentioned that a good number of these members were practitioners before 
and used to be members of the previous associations.  
“They blamed me for letting in 200 new members [during his 
presidency] and accused me of increasing the competition. 
We need the new blood. I told them I am 64 years old, and 
soon will retire. Am I not obliged to bring a replacement for 
me? The association is aging. Many members are dying or 
retiring, and we have economic expansions in Lebanon. These 
reasons demand that we have new qualified CPAs enter the 
LACPA. We have a lobby in the association that wants the 
membership numbers to remain low to decrease their 
competition. This is very short-sighted. The numbers of 
LACPA members have remained somehow the same over 20 
years, regardless of the economic situation of the country”.  
Saleh’s discussion does not depart far from the statistical analysis provided 
in Table 6-9. Although LACPA is considered a young association, its 
members’ age trend reveals an alarming fact. While members aged under 
44 were the majority when LACPA was established in 1995, in 2015 
members under 44 years constitute only 27% of all members; 73% of 
LACPA members are over 45 years old, with around 14% of 2015 members 
aged 70 and above. This alarming fact was highlighted by Saleh in his 
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interview, when he stated that during the past 20 years only 630 new 
members joined LACPA, compared to the original 1,640 members who 
joined when it was established in 1995.  
Table 6-9: Age of members 1995 – 2015 
Year 
Total 
Members 
24-44 
Years 
% of 
Total 
Members 
Above 
45 Years 
% of 
Total 
Members 
1995 1,640 935 57% 705 43% 
1996 1,664 920 55% 744 45% 
1997 1,670 885 53% 785 47% 
1998 1,678 834 50% 844 50% 
1999 1,683 787 47% 896 53% 
2000 1,696 749 44% 947 56% 
2001 1,626 691 42% 935 58% 
2002 1,617 648 40% 969 60% 
2003 1,599 604 38% 995 62% 
2004 1,617 575 36% 1,042 64% 
2005 1,580 516 33% 1,064 67% 
2006 1,615 504 31% 1,111 69% 
2007 1,647 494 30% 1,153 70% 
2008 1,644 489 30% 1,155 70% 
2009 1,679 482 29% 1,197 71% 
2010 1,707 470 28% 1,237 72% 
2011 1,718 446 26% 1,272 74% 
2012 1,718 412 24% 1,306 76% 
2013 1,745 472 27% 1,273 73% 
2014 1,768 491 28% 1,277 72% 
2015 1,761 471 27% 1,290 73% 
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The entry barriers to education and training, created by LACPA to ‘preserve’ 
the profession, are the same ones that make the association an ‘aging’ 
one. Interviewee Walid Richani stated that many CPAs refuse to have 
trainees as they view the ‘new blood’ as a threat to their economic 
interests, since the trainees will become the ‘competition’ in a few years. 
If corrective actions are not taken soon, by 2025 90% of LACPA members 
will be over 45 years old.  
In addition to the age problem, Amin Saleh pointed to the fact that the 
members who joined LACPA in 1995 were accepted on the basis of their 
professional experience or educational qualifications. To overcome this 
problem, the LACPA internal bylaws require new members to sit and pass 
four exams in order to join the association. According to Saleh, the 
members had to pass the exams without being trained or given study 
materials, making the admission rate very low. He recalled that between 
1994 and 2014, only around 600 new members joined LACPA, including 
about 200 new members during his tenure as LACPA president.  
Afif Sharara also discussed the examination problem. He claimed that the 
examination committee, enforced by the law, has been, for the past few 
years, diminished by those seeking personal gain. He clarified: 
“The Minister of Justice appoints a member [of the 
examination committee], the Minister of Education appoints 
another, and so. But they are not appointed based on 
qualifications but on greed. They only care about getting paid 
each year for the exams they put, with no care really about 
the exams’ quality. They don’t care about putting a proper 
exam, nor do they care about grading the papers properly. In 
this year [2015], out of 180 or 200 training members who sat 
the exam, only five passed. This is a scandal. Why only five?” 
Sharara stated that in 2008 the exams were full of errors and students 
were not aware of the exam material since no reference books had been 
   249 
 
set for each topic. He attributed the high failure rate in 2015 to the fact 
that the exams were imported from ACCA, and that the LACPA students 
are not yet accustomed to ACCA standards. He recalled that he had had a 
discussion with the LACPA president Elie Abboud and told him that he 
cannot simply raise the bar that high in just one turn without first fully 
preparing trainees. Moreover, he stated that British accounting standards 
do not apply in Lebanon. He continued by defining, in his opinion, a big 
problem, which is that the few training sessions offered to trainees are 
conducted in English. Not all LACPA trainees are fluent in English, as some 
are French-educated while others speak only Arabic. Sharara explained 
that he has no problem with conducting training sessions in English as long 
as there are also parallel sessions in Arabic, Lebanon’s native language.  
In her interview, Gina Chammas commented that it would have taken her 
tremendous time and effort to fix the exams when she was president of 
the LACPA in 2011. She stated that she did not believe that efficient and 
honest exams can be created in a limited period of time. To overcome this 
problem, she discussed with Amideast (an institute that organizes 
American English language and professional exams in the Middle East) the 
possibility of LACPA members sitting for the American Institute of CPAs 
(AICPA) exams in Lebanon. Her efforts succeeded in making Lebanon one 
of the four countries outside of the US where students can take the AICPA 
exams: 
She then stated that Amin Saleh, her successor, decided to go back to the 
old examination system, recalling that more than 230 people passed that 
examination session during his tenure. She indicated that it was interesting 
that only 9% of those who passed these exam were graduates from the 
American University of Beirut (one of the top university in Lebanon), 
whereas graduates from universities from South Lebanon province had a 
28% success rate, hinting that sectarian favouritism was a factor: Shia 
Muslims are a majority in South Lebanon, and it is also the religious sect 
of Amin Saleh. 
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The findings of this section indicate that the entry barriers, set by LACPA 
to close the profession, could affect the profession negatively, since some 
CPAs prefer not to train future CPAs to preserve their own market share. 
This has resulted in a professional dominance of CPAs aged over 45. The 
future CPAs are expected to pass exams that change in form every year 
without the proper academic background or training, thus limiting their 
ability to become LACPA members.  
The entry barriers are also used as a means to control the profession by 
the dominant group. The use of exams as a way of accepting large numbers 
of new members based on sectarian identity reflects the wish to preserve 
the economic benefits of the sect. The use of professional power within 
LACPA to increase the number of members belonging to a sect is a vivid 
example of the struggle for additional power for the sect within LACPA. 
More members belonging to a certain sect will ensure an increased 
influence of that sect in LACPA through voting rights, which may extend to 
the presidency and board membership.    
6. 6. 3. Effect of the competition 
According to Amin Saleh, only a few big audit firms audit 75% of the 
Lebanese market, as there is no quota of the number of customers that 
one company can have. He claims that these firms have created a lobby 
by establishing connections with the biggest economic entities, who in turn 
are connected to political sectarian parties.  
Interviewee Abed Al Kader Al Sagir argued that the profession is not 
financially rewarding, because, instead of a predetermined hourly rate or 
lump sum set by the LACPA, the customer controls the amount paid. He 
stated that there are members who lower their prices to gain customers, 
leading to other members doing the same. He debated the importance of 
having a unified rate which would then force the customer to select 
between the CPAs based on their competencies, not their price. He also 
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pointed out that some of the practicing members perform all functions for 
the customer, including accounting, tax declarations, reviews, and audit, 
indicating a conflict of interest and potential corruption; he asked: “How 
can you audit your own work?”  
The statements by Saleh and Al Sagir are evidence that the profession has 
failed to attain all the characteristics discussed in Chapter Two, since it has 
been unsuccessful in providing Lebanese CPAs with the rewards, 
protection, and independence that should be associated with the 
profession.   
6. 6. 4. Relationship with the government and 
universities 
Interviewee Abed Al Kader Al Saghir highlighted that LACPA has no political 
support from the government. His view was that the Ministry of Finance 
considers LACPA members as their adversaries. As he explained: 
“The last time I met with the Minister [of Finance], I told him 
how we feel, and that we are not foes, we are partners that 
complete each other. It is not acceptable that the general 
manager of the Ministry of Finance to take a decision relating 
to our profession without deliberating with us. They have to 
understand that we are the ones that have a say in matters 
related to our profession, not them”. 
This statement indicates that the profession has suffered from a decrease 
in its professional power, as it no longer has the full autonomy supported 
by the state. This was not the case in LACPA’s early years (1993-2000), 
when the association was able to benefit from its positive relationship with 
the government, allowing it to set its own professional standards with full 
autonomy.  
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Similarly, Amin Saleh believes that the government does not want the CPAs 
to have a financial position that would free them from being controlled by 
customers and provide them with the ability to give independent opinions. 
He then made another important point about the non-existent collaboration 
with Lebanese universities. Both Amin Saleh and Abed Al Kader Al Saghir 
asserted that many agreements with some Lebanese universities were 
made, but have never been activated. Al Saghir stated that LACPA cannot 
force onto universities Lebanese principles of accounting and auditing, and 
that the universities in return do not contact LACPA to align their teaching 
with accounting practice, a sign of LACPA’s weakness. He wondered how 
fresh accounting graduates would practice the profession in Lebanon while 
being taught different standards, such as the American GAAP, the IFRS, 
and the French system. This indicates that fresh graduates from Lebanese 
universities are ill-equipped to practice the profession upon graduation, 
due to inadequate academic preparation, which in turn places greater 
emphasis on the three-year training condition to qualify as a CPA. 
However, referring back to section 6.5, the availability of training is 
dependent on sectarian identity, creating an additional barrier for many of 
those who would like to become CPAs in Lebanon. 
6. 6. 5. Incompetent governance 
Afif Sharara recalled in his interview that LACPA, under the presidency of 
Mowafak El Yafi (1995-1999, 2002-2003, and 2010), reached its peak due 
to the latter’s charisma and way of dealing with others. However, Sharara 
also believed that El Yafi treated LACPA as an extension of himself, and 
stated that some presidents, other than El Yafi, had sharp attitudes in a 
negative way:  
“They had the “I only” attitude rather than “We” attitude, and 
didn’t have the smoothness of El Yafi, making them seem very 
aggressive. Some of them didn’t have leadership quality, 
regardless of their abilities as CPAs. We faced this problem with 
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two or three presidents. They didn’t have the experience or the 
insight to run the association”.  
He then specifically referred to the presidential term of Amin Saleh (2012-
2013), stating that one of the dangers of Saleh’s term was that he 
amended the internal bylaws of the association, in the process giving the 
president unlimited power and reducing the board to mere consultants with 
no real say. He recalled that Saleh adjusted the internal bylaws in two 
ways. The first allowed the president to ask the board to convene once per 
month, and the second gave the president the discretion to set the entire 
meeting agenda. Sharara pointed out the dangers of this by commenting 
that the president has full control over the agenda and consequently over 
LACPA’s future.   
Sharara also explained that when a new president is elected, he “enforces 
his point of view” on the work of the previous president, but sometimes 
not due to personal aspirations, but rather to surrounding conditions. He 
pointed out that the whole point of drawing five new members each year 
is to ensure continuity (as discussed in section 6.5.1), so that when a new 
president is elected he would have at least five board members to advise 
him on the work already accomplished by his predecessor. Sharara 
reviewed the board history as follows: 
“Since the year 2000, the El Yafi term set a trend of electing 
five board members each year. It continued till 2010 till El 
Yafi’s term. In about 10 months to his term, just before the 
draw for new members, six members resigned due to a 
conflict with El Yafi, leading to the board being dissolved and 
ending his term. New elections were set for the president and 
– for the first time – ten members, and Gina Shammas won 
the elections. Chammas [2011] also served for 10 months and 
had a conflict with the board members. When six board 
members from Gina Chammas’s term resigned, the whole 
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board was dissolved, and Amin Saleh [2012-2013] was 
elected along with ten new board members. After one year to 
his term, he was supposed to draw for five new board 
members to replace five of the existing ones. He refused. 
When his term ended, so did the term of the board. When Elie 
Abboud [2014-2015] was elected, so were ten new members 
for the board. This means that since 2010, even if the 
president wants to continue his predecessor work, he wouldn’t 
know what happened before. He would have to read every 
transcript written, and no everything was written on paper. 
Even the current president [Elie Abboud] now refuses to draw 
five members, which means that when his term ends, it will 
have no continuity”.  
The 2012 change in the governance mechanism of LACPA provides its 
president with total control over the association. While the board enjoyed 
the continuity of work due to the yearly elections before 2010, the change 
in the internal bylaws in 2012 gave the president absolute power. It can 
be assumed that the strategic direction of LACPA is not sustained by the 
board, since a president may aim to develop and implement his own point 
of view over LACPA’s future without taking into consideration previous 
work. Such complete control by the president should be minimized and 
major decisions should be taken by the board as a whole.  
6. 6. 6. Gender inequality 
Interviewee Gina Chammas is the first and only female president of the 
LACPA since its inception till 2015. However, she feels that she might also 
be the last. She attributes the low percentage of female LACPA members 
to the male-dominated mentality in the LACPA:  
“They [male LACPA members] are extremely aggressive with 
women. I had never realized in Lebanon to what extent the 
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fear of female leadership is before I became president. I have 
been talking to other women in the LACPA trying to promote 
the idea of having another female president; they are not 
interested. They are scared because men are very aggressive, 
unfortunately”. 
The statistical analysis supports Chammas’s statement, since the majority 
of LACPA members, former and current, are male. Out of 2,271 total 
members, 1,980 are male compared to 291 females. While male members 
have been dominant over the years, an increasing percentage of female 
members have joined LACPA, especially since 2008 and onwards, as shown 
in Figure 6-28. Compared to 120 females in 1995, female members in 2015 
numbered 259, which implies an increase of 116% over 20 years.  
Figure 6-28: All members – Gender trend 
 
Chammas’s view corresponds with the reality of Lebanese culture, in which 
men are considered to be ‘better’ than women. While the accounting 
profession does not use gender as an entry barrier, the nature of the 
Lebanese masculine society explains the dominance of men over women 
in the accounting profession. Aside from Chammas, only three other 
women have served on the board, making in total only four females over 
a period of 20 years. According to Chammas, one of these female board 
members wanted to create an LACPA ‘women’s committee’, but her request 
was rejected.  
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6. 7. Conclusion 
This chapter has revealed the successful and unsuccessful strategies used 
in the professionalization of accounting in Lebanon after the end of the civil 
war in 1990. The shift in the government’s attitude towards the profession 
resulted in the passing of Law 364 and the establishment of LACPA in 1994. 
While some sectarian pressures have affected the law before its approval 
by the Lebanese parliament, the sectarianism of LACPA members has been 
the main influence on the profession between 1995 and 2015.  
The testimonies of the interviewees and the statistical data presented in 
this chapter reveal the depth of such influence. The sectarian effect not 
only determines the religion of the LACPA president and board members, 
but it also controls the entry barriers to LACPA membership. The three-
years training criteria to become a member limits the ability of those who 
would like to become CPAs, simply because they do not belong to a specific 
religious sect. The low trust level between the sects may deprive trainees 
from the opportunity to be trained because they belong – or do not belong 
– to a certain sect. This low trust level is evidenced in section 6.5.3, which 
reveals that the 2015 practising CPAs who work in firms with more than 
one CPA (amounting to almost 82% of the total membership) prefer to 
work with CPAs from their own religion; moreover, 48% of these CPAs 
prefer to work with someone from their own religious sect. While such 
preferences could not be determined for non-practising members and CPAs 
with a proprietorship, it was established that 24% of LACPA’s practicing 
members in 2015 preferred to work with members of their own religious 
sect, and 41% of them preferred to work with members of their own 
religion. Such preferences will limit the ability of future CPAs to be trained, 
since they will invariably have to belong to the same sect or religion as 
that of the training CPA.  
The sectarian influence extends beyond the entry barriers, as the attitude 
of LACPA members is affected by sectarian belonging. The struggle to 
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control LACPA by the sects is revealed in the behaviour towards sect 
members who deviate from the sect’s wish to control the association, and 
in the behaviour towards members of other sects who aim to have such 
control. The dominant group exerts pressure over its followers to maintain 
power, while the subordinate group develops strategies to attain power; 
both groups aim for economic benefits. This is evident in the case of 
Christian Maronites, Muslim Shia and Muslim Sunni in the LACPA. While the 
Christian Maronites were numerically the dominant group in LACPA at its 
inception, they were not in control, since the Muslim Sunni sect was the 
dominant sect in Lebanese society. Muslim Sunni power over LACPA began 
to decline in 2003 and was lost by 2006. This is reflected in the declining 
number of Muslim Sunni LACPA members in recent years. The 
assassination of Rafic Hariri in 2006 resulted in the rise to power of the 
Muslim Shia, who attempted to extend their power to the LACPA. This was 
met by the existing plans of the Christian Maronite dominant group, who 
were also attempting to have power over the association. The intention of 
both sects is revealed by the increase in their respective membership 
numbers. Again, this increase can only be achieved by successfully 
completing three years of training, which (as discussed above) is also 
subject to sectarian influence.  
While religious sectarianism has negatively impacted the development of 
Lebanese accounting, other factors have also played a role in shaping the 
profession. The level of corruption in Lebanon, as well as intense 
competition, have limited Lebanese CPAs from enjoying the characteristics 
associated with the profession, such as prestige, wealth, and 
independence. The absent relationship with the universities and the entry 
barriers set by LACPA to preserve the profession have been proven to 
obstruct new talent from joining the profession. The positive relationship 
with the government, which provided LACPA with autonomy at its 
inception, has changed as the government began taking unilateral 
decisions that affected the profession. Mirroring the masculine nature of 
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Lebanese society, LACPA has been dominated by men since its inception, 
leading to loss of the ‘voice of others’ within the association. 
This chapter has provided an in-depth analysis of the construction and 
reconstruction of the accounting profession in Lebanon between 1990 and 
2015. The next chapter presents the recommendations of this research and 
a summary of its findings. It also highlights the need for further research 
on other elements that play a role in the accounting profession in Lebanon.  
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Chapter 7. Conclusion 
7. 1. Introduction 
The literature review discussed in Chapter Two has provided the 
foundations for this research. Among the three approaches to the sociology 
of profession, the Neo-Weberian critical approach establishes the need to 
examine the development of the accounting profession via the lens of the 
social attributes that are used by the occupational groups to achieve 
closure through setting entry barriers, thus gaining a monopoly over the 
work and market. In the case of Lebanon, religious sectarianism was the 
driving force within wider society, forming the Lebanese identity, and 
controlling everyday life. Therefore, this research has examined the 
development of the accounting profession in Lebanon while considering the 
role played by religious sectarianism in the construction and reconstruction 
of the profession.  
The Birkett and Evans’ (2005) professionalization model was used to 
examine and highlight the strategies used by the accounting occupation 
group in Lebanon during the professionalization process, emphasizing the 
conditions that were met, the dependencies that were maintained, and the 
continuous management of these conditions and dependencies. Chapter 
Two discussed the use of these social constructs in the professionalization 
process as a method to exclude the ‘ineligibles’. Thus, the 
professionalization process strategies that were set in order to gain a 
monopoly could also be the ones that enabled the accounting profession in 
Lebanon to exclude the ‘ineligibles’. 
The theoretical framework of this research has integrated Social 
Dominance Theory, the Theory of Ethnic Conflict, and the Neo-Weberian 
concept of closure to investigate the role played by religious sectarianism 
on the development of the accounting profession in Lebanon. More 
specifically, the strategies implemented by AAFO and LACPA to achieve 
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closure and then manage the profession were examined using the Birkett 
and Evans model, and SDT and TEC were applied to provide theoretical 
interpretation.   
This chapter summarizes the findings of this research and provides 
concluding remarks. It reveals the limitations that faced the research and 
it also offers recommendations for future research.  
7. 2. Summary of findings 
While accounting as an occupation was practiced in Lebanon during the 
Ottoman Era (5th century – 1920), it was limited to government accounting 
in general. In 1920, shortly after the end of World War I, Lebanon was 
ruled by the French, while Palestine, its neighbour to the south, was ruled 
by the British. At the time, the accounting profession in the United Kingdom 
was thriving, since the British accounting associations could successfully 
establish accounting as a prominent profession. Consequently, British 
accountants were able to transfer their capabilities and the British 
accounting standards to the colonized countries, one of which was 
Palestine. Meanwhile, the French accounting profession was not sufficiently 
developed to be transmitted to Lebanon. The immigration of Palestinian 
talent to Lebanon carried with it the introduction of British accounting 
standards, creating a unique mix where practice followed the British 
standards but took place under laws adapted from the French system.  
Calls for the establishment of an accounting occupational group in Lebanon 
began in the 1950s. These calls were made in the face of a growing threat 
from foreign accounting and audit firms who were establishing their 
presence in Lebanon. After several meetings that were delayed due to the 
sectarian armed conflicts in 1958, Decree no 518/1 was issued on 17 
December 1963 by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, granting 
permission to establish AAFO, which can be considered the first successful 
implementation of S8 (achieving a relationship with the state). The AAFO 
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general assembly held on 6 July 1964 approved the first internal bylaws of 
the association. These bylaws set the entry barriers to AAFO membership. 
However, these barriers did not focus on the education, experience or 
competency of the members, but rather on the member being an owner of 
an accounting and auditing firm. By setting this condition, the AAFO 
implemented a closure mechanism to exclude those who did not have the 
financial means to be an accounting firm owner.  
AAFO then created a comprehensive draft law that would organize the 
accounting profession in Lebanon; it was presented to and approved by 
AAFO’s general assembly on 14 March 1965. In this profession organization 
draft law, AAFO attempted to implement various association control 
strategies by defining the level of education, the need for training, and the 
level of experience of its members. In addition, the draft law restricted the 
CPA title to those registered with AAFO, thus attempting to attain 
monopolistic control by AAFO’s members over work.  
The draft law was, however, set aside by the Lebanese government several 
times between 1965 and 1981, due to the interference of the other two 
accounting associations, CPAME and the Court Experts, accompanied by 
the reluctant attitude of the Lebanese government to pass the law. By not 
gaining the support of the state to monopolize work, AAFO was 
unsuccessful in implementing the strategy of building a relationship with 
the state (S8 – achieving a relationship with the state). AAFO also 
attempted to implement other professionalization strategies, such as 
suggesting a unified accounting framework (S5 – determinations of 
standards), creating entry barriers (S3 – control of education and entry; 
and S4 – definition of competence levels), formulation of a code of ethics 
(S1), and persuasion of the public of the legitimacy of the profession (S6 
– image building). While some of these strategies were successful, the lack 
of interest by the government and the onset of sectarian war in 1975 
postponed further discussions regarding the draft law until 1990.  
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Mr Wael Abou Shakra outlined his two encounters with the religious 
sectarianism that faced the accounting profession in Lebanon prior to 1990. 
In addition, the analysis of the religious sects of AAFO’s presidents and 
board members has revealed the dominance of Christians over AAFO’s 
governance since its establishment. The election of Abou Shakra as AAFO’s 
president in 1977 was accompanied by accusations of attempting to create 
two associations divided on a sectarian basis. In addition, the profession 
lost many talents, since the 15-year civil war led to the death or emigration 
of many CPAs. However, there is no other tangible evidence due to the 
lack of archival material and the inability of the other interviewees to 
comment on that period during which they were not AAFO members. 
However, it is only logical to assume that the driving force behind the civil 
war, namely religious sectarianism, had an impact on AAFO’s members and 
their attitudes towards each other. Such an assumption is vividly backed 
up by the analysis of the CPA firms in 2015 which was presented in Chapter 
Six and is further discussed below.   
The end of the civil war in 1990 brought with it the restructuring of the 
Lebanese state and economy. In order to regain the trust of the 
international community and the public, the government showed an 
interest in establishing an accounting profession organization law. For the 
first time, AAFO had the support of the Lebanese government to establish 
the accounting profession. While AAFO presented its draft law again for the 
government’s approval, there were demands by CPAME to change some of 
the draft’s articles regarding the level of education and required experience 
of the members. For the first time, sectarian political relationships were 
used to stop the law from being passed by the Lebanese parliament. After 
reaching a compromise, Law 364 – The Organization of the Lebanese 
Chartered Accountants Profession in Lebanon – was passed on 1 August 
1992, which led to the formation of LACPA in 1994, thereby establishing 
accounting as a profession rather than an occupation.  
   263 
 
The discussions with the interviewees in Chapter Six reveal the high 
negative impact of religious sectarianism on the accounting profession in 
Lebanon between 1995 and 2015. Those interviewees who shared their 
experience of religious sectarianism in LACPA were very open in stating 
their opinions. For example, Mr Afif Sharara’s experience demonstrated the 
attitude of the sect towards a member who acted not in accordance with 
the wishes of the sect, but rather based on professional opinion. Mrs. Ghina 
Chammas’s experience revealed the magnitude of retaliation that a sect is 
willing to undertake to preserve its rights in LACPA. However, it was noted 
that the interviewees unconsciously exhibited the ‘us versus them’ attitude 
when discussing members of other religious sects, which is an inherent 
attitude within Lebanese society due to the high level of religious 
sectarianism. Such behaviour is expected from the members of the sects; 
as explained by SDT, members of one sect have low opinions regarding 
members of the other sects. 
The statistical data gathered in Chapter Six supports the claims of the 
interviewees. The composition of LACPA mimics that of the confessional 
distribution within the government, where positions are divided equally 
between Muslims and Christians, regardless of qualifications. The 
examination of the presidents’ religion between 1995 and 2015 supports 
the claim that there is an unwritten rule of alternating the presidency 
between Muslims and Christians.  
Statistical data analysis also reveals the dominance of Christians over 
Muslims in LACPA. In contrast to the demographics of Lebanon, in which 
Christians amount to 38% and Muslims to 62% of the population, LACPA’s 
members, between 1995 and 2015, averaged 54.7% Christians and 45.3% 
Muslims. In addition, the Christian Maronites constituted 35.5% of LACPA 
members, compared to their 21% representation in the Lebanese 
population. This finding, which evidences the dominance of the Christian 
Maronites over LACPA membership, can be explained by the dominance of 
this sect over occupations before the civil war, which meant that the 
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majority of those who were practicing accounting when LACPA was formed 
in 1994 were from that sect. The Christian Maronite sect also shows 
dominance in the number of members who joined LACPA between 1995 
and 2015, which can be explained by the entry condition of having trained 
for three years at a licensed CPA firm. This can be explained by the use of 
family ties and sectarian belonging as legitimizing myths to attain/maintain 
power within LACPA. Family ties were a means for the sects to preserve 
economic status. Such utilization is evident in the case of LACPA, since 269 
of its members have family ties. By using the training requirement and 
family ties, the Christian Maronites were able to maintain their dominance 
over LACPA and to preserve the benefits associated with such dominance 
(a conclusion in accordance with SDT). Such dominance may change, since 
one of the subordinate groups, the Muslim Shia, has taken several steps 
to increase its presence in LACPA, whether by demanding a stated turn at 
holding the LACPA presidency or by increasing the number of its members 
within the association.  
TEC explains that group comparison and group identity are the main 
drivers of the tension between ethnic groups; this is exemplified in the 
sectarian belonging in the case of LACPA members. The sectarian 
belonging of the members and their low level of trust of the other sects 
could be the main factors that drive trainee members to complete their 
training requirements at firms that match their sectarian identity. It can be 
assumed that the CPA firms would only take on trainee CPAs who have a 
specific sectarian belonging, since most LACPA members prefer to work in 
firms that match their own religious belonging. This is evident as 342 out 
of 708 practicing LACPA members in 2015 operated in accounting and audit 
firms whose staff came from a single religious sect. Of these 708 members, 
244 worked in firms that solely hire members from a specific religion. While 
122 CPAs worked in firms with employees from different religions, the 
evidence reveals that most of these firms had one token CPA to deter a 
reputation for sectarianism. Such an interpretation could also explain why 
some minorities had no representation in LACPA between 1995 and 2015.  
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The data also reveals that members of certain religious sects have 
increased in numbers in LACPA as their sects’ power has increased within 
Lebanese society. Similarly, members who belong to other religious sects 
have decreased in numbers at the same time as their sects’ power has 
decreased. For example, Muslim Sunni members have decreased in 
numbers, especially since the assassination of Hariri in 2005 which led to 
the decrease in political power of the Muslim Sunni sect.  
While religious sectarianism has affected the development of the 
accounting profession in Lebanon, it has not been the only factor. The 
corruption within the Lebanese economy, the negative attitude of the 
Lebanese firm owners towards auditors, gender inequality, government 
interference, and the increased level of competition have also influenced 
the profession negatively. The entry barriers set by LACPA have led to an 
association filled with members over the age of 45. The new members who 
wish to join LACPA are faced with a lack of training and reading material 
while sitting for exams that are filled with errors. In addition, there is no 
unified strategic alliance between LACPA and the Lebanese universities, 
leading to accounting graduates with no academic background in relation 
to Lebanese accounting standards.  
This research has documented the closure strategies used to achieve a 
monopoly over the accounting profession in Lebanon by exhibiting the 
professionalization strategies implemented in accordance with the Birkett 
and Evans (2005) model. Through interviews, archival material, and 
quantitative data, this research has presented evidence that the 
accounting profession in Lebanon has been impacted by the religious 
sectarianism practiced in Lebanese society. Under SDT, the Christian 
Maronites exhibit dominance over LACPA, in terms of governance and 
numbers of members, over other religious sects. TEC suggests that 
economic competition is the reason for desiring dominance, which is 
evident in the utilization of family ties and training requirements to 
preserve the Christian Maronites’ dominant position in LACPA, and in the 
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Muslim Shia’s attempts to increase their presence and power in LACPA. 
Such attempts by the Muslim Shia reflect this group’s increase in power 
within Lebanese society since 2005, which fits the observation of TEC that 
subordinate groups strive to become a dominant group as the group 
desires more power.  
7. 3. Contribution of the research 
This research provides contribution to the literature, theory, and practice. 
The research provides a summary of the research conducted on exclusion 
practices in many countries, using race, ethnicity, and gender as means of 
exclusion. It sums the researches findings and navigates them into a newly 
identified mean of exclusion; religious sectarianism. The topic by itself is 
identified as a taboo in research, given the sensitivity it might rise between 
the various parts of any society.  
Although Annisette and O’Regan (2007) and Edwards and Walker (2008) 
find strong evidence of informal exclusionary closure based on religion 
within the early Canadian accounting community and in nineteenth-century 
Ireland, neither piece of research provides the reasons for the 
disproportionate dominance of certain sects over the others. Their 
researches touch briefly on the topic while discussing other social 
attributes, might that be for lack of additional information or the focus of 
their researches.  
This research also gathers the fragmented pieces of information about the 
accounting profession in Lebanon and gather them in a comprehensive 
research, featuring the past and the current position of the profession in 
Lebanon, highlighting the threats and opportunities that would face it in 
the future. In a world that is heading towards globalization and unification 
of accounting standards, the influence of sectarianism on the Lebanese 
accounting profession might hinder its progress to elevate to these 
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international standards, and might even endanger the professional body’s 
position as a member of international organizations such as IFAC. 
Lastly, the research highlights that it is not enough to look at the 
professionalisation process, even while using a holistic model such as 
Birkett and Evans (2005). It is important to examine how the profession 
will maintain its position as a profession. In the case of Lebanon, it was 
necessary to triangulate the Birkett and Evans model with TEC and SDT. 
The model outlines the professionalization strategies used by the LACPA to 
attain conditions of professional power, association control, and sustaining 
ideology while managing the dependencies of work, market and the state. 
The social dominance theory adds to the model by looking at the society 
in which the profession operates, and divides it to group-based social 
hierarchies that use social constructs, thus enabling the 
organizational/professional body to add entry barriers to the profession 
based on these social contracts. The theory of ethnic conflict completes the 
triangle by attributing the creation these groups to the economic 
competition between socially-differentiated groups, where ethnicity is used 
as the joining factor between members of the same group.  
7. 4. Limitation of the research 
While this study has provided evidence for the negative impact of religious 
sectarianism on the accounting profession in Lebanon, the research has 
some limitations. The number of interviewees in this research may be 
considered small when compared with the overall size of LACPA 
membership. I faced several rejections by other potential interviewees 
because I did not belong to their religion or religious sect, which in itself is 
a further evidence of the continuing role of religious sectarianism. The 
second limitation was my difficulty finding voices that could shed more light 
on AAFO and the possible effect of sectarianism on the association between 
1964 and 1990. The lack of archival material and public records has been 
another limitation when attempting to access the history of the profession. 
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Lastly, the use of the 2015 electoral lists instead of a census could be 
considered as a limitation, since the lists are not the optimal representation 
of the Lebanese population. 
7. 5. Recommendations 
While Chapter Six has provided some insights on other factors that have 
influenced the development of the accounting profession in Lebanon, 
future research could be developed to obtain a better understanding of 
these factors. The aging membership of the association, gender inequality, 
and accounting education are three of the most pressing items that should 
be addressed urgently by LACPA. New members should be recruited quickly 
to avoid the expected shortage of CPAs, many of whom will soon be 
reaching retirement age. In addition, LACPA should develop accounting 
textbooks that are based on Lebanese accounting standards, and it should 
work with the universities to incorporate these books in their accounting 
degrees.  
Lastly, it is to be hoped that Lebanese society can eradicate the religious 
sectarianism which has damaged Lebanon, its economy, and its people for 
more than two centuries. While this call may seem impossible at the 
present moment, it is the hope of this research to see Lebanese society 
become sectarian-free.  
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Appendix I 
Lebanon’s Statistics 
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All Members Statistics – Gender 
Total  Members Gender # of Members % of Total Members 
2271 Male 1980 87.19% 
 Female 291 12.81% 
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All Members Statistics – Age 
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1995 139 254 291 251 210 213 154 78 37 13 
1996 109 242 299 270 221 204 162 95 46 16 
1997 79 224 307 275 231 201 170 109 53 21 
1998 61 204 283 286 245 210 175 126 58 30 
1999 28 194 279 286 256 206 190 140 66 38 
2000 15 170 264 300 252 214 210 147 76 48 
2001 19 141 240 291 253 206 193 142 85 56 
2002 11 117 225 295 260 211 189 149 96 64 
2003 21 105 205 273 268 210 191 152 101 73 
2004 23 78 207 267 271 227 179 171 107 87 
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All Members Statistics – Religion 
 
Percentage of Change among Religions of Members over the years 
Religion Christian 
% of Change 
in Christian 
Members 
Muslim 
% of Change 
in Muslim 
Members 
Total 
1995 905  736  1641 
1996 914 1.0% 750 1.9% 1664 
1997 913 -0.1% 757 0.9% 1670 
1998 915 0.2% 763 0.8% 1678 
1999 914 -0.1% 769 0.8% 1683 
2000 918 0.4% 778 1.2% 1696 
2001 885 -3.6% 741 -4.8% 1626 
2002 881 -0.5% 736 -0.7% 1617 
2003 871 -1.1% 728 -1.1% 1599 
2004 881 1.1% 736 1.1% 1617 
2005 856 -2.8% 724 -1.6% 1580 
2006 876 2.3% 739 2.1% 1615 
2007 894 2.1% 753 1.9% 1647 
2008 890 -0.4% 754 0.1% 1644 
2009 908 2.0% 771 2.3% 1679 
2010 918 1.1% 789 2.3% 1707 
2011 927 1.0% 791 0.3% 1718 
2012 927 0.0% 791 0.0% 1718 
2013 950 2.5% 795 0.5% 1745 
2014 971 2.2% 797 0.3% 1768 
2015 967 -0.4% 794 -0.4% 1761 
1030
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All Members Statistics – Length of Membership and Family 
Relationships 
Length of Membership # of Members % of Total  Members 
1 Year 96 4.2% 
2 Years 84 3.7% 
3 Years 44 1.9% 
4 Years 25 1.1% 
5 Years 36 1.6% 
6 Years 142 6.3% 
7 Years 60 2.6% 
8 Years 80 3.5% 
9 Years 53 2.3% 
10 Years 75 3.3% 
11 Years 37 1.6% 
12 Years 36 1.6% 
13 Years 59 2.6% 
14 Years 16 0.7% 
15 Years 45 2.0% 
16 Years 18 0.8% 
17 Years 26 1.1% 
18 Years 80 3.5% 
19 Years 85 3.7% 
20 Years 1174 51.7% 
 
Relationship Number of Members Percentage of Members 
Brother 100 37% 
Cousin 3 1% 
Daughter 31 12% 
Father 67 25% 
Nephew 3 1% 
Sister 6 2% 
Son 56 21% 
Uncle 3 1% 
Total 269 100% 
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All Members Statistics – Religious Sects 
 Christian Muslim  
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1995 7 11 6 10 125 147 10 577 7 6 75 301 359 1641 
1996 7 11 8 10 123 150 10 580 6 6 75 311 363 1660 
1997 7 11 8 10 122 150 10 580 6 6 77 315 364 1666 
1998 7 11 8 10 123 150 10 582 6 6 79 315 367 1674 
1999 7 11 8 10 123 149 10 582 6 6 80 319 368 1679 
2000 7 11 8 10 124 148 10 586 6 6 81 321 374 1692 
2001 7 11 8 11 121 141 9 563 6 6 80 312 347 1622 
2002 7 11 8 11 123 141 8 558 6 6 80 306 348 1613 
2003 7 11 8 11 121 142 8 549 6 6 79 310 337 1595 
2004 7 11 8 11 122 143 8 558 6 6 78 317 339 1614 
2005 5 10 7 11 116 143 8 544 5 6 77 315 330 1577 
2006 5 11 7 11 120 147 8 555 5 6 80 324 333 1612 
2007 5 11 7 11 122 149 8 568 5 7 83 332 336 1644 
2008 6 11 7 7 121 146 8 571 5 7 87 328 337 1641 
2009 6 11 7 7 124 148 8 584 5 7 89 335 345 1676 
2010 7 12 7 7 126 149 9 588 5 7 92 342 353 1704 
2011 7 12 6 7 125 149 12 596 5 7 91 349 349 1715 
2012 7 12 6 7 122 151 12 597 5 7 90 349 350 1715 
2013 7 10 6 6 128 154 11 616 5 5 90 359 345 1742 
2014 7 9 6 6 131 152 11 636 4 7 88 361 347 1765 
2015 6 9 6 6 131 149 11 636 4 7 88 363 342 1758 
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1995 - 2015
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All Members Statistics – Origin Province 
Origin 
Province 
Beirut 
Mount 
Lebanon 
North 
Lebanon 
South 
Lebanon 
Bekaa Total 
1995 460 667 122 307 85 1641 
1996 464 679 121 314 86 1664 
1997 467 681 120 316 86 1670 
1998 467 683 122 319 87 1678 
1999 460 667 122 307 85 1641 
2000 466 688 129 326 87 1696 
2001 438 663 123 318 84 1626 
2002 435 662 121 315 84 1617 
2003 422 657 119 316 85 1599 
2004 424 667 118 319 89 1617 
2005 407 656 118 311 88 1580 
2006 415 672 124 312 92 1615 
2007 417 692 125 318 95 1647 
2008 406 690 129 317 102 1644 
2009 410 703 135 326 105 1679 
2010 416 713 139 332 107 1707 
2011 417 719 142 333 107 1718 
2012 420 717 140 334 107 1718 
2013 408 735 143 339 120 1745 
2014 401 753 140 350 124 1768 
2015 398 750 138 350 125 1761 
Percentage of Religious Sects among Origin Province of the Lebanese 
Population 
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Beirut 2% 10% 2% 4% 9% 5% 5% 37% 0% 1% 47% 15% 63% 
Mount Lebanon 1% 4% 1% 5% 7% 45% 1% 64% 0% 19% 9% 8% 36% 
North Lebanon 0% 0% 0% 1% 14% 25% 0% 40% 4% 0% 55% 1% 60% 
South Lebanon 0% 0% 0% 5% 2% 9% 0% 16% 0% 2% 12% 71% 84% 
Bekaa 0% 2% 0% 10% 5% 10% 1% 29% 0% 4% 25% 43% 71% 
Total 1% 3% 1% 5% 7% 21% 1% 38% 1% 6% 28% 28% 62% 
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All Members Statistics – Origin District 
Origin 
Province 
# of 
Members 
% of 
Total 
Members 
Origin 
District 
# of 
Members 
% of 
Total 
Members 
% of 
Total 
Province 
Beirut 575 25.3% Beirut 575 25.3% 100% 
Mount 
Lebanon 
948 41.7% 
Alay 114 5.0% 12.0% 
Baabda 181 8.0% 19.1% 
Chouf 172 7.6% 18.1% 
Jbeel 92 4.1% 9.7% 
Keserwan 174 7.7% 18.4% 
Maten 215 9.5% 22.7% 
North 
Lebanon 
177 7.8% 
Akkar 30 1.3% 16.9% 
Batroun 23 1.0% 13.0% 
Bsharry 12 0.5% 6.8% 
Koura 12 0.5% 6.8% 
Syrdiniyeh 8 0.4% 4.5% 
Tripoli 78 3.4% 44.1% 
Zgharta 14 0.6% 7.9% 
South 
Lebanon 
423 18.6% 
Bint Jbeel 48 2.1% 11.3% 
Hasbayah 20 0.9% 4.7% 
Jzeen 60 2.6% 14.2% 
Marjyon 50 2.2% 11.8% 
Nabatiyeh 88 3.9% 20.8% 
Saida 38 1.7% 9.0% 
Saida Villages 67 3.0% 15.8% 
Tyre 52 2.3% 12.3% 
Bekaa 148 6.5% 
Baalbak 54 2.4% 36.5% 
Hermel 5 0.2% 3.4% 
Rashaya 7 0.3% 4.7% 
Western Bekaa 25 1.1% 16.9% 
Zahle 57 2.5% 38.5% 
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All Members Statistics – Distribution of Religion in Origin Districts 
 
Origin 
District
Number of 
Members
% of 
Members
Religion
Number of 
Members
% of 
Members
Sect
Number of 
Members
% of 
Members
% of 
Religion
Beirut 575 25% Christian 217 38% Armenian Catholics 6 1% 3%
Armenian Orthodox 8 1% 4%
Chaldeans 4 1% 2%
Evangelicals 8 1% 4%
Greek Catholic 38 7% 18%
Greek Orthodox 84 15% 39%
Latins 13 2% 6%
Maronite 45 8% 21%
Syriac Catholics 5 1% 2%
Syriac Orthodox 7 1.2% 3%
Muslim 358 62% Druz 2 0.3% 1%
Shia 71 12% 20%
Sunni 284 49% 79%
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Origin 
District
Number of 
Members
% of 
Members
Religion
Number of 
Members
% of 
Members
Sect
Number of 
Members
% of 
Members
% of 
Religion
Alay 114 5% Christian 82 72% Greek Catholic 6 5% 7%
Greek Orthodox 24 21% 29%
Maronite 52 46% 63%
Muslim 32 28% Druz 29 25.4% 91%
Shia 3 3% 9%
Baabda 181 8% Christian 122 67% Greek Catholic 18 10% 15%
Greek Orthodox 14 8% 11%
Maronite 89 49% 73%
Syriac Catholics 1 1% 1%
Muslim 59 33% Druz 24 13% 41%
Shia 32 18% 54%
Sunni 3 2% 5%
Chouf 172 8% Christian 76 44% Evangelicals 2 1% 3%
Greek Catholic 18 10% 24%
Greek Orthodox 2 1% 3%
Maronite 54 31% 71%
Muslim 96 56% Druz 48 28% 50%
Shia 6 3% 6%
Sunni 42 24% 44%
Jbeel 92 4% Christian 89 97% Evangelicals 1 1% 1%
Greek Catholic 1 1% 1%
Greek Orthodox 2 2% 2%
Maronite 84 91% 94%
Syriac Orthodox 1 1% 1%
Muslim 3 3% Shia 2 2% 67%
Sunni 1 1% 33%
Keserwan 174 8% Christian 173 99% Chaldeans 1 1% 1%
Greek Catholic 6 3% 3%
Greek Orthodox 1 1% 1%
Maronite 165 95% 95%
Muslim 1 1% Shia 1 1% 100%
Maten 215 9% Christian 212 99% Armenian Catholics 3 1% 1%
Armenian Orthodox 7 3% 3%
Chaldeans 2 1% 1%
Greek Catholic 21 10% 10%
Greek Orthodox 18 8% 8%
Latins 2 1% 1%
Maronite 159 74% 75%
Muslim 3 1% Druz 2 0.9% 67%
Shia 1 0.5% 33%
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Origin 
District
Number of 
Members
% of 
Members
Religion
Number of 
Members
% of 
Members
Sect
Number of 
Members
% of 
Members
% of 
Religion
Akkar 30 1% Christian 24 80% Greek Catholic 2 7% 8%
Greek Orthodox 9 30% 38%
Maronite 13 43% 54%
Muslim 6 20% Sunni 6 20% 100%
Batroun 23 1% Christian 20 87% Chaldeans 1 4% 5%
Greek Orthodox 2 9% 10%
Maronite 17 74% 85%
Muslim 3 13% Shia 2 9% 67%
Sunni 1 4% 33%
Bsharry 12 1% Christian 12 100% Greek Orthodox 1 8% 8%
Maronite 11 92% 92%
Muslim 0 0%
Koura 12 1% Christian 11 92% Greek Orthodox 8 67% 73%
Maronite 3 25% 27%
Muslim 1 8% Druz 1 8.3% 100%
Syrdiniyeh 8 0% Christian 2 25% Greek Orthodox 1 13% 50%
Maronite 1 13% 50%
Muslim 6 75% Sunni 6 75% 100%
Tripoli 78 3% Christian 5 6% Greek Catholic 1 1% 20%
Greek Orthodox 4 5% 80%
Muslim 73 94% Sunni 73 94% 100%
Zgharta 14 1% Christian 14 100% Maronite 14 100% 100%
Muslim 0 0%
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Origin District
Number 
of 
Members
% of 
Members
Religion
Number of 
Members
% of 
Members
Sect
Number 
of 
Members
% of 
Members
% of 
Religion
Bint Jbeel 48 2% Christian 6 13% Greek Catholic 3 6% 50%
Maronite 3 6% 50%
Muslim 42 88% Shia 42 88% 100%
Hasbayah 20 1% Christian 6 30% Greek Catholic 1 5% 17%
Greek Orthodox 3 15% 50%
Maronite 2 10% 33%
Muslim 14 70% Druz 3 15% 21%
Shia 1 5% 7%
Sunni 10 50% 71%
Jzeen 60 3% Christian 47 78% Greek Catholic 4 7% 9%
Maronite 43 72% 91%
Muslim 13 22% Druz 1 2% 8%
Shia 12 20% 92%
Marjyon 50 2% Christian 6 12% Greek Catholic 3 6% 60%
Greek Orthodox 2 4% 40%
Maronite 1 2% 20%
Muslim 45 88% Shia 43 86% 96%
Sunni 1 2% 2%
Nabatiyeh 88 4% Christian 9 10% Greek Catholic 3 3% 33%
Maronite 6 7% 67%
Muslim 79 90% Shia 79 90% 100%
Saida 38 2% Christian 2 5% Greek Catholic 1 3% 50%
Maronite 1 3% 50%
Muslim 36 95% Druz 1 3% 3%
Shia 1 3% 3%
Sunni 34 89% 94%
Saida Villages 67 3% Christian 19 28% Greek Catholic 12 18% 63%
Maronite 7 10% 37%
Muslim 48 72% Shia 45 67% 94%
Sunni 3 4% 6%
Tyre 52 2% Christian 2 4% Evangelicals 1 2% 50%
Greek Catholic 1 2% 50%
Muslim 50 96% Shia 50 96% 100%
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Origin District
Number of 
Members
% of 
Members
Religion
Number of 
Members
% of 
Members
Sect
Number of 
Members
% of 
Members
% of 
Religion
Baalbak 54 2% Christian 16 30% Greek Catholic 5 9% 31%
Greek Orthodox 1 2% 6%
Maronite 10 19% 63%
Muslim 38 70% Shia 32 59% 84%
Sunni 6 11% 16%
Hermel 5 0.2% Christian 0 0%
Muslim 5 100% Shia 5 100% 100%
Rashaya 7 0% Christian 3 43% Greek Orthodox 3 43% 100%
Muslim 4 57% Druz 3 43% 75%
Sunni 1 14% 25%
Western Bekaa 25 1% Christian 17 68% Greek Catholic 6 24% 35%
Greek Orthodox 2 8% 12%
Maronite 9 36% 53%
Muslim 8 32% Shia 4 16% 50%
Sunni 4 16% 50%
Zahle 57 3% Christian 50 88% Armenian Orthodox 1 2% 2%
Greek Catholic 18 32% 36%
Greek Orthodox 11 19% 22%
Maronite 18 32% 36%
Syriac Catholics 1 2% 2%
Syriac Orthodox 1 2% 2%
Muslim 7 12% Shia 1 2% 14%
Sunni 6 11% 86%
Province District
Lebanese 
Population
All LACPA 
Members
Difference Comparison Province District
Lebanese 
Population
All LACPA 
Members
Difference Comparison
Beirut Beirut 2% 1% -1% Negative Beirut Beirut 10% 1% -9% Negative
Alay 0% 0% 0% Neutral Alay 1% 0% -1% Negative
Baabda 0% 0% 0% Neutral Baabda 1% 0% -1% Negative
Chouf 0% 0% 0% Neutral Chouf 0% 0% 0% Neutral
Jbeel 0% 0% 0% Neutral Jbeel 1% 0% -1% Negative
Keserwan 1% 0% -1% Negative Keserwan 2% 0% -2% Negative
Maten 4% 1% -3% Negative Maten 15% 3% -12% Negative
Akkar 0% 0% 0% Neutral Akkar 0% 0% 0% Neutral
Batroun 0% 0% 0% Neutral Batroun 0% 0% 0% Neutral
Bsharry 0% 0% 0% Neutral Bsharry 0% 0% 0% Neutral
Koura 0% 0% 0% Neutral Koura 0% 0% 0% Neutral
Syrdiniyeh 0% 0% 0% Neutral Syrdiniyeh 0% 0% 0% Neutral
Tripoli 0% 0% 0% Neutral Tripoli 1% 0% -1% Negative
Zgharta 0% 0% 0% Neutral Zgharta 0% 0% 0% Neutral
Bint Jbeel 0% 0% 0% Neutral Bint Jbeel 0% 0% 0% Neutral
Hasbayah 0% 0% 0% Neutral Hasbayah 0% 0% 0% Neutral
Jzeen 0% 0% 0% Neutral Jzeen 0% 0% 0% Neutral
Marjyon 0% 0% 0% Neutral Marjyon 0% 0% 0% Neutral
Nabatiyeh 0% 0% 0% Neutral Nabatiyeh 0% 0% 0% Neutral
Saida 0% 0% 0% Neutral Saida 0% 0% 0% Neutral
Saida Villages 0% 0% 0% Neutral Saida Villages 0% 0% 0% Neutral
Tyre 0% 0% 0% Neutral Tyre 1% 0% -1% Negative
Baalbak & Hermel 0% 0% 0% Neutral Baalbak & Hermel 0% 0% 0% Neutral
Rashaya & Western 0% 0% 0% Neutral Rashaya & Western 0% 0% 0% Neutral
Zahle 1% 2% 1% Positive Zahle 5% 0% -5% Negative
South 
Lebanon
South 
Lebanon
Bekaa Bekaa
Mount 
Lebanon
Mount 
Lebanon
North 
Lebanon
North 
Lebanon
Armenian Catholics Armenian Orthodox
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Province District
Lebanese 
Population
All LACPA 
Members
Difference Comparison Province District
Lebanese 
Population
All LACPA 
Members
Difference Comparison
Beirut Beirut 4% 7% 3% Positive Beirut Beirut 9% 15% 6% Positive
Alay 3% 5% 2% Positive Alay 13% 21% 8% Positive
Baabda 5% 10% 5% Positive Baabda 8% 8% 0% Neutral
Chouf 7% 10% 3% Positive Chouf 0.6% 1% 0.4% Positive
Jbeel 0.4% 1% 0.6% Positive Jbeel 3% 2% -1% Negative
Keserwan 2% 3% 1% Positive Keserwan 1% 1% 0% Neutral
Maten 10% 10% 0% Neutral Maten 14% 8% -6% Negative
Akkar 1% 7% 6% Positive Akkar 16% 30% 14% Positive
Batroun 2% 0% -2% Negative Batroun 16% 9% -7% Negative
Bsharry 0% 0% 0% Neutral Bsharry 1% 8% 7% Positive
Koura 0% 0% 0% Neutral Koura 64% 67% 3% Positive
Syrdiniyeh 0% 0% 0% Neutral Syrdiniyeh 8% 12.5% 4.5% Positive
Tripoli 1% 1% 0% Neutral Tripoli 6% 5% -1% Negative
Zgharta 0% 0% 0% Neutral Zgharta 4% 0% -4% Negative
Bint Jbeel 3% 6.5% 2.5% Positive Bint Jbeel 0% 0% 0% Neutral
Hasbayah 2% 5% -3% Negative Hasbayah 10% 15% 5% Positive
Jzeen 15% 7% -8% Negative Jzeen 0% 0% 0% Neutral
Marjyon 3% 6% 3% Positive Marjyon 7% 4% -3% Negative
Nabatiyeh 1% 3% 2% Positive Nabatiyeh 0% 0% 0% Neutral
Saida 3% 3% 0% Neutral Saida 0% 0% 0% Neutral
Saida Villages 13% 18% 5% Positive Saida Villages 0% 0% 0% Neutral
Tyre 4% 2% -2% Negative Tyre 0% 0% 0% Neutral
Baalbak & Hermel 6% 8% 2% Positive Baalbak & Hermel 1% 2% 1% Positive
Rashaya & Western 8% 19% 11% Positive Rashaya & Western 8% 16% 8% Positive
Zahle 19% 32% 13% Positive Zahle 10% 19% 9% Positive
Bekaa Bekaa
South 
Lebanon
South 
Lebanon
Mount 
Lebanon
Mount 
Lebanon
North 
Lebanon
North 
Lebanon
Greek Catholic Greek Orthodox
Province District
Lebanese 
Population
All LACPA 
Members
Difference Comparison Province District
Lebanese 
Population
All LACPA 
Members
Difference Comparison
Beirut Beirut 2% 1% -1% Negative Beirut Beirut 5% 5.5% 0.5% Positive
Alay 1% 0% -1% Negative Alay 0% 0% 0% Neutral
Baabda 0% 0% 0% Neutral Baabda 1% 1% 0% Neutral
Chouf 0.4% 1% 0.6% Positive Chouf 0% 0% 0% Neutral
Jbeel 0.1% 1% 0.9% Positive Jbeel 0.9% 1% 0.1% Positive
Keserwan 0% 0% 0% Neutral Keserwan 1% 1% 0% Neutral
Maten 2% 0% -2% Negative Maten 5% 2% -3% Negative
Akkar 0% 0% 0% Neutral Akkar 0% 0% 0% Neutral
Batroun 0% 0% 0% Neutral Batroun 0.6% 4% 0.4% Positive
Bsharry 0% 0% 0% Neutral Bsharry 0% 0% 0% Neutral
Koura 0% 0% 0% Neutral Koura 0% 0% 0% Neutral
Syrdiniyeh 0% 0% 0% Neutral Syrdiniyeh 0% 0% 0% Neutral
Tripoli 0% 0% 0% Neutral Tripoli 0% 0% 0% Neutral
Zgharta 0% 0% 0% Neutral Zgharta 0% 0% 0% Neutral
Bint Jbeel 0% 0% 0% Neutral Bint Jbeel 0% 0% 0% Neutral
Hasbayah 1% 0% -1% Negative Hasbayah 0% 0% 0% Neutral
Jzeen 0% 0% 0% Neutral Jzeen 0% 0% 0% Neutral
Marjyon 1% 0% -1% Negative Marjyon 0% 0% 0% Neutral
Nabatiyeh 0% 0% 0% Neutral Nabatiyeh 0% 0% 0% Neutral
Saida 0% 0% 0% Neutral Saida 0% 0% 0% Neutral
Saida Villages 0% 0% 0% Neutral Saida Villages 0% 0% 0% Neutral
Tyre 0% 2% 2% Positive Tyre 0% 0% 0% Neutral
Baalbak & Hermel 0% 0% 0% Neutral Baalbak & Hermel 0% 0% 0% Neutral
Rashaya & Western 0% 0% 0% Neutral Rashaya & Western 0% 0% 0% Neutral
Zahle 1% 0% -1% Negative Zahle 4% 4% 0% Neutral
Bekaa
South 
Lebanon
Bekaa
Mount 
Lebanon
South 
Lebanon
North 
Lebanon
Mount 
Lebanon
Christian Minorities
North 
Lebanon
Evangelicals
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Province District
Lebanese 
Population
All LACPA 
Members
Difference Comparison Province District
Lebanese 
Population
All LACPA 
Members
Difference Comparison
Beirut Beirut 5% 8% 3% Positive Beirut Beirut 1% 0.3% -0.7% Negative
Alay 24% 46% 22% Positive Alay 54% 25% -29% Negative
Baabda 37% 49% 12% Positive Baabda 17% 13% -4% Negative
Chouf 30% 31% 1% Positive Chouf 32% 28% -4% Negative
Jbeel 72% 91% 19% Positive Jbeel 0% 0% 0% Neutral
Keserwan 91% 95% 4% Positive Keserwan 0% 0% 0% Neutral
Maten 45% 74% 29% Positive Maten 1% 0.9% -0.1% Negative
Akkar 12% 43% 31% Positive Akkar 0% 0% 0% Neutral
Batroun 74% 74% 0% Neutral Batroun 0% 0% 0% Neutral
Bsharry 99% 92% -7% Negative Bsharry 0% 0% 0% Neutral
Koura 19% 25% 6% Positive Koura 0% 8% 8% Positive
Syrdiniyeh 6% 12.5% 6.5% Positive Syrdiniyeh 0% 0% 0% Neutral
Tripoli 2% 0% -2% Negative Tripoli 0% 0% 0% Neutral
Zgharta 83% 100% 17% Positive Zgharta 0% 0% 0% Neutral
Bint Jbeel 9% 6.5% -2.5% Negative Bint Jbeel 0% 0% 0% Neutral
Hasbayah 4% 10% 6% Positive Hasbayah 32% 15% -17% Negative
Jzeen 62% 71% 9% Positive Jzeen 1% 2% 1% Positive
Marjyon 5% 2% -2% Negative Marjyon 1% 0% -1% Negative
Nabatiyeh 3% 7% 4% Positive Nabatiyeh 0% 0% 0% Neutral
Saida 2% 3% 1% Positive Saida 0.9% 3% 2.1% Positive
Saida Villages 11% 10% -1% Negative Saida Villages 0% 0% 0% Neutral
Tyre 1% 0% -1% Negative Tyre 0% 0% 0% Neutral
Baalbak & Hermel 8% 17% 9% Positive Baalbak & Hermel 0% 0% 0% Neutral
Rashaya & Western 7% 28% 21% Positive Rashaya & Western 15% 9% -6% Negative
Zahle 16% 32% 16% Positive Zahle 1% 0% -1% Negative
South 
Lebanon
South 
Lebanon
Bekaa Bekaa
North 
Lebanon
North 
Lebanon
Mount 
Lebanon
Mount 
Lebanon
Maronite Druz
Province District
Lebanese 
Population
All LACPA 
Members
Difference Comparison Province District
Lebanese 
Population
All LACPA 
Members
Difference Comparison
Beirut Beirut 47% 49% 2% Positive Beirut Beirut 15% 12% -3% Negative
Alay 1% 0% -1% Negative Alay 3% 3% 0% Neutral
Baabda 6% 2% -4% Negative Baabda 24% 18% -6% Negative
Chouf 28% 24% -4% Negative Chouf 2% 3% 1% Positive
Jbeel 2% 1% -1% Negative Jbeel 20% 2% -18% Negative
Keserwan 0% 0% 0% Neutral Keserwan 2% 1% -1% Negative
Maten 2% 0% -2% Negative Maten 3% 0.5% -2.5% Negative
Akkar 66% 20% -46% Negative Akkar 1% 0% -1% Negative
Batroun 6% 4% -2% Negative Batroun 2% 9% 7% Positive
Bsharry 0% 0% 0% Neutral Bsharry 0% 0% 0% Neutral
Koura 13% 0% -13% Negative Koura 2% 0% -2% Negative
Syrdiniyeh 86% 75% -11% Negative Syrdiniyeh 0% 0% 0% Neutral
Tripoli 80% 94% 14% Positive Tripoli 0% 0% 0% Neutral
Zgharta 12% 0% -12% Negative Zgharta 0% 0% 0% Neutral
Bint Jbeel 0% 0% 0% Neutral Bint Jbeel 88% 88% 0% Neutral
Hasbayah 50% 50% 0% Neutral Hasbayah 1% 5% 4% Positive
Jzeen 2% 0% -2% Negative Jzeen 20% 20% 0% Neutral
Marjyon 3% 2% -1% Negative Marjyon 81% 86% 5% Positive
Nabatiyeh 1% 0% -1% Negative Nabatiyeh 95% 90% -5% Negative
Saida 84% 89% 4% Positive Saida 9% 3% -6% Negative
Saida Villages 3% 4% 1% Positive Saida Villages 73% 67% -6% Negative
Tyre 8% 0% -8% Negative Tyre 85% 96% 11% Positive
Baalbak & Hermel 13% 10% -3% Negative Baalbak & Hermel 73% 63% -10% Negative
Rashaya & Western 48% 16% -32% Negative Rashaya & Western 14% 13% -1% Negative
Zahle 27% 11% -16% Negative Zahle 15% 2% -13% Negative
Bekaa Bekaa
South 
Lebanon
South 
Lebanon
North 
Lebanon
North 
Lebanon
Mount 
Lebanon
Mount 
Lebanon
Sunni Shia
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New Members  
Religion Christian Muslim Total 
1996 19 21 40 
1997 1 8 9 
1998 3 6 9 
1999 1 7 8 
2000 6 12 18 
2001 14 17 31 
2002 3 1 4 
2003 17 11 28 
2004 13 13 26 
2005 16 11 27 
2006 27 17 44 
2007 21 17 38 
2008 21 19 40 
2009 21 19 40 
2010 16 24 40 
2011 13 9 22 
2012 6 5 11 
2013 65 39 104 
2014 40 30 70 
2015 13 8 21 
Total 336 294 630 
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Deleted Members 
 
 
  
 
 
Total Gender
% of 
Members
# of 
Members
Religion
% of 
Members
# of 
Members
Sect
% of 
Members
# of 
Members
% of 
Religion
369 Male 92% 340 Christian 52% 191 Armenian Catholics 1% 2 1%
Female 8% 29 Armenian Orthodox 1% 5 3%
Chaldeans 1% 2 1%
Evangelicals 1% 4 2%
Greek Catholic 7% 27 14%
Greek Orthodox 8% 29 15%
Latins 1% 2 1%
Maronite 32% 117 61%
Syriac Catholics 1% 2 1%
Syriac Orthodox 1% 2 1%
Muslim 48% 178 Druz 5% 20 11%
Shia 15% 56 31%
Sunni 27% 101 57%
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Non-Practicing Members  
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Firms with One CPA 
  
 
Religion Sect 
Lebanese 
population 
Firms with 
One CPA 
Difference Impact 
Christians 
Armenian 
Catholics 
0.6% 0.4% -0.20% Negative 
Armenian 
Orthodox 
2.6% 0.3% -2.30% Negative 
Evangelicals 0.5% 0.4% -0.10% Negative 
Greek Catholic 4.7% 7.6% +2.90% Positive 
Greek 
Orthodox 
7.3% 9.6% +2.30% Positive 
Maronite 20.9% 37.4% +16.50% Positive 
Minorities 1.3% 1.2% -0.10% Negative 
Total 
Christians 
37.9% 57% +19.10% Positive 
Muslims 
Alawites & 
Ismailis 
0.9% 0% -0.90% Negative 
Druze 5.7% 5.6% -0.10% Negative 
Sunni 27.9% 18.6% -9.30% Negative 
Shia 27.6% 18.8% -8.80% Negative 
Total Muslims 62.1% 43% -19.10% Negative 
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Sect 
Lebanese 
Population 
-  
Distribution 
Sects in 
Religion 
Firms with 
One CPA -  
Distribution 
Sects in 
Religion 
Difference Impact 
C
h
r
is
ti
a
n
s
 
Armenian 
Catholics 
1.6% 0.73% -0.85% Negative 
Armenian 
Orthodox 
6.9% 0.49% -6.37% Negative 
Evangelicals 1.3% 0.73% -0.59% Negative 
Greek 
Catholic 
12.4% 13.41% 1.01% Positive 
Greek 
Orthodox 
19.3% 16.83% -2.43% Negative 
Maronite 55.1% 65.61% 10.46% Positive 
Minorities 3.4% 2.20% -1.23% Negative 
M
u
s
li
m
s
 
Alawites & 
Ismailis 
1.45% 0% -1.45% Negative 
Druze 9.18% 12.90% 3.72% Positive 
Sunni 44.93% 43.23% -1.70% Negative 
Shia 44.44% 43.55% -0.90% Negative 
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 Sect 
Lebanese 
Population – 
Beirut  
LACPA 
Members – 
Beirut  
Differenc
e 
Impact 
C
h
r
is
ti
a
n
s
 
Armenian 
Catholics 
5.5% 0.0% -5.5% Negative 
Armenian 
Orthodox 
26.7% 0.0% -26.7% Negative 
Evangelica
ls 
4.0% 2.8% -1.3% Negative 
Greek 
Catholic 
11.1% 18.1% 6.9% Positive 
Greek 
Orthodox 
25.3% 25.0% -0.3% Negative 
Maronite 14.3% 48.6% 34.3% Positive 
Minorities 13.0% 5.6% -7.4% Negative 
M
u
s
li
m
s
 Alawites & 
Ismailis 
0.1% 0.0% -0.1% Negative 
Druze 2.0% 7.2% 5.2% Positive 
Sunni 74.3% 59.0% -15.3% Negative 
Shia 23.7% 33.8% 10.1% Positive 
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 Sect 
Lebanese 
Population – 
Mount Lebanon 
LACPA 
Members – 
Mount Lebanon  
Differenc
e 
Impact 
C
h
r
is
ti
a
n
s
 
Armenian 
Catholics 
1.7% 0.9% -0.7% Negative 
Armenian 
Orthodox 
5.9% 0.6% -5.3% Negative 
Evangelica
ls 
1.0% 0.0% -1.0% Negative 
Greek 
Catholic 
8.3% 12.6% +4.3% Positive 
Greek 
Orthodox 
11.0% 13.9% +2.8% Positive 
Maronite 69.8% 70.3% +0.6% Positive 
Minorities 2.3% 1.6% -0.8% Negative 
M
u
s
li
m
s
 Alawites & 
Ismailis 
0.1% 0.0% -0.1% Negative 
Druze 52.9% 26.9% -26.0% Negative 
Sunni 24.0% 10.2% -13.8% Negative 
Shia 23.0% 63.0% +40.0% Positive 
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 Sect 
Lebanese 
Population – 
North Lebanon 
LACPA 
Members – 
North Lebanon  
Differenc
e 
Impact 
C
h
r
is
ti
a
n
s
 
Armenian 
Catholics 
0.2% 0.0% -0.2% Negative 
Armenian 
Orthodox 
0.7% 0.0% -0.7% Negative 
Evangelica
ls 
0.4% 9.1% +8.7% Positive 
Greek 
Catholic 
1.4% 0.0% -1.4% Negative 
Greek 
Orthodox 
33.9% 36.4% +2.4% Positive 
Maronite 63.0% 54.5% -8.5% Negative 
Minorities 0.4% 0.0% -0.4% Negative 
M
u
s
li
m
s
 Alawites & 
Ismailis 
6.3% 0.0% -6.3% Negative 
Druze 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% Neutral 
Sunni 92.5% 100.0% 7.5% Positive 
Shia 1.2% 0.0% -1.2% Negative 
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 Sect 
Lebanese 
Population – 
South Lebanon 
LACPA 
Members – 
South Lebanon  
Differenc
e 
Impact 
C
h
r
is
ti
a
n
s
 
Armenian 
Catholics 
0.2% 0.0% -0.2% Negative 
Armenian 
Orthodox 
1.1% 0.0% -1.1% Negative 
Evangelica
ls 
2.1% 0.0% -2.1% Negative 
Greek 
Catholic 
29.9% 0.0% -29.9% Negative 
Greek 
Orthodox 
9.6% 0.0% -9.6% Negative 
Maronite 56.8% 0.0% -56.8% Negative 
Minorities 0.4% 0.0% -0.4% Negative 
M
u
s
li
m
s
 Alawites & 
Ismailis 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% Negative 
Druze 2.4% 3.3% +0.9% Neutral 
Sunni 13.7% 46.7% +32.9% Positive 
Shia 83.9% 50.0% -33.9% Negative 
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 Sect 
Lebanese 
Population – 
Bekaa 
LACPA 
Members – 
Bekaa  
Differenc
e 
Impact 
C
h
r
is
ti
a
n
s
 
Armenian 
Catholics 
1.2% 0.0% -1.2% Negative 
Armenian 
Orthodox 
5.5% 0.0% -5.5% Negative 
Evangelica
ls 
1.2% 0.0% -1.2% Negative 
Greek 
Catholic 
35.2% 20.0% -15.2% Negative 
Greek 
Orthodox 
17.4% 30.0% +12.6% Positive 
Maronite 35.1% 50.0% +14.9% Positive 
Minorities 4.6% 0.0% -4.6% Negative 
M
u
s
li
m
s
 Alawites & 
Ismailis 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% Neutral 
Druze 3.5% 0.0% -3.5% Negative 
Sunni 25.0% 44.4% 19.4% Positive 
Shia 42.9% 55.6% +12.7% Positive 
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Appendix II 
 
To:   :ىلإ 
Subject: Request for Interview ةلباقم بلط :عوضوملا 
I am a research student carrying my 
PhD in accounting at Aberdeen 
Business School, Robert Gordon 
University. I am conducting a 
research titled “The development of 
the Accounting Profession in 
Lebanon” under the supervision of 
Professor Linda Kirkham. I would 
like to conduct an interview with you 
regarding that topic, which will be 
used solely for the purpose of my 
research. 
دربأ ةيلك ىدل ةبساحملا يف هاروتكد ةبلاط انأ ني
 يف نودروغ تربور ةعماج ،لامعلأا ةرادلإ
 روطت" ناونع تحت ثحبب ًايلاح موقأ .ادنلتكسا
 فارشإ تحت "نانبل يف ةبساحملا ةنهم
ةلباقم ءارجإ دوأو ,ماهكريك ادنيل روسيفوربلا 
 متي فوس و ،عوضوملا اذهب قلعتي اميف كعم
 هذه مادختسا.طقف ثحبلا اذه ضارغلأ ةلباقملا  
Interview questions are mainly the 
following: 
:ةيلاتلا يه ةيسيئرلا ةلباقملا ةلئسأ 
1- What were, in your opinion, the 
main factors that led to the 
establishment of LACPA? 
1تدأ يتلا ةيسيئرلا لماوعلا ،كيأر يف ،يه ام . 
ن ءاشنإ ىلإنانبل يف نيزاجملا نيبساحملا ةباق؟  
2- Which factor do you believe to 
be the most significant one? 
2 وه ام .؟كداقتعإ يف ًاريثأت رثكلأا لماعلا  
3- Which interest group (or groups) 
do you believe were most 
influential in promoting the 
establishment of LACPA?  
3نم .  تناك ةحلصملا تاذ تاهجلا وا ةهجلا يه
بساحملا ةباقن ءاشنإ عيجشت يف ًاريثأت رثكلأا ني
؟ نانبل يف نيزاجملا 
4- In your opinion, what were the 
major influences that affected 
the development of LACPA? 
What pushed it in the direction it 
is in right now?   
4كيأر يف .ؤت يتلا ةيسيئرلا لماوعلاا يه ام ، رث
؟نانبل يف نيزاجملا نيبساحملا ةباقن روطت ىلع 
 اهتهجو ىلا اهب تعفد يتلا لماوعلا يه ام
؟ةيلاحلا 
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 eveileb uoy od stnemele tahW -5
 tnemecnavda eht ni gnipleh era
 era stnemele tahW ?APCAL fo
 ?kcab ti gnidloh
اصر أن تساعد في . بإعتقادك ما هي العن5
 نهوض نقابة المحاسبين المجازين في لبنان ؟ ما
 هي العناصر التي تعيق و تأخر تطورها؟
 APCAL ees uoy od erehW -6
 ?sraey 02 txen eht ni gniog
 .  أين ترى مستقبل نقابة المحاسبين المجازين6
 في لبنان في السنوات العشرين المقبلة؟
 a ebircsed uoy dluow woH -7
 ?APCAL fo rebmem lacipyt
. ما هي برأيك صفات عضو نموذجي في نقابة 7
 المحاسبين المجازين في لبنان ؟
 eht rof ecnatpecca ruoy etaicerppa I
  .weivretni
 وشكرا ًلقبولك إجراء المقابلة.
  
 مع خالص تحياتي, ,sdrageR tseB
 ميساء المارديني inidraM lA asiaM
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   Participant Information Sheet                          ليلد نيكراشملا         
 
Project Title عورشملا ناونع 
The Development of the Accounting 
Profession in Lebanon 
وطتنانبل يف ةبساحملا ةنهم ر  
  
Purpose ضرغلا 
This interview is conducted as part of the 
primary research for PhD in Accounting.   
 ةلباقملا هذه ةجردل ةيلولأا ثوحبلا نم ءزج يه
ةبساحملا يف هاروتكدلا.  
  
What is this research project about? ؟ يثحبلا عورشملا اذه وه ام 
This research aims to examine the 
development of the accounting profession in 
Lebanon. Such examination includes the 
factors that led to its establishment and main 
forces leading to it. It also includes the 
inspection of factors that shaped the 
profession over the years. 
رد ىلإ ثحبلا اذه فدهي يف ةبساحملا ةنهم روطت ةسا
نانبل علا ةسارد لمشيو اهئاشنإ ىلإ تدأ يتلا لماو
 .اهيلإ ةيدؤملا ةيسيئرلا ىوقلاو امكسارد اضيأ لمشي ة
تلا لماوعلا تلكش ي ىلع ترثأ و رم ىلع ةنهملا هذه
نينسلا.  
  
What will you have to do and how long 
will it take? 
س تقولا نم مكو ،هلعف كيلع امتقرغتس ةلباقملا؟  
The researcher will want to interview you. 
This should take no longer than 1 hour.  The 
interview is recorded.  You will be asked to 
give consent prior to the interview. 
 ثحابلا ديريإكعم ةلباقم ءارج ةباجلإل ىلع سأئ ةلعتتقل 
عوضومب ثحبلا نع ةلباقملا ةدم ديزت لا نأ يغبني .
و ةعاسحا.ةد  فوس ليجست متيةلباقملا   ايتوص. امك 
 بلطي فوسكنم   اقبسم ءاطعإ قفاومكت لبق ءارجإ 
ةلباقملا.  
  
What will happen to the information 
collected? 
 تامولعملل ثدحيس اذاميتلا متيس ؟اهعمج  
The information collected will be used by the 
researcher to write a dissertation for PhD in 
Accounting.  Only the researcher and 
supervisor will be privy to the notes, 
documents, recordings and the paper 
written.  Afterwards, notes and documents 
will be destroyed and recordings erased.  
 يتلا تامولعملا مدختستسيسباتكل ثحابلا نم اهعمج مت ة
 ثحابلا  .ةبساحملا يف هاروتكدلا ةحورطأفرشملاو  طقف
 تلايجستلاو قئاثولاو تاظحلاملا ىلع نيعلطم نانوكيس
 تاركذملا ريمدت متيس ،كلذ دعب  .بوتكملا ثحبلاو
جستلا وحم و قئاثولاو صوصن ىقبت فوس  .تلاي
تلايجستلا م ةيتوصلاع  لماعتلا متي فوس  نكل ثحابلا
 ةيرسب مهعمةمات.  
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The researcher will keep transcriptions of 
the recordings and a copy of the paper but 
will treat them with the strictest 
confidentiality.   
Declaration to participants نيكرتشملل نلاعإ 
If you take part in the study, you have the 
right to: 
:يف قحلا كيدل ،ةساردلا هذه يف تكراش اذإ: 
 Refuse to answer any particular 
question, and to withdraw from the 
study at any time (including after 
the interview has been completed). 
  ،نيعم لاؤس يأ ىلع ةباجلإا ضفر
 امب( تقو يأ يف ةساردلا نم باحسنلااو
فةلباقملا نم ءاهتنلاا دعب كلذ ي.) 
 Ask any further questions about the 
study that occurs to you during your 
participation. 
  ةلئسأ يأ لاؤس ةيفاضإ ءانثأ ةساردلا لوح
.كتكراشم 
 Be given access to a summary of 
findings from the study when it is 
concluded. 
 لاح لوصع تلصوت يتلا جئاتنلل زجوم ىل
 اهيلإ امدنع ةساردلاثحبلا نم ءاهتنلإا . 
  
Who’s responsible? ؟لوؤسملا وه نم 
If you have any questions or concerns about 
the project, either now or in the future, 
please feel free to contact either: 
 يأ كيدل ناك اذإإستاراسفت  ،عورشملا لوح فواخم وأ
 ددرتت لا ،لبقتسملا يف وأ نلآا ءاوسب لاصتلاا
:ةيلاتلا صاخشلااب 
Researcher: Maisa Al Mardini 
m.al-mardini@rgu.ac.uk 
ينيدراملا ءاسيم :ثحابلا 
m.al-mardini@rgu.ac.uk 
  
Supervisor: Linda Kirkham 
l.m.kirkham@rgu.ac.uk 
ماهكريك ادنيل :فرشملا 
l.m.kirkham@rgu.ac.uk 
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   Consent Form for Participants             جذومن ةقفاوم نيكراشملل          
                                                          
 
The Development of the Accounting Profession in Lebanon 
نانبل يف ةبساحملا ةنهم روطت 
 
Consent Form for Participants نيكراشملل ةقفاوم جذومن 
 
I have read the Participant Information Sheet for this study and have had the details of the 
study explained to me. My questions about the study have been answered to my satisfaction, 
and I understand that I may ask further questions at any time.  
 
ل دق" تأرق ليلدو ،ةساردلا هذهل "كراشملا.يل ةساردلا ليصافت حرش مت دقل متت ايتلئسأ ىلع ةباجلإ  ةساردلا لوح لكشب
يضرُمنأ مهفأ انأو ،ه  يناكمإب نأحرطأ  ةلئسأةيفاضإ .تقو يأ يف  
 
I also understand that I am free to withdraw from the study at any time, or to decline to answer 
any particular questions in the study. I understand I can withdraw any information I have 
provided up until the researcher has commenced analysis on my data. I agree to provide 
information to the researchers under the conditions of confidentiality set out on the 
Participant Information Sheet.  
 
نأ اضيأ مهفأو لماك يدل يأ نع ةباجلإا نع عنتمأ نأ وأ ،تقو يأ يف ةساردلا نم باحسنلال ةيرحلاة أ ةلئسقلعتت 
نأ مهفأ انأ .ةساردلابه يناكمإب ملا ليلحت ثحابلا أدبي نأ لبق اهتمدق يتلا تامولعملا نم يأ بحس امك  .ينم ةمدقملا تامولع
 صوصنملا ةيرسلا فورظ لظ يف ثحابلل تامولعملا ريفوت ىلع قفاوأ" يف اهيلع ليلد."كراشملا  
 
I agree to participate in this study under the conditions set out in the Participant 
Information Sheet. I also agree to my responses to be recorded. 
 
."كراشملا تامولعم ةقرو" يف ةنيبملا طورشلل اقفو ةساردلا هذه يف ةكراشملا ىلع قفاوأ امك قفاوأ ع هذه ليجست ىل
ةلباقملا  ً ايتوص.  
 
 
Signed:  _____________________________________________ 
                        :عيقوتلا 
 
 
Name:  _____________________________________________                   
       :مسلأا 
 
 
Date:  _____________________________________________                       
 :خيراتلا 
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Researcher: Maisa Al Mardini 
m.al-mardini@rgu.ac.uk 
ينيدراملا ءاسيم :ثحابلا 
m.al-mardini@rgu.ac.uk 
  
Supervisor: Linda Kirkham 
l.m.kirkham@rgu.ac.uk 
ماهكريك ادنيل :فرشملا 
l.m.kirkham@rgu.ac.uk 
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Appendix III 
To: The esteemed Lebanese Association of Certified Public Accountants 
Subject: Request for Data Collection and Research Work 
I am a research student carrying my PhD in accounting at Aberdeen Business 
School, Robert Gordon University. I am conducting a research titled “The 
development of the Accounting Profession in Lebanon” under the supervision 
of Professor Linda Kirkham. I need to collect data from your organization and 
conduct interviews with some of its key members, which will be used solely for 
the purpose of my research. 
The data to be collected include elements such as the names, age, gender, 
province, sect, and membership length of LACPA members over the years to 
construct the characteristics of a typical LACPA member.  
Interview questions are as follows: 
8- What were, in your opinion, the main factors that led to the establishment 
of LACPA? 
9- Which factor do you believe to be the most significant one? 
10- Which interest group (or groups) do you believe were most influential in 
promoting the establishment of LACPA?  
11- In your opinion, what were the major influences that affected the 
development of LACPA? What pushed it in the direction it is in right 
now?   
12- What elements do you believe are helping in the advancement of 
LACPA? What elements are holding it back? 
13- Where do you see LACPA going in the next 20 years? 
14- How would you describe a typical member of LACPA? 
I would appreciate if you provide me with access to such data and information.  
 
Best Regards, 
 Maisa Al Mardini 
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Doctoral Researcher  
Research Institute for Management Governance and Society (IMaGeS) 
Aberdeen Business School - The Robert Gordon University 
Garthdee Road - Aberdeen AB10 7QE 
Email: m.al-mardini@rgu.ac.uk 
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To: The esteemed Lebanese Association of Certified Public 
Accountants 
Subject: Letter of Recommendation for Data Collection and Research 
Work 
This is to certify that Mrs Maisa Al Mardini is a research student studying 
her PhD in accounting at Aberdeen Business School, Robert Gordon 
University. She is conducting research on “The development of the 
Accounting Profession in Lebanon” under the supervision of Professor 
Linda M. Kirkham. As part of her research, she hopes to collect data from, 
and conduct interviews with some key members within, your organization. 
Any data or information collected will be used solely for the purpose of 
her research.  
Your cooperation will be highly appreciated.  
Best Regards, 
 Professor Linda M Kirkham  
Professor of Accounting and  
Research Co-ordinator for Accounting and Finance 
Aberdeen Business School 
Robert Gordon University 
Garthdee Road 
Aberdeen 
AB107QE 
 
TEL: +44 (0)1224 263554 
Email: l.m.kirkham@rgu.ac.uk 
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Appendix IV 
Document 5-1: A newspaper article discussing the need to protect 
national accounting from ‘foreign espionage 
The Accountant Association Delegation Meets the Minister of Social Affairs 
and Request Protection of the National Accounting from Foreigners 
Espionage 
The Accountant and Auditing Offices Owners Association in Lebanon has 
formed a key delegation from Members of the Board of Directors to visit 
and congratulate the New Minister of Labour and Social Affairs. The 
Delegation will take advantage of this occasion to discuss with his Highness 
the organization of the profession of accounting in Lebanon and to ask for 
the protection of the national accounting from probable espionage which 
might performed by foreigners accounting offices owners especially the 
Anglo-American Offices  
We also learned that the Delegation would explain to his Highness the good 
qualities that are found among the accountant and auditing offices and 
their high scientific experience and qualifications. In addition, the 
Delegation will drive attention to the various memorandums which the 
Association has forwarded to the Ministry of Social Affairs and the 
organization project which had been presented in the past to continue its 
normal process among the concerned departments instead of its dormancy 
in drawers.  
How the Association Formed:  
A Knowledgeable figure explained to "Hello Beirut" the steps which 
underwent the formation of the Association saying:  
Mr. Antoine Karam, the owner of Karam Accounting Establishment, had the 
first administrative opinion to gather together the owners of the accountant 
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offices in Lebanon in one united Association that serves their interests and 
follows up their affairs, claims their rights and secures better professional 
conditions.  
Mr. Karam called Mr. Jamil Atieh, Mr. Fouad Abou Ezzeddine, Mr. Farid 
Jebran, and others and discussed the idea in a series of meetings held in 
the mentioned concerned parties offices which lead to more than one draft 
version after a year of revises, studies and communications.  
However, the extraordinary conditions which Lebanon passed through in 
the year 1958 was the reason behind freezing the communications and 
stopping the actions of establishing the association where these actions 
were not resumed unless after the events in the country settled.  
The grand meeting was held in the Lebanese Family Club on 07/01/1960 
which from two committees were formed. The first was entrusted to follow 
up the issue with officials and the second to study the possibility of 
canceling the income tax.  
In these meetings, Mr. Jamil Atieh talked about the previous 
communications and the results of the talks with bank managers and 
referred to the year 1958 and projects that were set to establish the 
association then.  
As for Mr. Farid Jebran he focused on importance of setting a research that 
show the negative consequences of canceling the income tax on both the 
……  and the public.  
Most of the accountant offices joined this aggregation to establish the core 
of the first association of accountant and auditing offices in Lebanon.  
The following attended the meeting:  
- Moustafa Al Monla  
- Mohamad Walid Fanj  
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- Mohamad Nashaat Fanj  
- Fouad Allawzi  
- Joseph Saba  
- Boni Arida  
- Elie Aoun  
- Michelle Asmar  
- Bashar Al Shemali  
- Gabi Barghout & Tweini  
- Amine Masoud  
- Charles Khoury Rophael  
- Wadih Saikali  
- Joseph Shisheh  
- Joeph Taso  
- Farjaallah Fayad 
- Mahmoud Salloum  
- Edward Kasbarian  
- Ahamd Abdul Baki  
- Ali Awada  
- Joseph Jabbour  
- Iskender Ghalib 
- Elias Chemali  
- Adel Al Danaf 
- Simon Zakka  
- Rimond Shammas  
- Michel Najjar  
- Ghazi Al Chamaa  
- Kanaan Nader  
- Antoine Habib 
- Elias Basil  
- Samir Haddad  
- Alber Badr  
- Elie Abdul Nour  
- Soufan & Akkawi Est.  
- Wafik Tabbani  
- Elie Atallah & Elias Al Ghafri  
- Jospeh Abou Halka  
- Boulos Kazzi  
- Wael Abou Shakra  
- Anis Kasbarian  
- Michel Farnini  
- Michel Seriani  
- Antoine Karam 
- Beshar Al Bahout  
- Salim Yassine  
- Samir Khalil Est.  
- Joseph Al Maouchi  
- Hafez Al Danaf  
- Jack Sorani  
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The first assembly was formed of the following gentlemen:  
- Joseph Taso   President  
- Ali Awada     Vice President  
- Bachar Al Bahout   General Secretary          
- Amine Masoud   Accountant  
- Joseph Jabbour  Cashier 
Members:  
- Iskender Ghaleb  
- Simon Zakka  
- Edward Kasbarian  
- Mahmoud Salloum  
- Elie Aoun  
- Joseph Saba  
- Ahmad Abdul Baki  
The Second Assembly – current one – of the following:    
- Amine Masoud   President 
- Bachar Al Bahout   Vice President 
- Wafik Kabbani   General Secretary  
- Wael Abou Shakra   Accountant         
- Joseph Jabbour   Cashier 
Members:  
- Iskandar Ghaleb  
- Gabi Barghout 
- Michel Seriani 
- Mostapha Al Monla  
- Elie Aoun  
- Ahmad Abdul Baki  
- Joseph Saba  
The first assembly set a law draft to organize this profession based on 
international studies known in this field and held many general assemblies 
to discuss the law draft to be after forwarded to the concerned officials for 
evaluation. The Association committed itself to look after the interests of 
its members within the borders of the public welfare and the organization 
of this profession and to follow up the communications with the officials to 
acknowledge it.  
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The Delegation, which was recently formed, will continue to meet the 
Minister of Social Affairs and discuss with him these issues and will seek 
solutions to all pending affairs.  
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Document 5-2: Decree number 518/1 of 17 December 1963 
Resolution №. 518/1 
Association Establishment  
The Minister of Labor and Social Affairs  
Pursuant to the Decree №. 7994 dated on 03/11/1961  
Pursuant to Article 87 of the Lebanese Labor Code  
Pursuant to the Approval of Minister of Interior Affairs  
Pursuant to the Advice of the General Manager  
The Following is ordered:  
First Article: It is licensed to: Farid Youssef Jebran, Ahmad Youssef Abdul 
Baki, Amine Georgi Masoud, and Bechara Youssef Al Bahout to establish 
an association under the title of:  
"The Accountant and Auditing Offices Owners in Beirut Association" 
Whose center is in Beirut and objective is to elevate the quality level of this 
profession financially, economically, and socially.  
Second Article: The Establishment Committee, which is formed of the 
above named members, is required to register all the affiliate members of 
the Association according to the provisions which are set by the Lebanese 
Labor laws, and to call for a general assembly to elect the first Association's 
board of managers within a period of three months with the knowledge of 
the Professional Relations & Associations Dep. of the Ministry of Labor and 
Social Affairs. If the said election of the board of managers is not executed 
within the said period, then this license will be considered invalid and 
cancelled.  
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Third Article: This Resolution is to be informed to wherever is needed.  
Beirut 17/12/1963  
Minister of Labor and Social Affairs by Delegation 
Fouad Botros / Signature  
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Document 5-3: The first, second and last pages on the Association 
of Accounting Firms’ Owners Internal Bylaws as approved by the 
first general assembly of the association 
The Accountant and Auditing Offices Owners Association Bylaws  
As approved by the Extraordinary General Assembly in its session held on 
06/07/1964 and after the reformations that were required to be entered 
by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs   
-----------------------  
Article 1: The Title of Association, Central Office and Objectives:  
a- The title of the association is "The Accountant and Auditing Offices 
Owners Association" 
b- The central office of the association is in Beirut and can establish 
branches and centres in other provinces.  
Article 2: The Association has a legal entity which aims are to:  
a- Protect the accounting and auditing profession, encourage and raise 
its standard, secure its dignity, work on its development and flourish 
in all financial and economical fields.  
b- Develop the team spirit among the members of the association and 
serve their interests, defend their rights, and work on developing 
their affairs.  
c- To execute scientific research and to share them, improve the 
accounting and technical principles and use of Arabic terms of 
accounting to be used locally.   
d- Encourage exchanging professional information with the 
association and syndicates of accounting in Arab and other 
countries.  
e- Supply the association members with information related to the 
development and improvement of the profession.  
f- Charge the members of the association with the responsibility to all 
the work they perform and present to public and private 
departments.  
Association's Affiliation and Membership  
Article 3: The members of the Association are of two types:  
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- Active members: these are the members of the association 
according to the membership provisions as defined in this bylaw.  
- Honorary members: these are the members who are granted this 
title by a decision of Association assembly for their services in the 
field of finance and economy or for their social status and fame, 
and these have no rights to vote.  
Article 4: Whoever wants to join the association as active member is 
required to enjoy the following:  
a- to be a Lebanese and enjoying his civil rights  
b- not to be an employee in an official or private department or in an 
independent service and to be working in accounting and auditing in 
an office registered to his name or in a accounting company which 
he is registered as one of the owners and not working in any other 
profession. In the latter case, the said company will be represented 
by one vote.  
c- To have completed 18 years old.  
d- Not to be convicted by any felony or shameful crime. 
e- Not to be deleted from the Association by and order from the 
Disciplinary Council unless his file becomes clean according to the 
provisions defined in this bylaw.  
Article 5: The foreigners who enjoy the last four (check) conditions and 
have permits of work in Lebanon may join the Association as active 
members. 
However, they don’t have the right to join the elections nor do they have 
the right to be members of the Association Board. Nonetheless, they have 
the right to appoint a delegate on of them as their representative to defend 
them before the Association Board.  
Article 6: The membership applicant must present a defined form written 
application directed to the Association President attached to other required 
instruments.  
-----------------------  
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Article 71: The Accountant must present to the Association Board a 
statement in the end of each three months and in the first session held by 
the Board in which he reflects the financial status of the Association.  
Miscellaneous Provisions  
Article 72: The financial year ends on thirty first of December 1964.  
Article 73: In violation to the provisions of this bylaw and to the resolutions 
of the Institutional General Assembly, the annual subscription of the year 
1964 will be defined to only one hundred Lebanese pounds.    
The previously registered members of the Association have to pay off their 
remaining amounts following up the reformation of the subscription and 
the annual fees in a period of one month at most starting from the day of 
approving this bylaw.  
Article 74: The Association Board has the right to name one of the honorary 
members as honorary president of Association provided that the General 
Assembly of the Association approves that.  
Article 75: The members of the Association who joined the Association 
before the date of the General Assembly which approved this by law are 
excluded from the provisions of paragraph (b) of article 4 of this bylaw.  
Article 76: The General Assembly held on sixth of July 1964 approved all 
the terms of this bylaw, which are formed of seventy-six article, and 
decided to forward it to Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs for 
acknowledgement.   
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Document 5-4: The first and the second pages of the amended law 
relating to the organization of the accounting profession in 
Lebanon 
Law Draft  
Concerning the Organization of Exercising the Profession of CPA  
Chapter One  
Exercising the Profession of CPA 
Article 1: A CPA is the one who organizes, audits, controls, revises, and 
reforms all the accounts of establishments in both private or in public 
sector.  
Article 2:  Nobody has the right to exercise the profession of CPA or to 
adopt this title unless he enjoys the characteristics which are defined in 
law.  
Article 3: The Lebanese citizen who wants to exercise the profession of a 
licensed CPA should:  
1- Be a Lebanese citizen for more than ten years.  
2- Have completed 21 years of age  
3- Not be convicted by a felony or shameful crime  
4- At least have a license diploma (B.A. degree) in Commerce 
(Accounting Branch) from one of the Lebanese active universities, 
or any of the degrees which are equivalent and grant the 
qualifications to exercise the profession of accounting according to 
the regulations set by the Ministry of Education provided that the 
period of education required to receive such degree is not less than 
four years following the high school diploma.  
5- Receive a permit to exercise this profession.  
6- Have covered a period of training in one of the accountant offices 
which are registered in the Association pursuant to the provisions of 
this law. The training period should not be less than three years, or 
he should have exercised the accounting profession in a public or 
private institution by the title of president or first accountant for at 
least a period of three years after he had received the diploma 
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defined in paragraph 4 of this article and have completed one year 
training in one of the Association registered accountants offices. The 
training period are accepted if performed in other offices within the 
terms defined in the Association Bylaw.  
7- Be registered in this Association list which is established by virtue of 
this law.  
Article 4:  a non-Lebanese can exercise a CPA profession in Lebanon if, in 
addition to the characteristics of a Lebanese accountant, he enjoys the 
following:  
1- If he is a citizen of country which local laws allow Lebanese 
accountants to work in their countries; thus, reciprocity of treatment 
concerning allowing a licensed Lebanese accountant to exercise his 
profession.  
2- To enjoy all the required professional characteristics which allow him 
to exercise this profession in his country.   
3- To have completed all the legal regularities related to the work of 
foreigners in Lebanon.  
Article 5: A license to exercise the profession of accounting is granted in 
virtue of an order of a commission assigned by the Minister of Finance and 
which are formed of the following:  
- The General Manager of the Ministry of Finance or whoever he appoints
 as president  
- At least one representative of the second degree employees from the 
following:  
- Ministry of National Economy        Member  
- Ministry of National Education       Member  
- Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs      Member  
- President of the Licensed Expert Accountant Association  Member  
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The secretary general services of the commission will be secured by at 
least one third degree employee of Ministry of Finance.  
Article 6 – The commission which is defined above will study the 
applications presented to the Ministry of Finance attached to the 
instrument required as defined by this law where decision must be 
undertaken by the majority of votes, and they have to give an order 
concerning the applied file in a period of three months at most otherwise 
the application will be considered accepted automatically. In this case the 
Association Board has the right to appeal this automatic acceptance 
according to the provision of article 52 of this law.  
The Committee will set an internal bylaws, which is to be acknowledged by 
a resolution from the Minister of finance, to organize its works within three 
months of this law entry into action.  
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Document 5-5: The letter from the Ministry of Labour and Social 
Affairs to the cabinet asking for its decision on the Organization of 
the Accounting Profession Law in 1971 
Lebanese Republic  
Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs  
-----------------------  
Archive №.  :  
Issue №.  :  
Beirut  
To the Presidency of the Council of Ministers  
Subject: Forwarding the Law Draft of Organizing the Profession of CPA  
Reference: The Correspondence of the Minister of Labor and Social Affairs 
№. 1807/2 dated on 24/12/1970 – Resolution of the Council of Ministers 
dated on 27/01/1971  
In virtue of our correspondence which is defined in the reference above 
and pursuant to Resolution of the Council of Ministers adopted on 
27/01/1971, I forward to your attention the Law Draft aiming at organizing 
the profession of CPA after entering the necessary amendments based on 
the opinion of the Accounting Registrar and the observations which was 
presented in the Council of Ministers session.  
We to refer the same to Council of Ministers to adopt the necessary 
decisions to forward it to the Council of Deputies.  
Minister of Labour and Social Affairs  
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Document 5-6: A letter addressed to the Lebanese President asking 
him to approve the profession organization law in February 1972 
The Accounting and Auditing Offices Owners Association  
Abul Karim Al Khalil Street (Ras Al Nabaa) – Prince Bros Bldg.  
Beirut Lebanon  
Memorandum  
Forwarded to His Highness the President of the Republic 
The Applicant: The Accounting and Auditing Offices Owners Association 
Board  
Subject: Acknowledgement of the Draft Law Aiming at Organizing the 
Expert Accountant Profession Exercise  
Since the Association has filed since 1963 – i.e. eight years before – a law 
draft aiming to organize the exercise of expert accountant profession, and 
the said project was studied and approved by all the concerned parties and 
it is currently pending the acknowledgment of the Council of Prime 
Ministers.  
Therefore,  
Since we sensed in you a tendency towards general organization of 
professions and especially the expert accountants' profession who are 
performing an active and important task in the fields of justice, economy 
and finance.  
Thus, we request from your highness to take into consideration the 
mentioned reasons which demand approval of the said law.  
Respectfully Yours,  
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The President  
Attached:  
The Law Draft     
(Signature and Official Seal)  
  
   426 
 
Document 5-7: Letter to the President of the Lebanese Cassation 
Court demanding the inclusion of the association in decisions 
relating to sworn experts appointments and other matters. 
Memorandum Project 
To the Respectful Court of Appeal First President  
The applicants' members of the Association of the Accounting and Auditing 
Offices Owners would like to dispose to your attention the following lines:  
The Association Board firstly would like to express its thankfulness to the 
actions undertaken by the First President from his previous requesters 
which encourages to continue working on what he is on of elevating the 
level of the profession and thus more serving the public interest.  
With this spirit of appreciation, the members of the above Association 
present the following:  
Concerning filing the experts list at courts: 
The Association Board draws attention to the presence of a law draft (a 
copy is attached here with) aiming at organizing the exercise of the 
profession of expert accounting, and that the said law have passed all the 
necessary steps and now is in the Council of Ministers for legalization.  
Since this project has confined the exercise of the said professions to only 
the members of the Association after settling the required scientific and 
behavioural standards.  
Since this project has noted in its article 54, "it is not allowed to register 
in the expert accountants list which is defined in the legislative Decree №. 
54 dated on 17/03/1953 except accountants who are licensed and 
registered in the Accountant Association General List, and consequently 
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any entry done otherwise will be considered invalid pursuant to the terms 
of the said article"  
Therefore,  
The Association Board requests to freeze the concerned appointments to 
the following session until the organization law is issued to move onward 
to apply the new terms and to avoid the inflation of the number of the 
accounts to no real use where quality not quantity is taken into 
consideration which consequently leads to improving the current state.  
 
  
   428 
 
Document 5-8: A letter addressed to the prime minister soliciting 
his help in passing the profession organization law in August 1971 
Your Highness Prime Minister 
After Greetings,  
We have the honour to present to your attention the detailed memorandum 
which we have promised to present to you in our prior memorandum dated 
on 17/08/1971 concerning the request of:  
- Halting the publication of the judicial decree related to the 
organization of the auditors profession at banks and which was 
previously approved by the Council of Ministers in its session held 
on 11/08/1971.  
- Upon necessity, revising the same via a commission represented by 
all the concerned official departments and professional committees 
to work on setting a complete legislation fulfilling all the required 
legal, scientific and professional provisions of the same.  
We also attach here the suggested reforms to the points subject of 
objection. We assure all the reservation that we have pointed out, in form, 
towards demanding the acknowledgment of the law that organizes the 
profession of auditing which without it cannot be defined who are the 
qualified ones to practice professional activities at companies in general 
and at banks in specific knowing that this profession forms a derivative of 
expert accounting. Thus, by keeping legislation special to the auditors at 
banks, then those are supposed to be certified expert accountants 
according to the law that we are requesting to be issued.  
This is exactly what verifies our demand to issue a law concerning 
organizing the profession of expert accountants especially that this law 
project will save us from searching for a special law to auditors at banks. 
Consequently,  
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We worked on setting the required reforms that we suggest adding to the 
objected decree pursuant to the legal, scientific principles and the 
commonly known professional norms which are briefed in the introduction.  
Hoping that our suggestions meet – when necessary – the required special 
suggestions to the legal notion of the auditor's task and the approved 
international auditing means applied by us.  
Therefore, our care to adhere to laws pushes us to demand clear texts 
which are not liable to manipulation and to that can be applied practically 
and which are not liable to analysis and explanations.  
All the reforms which we entered are either to explain the text or to avoid 
confusion or to make its provisions conformable with the legal and scientific 
notion of an auditor's mission.  
We declare here that we are ready to present to you all the required 
explanations hoping you respond to our request in the light of the public 
service and the Lebanese economy's interest.  
Respectfully Yours,  
The Middle East Certified Public Accountant Association, 
Secretary General / Dr. Fawzi Saba   President / Fouad Saba  
Accounting and Auditing Offices Owners' Association  
Secretary General / Wael Abou Shakra  President / Joseph Taso  
Attached:  
1) The organizational decree in its present form with the suggested 
reforms.  
2) List of the scientific references  
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Document 5-9: The minutes of the meeting held between AAOF and 
CPAME 
Association Board Meeting Minute Dated on 03/09/1974   №. - 10 
– 
At Exactly eleven and half o'clock of this Tuesday noon, 3rd of December 
1974 and pursuant to the invitation directed to the members as duly 
required by law, the Association of the Accounting and Auditing Offices 
Owners held a meeting headed by President Simon Zakka and in the 
presence of colleagues members: Elie Abdul Noor, Bchara Al About, Amine 
Masoud, Osama Tabbara, Zouheir Bekdache, Aziz Moukarzel, and Riad 
Nasour.  
Each of the following members were absent to reasons: Gebran Barghout 
for illness, Joseph Gabbour for illness, Wael Abou Shakra was called to a 
juridical court, Michelle Seriani who had to go with his judge brother to 
Bekfaya.  
The President announced the start of the meeting for the completion of the 
necessary legal quorum and the Board commenced on studying the 
meeting agenda as follows:  
1- Reading and Approving the Previous Minute:  
The previous minute was read approved by the Board. The Board 
also approved the extraordinary meeting held in the President Mr. 
Simon Zakka's office upon his urgent telephone call.  
2- 3 – Informing the Board to the meeting that took place between the 
president and his assistant and the President of Accredited 
Association and Mr. William Metri and the discussions of the steps 
that should be adopted to proceed with the Law of Exercising the 
Profession.  
The President Declared that about a month and a half ago, he met Mr. 
Fouad Saba and Mr. William Metri upon the invitation of Mr. Fouad Saba. 
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Vice President Colleague Gebran Barghout also attended that meeting, 
the conclusion of the meeting was:  
1- Mr. Fouad Saba protested against the campaign which is driven 
against him by the Arab Federation of Accountants & Auditors 
General Secretariat through its Assistant General Secretary Mr. Wael 
Abou Shakra, and said that he was bewildered, as he said, by this 
campaign which is driven by our colleague Mr. Wael Abou Shakra, 
and he asked for an explanation to whether or not our Board had 
empowered Mr. Abou Shakra to carry out such campaign. Mr. Fouad 
Saba and Mr. William Metri were informed that the said campaign is 
driven by the Arab Federation of Accountants & Auditors General 
Secretariat and the appearance of our colleague Mr. Wael Abou 
Shakra on top of the campaign is because Mr. Wael Abou Shakra is 
the Assistant General Secretary of the said Federation, and he 
carries out all the secretarial affairs of the said Federation, and I 
didn’t discuss with Mr. Saba the decision of the Association 
concerning entrusting our colleague Abou Shakra to carry out the 
said campaign for the sensitivity of the issue.  
2- We asked colleagues Fouad Saba and William Metri to cooperate and 
support us to achieve the project we are after, and they were so 
cooperative.  
3- Mr. Fouad Saba suggested to form a commission formed of three 
members from the Association and three from the Federation.  
4- We informed Mr. Saba and Mr. Metri that we will present this issue 
to our Association's Board in the nearest meeting.  
After Discussion The Board Decided the Following: 
Firstly: To form a commission to follow up the preparation of a law draft to 
the organization of the profession of accounting in Lebanon formed of 
President Simon Zakka, colleagues Osama Tabbara, Bchara Al Bahout, and 
Wael Abou Shakra and to entrust them to perform all the necessary 
communications with all those who are concerned and interested to 
achieve the said goal.  
Secondly: The commission is granted unlimited powers to execute the 
content of this resolution.  
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Document 5-10: The cabinet decision to establish a committee that 
will suggest a law to organize the accounting profession in 
Lebanon in 1977 
Lebanese Republic  
Presidency of the Council of Ministers  
Resolution №. 43  
Concerning the Formation of a Committee to Study the  
Organization of Accounts and CPA Profession  
in Lebanon and Suggestion of a Draft Law Concerning the Same  
The Prime Minister,  
In virtue of Decree №. 2 dated on 09/07/1976,  
In virtue of the correspondence of the Ministry of Finance №. 509/S dated 
on 07/07/1977 and after consulting and receiving the opinion of the 
concerned public directorate,  
The Following is decreed:  
First Article:  
A committee of the following persons is formed:  
-  Mr. Abdul Hafiz Chaaban  President of the Tax Department in the 
Ministry of Finance  
- Mr. Fouad Nasr Abi Raad  President of Methodology Dep. in the 
Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs  
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- Mr. Mostafa Hawi  President of the Companies Dep. in the Ministry 
of Economy and Commerce  
- Mr. Elias Nassif   President of the Accounting Dep. in the Ministry 
of Justice  
- The committee's task is to study the organization of accounts and 
CPA profession in Lebanon and Suggestion of a Draft Law concerning 
the same.  
- Mr. Wael Abou Shakra, the President the Syndicate of the Owners of 
Accounting Offices in Lebanon, and Mr. William Metri, delegate of 
the Middle East Public Accountant Society, will join the researches 
of the committee.  
- The delegate of the Ministry of Finance will be in charge of the 
committee's activities organization.  
Second Article: This resolution is to be informed to wherever is needed.  
Beirut 27/09/1977    The Prime Minister    
(Signature and Official Seal)   Salim Al Hoss (Signature and 
Official Seal) 
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Document 5-11: The first two pages of the suggested law 
governing the organization of the profession in 1978 
Presidency of the Council of Ministers  
Nr. 789 / Date 28/03/1978  
Beirut 23/03/1978  
Your Highness Mr. Prime Minister  
Subject: Draft Law Concerning the Organization of the Expert Accountants 
and Accountants Profession in Lebanon  
Reference: Resolution №.  43 dated on 27/09/1978  
The Committee which has been formed by the resolution №. 43 dated on 
27/09/1978 in virtue of Resolution №. 43 has convened many times in the 
office of the Committee's Affairs Organizer Mr. Abdul Hafiz Chaaban in the 
Ministry of Finance within and outside the official work day hours where all 
the opinion and suggestion presented by the members resulting from their 
studies and researches were heard; among heard ones:  
- Wael Abou Shakra  President of the Accounting & Auditing Syndicate  
- Mr. William Metri  Vice President of the Middle East Public Accountant 
Society, will share in researches of the committee.  
- Jean Abdullah  President of the Lebanese Accounting Experts & 
Consultants Association  
The Committee examined the presented projects and suggestions and 
consequently set forward the attached draft law which aims at organizing 
the profession of certified public accountants and accounting in Lebanon.   
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The Committee advised to distinguish between the organization of the CPA 
profession and the accountants’ profession for the following reasons:  
Firstly: Entrust the CPAs to supervise and control the affairs of joint stock 
and limited liability companies pursuant to the Law of Commerce and the 
Law of Money & Credit and the subsequent liabilities and duties of the 
experts which are forced by the above laws and the common rules which 
are internationally acknowledged.   
Secondly: Entrust the experts in juridical missions and appoint them by 
courts and adopt their reports to resolve to orders settling disputes and 
misunderstanding.    
Thirdly: The wide difference between the missions of the CPA whether for 
the liability or the actions which he performs which completely differ from 
that of an accountant whose duties are limited to filing accounts data into 
records and organizing them.  
Thus we forward to your highness the Draft Law as prepared by the 
Committee.  
President of the Studies Department of the Ministry of Finance  
The Committee's Affairs Organizer - Abdul Hafiz Chaaban / Signature  
President of Methodology Dep. in the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs  
Mr. Fouad Nasr Abi Raad / Signature  
President of the Companies Dep. in the Ministry of Economy and Commerce 
Mr. Mostafa Hawi  / Signature  
President of the Accounting Dep. in the Ministry of Justice  
Mr. Elias Nassif / Signature  
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Document 5-12: A letter from the Ministry of Finance addressed to 
the association asking for the establishment of a committee to 
create a unified accounting framework 
Ministry of Finance  
Revenues Department  
Ref.: 788/O - 2  
Date 06/11/1979  
To the Association of Accounting and Auditing Offices Owners 
Subject : Formation of a Committee to Set a Common Design of 
Accounting Form  
Reference  : Your Correspondence №. 125/79 Dated 30/10/1979  
Concerning the above mentioned subject and reference  
We forward to your attention a copy of Resolution №. 639/1 dated on 
05/11/1979 which orders the Formation of a Committee to Set a Common 
Design of Accounting Form. Thus, we hope you take knowledge of that and 
to refer the same to whoever is concerned.  
Respectfully Yours,  
Beirut 06/11/1979  
Revenues Department Chief  
Moustafa Al Hindi / Signature 
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Document 5-13: The minutes of the meeting held on 15 April 1980 
Minute 
Dr. Omar Msaikka, the General Secretary of the Council of Ministers 
Presidency, held a meeting under his presidency in his office in the 
Government Palace on 15/04/1980 upon the advice of his Highness the 
Prime Minister to discuss some brought forward points concerning the 
Organization of Accountants and Certified Public Accountants in Lebanon 
draft Law.  
The meeting was attended by Mr. Fouad Al Sanyoura, the President of the 
Banks Control Commission in Lebanon, Mr. Atallah Ghasham, The Council 
of Ministers Presidency Registration Office Chief, Wael Abou Shakra, 
President of the Accounting and Auditing Offices Association, Mr. Jospeh 
Nakkour representative of Mr. Souheil Saba office, Member of the Board of 
Directors of the Middle East Certified Public Accountant Association, Abul 
Hafiz Chaaban, President of the Researches Department in the Ministry of 
Finance.    
The General Secretary of the Council of Ministers Presidency reviewed the 
steps which ran the subject of organizing the accountants and certified 
public accountants profession in Lebanon for more than fifteen years. He 
added that all - this issue - concerned parties were represented in the 
Committee that was formed by the Prime Minister Order №. 43 dated on 
27/09/1977 to discuss the above-mentioned organization of the 
accountants and certified public accountants profession in Lebanon and to 
suggest a Draft Law concerning the same.  
The Committee presented its report attached to a draft law which is 
prepared to organize the said professions. The concerned project 
specialized public departments that are the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of 
Justice, and the Ministry Economy & Commerce opinion and advice were 
sought and that presented their remarks concerning the subject. 
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Consequently, the draft law was reformed in the light of the presented 
remarks which were set by the signatures of the concerned specialized 
ministers to arrive to the final draft prior to its acknowledgment by the 
Prime Ministers Board.  
Subsequent to all these steps, the Certified Public Accountant Association 
expressed its wish to present some more remarks concerning the said 
project although Mr. William Metri represented the Association in the 
Committee.  
The written remarks of Mr. Joseph Nakkour were also presented and 
discussed in this meeting, and it was agreed upon taking into consideration 
some of the points and add them into the core of the law draft. 
Nonetheless, Mr. Nakkour announced that the Association has other 
remarks concerning the law draft and asked for some time to present them.     
Later, it appeared that there were contradicting point of views among the 
concerned persons.  
Therefore, Mr. Fouad Al Sanyoura, the President of the Banks Control 
Commission, was entrusted to reach a compromise among the various 
opinions of the representatives of the Middle East Certified Public 
Accountants Association and the Accounting and Auditing Offices Owners 
Association.  
In virtue of the meetings which were held in the Central Bank of Lebanon 
in the presence of Mr. Wael Abou Shakra, President of the Accounting and 
Auditing Offices Association, Mr. Fouad Saba, President of the Middle East 
Certified Public Accountant Association, Mr. Antoine Mattar, Vice President 
of the Association, and Mr. Mounir Haidani, the Secretary General of the 
Association, in which they discussed the proposals concerning the said 
draft law, and consequently some amendments took place in some articles 
of the draft law. After discussions and expressing opinions some reforms 
were adopted as defined in Fouad Al Sanyoura's instrument which is 
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addressed to his Highness the General Secretary of the Council of Ministers 
Presidency in which he explained in details the articles which they agreed 
to reform.   
Thus, I received this instrument from the Secretary General and performed 
the required reforms according to the above mentioned and the law draft 
attached here has arrived to its final version after it was exposed along 
with the Draft Law Decree, which will be forwarded to the Chamber of 
Deputies, on the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Economy and 
Commerce and was verified by their signatures.  
This minute was entered today 30/11/1980  
Registration Office Chief  
Atallah Ghasham (Signature and Official Seal) 
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Document 5-14: Decree number 246/1 announcing the name 
change from the Association of Accounting Firms’ Owners to 
Lebanese Association of Certified Public Accountants in 1980 
Lebanese Republic  
Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs  
Resolution №. 246/1  
Concerning Reformation of the Association Title  
The Minister of Labour and Social Affairs,  
Pursuant to the Decree №. 2212 dated on 16/07/1979,  
Pursuant to article 83 of the Lebanese Labour Code,  
Pursuant to the application of the Accounting and Auditing Offices Owners 
Association filed under number 372/4 dated on 03/06/1980 in which they 
request the reformation of the association's title including the Association's 
General Assembly resolution which proves its approval to the same, and 
after the consent of the General Director of the Ministry of Labour and 
Social Affairs.  
First Article:  
The Accounting and Auditing Offices Owners Association title is reformed 
to be read as follows:  (The Association of the Certified Public Accounts of 
Lebanon) 
Article Two: This resolution is to be informed to wherever is necessary.  
Chiah 21/07/1980  
Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs  
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Nazem Al kadri (Signature and Official Seal)  
To Be Informed To:  
- Ministry of Interior Affairs  
- Labour Service and Professional Relations with whole file  
- Association Department – Concerned Parties  
- Official Gazette  
- Archive  
True Copy of the Original Zakaria Kalakesh  
(Signature and Official Seal) 
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Document 5-15: Letter from LACPA addressed to the Lebanese 
Ministry of Finance requesting the ministry’s aid in approving the 
professionalization law 
Lebanese Republic  
Presidency of the Council of Ministers  
-----------------------  
№.  : 6/80  
To the Ministry of Finance 
Subject: Urgent Law Draft Aiming at Organization of the Certified Public 
Accountant Profession in Lebanon  
Reference: Your Correspondence №. 461 dated on 09/11/1981 and its 
attachments.  
We return to your attention the file of your above-mentioned 
correspondence which was disposed to the Council of Ministers in its 
session dated on 20/01/1982 noting that we postponed taking decision to 
the same to give chance to more study concerning setting terms to the 
organization of the subject profession only and not to oblige affiliation and 
limiting exercising the same to only affiliates.  
Please take notice of that and forward the file to the concerned current 
Minister.  
Secretary General of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers  
Omar Msaikka (Signature and Official Seal)  
Beirut 22/12/1982 
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Department of Revenues  
Date 02/12/1982 
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Document 5-16: The results of the association elections in 1977 
Accounting and Auditing Offices Owners Association  
Abul Karim Al Khalil Street (Ras Al Nabaa) – Prince Bros Bldg.  
Telephone: ………..       
Beirut Lebanon  
Beirut 07/07/1977  
To the Respectful Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs  
Department of Associations  
The Accounting and Auditing Offices Owners Association has the honour to 
inform you that on Wednesday 06th of July 1977 and at exactly twelve 
o'clock in the afternoon the Board of the Association has convened to 
constitute the office committee as follows:  
Wael Abou Shakra   Association President  
Antoine Karam    Vice President  
Aziz Moukarzel    General Secretary  
George Sfeir    Accountant  
Michelle Seriani    Cashier  
Antoine Daher    Public Relation Member  
Ahmad Abdul Baki   Educational Affairs Member   
Gentlemen: Simon Zakka, Joseph Jabbour, Osama Tabbara, Gebran 
Barghout, Riad Mansour consultancy members  
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Accordingly and by this instrument, we came to inform and ask you to 
acknowledge the above mentioned elections as legally is due attaching 
herewith a minute of the session.  
Respectfully Yours,  
Secretary General / Aziz Moukarzel  President / Wael Abou Shakra  
Signature      Signature  
Seen and Approved  
Professional Relations Department (Signature and Official Seal)  
Date 09/09/1977  
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Document 5-17: Newspapers clips discussing AAOF warning of the 
war’s economic consequences and the immigration of 
practitioners. 
Orient Press Agency       Wednesday 
15/11/1978  
The Association of Accounting and Auditing Offices Owners is studying the 
issue of the increasing emigration phenomenon of professional 
accountants.     
Beirut November 1st  
The Association of Accounting and Auditing Offices Owners in Lebanon 
prepared a report concerning the workers in the field of accounting in which 
they focused on the day after day increasing emigration phenomenon of 
professionals.  
The report shows that there is a number that cannot be underestimated of 
accountants who are leaving Lebanon despite the fact that there are 
relatively many local employment opportunities for them; however, they 
are being driven away by the financial temptations found in other markets.  
The Association's report noted that a compromise could be established 
between work chances here in Lebanon and the allures of working abroad.  
Nonetheless, the report warned of the consequences of such emigration 
since accountants works to which they have become bound abroad are of 
the kinds which cannot be terminated immediately in case an accountant 
decides to come back home when the political and security conditions 
become favourable.  
It is obvious that the accountants emigration has recently increased rapidly 
especially because of their work ties with foreign and local companies.  
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-----------------------  
Al Anwar Newspaper  Date 15/11/1978  
The Association of Accountants Warns Again of the Conspiracy of Economy 
Devastation 
The Association of Accounting and Auditing Offices Owners held a meeting 
presided by Mr. Wael Abou Shakra in which they discussed the current 
economic crises and the actions which are undertaken by the Association's 
President concerning this issue especially in the light of the memorandum 
which was prepared by the Association and was sent to the officials in 
charge.  
The Association's Resolutions:  
The Association has decided to continue the actions, unite the efforts, and 
widen communications and meetings with the economists and officials in 
charge repeating the warning to destroying the Lebanese economy.  
As well, the Association Board resolved to empower its president to work 
on stopping the emigration of the accountants especially those working in 
foreign companies which have closed their offices in Lebanon.  
The Board also decided to act on minimizing the obstacles facing the 
activities of auditors who are working in banks and to invite the general 
assembly of the accountant to an extraordinary meeting which date and 
time will be decided later.  
Meanwhile, the president of the Association of Accounting and Auditing 
Offices Mr. Wael Abou Shakra has met the President of the Chamber of 
Commerce & Industry in Beirut Mr. Adnan Al Kassar last week, and they 
discussed the subject of the memorandum which was forwarded by the 
Association to the officials in charge …….. illegible …….  
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-----------------------  
Al Anwar 16/11/1978  
Accountant Offices' Report Concerning the Emigration of Professionals  
The Association of Accounting and Auditing Offices Owners in Lebanon 
prepared a report, which especially touched on the issue of the workers in 
the field of accounting and which focused on their increasing emigration 
phenomenon day after day.   
The report shows that there is a number that cannot be underestimated of 
accountants who are leaving Lebanon despite the fact that there are 
relatively many local employment opportunities; however, they are driven 
away by the financial  temptation and attractions found in other markets.  
The Association's report noted that a compromise could be established 
between work chances here in Lebanon and the allures of working abroad. 
Nonetheless, the report warned of  the consequences of such emigration 
since accountants employment commitment  which they become bound to 
abroad are of the kinds which cannot be terminated immediately in case 
an accountant decides to come back home when the political and security 
conditions become favorable.  
It is obvious that the accountants emigration has recently increased rapidly 
especially because of their work ties with foreign and local companies.  
-----------------------  
Al Nahar News Paper    Date: 15/11/1978  
Extraordinary General Assembly of the Accountants Offices Association  
The executive council of the Accountants and Auditing Offices Owners 
Association has decided to call for an extraordinary general assembly to 
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discuss the economic state and the current conditions of the accountants 
and the professional challenges they are facing.  
-----------------------  
Al Bayrak Newspaper     Date 15/11/1978  
The Accountants Association Warns Again of a Conspiracy Threatening the 
Economy  
The Association of Accounting and Auditing Offices Owners held a meeting 
presided by Mr. Wael Abou Shakra in which they discussed the current 
economic crises and the communications which are undertaken by the 
Association and the accountants current state. 
The Association has decided to continue the actions and unite the efforts 
and widen communications scope and meetings with the economists and 
officials in charge repeating the warning of destroying the Lebanese 
economy. As well, the Association Board resolved to empower its president 
to work on stopping the emigration of the accountants especially those 
working in foreign companies that have closed their offices in Lebanon.  
The Board also decided to work on minimizing the obstacles facing the 
activities of the auditors who are working in banks and invite the general 
assembly of the accountant to an extraordinary meeting which date and 
time will be decided later. 
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Document 5-18: Newspapers articles disusing the AAFO elections 
in 1983 
Al Amal 27-04-1983  
Election of the Expert Accountants Association  
Karam Announces His Nomination Pursuant to Defined Reformation 
Program  
The elections to the membership of the Licensed Expert Accountant 
Association in Lebanon will take place tomorrow's Tuesday. Two groups are 
competing to this post the first is presided by the current President Mr. 
Wael Abou Shakra and second is presided by the current vice president 
Antoine Karam.  
Mr. Karam reported to us that he is running this electoral battle according 
to a defined reformation program to correct violations which took place in 
the past which he was keen not declare it to the public trying not to keep 
it going and in order not to defame the Association. However, all the efforts 
that he performed with a group of colleagues were in vain. Therefore, this 
group took the decision to run this electoral battle to achieve as series of 
claims which conform with the interest of the Lebanese Accountant and to 
elevate the level of the profession which in fact the active vein of the 
national economic structure on both public and private sectors, and in 
relation to banking, industrial, commerce, professions and handicraft 
owners foundations even the smaller ones.  
Demands which are the Base of His Electoral Battle: 
Among the first demands which he is after:  
 Issuing the Accountants Profession Organization Law which will be 
the sole life guarantee of the Lebanese Accountant and to his future 
existence.  
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As for the reforms, they are concluded by the following goals: 
 Working on joining all the workers in the accounting sector in one 
entity which presided by understanding and truth.  
 Restudying and reforming the internal bylaws leading to the 
profession improvement.  
 Working on the graduation of the accountant according to the new 
accounting organization for free without the burdens of suck 
expenses.  
 Canceling the accounting system of the Association which allows 
spending sums by the president and the cashier individually.  
 Transferring the Association's temporary central office from Mr. 
Abou Shakra'a offices.  
 Setting a control committee from the members of the Bankers 
Association's General Assembly acknowledged by the Association's 
Board. Revising all the expenses since 1977 until now.   
 Canceling the membership of the Association in the Arab Accountant 
Federation which is of no use.  
 Formation of the Association Committee to reconsider the list of 
those who are not practicing the profession or are not working 
fulltime and they don’t enjoy the requirements of membership.  
 Entering an article in the internal bylaws forcing members not to 
compete prices among them.  
 Canceling the Accountant Cooperative because it is not practically 
real, and to return the funds paid by the members to their payers.  
Abou Shakra List  
The Current Association's President Mr. Wael Abou Shakra a list which 
includes Abou Shakra, Victor Barbara, Aziz Moukarzel, Antoine Daher, 
Joseph Jabbour, Sami Zakka, Elie Asfour, Georges Sfeir, Hassan Barrage, 
Habib Hatem, Gebran Barghoout, and Majed Majzoub.  
------------------- 
Allewaa 27/09/1983  
Election of the Expert Accountants Association  
The Annual Normal General Assembly of the Licensed Expert Accountants 
Association of Lebanon is meeting in the afternoon of tomorrow's Thursday 
in Carlton Hotel to elect the 12 members of the Association Board.  
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The nomination to the same was closed yesterday acting to the internal 
bylaws where the number of nominees reached 18.  
The President of the Association Mr. Wael Abou Shakra has formed a list 
which includes Abou Shakra, Victor Barbara, Aziz Moukarzel, Antoine 
Daher, Joseph Jabbour, Sami Zakka, Elie Asfour, Georges Sfeir, Hassan 
Barrage, Habib Hatem, Gebran Barghoout, and Majed Majzoub.  
-----------------------  
Al Nidaa 27/04/1983  
Election of the Expert Accountants Association  
The Annual Normal General Assembly of the Licensed Expert Accountants 
Association of Lebanon is meeting in the afternoon of tomorrow's Thursday 
in Carlton Hotel to elect the 12 members of the Association Board.  
The nomination to the same was closed yesterday acting to the internal 
bylaws where the number of nominees reached 18.  
The President of the Association Mr. Wael Abou Shakra has formed a list 
which includes Abou Shakra, Victor Barbara, Aziz Moukarzel, Antoine 
Daher, Joseph Jabbour, Sami Zakka, Elie Asfour, Georges Sfeir, Hassan 
Barrage, Habib Hatem, Gebran Barghoout, and Majed Majzoub.  
-----------------------  
Al Bayrak 27/04/1983  
Election of the Licensed Expert Accountants Association Elects Its New 
Board on Tuesday  
The Annual Normal General Assembly of the Licensed Expert Accountants 
Association of Lebanon is meeting in the afternoon of tomorrow's Thursday 
in Carlton Hotel to elect the 12 members of the Association Board.  
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The nomination to the same was closed yesterday acting to the internal 
bylaws where the number of nominees reached 18.  
The President of the Association Mr. Wael Abou Shakra has formed a list 
which includes Abou Shakra, Victor Barbara, Aziz Moukarzel, Antoine 
Daher, Joseph Jabbour, Sami Zakka, Elie Asfour, Georges Sfeir, Hassan 
Barrage, Habib Hatem, Gebran Barghoout, and Majed Majzoub.  
Whereas the Vice President Mr. Antoine Karam formed a counter list saying 
that he is joining this electoral battle according to reformer program to 
elevate the level of this profession.  
Among the most protruding claims which Mr. Karam is basing his campaign 
on are the following: issuing the Accountants Organization Law, restudying 
and reforming the internal bylaws, working on graduating the accountant 
on the bases of the new accountant organization for free and canceling the 
Association subscription with Arab Accountants Federation and canceling 
the Accountants Cooperative.  
-----------------------  
Al Shark 27/04/1983  
Tuesday the Election of the New Expert Accountants Association  
The Annual Normal General Assembly of the Licensed Expert Accountants 
Association of Lebanon is meeting in the afternoon of tomorrow's Thursday 
in Carlton Hotel to elect the 12 members of the Association Board.  
The nomination to the same was closed yesterday acting to the internal 
bylaws where the number of nominees reached 18.  
The President of the Association Mr. Wael Abou Shakra has formed a list 
which includes Abou Shakra, Victor Barbara, Aziz Moukarzel, Antoine 
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Daher, Joseph Jabbour, Sami Zakka, Elie Asfour, Georges Sfeir, Hassan 
Barrage, Habib Hatem, Gebran Barghoout, and Majed Majzoub.  
President Abou Shakra is competed with a list headed by his Vice President 
Mr. Anotine Karam who declared that he is running this electoral battle 
according to a defined reformation program to correct violations which took 
place in the past.  
-----------------------  
ANNAHAR 27/09/1983  
The Accountants Association Elections are Tomorrow: One Complete List 
and 6 Individual Nominees  
The Elections of the Licensed Accountants Association on tomorrows 
Thursday's afternoon in Carlton Hotel.  
The nomination to the same was closed yesterday acting to the internal 
bylaws where the number of nominees reached 18 competing to 12 
positions. Twelve of the whole nominees are enlisted under the list headed 
by the present Association President Mr. Wael Abou Shakra and they are: 
Abou Shakra, Victor Barbara, Aziz Moukarzel, Antoine Daher, Joseph 
Jabbour, Sami Zakka, Elie Asfour, Georges Sfeir, Hassan Barrage, Habib 
Hatem, Gebran Barghoout, and Majed Majzoub. The members who have 
paid their affiliation fees were 163 out of 194 registered members thus the 
quorum is considered legal by the presence of half of the registered 
members plus one i.e. 98 member.   
Mr. Antoine Karam reported that he is running this electoral battle 
according to a defined reformation program to correct violations which took 
place in the past which he was keen not declare it to the public trying not 
to keep it going; nonetheless, he was forced to run this electoral battle to 
achieve some demands. 
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-----------------------  
Al Safir Wednesday 27/09/1983  
New Expert Accountants Association Elects Their Board Tomorrow  
The Annual Normal General Assembly of the Licensed Expert Accountants 
Association of Lebanon is meeting in the afternoon of tomorrow's Thursday 
in Carlton Hotel to elect the 12 members of the Association Board.  
The nomination to the same was closed yesterday acting to the internal 
bylaws where the number of nominees reached 18.  
The President of the Association Mr. Wael Abou Shakra has formed a list 
which includes Abou Shakra, Victor Barbara, Aziz Moukarzel, Antoine 
Daher, Joseph Jabbour, Sami Zakka, Elie Asfour, Georges Sfeir, Hassan 
Barrage, Habib Hatem, Gebran Barghoout, and Majed Majzoub. 
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Document 6-1: Al Mal Wal Alam article pertaining to the AAFO 
elections in 1992 
Al MAL WAL ALAM  
The Wind of Reform Missed the Elections of the Expert Accountants 
Association 
The winds of change the blew in the past few months on some associations 
and societies of profession owners was knocked out last months in the 
elections of the Licensed Expert Accountants Association where the 
previous the old President Wael Abou Shakra won the elections for a third 
term.  
Mr. Abou Shakra was elected as President of the Association for the first 
time in 1974. Because of the Lebanese civil war his first office period ran 
until 1983 when his office was renewed for the second time, and because 
of the consequent events that took place in the country no new elections 
took place in the Association until last month.  
The elections of last month were preceded by many meetings among the 
members of the association to come out with an agreed upon list the last 
of which was the meeting which was held on 13th of last month in the 
house of Mr. Abou Shakra who announced to the meeting members then 
that the Association Board is asking him to preside the Board again asking 
all to support him to the third office term. However, voices raised asking 
the president Abou Shakra to step aside and give chance to a new blood 
to lead the Association in the present new period of peace. Mr. El Yafi 
focused during the meeting on the necessity of turning the association from 
the one man association to the group association.  
The opponents of Mr. Abou Shakra admits that their achievements that 
took place in the past seventeen years of his office. Nonetheless, there 
were negative issues that were reflected on the licensed accountants. 
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Among which is the resolution №. 12 which charged the auditor all the 
responsibilities of the companies’ affairs as and administrative employee 
of the company. Where the international norms doesn’t charge him with 
such responsibility. Pursuant to the idea of reform, it was agreed upon 
electing a group of the best Lebanese accountant offices which are 
representatives  of international accounting offices such as Georges Awaida 
Office, William Metri Office, Mouwafak Al Yaffi Office, Riad Mansour Office, 
and Mounir Sidani Office which are accredited by the Central Counsel of 
Bank of Lebanon which lead to the formation of the compromise list 
presided by Mr. George Awaida and of gentlemen Antoine Karam, Mounir 
Sidani, George Abou Mansour, Mouwafak El Yafi, Emille Shartouni, Elie 
Chamas, Mahmoud Dafer, Francoise Moubarak, Zouheir Bakdach, Salim 
Anid, Riad Mansour.  
The second list was formed from Mr. Wael Abou Shakra as the president 
and included the gentlemen Georges Sfeir, Habib Hatem, Gebran 
Barghoud, Antoine Daher, Hassan Barraj, Osama Tabbara, Jean Dagher, 
Samir Rawoul Haddad, Hasan Nakki, Mohamd Nabil Ghannam and Ghassan 
Daou.  
On the Election Day in Bristol Hotel the members of the first list were 
shocked by the presence of a large number of the association participants 
who are unknown to them and who young in age sharing and supporting 
the old board and who formed the turning point in the results of the 
elections. Thus, seventy vote paper were disclosed to reflect no deletion of 
any name all to the favor of Abou Shakra's list where the whole number of 
voters were 163. Thus – as one of the nominees on the first list said - that 
means the presence of a trick played in a safe democratic means legally 
saying.  
The result of the elections resulted in winning of Mr. Abou Shakra's list with 
all of its members who won 90 to 120 votes. On the other hand, the 
competing list won 50 to 60 votes.  
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The members of the new board gathered together and elected Mr. Wael 
Abou Shakra as the president of the Association.  
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Document 6-2: Newspapers articles covering the AAFO’ 1992 
elections, including Eid’s (1992) on top right. 
From One Month to Another  
Industry & Economy – Second Edition- May 1992  
The New Board of the Accountants Association  
Immediately and after the end of the elections which was performed by 
the General Assembly of the Licensed Expert Accountants of Lebanon on 
18 April 1992, the members who were granted the trust of the voters 
gathered together in a meeting in which they formed the Board of the 
Association as follows:  
- Wael Abou Shakra    President  
- Antoine Daher    Vice President  
- Gebran Barghoud    General Secretary  
- Georges Sfeir    Cashier  
- Hassan Takki   Accountant  
- Mohamad Nabil Ghannam  Assistant General Secretary  
- Hassan Barraj    General Relation Member  
- Habib Hatem    Association Relations Member  
- Osama Tabbara   Consultant Member  
- Samir Radwan Haddad     Consultant Member 
- Jean Dagher    Consultant Member 
----------------------- 
In the scope of the preparations to the Accountants Elections,  
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The Experts List completed its members and united their programs  
Fadi Eid  
The Certified Public Accounts of Lebanon had formed their list yesterday to 
join the election of the new board which is taking place tomorrows 
Saturday before noon in the Bristol Hotel. The list will include 12 members 
to a new office period of four years. The list is formed of the following 
gentlemen: Wael Abou Shakra, Georges Sfeir, Habib Hatem, Gebran 
Barghoud, Antoine Daher, Hassan Barraj, Osama Tabbara, Jean Dagher, 
Samir Rafoul Haddad, Hassan Takki, Mohamad Nabil Ghannam, and 
Ghassan Daou.  
The List published a statement in which they announced the following:  
1. They continue working on issuing a law which organizes the 
accounting profession and protects the professional sector and its 
affiliates.  
2. Securing a centre to the Association which secures the start of its 
activities.  
3. Intensifying the scientific and retaliatory activities.  
4. Continuing coordination with the Ministry of Finance and the Higher 
Accountant and Auditing Evidences Council.  
5. Continuing coordination with Lawyers Association to secure the 
completion of roles between the two association and their bodies.  
6. Activation of the role of the syndicate and seeking means and 
programs which realize the social purposes which it was raised for.  
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7. Continuing coordination with the monitory authorities and the 
banks control committee to enhance the professional tasks and to 
achieve their goals.  
8. Improve the relations with the Arab and international professional 
committees to secure and save the role of the association.  
9. Improve the common commission to play their roles in preparing 
for scientific researches and continue the professional 
developments.  
10.Working on the foundation of a professional documentation center 
which task will be gathering and archiving professional documents.  
----------------------- 
Al Diyar 17/04/1992  
Abou Shakra The Accounts' Association President  
The Certified Public Accountant Association elected its new board which 
was formed of:  
Wael Abou Shakra as President, Georges Sfeir as Cashier,  Gebran 
Barghoud as General Secretary,  Antoine Daher as Vice President, Habib 
Hatem as Association Relations Member,  Mohamad Nabil Ghannam as 
Assistant General Secretary, Hassan Takki as Accountant, Hassan Barraj 
as Educational Relations Member, Osama Tabbara, Jean Dagher and Samir 
Haddad  as Consultant Members.  
The elections took place in Bristol Hotel where 163 members voted and 25 
members were nominees.  
----------------------- 
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Al Nahar 17/04/1992  
The Nominees to the Expert Accountants Elections 
The Certified Public Accounts of Lebanon elections are taking place before 
tomorrow's noon in Bristol Hotel.   
Yesterday the nominee list to these elections, which include Wael Abou 
Shakra, Georges Sfeir, Habib Hatem, Gebran Barghoud, Antoine Daher, 
Hassan Barraj, Osama Tabbara, Jean Dagher, Samir Rafoul Haddad, 
Hassan Takki, Mohamad Nabil Ghannam, and Ghassan Daou, and their 
programs were announced.  
----------------------- 
Al Anwar  
The Expert Accounts' Association elected its New Board  
The Certified Public Accountant Association elected its new board which is 
formed of: Wael Abou Shakra as President, Georges Sfeir as Cashier,  
Gebran Barghoud as General Secretary,  Antoine Daher as Vice President, 
Habib Hatem as Association Relations Member,  Mohamad Nabil Ghannam 
as Assistant General Secretary, Hassan Takki as Accountant, Hassan Barraj 
as Educational Relations Member, Osama Tabbara, Jean Dagher and Samir 
Haddad  as Consultant Members.  
The elections took place in Bristol Hotel where 163 members voted and 25 
members were nominees.  
----------------------- 
Al Shark - Tuesday 21/04/1992  
The Expert Accounts' Association elected its New Board  
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Abou Shakra: The Accounting and Auditing Profession is a Basic and 
Important Element in Building up Economy  
The Certified Public Accountant Association elected its new board which 
was formed of: Wael Abou Shakra as President, Georges Sfeir as Cashier, 
Gebran Barghoud as General Secretary, Antoine Daher as Vice President, 
Habib Hatem as Association Relations Member, Mohamad Nabil Ghannam 
as Assistant General Secretary, Hassan Takki as Accountant, Hassan Barraj 
as Educational Relations Member, Osama Tabbara, Jean Dagher, Samir 
Haddad and Ghassan Daou as Consultant Members.  
The elections took place in Bristol Hotel in which 163 members voted and 
25 members were nominees.  
After announcing the results President Abou Shakra gave the following 
statement: Democracy was publicly practiced today. The achieved results 
are only the trust of all given to us by all and today we consider ourselves 
more responsible before the Assembly to all of our work program 
commitment, and we ask God to help us all to serve this Association and 
the Lebanese community.  
He added that there are large tasks which we have to perform to develop 
and elevate the professional work of Lebanon by means which are up to 
date with international developments because the profession of accounting 
and auditing is the main and important element which build up economy 
in all its sectors. Our responsibility today is very big toward the trust which 
was granted to us by the association.  
We hope to achieve all our scientific educational programs, rehabilitator, 
and training goals either on the level of organizing the profession or on the 
bases that the profession of accounting and auditing in Lebanon is still 
legally unorganized, and there are many legal organizations that were 
granted to this sensitive profession in developed and developing countries. 
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Document 6-3: Letter addressed to the Minister of Finance from 
AAFO in 1992 
Lebanese Association of Certified Public Accountants  
Member of:  
Arab Federation of Accountants & Auditors  
International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) 
Federation Innternationale Des Experts –  
Comptable – Francophones (FIDEF)  
17 March 1992  
To His Highness Khatshik Babkian  
Minister of Justice  
Beirut Lebanon  
After Greetings  
Following to our oral talks, we are happy to present to your attention the 
following:  
The attached is a law draft - in addition to its obliging reasons which assist 
in enhancing the governmental income, control taxes, and secure a safe 
run of the banker, financial, and economic foundations of different kinds –  
and contains the following :  
1- Protection of the Lebanese professional labour which became owner 
of high proficiency that makes it able to carry obligations that cannot 
be carried by other foreigners and exceptionally grants the 
foreigners license rights provided that their countries allow Lebanese 
accountants to work in their countries; i.e. reciprocity of treatment.  
2- The scientific terms are based on Lebanese vocational university 
diplomas, and the superior technical diploma which the government 
grants to major of accounting and auditing (TS) and the overseas 
diplomas which are equivalent to the Lebanese universal diplomas.  
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Document 6-4: The Lebanese president authorizes the law 
governing the organisation of the profession and transfer it to the 
parliament for final approval 
Decree №. 4683  
Forwarding of an urgent law draft aiming at organizing the profession of 
the licensed accountants in Lebanon to the Council of Deputies 
The President of the Republic 
Pursuant to the Constitution,  
Pursuant to the advice of the Prime Minister and the Minister of Justice,  
Upon the approval of the Council of Ministers in its session dated on 
15/12/1993,  
The Following is decreed:  
Article One:  
To forward the urgent law draft aiming at organizing the profession of the 
licensed accountants in Lebanon to the Council of Deputies.  
Article Two: The Prime Minister is entrusted to execute the terms of this 
Decree.  
Issued by the Presidency of the Republic  
Presidency of the Council of Ministers  
Signature Rafik Al Hariri  
 Baabda 20/01/1994  
Signature : Elias Hrawi  
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Ministry of Finance  
Signature Rafik Al Hariri  
President of the Council of Ministers  
Signature Rafik Al Hariri  
True Copy of the Original 
(Signature and Official Seal) 
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Document 6-5: The first two pages of the Law number 364 - The 
Organization of the Lebanese Chartered Accountants Profession in 
Lebanon as it appeared in the Official Gazette in 1994 
The Accountancy Profession Act of the Lebanese Association of Certified 
Public Accountants Law No 364 
Article 1: The present Act regulates the profession of Certified Public 
Accountants in Lebanon.                                       
            PART I – The Lebanese Association of Certified Public Accountants 
Chapter I – General Provisions: 
Article 2 – Definition: 
         A Certified Public Accountant (CPA) is any/all natural person 
performing in his name or on behalf of another legal entity:  auditing and 
appraisal of all types of accounts and rendering an opinion as to the 
authenticity and accuracy of financial data. 
Article 3 – No person shall act as CPA unless registered in the tables of the 
Association established in accordance with the present Act. 
Article 4 – An association known as the “Association of Certified Public 
Accountants” having legal personality, shall be created with the aims of: 
1- Protecting the profession, promoting it and preserving its image. 
2- Promoting cooperation and solidarity among members, 
protecting their interests and defending their legitimate rights. 
3- Undertaking scientific research projects and improving 
accounting principles and techniques. 
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4- Formulating and proposing accounting and auditing principles as 
well as professional conduct rules in accordance with 
international standards, including those set by the Arab and 
international unions that the Association belongs to. 
5- Imposing sanctions on members who do not comply with its 
statutes or the ethics of the profession. 
6- Working on resolving conflicts and disputes that arise among 
members. 
Article 5 - The head office of the Association will be located in Beirut. The 
Association may set up offices in the various Lebanese Muhafazats.  
 Chapter II – The organizational structure of the Association 
Article 6 – The Association is composed of a general assembly and a 
Council exercising their powers in accordance with the provisions of the 
present Act. 
      Clause 1 – The General Assembly 
Article 7 – The general assembly is composed of all Certified Public 
Accountants registered in the General Table of the Association. 
      1- Membership Conditions: 
Article 8 – No one is entitled to be registered in the General Table of the 
Association or practice the profession in Lebanon or purport to be a CPA 
unless he meets the following requirements: 
1- Being a Lebanese citizen for more than ten years. 
2- Being over 21 years of age. 
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3- Enjoying all his civil rights and having never been convicted of a 
disgraceful crime or offence, as defined in law-decree No.59/112, 
article 4, paragraph (E). 
4- Holding a degree in Business Administration or its equivalent or a 
“TS” degree in accounting, recognized by the ministry of 
professional and technical education. These degrees must be 
accompanied by a minimum of five years of experience. 
5- Passing the examination set by the examination committee and 
approved by the Council. As for holders of CPA (Certified Public 
Accountant) or CA (Chartered Accountant) diplomas or their French 
equivalent, i.e., “Diplome d’Expertise Comptable”, and above, from 
international institutes and associations, they shall only sit for 
exams related to Lebanese laws as set by the Association Council. 
          The board of examiners consists of five members:  
- A judge chosen by the minister of Justice as chairman. 
- An expert appointed by the Finance minister 
- A university professor teaching accounting and auditing appointed 
by the president of the Lebanese University. 
- Two members designated by the Association Council. 
6-      Having settled his membership fees and the yearly subscription set 
fort in the Association’s Rules of Procedure. 
7-      Meeting experience requirements as stipulated in the present Act 
and attaching to the membership application a certificate granted by the 
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office where he trained, proving that he is entitled to be registered in the 
CPAs’ Table. 
8-      Having never been dismissed from civil service as a result of 
disgraceful or shameful offences. 
9-      Devoting himself entirely to the profession and practicing it in his 
own office or that of an associate or as employee in the firm of another 
CPA. 
Article 9 – Candidates applying for membership are first listed in the 
Trainee Register set by the Council in this respect. Candidates are to 
submit, for that purpose, in addition to all required documents proving they 
meet the conditions stipulated in aforementioned article 8, a written 
request including the name of the CPA at the office of which they trained 
as well as a certificate attesting to his consent. The Council shall pronounce 
on the filed application within two months from the date of submission, 
failing which, the application will be accepted without consultation. 
If the filed application is turned down, the candidate can appeal against 
the decision before the court of appeals within the thirty days following 
rejection. As soon as the case is submitted before the competent court, 
the Association Council shall, upon request, pass on the claimant’s file to 
the said court within two weeks at the most, along with any observations 
he deems fit to make. The Council is entitled to express an opinion on the 
matter before the court of appeal at Beirut, through a representative 
appointed by the President of the Association. 
 Article 10 – A trainee may request to be registered in the Table of Certified 
Public Accountants once having completed a three-year training period as 
auditor at the office of a registered CPA. 
The Council may, if deemed necessary, extend the mentioned training 
period by two additional years. It is also entitled to exempt the holders of 
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the higher technical degrees determined by the Council, from the 
aforementioned training period, provided their degrees are at least 
equivalent to those of “CPA” or “CA” or the French degree, known as 
“Diplome d’Expertise Comptable”. 
If the Council doesn’t render a decision regarding the aforementioned 
registration request within two months from the date of submission, the 
request will be deemed accepted. 
       2- Loss of membership: 
Article 11 – A CPA shall be deprived of his membership and prohibited from 
practicing the profession in the following cases: 
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Document 6-6: Decree number 9548/1 announcing the 
establishment of the constituent committee for organizing the 
profession 
Lebanese Republic  
Ministry of Finance  
------------------------- 
The Minister  
Resolution №.9548/1 
Appointment of the Institutional Commission to  
Organize the Expert Accountants Profession in Lebanon  
The Minister of Finance, Economy, and Commerce,  
Pursuant to the Decree №. 2900 dated on 31/10/1993,  
Pursuant to Law №. 364 dated on 01/08/1994 especially article №. 64, 
We decide the following:  
Article One:  The hereunder-named gentlemen are appointed as members 
of the Institutional Commission to Organize the Expert Accountants 
Profession in Lebanon:  
 
Habib Abou Sakr, Wael Abou Shakra, Abdul Hafiz Mansour, Joseph Al Fadel, 
Wael Hamdan, Geroge Abou Mansour, Mowafak El Yafi, Ramzi Akkawi, 
Ahmad Safa, and Jean Barbara.  
Article Two: This Resolution is to be informed to whoever is concerned.  
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Beirut 18/08/1994  
Minister of Finance by Proxy    Minister of Economy and 
Commerce  
Fouad Al Sanyoura / Signature    Signature   
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Document 6 7: Newspapers articles relating to the first constituent 
committee meeting 
AL NAHAR 02-09-1994  
The first meeting of the Licensed Expert Accountants Profession 
organization constitutional commission.  
Now the affiliation to the Association of the Licensed Expert Accountants 
became obligatory to all who want to practice the profession of accounting 
in Lebanon.  
The Licensed Expert Accountants Profession organization constitutional 
commission convened yesterday under the presidency of the General 
Manager Dr. Habib Abou Sakr and discussed the work procedures and it 
was agreed upon the basic steps that would be adopted among its 
members.  
Abou Sakr announced after the meeting that the commission which met 
today (yesterday) is the constitutional commission of the Licensed Expert 
Accountants Profession Association in Lebanon, and this commission is 
defined by the law no. 364 which was issued last August, and he said that 
this law is important to the organization of the expert accountants 
profession since this is the first time that there is an obligatory association 
forcing all who want to practice the profession of accounting, auditing or 
who want to sign upon their responsibility the financial statements of 
associations, individuals and companies in Lebanon.  
He also noted that “In order that this Association work actively, it should 
have a constitutional commission which will practice its duties for one year. 
According to law, the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Economy have 
appointed the ten members of the commission who will form the 
Association Board. These are Habib Abou Sakar, Wael Abou Shakra, Abdul 
Hafiz Mansour, Joseph Al Fadel, Wael Hamdan, George Abou Mansour, 
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Moueafak El Yafi, Ramzi Akkaoui, Ahmad Safa, and Jean Barbara all who 
met today and formed the commission office Abou Sakar as president, Abu 
Shakra as vice-president, Abdul Hafiz Mansour as general secretary, and 
Joseph Al Fadel as cashier. The commission discussed the various duties 
entrusted to them and the approval of the affiliates. The General Assembly 
will meet in the presence of the said members to elect the President of the 
Association and the new office members according to regulation and the 
Association will become active the same as other associations.  
He assured that this is an important event on the level of the accounting 
profession in Lebanon as it is for the first time there is an Accountant 
Association in true meaning.  
----------------------- 
Al SAFIR 02/09/1994  
The First Meeting of the Accounting Organization Commission  
The General Manager of the Ministry of Finance Dr. Habib Abou Sakr 
presided the Licensed Expert Accountants Profession organization 
constitutional commission that convened yesterday in his office in the 
Ministry of finance where they discussed the work procedures and agreed 
upon the basic steps that would be adopted and which would be announced 
in the following meetings.  
Abou Sakr announced after the meeting that the commission which met 
today is the constitutional commission of the Licensed Expert Accountants 
Profession Association in Lebanon, and this commission is defined by the 
law no. 364 which was issued last August, and he said that this law is 
important to the organization of the expert accountants profession since 
this is the first time that there is an obligatory association forcing all who 
want to practice the profession of accounting, auditing or who want to sign 
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upon their responsibility the financial statements of associations, 
individuals and companies in Lebanon.  
----------------------- 
Al Diyar 02/09/1994  
The first meeting of the Licensed Expert Accountants Profession 
organization commission.  
Now the affiliation to the Association of the Licensed Expert Accountants 
became obligatory to all who want to practice the profession of accounting 
in Lebanon.  
The General Manager of the Ministry of Finance Dr. Habib Abou Sakr 
presided the first Licensed Expert Accountants Profession organization 
constitutional commission that convened yesterday in his office in the 
Ministry of finance where they discussed the work procedures and agreed 
upon the basic steps that would be adopted and which would be announced 
in the following meetings.  
Abou Sakr announced after the meeting that the commission which met 
today (yesterday) is the constitutional commission of the Licensed Expert 
Accountants Profession Association in Lebanon, and this commission is 
defined by the law no. 364 which was issued last August.  
Abou Sakr also explained that this law is important to the organization of 
the licensed expert accountants profession since this is the first time that 
there is an obligatory association forcing all who want to practice the 
profession of accounting, auditing or who want to sign upon their 
responsibility the financial statements of associations, individuals and 
companies in Lebanon.  
Dr. Abou Sakr added that “In order that this Association work actively, it 
should have a constitutional commission which will practice its duties for 
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one year. According to law, the Minister of Finance and the Minister of 
Economy have appointed the ten members of the commission who will form 
the Association Board.  
The then members are Habib Abou Sakar, Wael Abou Shakra, Abdul Hafiz 
Mansour, Joseph Al Fadel, Wael Hamdan, George Abou Mansour, Moueafak 
El Yafi, Ramzi Akkaoui, Ahmad Safa, and Jean Barbara all who met today 
(yesterday) and formed the commission office Abou Sakar as president, 
Abu Shakra as vice-president, Abdul Hafiz Mansour as general secretary, 
and Joseph Al Fadel as cashier.  
The commission discussed the various duties entrusted to them and the 
approval of the affiliates. The General Assembly will meet in the presence 
of the said members to elect the President of the Association and the new 
office members according to regulation and the Association will become 
active the same as other associations.  
He assured that this is an important event on the level of the accounting 
profession in Lebanon as it is for the first time there is an Accountant 
Association in true meaning.  
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Document 6-8: The invitation to join LACPA published by AD-Diyar 
Newspaper 
AD-Diyar Newspaper – 25/10/1994  
Announcement to the Lebanese Expert Accountants 
The institutional commission of the Lebanese Association of Licensed 
Expert Accountants announces starting the subscription to the Association 
acting to the Law №. 364/94 dated on 01/08/1994 that organized the 
profession of the licensed expert accountants and forced all those who 
would like to practice this profession to subscribe to the said Association.    
Subscription applications are to be handed over in the center of the 
Association at Achrafieh near the Post Office, Esco Building, 3rd Floor, 
pursuant to the forms prepared for this purpose and which are available at 
the Association.  
Applications are received daily between nine and half in the morning and 
five in the afternoon except to Saturdays and Sundays.  
The Commission drives attention to that the subscription to the Association 
in the transitional period to benefit from the special provisions related to 
the workers in this profession, which are defined in article 60 of the law 
№. 364, ends on 17/08/1995. After this period, all benefits of these 
provisions are legally dropped.  
 
 
